THE BRITISH NEW LABOUR PARTY AND POLITICAL ZIONISM: CONTINUITY OF AN ESSENTIAL DILEMMA by Nelson,, Ian Martin
Durham E-Theses
THE BRITISH NEW LABOUR PARTY AND
POLITICAL ZIONISM: CONTINUITY OF AN
ESSENTIAL DILEMMA
ARTINNELSON, IA N M
How to cite:
ARTINNELSON, IA N M (2008) THE BRITISH NEW LABOUR PARTY AND POLITICAL ZIONISM:
CONTINUITY OF AN ESSENTIAL DILEMMA. Doctoral thesis, Durham University. Available at
Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1940/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
The British New Labour Party and Political Zionism: 
Continuity of an Essential Dilemma. 
by 
Ian Martin Nelson 
A thesis submitted for the fulfillment of the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS) 
School of Government and International Affairs 
Ustinov College 
Durham University 
(2001-2008) 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author or the university to which it was 
submitted. No quotation from it, or 
information derived from it may be 7k published without the prior written 1 
consent of the author or university, and 
any information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
Previous page: David with the Head of Goliath (c. 1610) by Michelangelo Merisi di Caravaggio (1571-1610), 
housed in the Galleria Borghese, Rome. 
Inspired by the martyrdom of St. John the Baptist, Valletta, Malta, the depictions of David's slaying of Goliath - 
the Philistine - illustrates how western Art and culture established the representation, perceptions and 
understandings of the conflict between the ancient Israelites and the Philistines as the triumph of good over evil. 
David (future King of Israel) is the threatened and righteously vulnerable figure, and Goliath (from the city State 
Gath, Philistine, lower Canaan, modem Gaza) is the slain menacing warrior perpetrating violence. These 
depictions account for the introduction and adoption of `Philistine/s' as a derogatory term of reference for those 
perceived to be un-cultured, uncivilised, ignorant, inferior and inherently violent. Until the post-1967 six-day war 
period Israel was generally identified as David, the Arab states as Goliath; after 1967 this perception began to 
change and reverse to the extent that by 1987 the Palestinians were identified as David. 
Source: http: //www. galleriaborghese. it/borghese/en/edavicara. htm 
The British New Labour Party and Political Zionism: 
Continuity of an Essential Dilemma 
The Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS) 
School of Government and International Affairs 
Ustinov College 
Durham University 
(2001 -2008) 
Ustinov College 
Diversitate Valemus 
(Diversity is our Strength) 
Durham University 
Fundamenta eius super montibus sanctis 
(Her foundations are set upon the Holy hills) 
For: Irene Maud Stevenitt (1919-1998) and Lionel Jacobs (1912-1996)' 
- They were both very much the products of the times and histories that lie herein. 
1 Lionel Jacobs participated in the `Battle of Cable Street' (October 4,1936) against the British Union 
of Fascists, and fought for the Spanish Republican Government in the civil war (1936-1939). A life- 
long Communist and non-political Zionist, Lionel was born in Hackney, East London, and is buried in 
the Jewish cemetery, Wilford Hill, Nottingham. 
Front Cover: 'David' (1623-1624) by Gian Lorenzo Bernini (b. 1598-4.1680); commissioned by 
Cardinal Scipione Borghese. Galleria Borghese, Rome. 
Source: http: //www. artchive. com/artchive/b/bernini/bernini_david2; jpg 
xr 25-W ý" ]P--_-- 
UN PARTITION PLAN-1947 
LEBANON 
-"- - Hruýaary at hammer r alcsenc 
Mandy r. 
j) 
I 
:. QYIý ýIIL 
PLAN J° PAPTITION 7417 i" 'ý fä SYRIA 
Arab 5tana ý a. aýý ra0tAA 
stfad 
-. ,. _. _. . _.., ý. 
U 
EDI1EIR. 0Nf. 4f 
. SF. A 
.9AI. r 
ýreh 
' _ 
hum 
, 
'. n«º: ýý ,. 
xc6f Sný Q+ý17lkh % '{y 
alAvvý y 
" 
0-01- 1 
Wf. 3c- 
B i[hur L! h, ri 4ý"+t 
.. 
.> 
Amman 
i 
I! ru. -A 1.4 In 
oon, +. y 
(1I, Dead 
-sea 
JORDAN 
t 
t' , 'L 
I 
Sr. 1"AF 
u 
EGYPT 
4 f'"" . ". 
}'aY. ý' UN ARMISTICE LINES 
1949 
I 
j J 
5 j 
S r 
i y 
1 
1 f 
ý t 
1 1 
rn" , iy: QMri, 1^r wýn'tiýw! wY ft. 
"ß! 1L% U. :Mi.., .,, w t\_ . ý.. 1 . i, y\It (t. s\ý, "r... u".. 
i , 
"0I 'v%AI"M WUMI\LMI , 1., III, ,: N'/ f. f ! IM . 
iat *hi'fl f 
I. , 
.. t 
U"i: EJ 
. 
\Aitýal'. 6 f. hýM", 1! y .;. a". 
ý'i\t' S: Jf.: S Of 4 
1ý.... ..: '. '. "l'. ".. nM'Y. ": "N. W AHN M1" Ut .nW: _' . *.:. 
iv. ,: 1 )/ 
".... Lvn. y i. ý"C : \,. I.. ti: Jf: A: \: f , iS ýron. ý. rt nr LOW. Yw". M\ ".... 
ý..... i ý f.. 
jr 
a. 
r t 
ý1+ 
c.. 1 
ä -`;,. 
'S' 
MAP NO22L6 '^'s. 1 IINITc fi NATs3gy 
TERRITORIESOCCUPIE17 -'LLBANONI 4: ýncýitaa 
BY ISRAEL 
ý. _,.. "` 
SINCF JUNE 1967 ' 
GOLAN Nalwa 
Haifa (7'' Tihrrias '.. SYRIAN ARAB 
'. %--',. 
`REPUBLIC 
Va7irrth 
.', i 'ý Al Fl. ) I FLKRANLAN 
SEA 
32' 
. '' rü 
ihlche:: r' 
/ 
SCIT 
r . ý_ 
ISRAEL 
EGYP'T' 
SINAI 
(ha q9i. nn, 7inns B nOfo *i ins) ; ns 
, ^. JCx/1ýfahnr. 
mM. ouz, wtih, s ý1aý9. 'M 
"1 
'c i. rýJ1/y thr c>ý, ýMrr pf pny+u pi. l ian 
Oil Nin purl Om. 5tcTcloyi J u% . 
1'Ir La, RCr! Wtwas Cpntdrni9g : AG )s .l i(tl(L. i 
_f a.; y i. uuu! rv, rerranrr, i-iry r: r am7 or n! Cs 
6vJM6ri: i@t Cyr V01VOrfrin4, Me dB! irtßY. 7. w1 of; '!., 
r.. ýnnar:: ýr ! ýnantlaias 
3a` 
/ 
/ 
/ 
I 
i 
JORDAN 
: 0, 
Armiuticc Demarcation 
Line. 194) 
Hpri: v7arY Cf f caner 
Palast; ne Marcate 
%-- Internetionsl 1 iti : nry 
' 
11 1'ý 
1 
'lam 7ý tll k-, 
J iV 
x. 11 
33 
Net. nvnr_ hilk)rm 
Tel Aviv ,c 
-'Amman 
I ý=rJý-. Irrvý. nlrir 
!, IrW Vn. 34-... = .! J! IFLr'M1? Lrf15 t; ccarcTCý! crr. - - v"or-ia! ný, 
NIAP SHOWING ISRAELI SLTrLEh1Ld. TS 
LSTABLIStILI) IN TI It TLKHIT(>KILS 
OCCUPIED IN JLNE'1%T 
cow, P"o l' ,u 
. Iq>! 1l gtllswlts 
I V" BMnk am 
L w:. alm as 
Tvwr ad"d ror ro'yran., proms x" 
rY wa.. e. 'YS. y. rseaa.. rvy' W.. ua. u ý. a,.. aý W LLti"t!: t. <ýi) hk..., t. . ý1. "a. ý. ýV 
: lainfdtu.. S. raft,.. 1ý'YaJ ^! a'Anu9! Y. Wat Cnera 
ial Pd.. ... iNU zJMp . trt: '. n ý[Y. Y: a, 1iu: eSi:: w 
: t!: th, c,. n: lý. sn-, wneal"! w. -.. tSrw, "YL »n. _a+n! r 
alaa. i n . w. n1Y" 
,u 
writ . 'v irinaYW. Y :Y 111.1.1 
n1Ltld . YýY Y 
'1V 
nev: iW . -- 
ýpCL 
'/. +<M' Caw n! 
aý"eu.. v .!! Yanl". 5e. lde... 4n lS a. w . 'U sa afro na n 
tY NV IU 
%1 
_'an. wl. awc to «M. pm. ýWaW. 'av av at 
. JY: YM Atw. 'v.!! a, n., n lla'. ao: IR'+ka. +ýrt.. xs'mW t 
t. iw"tº,. i. M G\ NýYSafb NvvU. 4NtwrbI ... *. týM 
týkY! WIM U: &s 4 allMsII. l. n M14 +4ýNti MwY1 
Ir'iw b. ' AYw 
Nan .K <M.! . }AI 
. 
Nw COMM~ 
IWF. R 
Na. ý 
Pa' P4" 
YWM 
YM 
Y. ar 
weY. "Ewt ý 
. "" 'u hw"l 
Fr "ý 
II: 
NY. 
M 
tit 
trat 
tai 
r. 
"M"arr Ilk \1 I e-. * 
. Alp 
ýiý'ON r'"ýL a i ... 
uýi..: v 
ýw1`'wY. 
i 
a 
asww V 
. ß'4r 
b°'3azn 
iW 
. ARAB, LLRANJOK 
..... REP. 
MOYýHý 
rl ai. " 
` 
lJ GOLAN 
x. ý 
*HEIGHTS 
:ý 
ý' 
I- 
I, 
. --ý-- -, rar VRtiMT l 'V A> ý1 
wa. nr 
"" 4Ný.. Vý 
Acknowledgements 
I am incalculably indebted to: 
Professor Emma C. Murphy (Professor of Political Economy), Fellow of the Royal Society 
for Arts, Manufacturers and Commerce (FRSA), Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic 
Studies (IMEIS), School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University. 
Professor Tim Niblock (Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter) 
Dr Gidon Cohen (School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University) 
Mr John D. Norton (IMEIS, Durham University) 
Professor Michael Rush (Department of Politics, University of Exeter) 
Durham University: Professor Anoush Ehteshami (Head of School), Ms Theresa McKinven (Vice- 
Principal and Senior Tutor, Ustinov College), Mrs Barbara Farnworth and Mrs Louise Haysey. 
The University of Nottingham: Professor Christine Ennew, Professor Hugh Goddard, Professor Fiona 
Broughton Pipkin (Co-Directors, Institute for Middle Eastern Studies (IMES); IMES staff members: 
Professor Julian Henderson, Professor Nidal Hilal, Dr Spencer Mawby, Professor John W. Morgan, 
Professor Ebrahim M. Shahid, Dr Amal Treacher. 
Ms Debra Booler (Humanities, School Manager), Dr Anthony Bums, Ms Ryan Cressida, Dr Gerard 
Hall, Dr Karen Kilby, Dr Ken Levine, Dr Jo Longman, Associate Professor Chris Middleton 
(President, UCU Local Association), Professor Gillian "Jill" Pascall, Professor John W. Rich (Head of 
School, Humanities). 
Professor Richard J. Aldrich (Warwick University), Dr Sarni Breem (Islamic University, Gaza), 
Professor Marie Parker-Jenkins (Derby), Professor Joseph Nevo (Haifa University), Dr Asaf Siniver 
(University of Birmingham), and Dr Warwick Knowles. . 
I am also indebted to: MPs, Rt. Hon Don Concannon, Louise Ellman, Rt. Hon Neil Kinnock (European 
Commissioner), Richard Burden, Rt. Hon Robin Cook, Gwyneth Dunwoody, Derek Fatchett, John 
Heppell, Dr Brian Iddon, Ernie Ross (Chair: Labour Middle East Council), Phyllis Starkey and David 
Watkins; and related figures, David Mencer (Director, Labour Friends of Israel), and Baroness 
Symonds (House of Lords, Labour spokesperson on Middle East), John Kampfher (Author/Film- 
maker), David Mepham (Associate Director, Institute for Public Policy Research, IPPR), Afif Safieh 
(PLO and Holy Sea to UK), Lord David Triesman (Labour Party General Secretary). 
Ms Judi Barnaby, Mr David Fox, Dr Ahmad Kabaha, Mr Barrie Russell-Smith, 
Dr Richard Tyler-Jones. 
Mr John Eric Nelson, Mrs Eileen Nelson, Garry, Kirt, and Lawrence Nelson. 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the basis and nature of the relationship between the British 
Labour Party and political Zionism. Specifically, it locates the decision-making 
process and policies of the British New Labour Party towards political Zionism and 
the Israel-Palestinian question, within the historical evolution of this relationship. This 
thesis demonstrates that this relationship is uniquely based on common origins, a 
shared socialist ideology and related religious philosophies, with the Labour Party 
historically demonstrating a pro-political Zionist tendency in its decision and policy- 
making trajectory. 
However, a growing awareness within the Labour Party of the realities of both 
Palestine and political Zionism, in particular the consequences for the indigenous 
people, - the Palestinians, has presented key Labour figures, and the party generally, 
with an essential dilemma. The thesis argues that support for political Zionism has 
ultimately posed ideological and political contradictions for the Labour Party, whilst 
simultaneously presenting personal psychological dilemmas for key leadership and 
policy-making figures. The three dimensions of this essential dilemma, ideological, 
political and psychological, have combined in a process of progressive adjustment of 
the historical pro-political Zionist policy trajectory, towards a position of neutrality. 
This adjustment has been consistent through the old Labour and New Labour decision 
and policy-making eras, and therefore the policy of New Labour cannot be filly 
understood without reference to this historical evolutionary process. This neutral 
position has enabled the party to not only accommodate its traditional pro-political 
Zionism inclinations, which stem from the personal or psychological and ideological 
commitments of its leadership and constituencies, but also to avoid the full 
implications of internal and external determinants that might have otherwise divided 
the party. 
`For the Jew, the immediacy of his remote past is an intimate reality. He 
is living among places whose names are enshrined in his racial literature 
and they make sweet music to his ears. From Dan to Beersheba, he can 
now make a journey - Nazareth, Galilee, Jerusalem, all these and so 
many more belong to him in a special sense, for they whisper in his 
blood, and evoke memories of a time that was, before he was compelled 
to seek shelter in reluctant lands. When therefore the Arab says that the 
Jew should find a home anywhere except in Palestine he asks something 
the Jew cannot concede without mutilating his racial personality beyond 
endurance. It is no answer to say that many centuries have passed into 
history since the Jew was at home in Palestine. If he had been permitted 
the security of a safe home elsewhere, the answer might do. But, as we 
know, it was not so. " 
Aneurin Bevan (January 1954) following his first visit to Israel. 
`We know that in Eternity exists a great world of truth, which here, in 
this falsity and confusion, is denied and obscured. And it is our business 
to set the whole living world into relation to the eternal truth.... We can 
at any rate begin the job. To finish it may be beyond us. But we must 
make a start, nevertheless. The success will be greater than the failure, 
however we fail, we shall be in closer relation to the Infinite Truth than 
we were. '2 
D. H. Lawrence 
' Foot, Michael (1973: 419) Aneurin Bevan: A Biography, Volume Two: 1945-1960, Chapter 
10, The Bevanites: II, 1953, quoting, Aneurin Bevan, (London: Davis-Poynter) 
2 Lawrence, David Herbert [Editor: Paul Eggert] (1997: xlix) Twilight in Italy and Other 
Essays, Introduction and Note on the Texts, Stefania Michelucci, quoting, D. H. Lawrence, 
The Lemon Gardens, August 1915 version, (London: Penguin Twentieth Century Classics) 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
The origins of this thesis are located in undergraduate dissertation research conducted 
between June 1993 and May 19943 into child casualties resulting from Israel's 
policies and activities in the Occupation Territories during the first Palestinian 
Intffadah4 (1987-1993). The conclusions of the dissertation brought to my attention 
two aspects of the role of the Israeli Labor5 Party in generating the Intifadah situation: 
its contribution to the establishment of some two hundred Israeli civilian settlements 
in the territories captured by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War (in violation of 
international law); and the Labor Party's participation in a succession of coalition 
governments and central role in generating policies, which resulted in extensive 
civilian casualties. Against this background, the researcher was interested to learn in a 
speech by Margaret Beckett6 (Deputy Leader of the Labour Party) to the annual 
Labour Party conference (October 1993) of the close and protracted basis and the 
nature of relations between the British Labour Party and the Israeli Labor Party ? over 
many decades. 
3 Nelson, Ian (1994) Promised Land: From Dido to Goya's Paragon. Child Death and 
Injuries, Occupation and the Intifadah, (Social Policy & Administration, BA Dissertation, 
The University of Nottingham), and Nelson, Ian (1995) Middle Eastern Terrorism and 
Western Europe, (International Relations, MA Dissertation, The University of Nottingham). 
The Intrfadah [Intifada] (in Arabic, a `shaking-off) refers to the Palestinian civil uprising in 
the Occupied Territories (West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem) against Israel's 
occupation that began in December 1987 and continued until the signing of the Oslo Accords 
in 1993. See: Hunter, Robert F. (1991) The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means, 
(London: I. B. Tauris), and, Nixon, Anne Elizabeth (1990) Status of Palestinian Children 
During the Uprising, Part 1: Child Death and Injury, Volume 1: A Chronology, and Volume 
2: Appendices, (Swedish Save the Children: Radda Bernen) 
S The spelling of `Labour' will denote the British Labour Party and labour movement (trades 
unions); the spelling of `Labor' will denote labor Zionism, the Israeli Labor Party, and Israeli 
labor movement (trades unions). 
6 Margaret Beckett (b. 1943) MP: (Lincoln, 1974-1979), (Derby South, 1983-present); Foreign 
Secretary, 2006-2007. 
Israeli Labor Party (Hebrew: Avoda) (Est. 1968) a centre-left social democratic, Zionist 
party; member of the Socialist International with observer status to Party of European 
3 
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It was the combination of the key aspects of this undergraduate research, and the 
suggestion from a senior Labour MP that there exists a fundamental ideological and 
political contradiction between political Zionism and socialism, which determined the 
subsequent direction of this research. In a correspondence with Margaret Beckett, the 
question was raised as to how the British Labour Party, with its socialist ideology and 
principles, had formed and maintained a relationship with the Labor Party of Israel in 
view of the evidence that senior Labor figures had played a significant role in the 
settlement programme and the policies which had generated so many Palestinian 
civilian casualties. Beckett replied that the `first' basis for the supportive nature of 
relations was the fact that the Labor Party of Israel was a `sister Party in the Socialist 
International. ' 8 
The question which then presented itself was how the British Labour Party had 
identified the political Zionist Israeli Labor Party as a sister party despite its 
complicity in actions that were clearly antithetical to socialist ideological principles. 
As the initial research evolved, it became clear that this was about Labour's relations 
with political Zionism as much as with the institutional manifestations of Zionism 
(either the Israel Labor Party or the State of Israel), since that relationship preceded 
either of the others, or largely facilitated them. 
Political Zionism and Socialism: Defining an Historical Partnership 
There are many forms of Zionism: political, religious, cultural, Labor, socialist, 
revisionist to name but some. They share the common theme of a return of Jews to the 
lands from which they were expelled two thousand years ago, but they vary greatly in 
their understanding of the logic and means of that return, and of the final objective. 
This thesis does not concern the various strands of religious Zionism, the faith- 
motivated belief in a return to await the fulfilment of biblical prophesy, nor the 
Socialists. Avoda was an alignment and later merger of several left-wing parties, including 
Mapai (Land of Israel Workers' Party) and Mepam (United Workers' Party), both founded in 
the 1930s. 
8 Beckett, Margaret (16.1.1.1993: 1) Letter: Beckett-Nelson, House of Commons 
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cultural Zionism of intellectuals like Asher Ginsberg9 who believed that `return' was 
necessary principally for the spiritual recovery of the Jewish people after their 
prolonged period of Diaspora and oppression. Rather, it concerns the political Zionism 
which evolved in the late nineteenth century and which advocated the creation of a 
Jewish political entity -a state - in Palestine, based on the notion that the Jews were 
defined by being a nation (rather than an ethnic, cultural or religious minority). This 
belief, the best known advocate of which was Theodor Herzl, 10 formed the basis for 
the founding of the Zionist Organisation in 1897 in Basle, and was operationalised 
through that movement (and the various organisations within it) as a manifesto for 
statehood. It is, in sum, a form of Jewish nationalism whilst at the same time being the 
raison d'etre for, and justificatory ideology of, the State of Israel. 
If political Zionism identifies with particularist interests, it would appear to sit 
uneasily with the socialism of the British Labour Party, which upholds a universalist 
set of values. It is important at this point to determine what `socialism' means to the 
British Labour Party, not least because its `New Labour' manifestation suggested 
some evolution in the understanding of the term. 
9 Asher Hirch Ginsberg (Hebrew: Ahad Ha'Am) (b. 1856-d. 1927), Ginsberg emphasised the 
importance of Hebrew and Jewish culture in Palestine; born in Syvyra, Ukraine [Russian 
Empire], his 1891 visit to Palestine, recounted in Truth from Palestine, conveyed the realities 
of Palestine to the Diaspora: `all Arabs [Palestinians] are savages of the desert, a people 
similar to a donkeys, ' dispelling the myths of political Zionist propaganda that Palestine was 
empty, warning, `should the time come when the life of our people in Palestine begins to 
develop to such an extent that they will supplant the natives to a smaller or greater degree, 
then that people will not easily surrender its place. " Shapira, Anita. (1992: 42-43) Land and 
Power: The Zionists Resort to Force 1881-1948, quoting, Ahad Ha'Am, Al parashat 
derakhim [At the -Crossroads], 
Truth from Palestine, Volume 1, p. 28,4 Volumes, Berlin, 
1930, (New York: Oxford University Press) 
10 Theodor Herzl (b. I 860-d. 1904) an Austro-Hungarian Jewish journalist widely recognised 
as the founder of modem political Zionism after the publication of his theoretical Zionist 
work The Jewish State (Der Judenstaat) (1896) expounding the establishment of a Jewish 
State as salvation from persecution, though controversially not necessarily in Palestine. 
5 
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Throughout the history of the Labour Party, Labour and related figures have wrestled 
with the charge of defining socialism, and therefore what the Labour Party represents 
as a socialist party, and what Labour and related figures represent as socialists. The 
absence of a definitional consensus of socialism is important for many reasons: not 
least because for a socialist party it would, as Shaw argues, `make parliamentary 
government impossible unless it contained a ... majority of members really clear 
in 
their minds as to what Socialism exactly means. '" Securing a working definition of 
socialism is not made any easier by the plethora of socialist theorists and theories. As 
the historian Harry Laider underlines: 
`He [the student of socialism] has vaguely heard about the "utopian socialism" 
of Owen and Saint-Simon, the "state socialism" of Schmoller and Bismarck, 
the "Christian socialism" of Kingsley and Maurice, the "scientific socialism" 
of Marx and Engels, the "Fabian socialism" of Shaw and the Webbs, the 
"revisionism" of Bernstein, the "guild socialism" of Cole' 2 and Hobson, the 
"bolshevism" of Lenin and Trotsky. He has read somewhat, perchance, of the 
writings of Ramsay MacDonald, HG Wells, Karl Kautsky, William Morris, 
Anatole France and others who represent various aspects of the socialist 
philosophy. But he has little or no idea as to which schools are spurious, which 
defunct, which struggling for the mastery; what the difference between the 
schools are; what, if any, their underlying similarities. ' 13 14 
In Britain (as elsewhere) there is no shortage in socialist theorists or theories of 
socialism: some of the most eminently familiar socialist thinkers have assigned 
themselves or been commissioned to defining socialism on Labour's behalf. The list 
" Shaw, George Bernard (1929: xxix) The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and 
Capitalism, (London: Constable) 
12 George D H. Cole 1889-1959 taught and profoundly influenced students Hugh Gaitskell 
and Harold Wilson at Oxford; Wilson joined the Labour Party as a consequence. 
13 Laider, Harry W. (1933: v) A History of Socialist Though, (New York: Crowell) 
14 Robert Owen, 1771-1858; Claude-Henri de Rouvroy [Comte de Saint-Simon], 1760-1825; 
Gustav von Schmoller, 1838-1917; Otto von Bismarck, 1815-1898; Charles Kingsley, 1819- 
1875; Frederick Maurice, 1805-1872; Eduard Bernstein, 1850-1932; George Bernard Shaw, 
1856-1950; John A. Hobson 1858-1940; remaining figures biographies in later text. 
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reads like a roll-call of intellectual, political and philosophical giants: John Ruskin, R. 
H. Tawney, Bertrand Russell, Leonard Woolf etc, all of whom represented `different 
brands of socialism' and `their own particular [socialist] philosophy. "5 The choice 
and adoption of a particular socialist theorist and/or theory of socialism has perplexed 
the Labour Party since its foundation to the present day. The nineteenth century 
theorist Fredrick Maurice viewed `Socialism of the modem world' as a vehicle of 
morality and equality possessing a religious scented power to `lift the beggar out of 
his dunghill, that he may be an heir with princes' which he saw as being `in some sort 
the peculiarity Christian truth. ' 16 A century later Maurice's spiritual connotations are 
far from lost amid the often recited claim that there is `more of Methodism than Marx 
in British Socialism, ' 17 and the emphasis of Labour's and Britain's first woman 
cabinet minister - Margaret Bondfield'8 - in 1911 that `Socialism is not merely 
material. It has its spiritual aspects in the Fatherhood of God and therefore the 
brotherhood of Man' 19 all muddy the definitional waters somewhat further . 
20 In a 
15 Laider, Harry W. (1933: v, vi) 
16 McClain, Frank Mauldin (1972: 129) Maurice: Man and Moralist, Chapter 7, The Nation: 
The Cultivation of Morality, Memorandum, F. D. Maurice to Charles Kingsley, British 
Museum, Ms. No. 43621, (London: S. P. C. K. ) 
" Smith, Leonard (1993: 11) Religion and the Rise of Labour: Nonconformity and the 
Independent Labour Movement in Lancashire and the West Riding 1880-1914, Chapter 1, 
Introduction, (Ryburn: Keele University Press) 
18 Bondfield, Margaret (b1873-d. 1953) MP: (Northampton, 1923-1924) and (Wallsend, 1926- 
1931); Minister of Labour, 1929-1931); in 1923 Bondfield, Susan Lawrence and Dorothy 
Jewson became Labour's first women MPs. 
19 Bondfield, Margaret (1948: 358) A Life's Work Chapter XVII, There Shall Be Light (1938- 
1941), (London: Hutchinson & Co. ) 
20 Aside the hard political realities of inexorable Liberal decline, the basis for Methodism- 
Labour relations partly lie in the Nonconformist assertions that soul of the labourer was of 
equal importance in the eyes of God; that pulpits and pews alone were insufficient and 
inappropriate in an industrial society; and that Bible studies should not be restricted to the 
interpretations of priests, but accessible to all via universal education. Methodism-Labour 
relations have attracted substantial debate: conversely, it is attributed as having `prevented 
political revolution' by retaining the general Christian doctrine of `attributing suffering to the 
hand of Providence, and by preaching spiritual regeneration as the ultimate answer, the 
Methodist intellect emphasised the next-world rather than this, moral reform rather than 
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more applied secularist stance, Herbert Morrison is famously attributed for stating in 
the post-1945 period that `Socialism is what the Labour government does. 21 
However, as one commentator identifies, one of the problems with this general 
assessment occurs `simply by shifting the emphasis in that statement, you can say one 
of two things: 1) a Labour government is, by definition, a government that will 
implement the classic ideas of socialism; or 2) the definition of socialism depends 
entirely on the Labour government that claims to be implementing it. '22 Of a later 
generation, arguably Labour's most revered intellectual and leading socialist theorist - 
Anthony "Tony" Crosland 23 - widely viewed as `one of the foremost figures in the 
post-war Labour Party'24 and `gifted beyond the reach of many of us'25 also appeared 
to struggle to definitively define the meaning of socialism. In his seminal revisionist 
publication - The Meaning of Socialism (1967)26 - Crosland states: 
politics, and individual salvation rather than class struggle. ' Samuel, Raphael (1981: 358) 
Peoples History and Socialist Theory, Chapter 43, Religion, John Walsh, Methodism and the 
Common People, A Critique of Elie Halevy (1924) A History of the English People in the 
Nineteenth Century, Volume 1, England in 1815, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) And as 
an `active and influential' two-way relationship via two `disparate bodies ... not only did 
Labour MPs become the main carriers of the nonconformist conscience .... 
They [the 
Methodists] also made a distinctive and important contribution to the development and ideals 
of the Labour Party. ' Catterall, Peter Morality and Politics: The Free Churches and the 
Labour Party between the Wars, The History Journal, 36,3 (1993), pp. 667-685, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press) 
21 Beckett, Francis (2007: 243) Clem Attlee, Chapter 8, Building Jerusalem, (London: 
Richard Cohen Books) 
22 Granville, S. (12 September 2007) A literary review of Dell, Edmund (1999) A Strange 
Even ful History: Democratic Socialism in Britain, (London: Harper Collins), 
http: //tobedwithatrol lope. wordpress. com/2007/09/ 12/a-strange-eventful-history-democratic- 
socialism-in-britain-by-edmund-dell 
23 Anthony "Tony" Crosland (b. 1918-d. 1977) MP: (South Gloucestershire, 1950-1955), 
(Great Grimsby, 1959-1977); Foreign Secretary, April 1976-February 1977 
24 Jefferys, Kevin (2000: xiii) Anthony Crosland, (London: Politico's) 
25 Ibid., (2000: 221) The Times, February 22,1977, quoting, James Callaghan, eulogy to the 
House of Commons, February 21,1977 
26 Ibid., (2000: xiii) 
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`If we are to formulate socialist doctrine, the first task is clearly to decide what 
precise meaning is to be attached to the word `socialism. ' This is not an easy 
question to answer. The word does not describe any present or past society, 
which can be empirically observed, and so furnish unimpeachable evidence for 
what is or is not `socialism'. Thus statements about socialism can never be 
definitively verified; and we cannot treat it as being an exact [Crosland's 
emphasis] descriptive word at all. There is therefore no point in searching the 
encyclopaedias for a definitive meaning; it has none, and never could. ' 27 
Nevertheless Crosland did later conclude, in a 1974 publication, that within the 
revisionist section of the party at least, `Socialism ... was basically about equality. 128 
In relation to the related movement for greater sexual equality it was also in the 
decades of the 1960s and 1970s that some prominent women socialist theorists, 
notably Labour related figure Sheila Rowbotham29 in her key note pamphlet Women's 
Liberation and the New Politics (1969), who argued that defining socialism had to be 
undertaken within the context of the cultural oppression of women in addition to the 
traditional economic and political terms of repression. 30 
Given the apparent endemic problematics in defining socialism per se, and the fact 
that many Labour figures were, in the Robert Owen tradition, 31 `socialist' as a 
27 Crosland, Anthony [Tony] (1956: 64) The Future of Socialism, Chapter IV, The Meaning of 
Socialism, 11, The Confusion between Ends and Means, (London: Jonathan Cape) 
28 Crosland, Anthony (1974: 15) Part One, Essays on Socialism, Chapter 1, Socialism Now, 
(London: Jonathan Cape) 
29 Sheila Rowbotham (b. 1943) is a British socialist feminist and political historical writer. 
30 Sheila Rowbotham's theories of socialist feminism are expanded in: Rowbotham, Sheila. 
Segal, Lynne & Wainwright, Hilary (1979) [Second Edition] Beyond the 
Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism, (London: Merlin Press) 
31 The Welsh socialist philosopher Robert Owen (b. 1771-d. 1858) argued that the development 
of socialism generated as a result of individual and collective experience - as opposed to 
socialist theory - in his 1849 assertion that the `whole character is formed independently of 
himself, ' meaning people are entirely the product of their environments. See: Owen, Robert. 
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consequence of their experience - and not as a result of theory and/or theorists, - this 
thesis therefore relies on the most consistent and extensively binding working 
definition of socialism - that contained and enshrined in the constitution of the Labour 
Party (which also reflects the most frequently identified principles located in the 
definitions of socialism by the majority of theorist and theories), - `liberty, ' `social 
justice, ' and `equality'). 
The most relevant section of the constitution lies in Clause IV. This clause contains 
not only the important subject of the `aims' of the party, but crucially (in terms of the 
assertion that Labour-Zionism relations represented an ideological contradiction), the 
stated `values, ' - the core moral and ethical principles and dimensions of the party. 
Clause IV was originally written in November 1917 by Labour's socialist theorist 
Sidney Webb (later Lord Passfield, 1929)32 -a revered figure particularly among the 
Fabian and intellectual sections of the party - and formally adopted in 1918. Clause IV 
and its `aims' are among the most contentious aspects of Labour's constitution, 
particularly as Neil Kinnock's, 33 John Smith's34 and Tony Blair's35 Third Wayism 
was viewed as an rejection of socialism and socialist values, but also because it 
contained the original commitment to public ownership - nationalisation (state control 
of what Marx called the `means of production'); government economic intervention (a 
reversal of the `free market' - laissez faire doctrine); wealth redistribution (via fiscal 
policies); and state welfare provision (including health and education). However, the 
stated `values' aspect has remained far less controversial and constant. 
(1968 reprint) The Revolution in the Mind and Practice of the Human Race; or, The Coming 
Change from Irrationality with a supplement 1849, (New York: Augustus M. Kelly) 
32 Sydney Webb [Lord Passfield, 1929] (b. 1859-d. 1947) MP: (Seaham, 1922-1929); Labour 
Chair, 1922-1923; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1929-1930; Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, 1929-1931. 
33 Neil Kinnock (b. 1942) MP: (Bedwellty, 1970-1983), (Islwyn, 1983-1995); Labour leader, 
1983-1992 
34 John Smith (b. 1938-d. 1994) MP: (Lanarkshire North, 1970-1983) and (Monkslands East, 
1983-1994); Labour leader, 1992-1994 
35 Anthony "Tony" Blair (b. 1953) MP: (Sedgefield, 1983-2007); PM: 1997-2007; Labour 
leader, 1994-2007; June 27,2007, became envoy for the `Quartet on the Middle East' (UN, 
EU, USA and Russia) established in Madrid, 2002. 
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Blair's New Labour would dispute the suggestion that abandoning these core policies 
does not amount to a rejection of the core values. Indeed, even though Labour was 
originally composed from a raft of small socialist parties and societies, a direct 
reference to the term `socialism' and/or `socialist' in the constitution was not made 
until 1995; the party still explicitly identified itself as a `socialist'36 party in 2007. For 
New Labour, the `aims' of achieving `socialism' via `socialist' policies were 
generally accepted: the founding `values' of the party, as Tony Blair stated, were 
`constant. ' Blair was not however an adherent to socialist theory and/or a theorist, `I 
am a socialist not through reading a textbook. ' Rather, he considered socialism to 
correspond with the `moral, ' `It stands for equality. '37 Thus, we can argue that the 
founding and continuing values of the Labour Party are located in `liberty' and 
`equality' - social, economic and political justice, anti-exploitation, anti-exclusion, the 
party is non-revolutionary (anti-violence, though not pacifist). This is the socialism to 
which this thesis refers. 
The title of this thesis might suggest to the reader that the intellectual attempts to 
reconcile socialism and Zionism would be the starting point and theoretical frame of 
reference. Various forms of socialist, Marxist and Labor Zionism exist (Labor is 
spelled without the `u' when transliterated from the Hebrew), some of which eschew 
the narrow state-based nationalism of political Zionism, but many of which have 
found ways to accommodate universal class struggle with the Jewish national struggle 
and have consequently operated in collaboration with both the World Zionist 
Organisation and the agencies of the Israeli state (even holding government for 
prolonged periods of time). The key elements in this reconciliation have been the 
liberational aspects of political Zionism and the progressive features of socialist 
Zionism and the Israeli state. 
36 Labour policies: http: //www. labour. org. uk/labour_. policies 
3' Blair, Tony (06.07.1983) Maiden Speech as MP for Sedgefield, House of Commons, 
Hansard, 6th. Series, vol. 45, col. 316 
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Jewish socialism has its roots among Russian workers at the turn of the century, many 
of whom were initially drawn to non-sectarian Marxism rather than political Zionism. 
They formed clandestine trades unions (Kassy) which operated alongside non- 
sectarian unions but found themselves subjected to the anti-Semitism of both their 
fellow workers and the repressive state. For most of these early Jewish socialists, led 
by figures such as Karl Kautsky38, the struggle lay in Russia rather than Palestine, 
religious and cultural forms of Zionism being eschewed as reactionary. Others, like 
Dov Ber Borochov, 39 began to use Marxist reasoning to argue for transferring the 
Jewish proletariat to Palestine. Here Jewish proletarian action could both assist Jewish 
settlement and escape the constraints of European anti-Semitism whilst contributing 
to universal class struggle. Borochov and his fellow socialist Zionist, Nachman 
Syrkin40 (who argued that internationalism was the most desirable socialist outcome, 
but that in the meantime the phase of nation-statehood was a stage that had to be gone 
through, a necessary historical step, although not inevitably a capitalist or bourgeois 
enterprise) did not inspire mass movements, but their ideological `synthesis' of 
socialism and Jewish nationalism did enable leftists to find a place in political Zionist 
movements, notably inspiring the founding of Poale Zion 41 Consequently a majority 
38 Karl Kautsky (b. 1854-d. 1938) a leading theoretician of social democracy, and promulgator 
of orthodox Marxism. Born in Prague [Austro-Hungarian Empire] 
39 Dov Ber Borochov (b. 1881-d. 1917) a Ukrainian [Russian Empire] Marxist Zionist, 
founding figure in the labor Zionism movement and Poale Zion. 
40 Nachman Syrkin (b. 1868-d. 1924), a political theorist and founder of labor Zionism. Born in 
Belarus [Russian Empire] he was dedicated to synthesising socialism and political Zionism; 
while Syrkin's seminal work The Jewish Problem and the Jewish Socialist State (1898) 
reflects his Jewish heritage, he argued political Zionism should replace Judaism. 
41 Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) is a Jewish Marxist party founded in Russia (c. 1900) after the 
rejection of political Zionism in 1901 by the Bund. Poale Zion's political ideology is a blend 
of Marxism and Jewish Nationalism; the priority was the salvation of the Jews in a Jewish 
State in Palestine before the greater proletariat struggle. Poale Zion founded branches in 
London (1903/04) and Leeds (1905); close links with the trade union movement and Labour 
Party led to Poale Zion's official affiliation to Labour in 1920. Poale Zion was re-named the 
Jewish Labour Movement in 2004. 
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of the Jewish settlers of the Second Alihah42 (1904-1914) were socialist idealists from 
Russia and Eastern Europe. However, unlike their proletarian siblings back home, 
they were equally inspired by the moral virtues of manual labour and, in particular, 
agricultural occupation, which had frequently been denied them elsewhere. The harsh 
economic situation, the requirements of settlement, and the resistance of an 
indigenous population, forced Poale Zion to reformulate its Marxist ideology, 
favouring collectivism within Jewish communities rather than universalism in class 
struggle. Under the pressures of ideological dispute, the party fractured, the off-shoot 
Hapoel Hatzair placing Jewish national struggle above class struggle as the supreme 
value and the conquest of labour as superior to militarist conquest of Palestine. 
Nonetheless, together the socialist parties in Palestine inspired and managed the 
creation of the Kvutzim, collective agricultural settlements which dispensed with 
private property, established the equality of all members, and introduced worker 
management. These utopian communities became the flagships of socialist Zionism 
and became the basis for subsequent association between Jewish Palestinian, later 
Israeli, socialist parties and their European counterparts. 
However, the intellectual efforts within Jewish socialism to reconcile itself with 
Jewish nationalism did not form the basis for the British Labour Party's early 
affiliation with political Zionism, as this thesis will demonstrate. Indeed, it is strange 
but true to say that very few Labour Party intellectuals really engaged with the 
debates at length (the notable exceptions being Harold Laski, and to a lesser extent 
Ramsey MacDonald43 and Sidney Webb, to whom we will turn at a later point in the 
thesis). The moral values associated with the Kvutzim, the Jewish effort to emancipate 
itself from European bourgeois repression, and the romanticism of the settlement 
process as it was portrayed in an Orientalist, Christian Europe, were of far greater 
42 Alihah (Hebrew: Ascent) refers to Jewish immigration to Palestine and later Israel. The 
First Aliyah (1882-1903), Third (1919-1923), fourth (1924-1929) and Fifth (1929-1933) are 
used to denote periods of high immigration caused by pogroms, political persecution. 
43 James Ramsay MacDonald (b. 1911-d. 1937) MP: (Leicester, 1906-1918), (Aberavon, 1922- 
1929), (Seaham, 1929-1935), (Combined Scottish Universalities, 1936-1937); Labour Party 
leader, 1911-1914,1922-1931; Foreign Secretary, 1924; PM: 1924,1929-1931; born 
Lossiemouth, Scotland, the illegitimate son a farm labourer and housemaid. 
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importance in determining Labour's early support for political Zionism and the 
legacies which continue to shape New Labour policy today. Therefore, the thesis does 
not after all use the intellectual debates regarding the synthesis or otherwise of 
Zionism and socialism as the central focus of the study, although inevitably the 
contradictions which this poses for the Labour Party, Labour MPs, and Labour related 
figures" becomes increasingly important throughout the history of the Labour Party 
as greater awareness of the realities of Jewish colonisation and Israeli statehood for 
the indigenous Palestinians made its way into the consciousness of Labour MPs and 
related Labour figures. 
A final note on terminology, then, is that in this thesis I will for the most part discuss 
the British Labour Party's relationship with political Zionism generally, but at times 
more specific discussion of socialist and Labor Zionism will be necessarily 
introduced. Christian Zionism is also introduced in so far as it relates to those 
individuals whose Christian faith draws its roots from a common biblical past and 
worldview with the Jewish faith, and who perceive Christian prophesy to be 
interwoven with Jewish fate and faith. 
Literature Review 
The research question for this thesis seeks to understand how New Labour's policy 
and decision-making reflected the party's understanding, and relations with, political 
Zionism, since policy provides the illustration or indicator of the party's perception of 
that relationship. Our starting point must be the existing literature and research which 
refers to this relationship, which can be divided into a number of genres. 
The most obvious starting point would seem to be the extensive array of primary and 
secondary sources provided by Labour and related figures, and the more general 
studies of the Labour Party, and the party in the context of British politics and 
international affairs. This would be in addition to the literature with a more specific 
44 The term `related figures' is used to denote people like Harold Laski, John S. Middleton 
and Michael Levy, for example, who never became Labour MPs, or, as in the case of Peter 
Mandelson, later became a Labour MP; the term `Labour figures' denotes both Labour MPs 
and Labour related figures. 
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focus on Labour's relations with political Zionism and includes the seminal works of 
June Edmonds (May 1998,1999 and 2000) covering the period 1967-1987 and the 
1980s, Joseph Gorny45 (1983) looking at the 1917-1948 period, and Paul Kelemen 
(January 1996,1996 [two], 1998 and 2000) covering circa 1917-1948 and the 1980s. 
Further important contributions are provided by Fred Lennis Lepskin (1986), 
Jacqueline M. Linthwaite (1960) and Andrew Sargent (1980), in sum, incorporating 
the years from 1914 to 1949. 
The importance of the historical perspective and narrative (noted during preliminary 
research interviews) in trying to understand the contemporary approach and position 
of New Labour and related figures to political Zionism is also firmly underlined in 
much of the academic literature. For instance, as Cline says in a review of Gorny's 
important 1983 study, `his examination of the development of Labour's views on the 
question fills a distinct need. ' But by accounting for the `development' in providing 
the historical narrative and context belying the opinions of Labour figures in debates 
and contributions to policy-making in light of events and issues, Gorny's ideological 
and political survey makes that much more sense. As Cline again states, the historical 
content illustrates that Labour's `responses were conditioned to some extent by 
attitudes and comments that had evolved over the years. A6 In other words, even 
Gorny's brief concession to the wider historical narrative inevitably taps into the 
human psychological aspects seen in `conditioned' `attitudes' that helped shape 
responses and policy. This historical element is particularly important not just to 
reflect on the early dynamics that conditioned perspectives, but also because the 
careers of some key Labour and related figures spanned vast tracks of time, events 
and issue, frequently far beyond the parameters of the existing literature. 
However, and reflecting the central flaw located in the relatively narrow periods of 
time explored by the existing literature, a more critical review of Gorny's work says, 
that although the work is `the only detailed study of the views of British socialists in 
as Joseph Gorny is occasionally referenced, Yosef Gorni. 
46 Cline, Catherine Ann The American Historical Review, Vol. 89, Issue No. 2, April, 1984, 
pp. 441-441, reviewing, Joseph Gorny (1983) The British Labour Movement and Zionism 
1917-1948, (London: Frank Cass) 
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the Mandate era, ' he `concentrates overwhelmingly on party leaders and takes a 
strong pro-Zionist standpoint. '47 A more general comment on the narrowness of the 
time-frame and subject focus relating to the historical developments and nature of 
those human perspectives is made by Vickers, who states, `Research that does focus 
on Labour's foreign policy, ... 
focuses on quite specific time periods, on individual 
administrations - in particular the 1945 Labour government - or on particular issues. 
None of the major studies of the Labour Party subject Labour's foreign policy to 
sustained analysis. Research that does provide any kind of overview is in desperate 
need of updating. '48 Furthermore, `foreign policy is in general an under-researched 
area of Labour Party policy and history. While there have been many studies of 
British foreign policy in the twentieth century, remarkably little has been said about 
the development, formulation and nature of the Labour Party's foreign policy. '49 
Although Vicker's study in foreign policy is quintessentially an `in-depth political 
history' and does not profess or seek to determine the `extent to which Labour's 
perspective was socialist, '50 some of its most important contribution to this thesis lies 
in that, while acknowledging it is `not clear that the Labour Party ever had any 
socialist ideology as such, '5' the study asserts the party has consistently offered an 
alternative approach to foreign affairs and policy-making via its internationalist 
credentials. Additionally, after paying tribute to the existence of `different strands of 
internationalism'52 (within and outside Labour) the key assertion that 
`internationalism has been the underlying basis of Labour's world-view and foreign 
policy' emulating from `radical liberal thinking' and a `Christian-socialist, 
47 Howe, Stephen (2007: 148) Anitcolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of 
Empire, 1918-1964. Chapter 4, The Labour Governments, 1945-1951, Part II, Palestine and 
the Middle East, [footnotes], (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
48 Vickers, Rhiannon (2003: 2-3) The Labour Party and the Wider World, Volume 1, The 
Evolution of Labour's Foreign Policy, 1900-51, Introduction, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press) 
49 Ibid., (2003: 1-2) 
so Ibid., (2003: 4-5) 
51 Ibid., (2003: 5) 
52 Ibid., (2003: 6) 
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Nonconformist streak, '53 in conjunction with the sheer historical scope of the work 
(1900-2004), allows a clear definition of what constitutes Labour's internationalism 
politically. Vickers links this definition of Labour's internationalism with the earliest 
periods of the party's approach to foreign affairs circa 1914 to 1939, with New 
Labour concepts like an `ethical dimension' to foreign policy and the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, all of which are central concepts to this thesis. 
As with the other major academic studies cited, Vickers does not diverge from the 
political and ideological aspects of foreign policy-making into the more personal, or 
what might be termed psychological, dimensions. This ideological and political focus 
is sustained by Kelemen as he explores foreign policy-making and the personal 
turmoil arsing from Labour-political Zionist relations. Kelemen sets his enquiries on 
the `ideological basis' and identifying the `source of political support'54 as he conveys 
the conundrum faced by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and related figure 
Harold Laski in 1929-1931 wrestling with policy-making while facing the emerging 
realities of political Zionism and Palestine, or similarly, Clement Attlee" and Earnest 
Bevin in 1945-1949. Moreover, although Kelemen recognises it is necessary to go 
`beyond the inner circle of policy-makers' and into the `ideological and political 
forces which influenced the party's understanding of the Palestine conflict 56 there is 
no further exploration of the psychological influence. 
While Gorny more than hints at the prospect of the role played by the psychological 
aspects in stating that relations were in part predetermined by a `long-standing 
personal ... contacts, ' a `special and unique bond's7 and a `socialist humanist 
53 Ibid., (2003: 5-6) 
54 Kelemen, Paul In the name of Socialism: Zionism and European Social Democracy in the 
Inter-War Years, International Review of Social History, Vol. 41, Issue No. 3,1996, pp. 331- 
350, p. 331 
 Clement Attlee (b. I883-d. 1967) MP: (Limehouse, 1922-1950), (Walthamstow, 1950-1956); 
Labour leader, 1935-1951; Prime Minister, 1945-1951 
56 Kelemen, Paul Zionism and the British Labour Party: 1917-1939, Social History, Vol. 21, 
Issue No. 1, January 21,1996, pp. 71-87, p. 71 
57 Gorny, Joseph (1983: xii) The British Labour Movement and Zionism 1917-1948, Preface, 
(London: Frank Cass) 
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tradition, '58 there is little further exploration or analysis as to what might comprise 
this tradition, its origins, or how this psychological aspect relates to the political and 
ideological factors, which are otherwise thoroughly examined. For Gorny, the 
relationship was not founded on `general socialist principles' and the `moral 
hypocrisy' and contradiction of `ideological principles' occurred when Labour 
distanced itself from political Zionism in the early 1930s; but this was not the result of 
the psychological aspects, but purely political factors, `a clear example of 
Machiavellian politics' and the `parliamentary `game. '59 Similarly, while Edmunds 
more than adequately explores the ideological and political dimensions via a `general 
question of party policy changes, ' and `sheds light not only on the intrinsically 
interesting issues of Labour's attitudes towards Israel, '60 references to the what could 
be deemed the psychological aspects largely remain enveloped in an alluding style; 
although the account of debates on foreign policy-making highlights the fact that the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict has `long been a source of dilemma for the left 61 of the 
Labour Party, the psychological aspects remain largely rooted on the opaque fringes 
of the studies or buried beneath the ideological and political features. In an similar 
vein Lepskin notes that while some Labour figures were `more passionate'62 than 
other Parties and `heart and soul committed to Zionism'63 he dryly concludes that 
while Palestine and `Zionism' remained for `a few individuals and restricted circles 
within the party ... a personal as well as political concern, ' the `bulk of the 
58 Ibid., (1983: 233) 
s9 Ibid., (1983: xiii) Preface 
60 Edmunds, June The Evolution of British Labour Party Policy on Israel from 1967 to the 
Intifada, University of Cambridge, Twentieth Century British History, Oxford Journals, Vol. 
11, Issue No. 1,2000, pp. 23-41, Abstract, p23, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
6' Edmunds, June The British Labour Party in the 1980s: The Battle Over the 
Palestinian/Israeli Conflict, University of Kent, Politics, Vol. 18, Issue No. 2, May 1998, 
pp. 111-118, p. 111, (Blackwell Publishing) 
62 Lepskin, Fred Lennis (July 1986: 45) The British Labour Party and Zionism: 1917-1947, 
Chapter 3, Stability and Instability (1932-1936), (Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, 
Canada) 
63 Ibid., (July 1986: 39) Chapter 2, First Political Crisis (1929-1931) 
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membership knew little and cared less, '64 but goes no further in accounting for the 
personal motivations and reasoning. 
Of the major studies, it is Kelemen's that comes closest to exploring the personal 
motivations of Labour and related figures when he says that Labour's pro-political 
Zionism stems from `strong emotional support' which reflects Labour's `socialist 
humanist tradition. '65 Kelemen quotes Gomy in asking, `Through what ideological 
prism did the party view the Arab-Jewish conflict? ' before answering that it was as a 
result of what Gomy identifies as the `more human 66 aspects, and rejecting Gorny's 
assertion that `socialist humanism was the ideological basis of Labour's policy on 
Palestine, ' claiming that it was a `political judgement. '67 
Both Edmunds and Kelemen note the role of religion in Labour-political Zionist 
relations. Edmunds says that the historical source, and therefore the understanding of 
`Labour's sympathy for the Jewish nationalist movement, [political] Zionism, 
stemmed from the traditionally strong political alliance between Labour and Jews. '68 
Kelemen quotes James S. Middleton in `explaining his sympathy for Zionism recalled 
how scripture lessons imprinted on his generation the stories of the Israelites'69 but 
neither delves further as to the origins of this related religious dimension amid the 
political and ideological factors. And even though references to leading figures like 
Harold Wilson and his influence in preserving the party's `traditional loyalty to the 
Jewish state 70 are often built into the studies, subsequent exploration and analysis is 
invariably rooted in the swirl of parliamentary debates amid war, and low-intensity 
64 Ibid., (July 1986: 44) Chapter 3 
65 Collette, Christine & Bird, Stephen [Editors] (2000: 142) Jews, Labour and the Left, 1918- 
48, Chapter 7, Paul Kelemen, Looking the Other Way: The British Labour Party, Zionism and 
the Palestinians, (Aldershot: Ashgate) 
66 Ibid., (2000: 142) Chapter 7, Paul Kelemen, quoting, Yosef Gorny, (1983) The British 
Labour Movement and Zionism 1917-1948, pp. 188, (London: Frank Cass) 
67 Ibid., (2000: 142) 
68 Edmunds, June (May, 1998: 112) 
69 Kelemen, Paul (January, 1996: 73) 
70 Edmunds, June (May, 1998: 17) 
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conflicts, with the exclusion of the personal motivations and emotions that were at 
play and which this thesis includes and considers. 
Among a cycle of histories, Nicholas Bethell (1979) presents a classic example of a 
limited time-frame (1935-49) but includes a significant section of the book in 
explaining the importance of `four thousand years of background. '" But there is a 
noticeable absence of any detailed psychological account and analysis despite the 
`inescapable conclusion that expediency and personal emotion played a much greater 
part in determining the course of events'72 in Britain and Palestine. Additional studies 
are also confined by relatively limited time-lines, including Michael J. Cohen (1978) 
1936-1945, Isaiah Friedman (1973) 1914-1918, Ilan Pappe (1992) 1947-1951, and 
Tom Segev (2000) 1920-1948, to name a few, and all with little more than a general 
reference to the personalities and their influences throughout. 
A further point from which to build the basis of the thesis would appear to be located 
in a recently published swathe of books on the rise to power and premiership of the 
principal architect of New Labour, Tony Blair, and on foreign policy making under 
his leadership. These would include Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones (2000) 
(arguably the earliest analysis of New Labour's foreign policy-making), as a 
collection of essays examining the ethical character of New Labour and assessing 
whether this has re-directed foreign policy from that set by the Conservative 
governments. Also the numerous works edited by Anthony Seldon, on Tony Blair 
(2004) and the New Labour governments (2001) and (2007), and the joint works on 
New Labour's policy-making by Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon (1999), 
Anthony Seldon, Chris Ballinger, and Daniel Collings (2005), along with Anthony 
Seldon, Peter Snowdon and Daniel Collings (2007) publication, that combined 
provided a comprehensive understanding of the ideological development of Blair via 
`powerful individuals, ' and the political characteristics of New Labour in domestic 
and foreign affairs, in opposition and in government. As does Roger Liddle and Peter 
'1 Bethell, Nicholas (1979: 11) The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle between the British, the 
Jews and the Arabs 1935-48, Chapter 1, The First Four Thousand Years, (London: Andre 
Deutsch) 
72 Ibid., (1979: Cover, Inside Front) 
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Mandelson (1996), Paul Anderson (1997), Stephen Driver and Luke Martell (1998, 
2002 and 2006) and Steve Ludlam and Martin J. Smith (2004). John Kampfher (1998, 
2007 and 2004) contributes a political journalist's perspective on Robin Cook, Blair 
and New Labour, with a keen emphasis on foreign affairs and policy-making, Paul 
Corthorn and Jonathan Davis [Editors] (2008), Karen E. Smith and Margot Light 
[Editors] (2001) give detailed analysis of the potential or actual instruments of ethical 
foreign policy-making, and the implications of the New Labour government for 
human rights, crimes against humanity, international law and humanitarian 
intervention. 
These studies combined give a thorough grounding as to the origins of New Labour 
and the 1997 landmark election victory - the `hand of history' - with a mandate to 
modernise, and the first Labour government for eighteen years (1997-2001). In 
addition to Seldon's collaborative works in particular, combining academics, 
historians, political journalists and commentators do much to explore and analyse the 
narrative, unearthing clues to Blair and New Labour's origins and approach in 
opposition and government. But for the most part, the Israel-Palestinian subject is 
understandably one among many subjects; the primary question focus is directed at an 
analysis of New Labour's policies and delivery record, overwhelmingly in terms of 
the domestic: education, health, law and order. Foreign affairs are incorporated, more 
often than not in examples of conflict, war, and the context of their significance to the 
domestic arena: `globe-trotting at the expense of his domestic agenda. 73 There is no 
doubt about the usefulness of Seldon for a comprehensive account of the inner 
workings and the complexities of the decision and policy-making mechanisms of New 
Labour, and an invaluable source into the background and philosophies of Blair. On 
foreign policy they are less clear: in part, the result of the low order allocated to 
foreign affairs generally, perhaps reflecting the lowly priority given by Blair and New 
Labour (Seldon, [Editor] 2001, has one chapter of twenty-eight on foreign policy, for 
example). On the specifics of the Israel-Palestinian question, while not unbalanced, 
they are nevertheless tilted somewhat: Seldon notes Blair's `deep feeling for Israel, 
73 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 506) Blair, 
Chapter 33,9/11 and Aftermath, 2001-02, (London: Free Press) 
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born in part from his faith'74 and his awareness of the `slums of Gaza. '75 Generally the 
Israel-Palestinian issues are treated with a relative degree of knowledge and 
understanding, but also employs classic negative connotations: Palestinian statehood 
is captured in the metaphor of a boil, `a sustainable state for the Palestinians, lanced, ' 
terror is singularly a case of `Palestinian terrorism against Israel, ' there is no Israeli 
violence, only `Palestinian violence; '76 and the incongruous use of the term `disputed 
territories'77 when in international law no dispute exists, as they are defined as 
Occupied Territories. 
Overall, Seldon's and his collaborative studies added a great deal of understanding 
about the origins and character of Tony Blair and New Labour in opposition and in 
government. The Kampfher and Wickham-Jones volumes and later editions fill some 
of the gaps in the jig-saw in terms of foreign policy-making and how that related to 
the ethical dimensions and concepts like humanitarian intervention, and in relation to 
domestic politics. However, despite their usefulness, the initial' investigations of this 
thesis indicated a key weakness. As early as 1996, a number of Labour MPs and 
related figures who had encouraged my doctoral research proposal into Labour- 
political Zionist relations directed me first and foremost to the historical origins and 
development of relations. It quickly became clear that, for them, New Labour could 
only be understood in the context of an historical evolution of party and policy. It was 
evident from very early on that the contemporary relationship between the Labour 
Party and political Zionism has been profoundly determined by its historical roots and 
evolution, and that understanding the policies of New Labour was more about these 
historical roots, and the role played within their evolution by key individuals, than it 
was about any socialist ideological discourse or contemporary context. Current 
Labour MPs understand their own policy positions in this way, and this therefore 
seemed the appropriate starting point, and provided the framework for the thesis. This 
historical evolution was so fundamental that it could not simply be considered as 
74 Ibid., (2004: 506) 
75 Ibid., (2004: 500) 
76 Ibid., (2004: 618-619) Chapter 38, George W. Bush 
77 Ibid., (2004: 506) Chapter 33,9/11 and Aftermath, 2001-02 
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`background' to the current situation, or a context within which to place it, but was the 
key to explaining the current policies and position of New Labour, which are only the 
latest stage in an ongoing process, the whole of which requires full consideration. 
A further possible starting point was thus the literature concerning the historical 
progression of debates within the British Labour Party over the correct understanding 
of, and response to, nationalism (political Zionism being a manifestation of Jewish 
political nationalism and, conversely, the reaction against it being that of Arab 
nationalism). We can draw a narrative of the evolution of these debates from a 
number of writers, principally, Christine Collette and Stephen Bird (2000), Ray M. 
Douglas (2004), Rhiannon Vickers (2003), Stephen Howe (2007), and John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith [Editors] (1994), Allan Warde (1982) and Peter 
Weiler (1993). 
The debates within the Labour Party regarding Jewish nationalism - as expressed in 
political Zionism, - were generally not in isolation. The concept of nationalism per se 
was a problematic and contentious subject generating some difficult issues and 
questions for Labour as both a socialist and internationalist party; Labour's debates on 
nationalism were, for the most part, securely located in the wider arena of foreign 
affairs and policy-making. As with nationalism itself, foreign affairs and policy 
formulation were also a source of vigorous debates and divisive policy decision for 
Labour. 78 While to an extent the traditional perception of Labour as primarily a 
domestic issues party still hold true, particularly in the period before 1914, it is also 
clear that the party was inextricably associated with wider world affairs by virtue of 
its internationalism, its membership of the Second International (1908), and simply by 
events and the responsibilities as a government. And although a significant section of 
Labourites retained their parochial isolationism, there existed a number of leading 
figures (notably Ramsay MacDonald) who were not only versed in the socialist 
theorist literature from many countries, but also experienced in travel, and possessing 
worldly perspectives that were firmly propagated from the earliest periods. 
'8 It is argued that `up to the First World War, interest in nationalism was largely ethical and 
philosophical. ' Ozkirimli, Umut (2000: 12) Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, 
Chapter 2, Discourses and Debates on Nationalism, (Basingstoke: Macmillan), 
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Regardless of the positions of various Labour and related figures, the very history of 
Europe and the Labour Party is undoubtedly shaped by the development of modem 
nations and nationalism in foreign affairs. In 1900, the year of the party's founding, 
Britain was engaged in the Boer War (1899-1902); and it was another conflict that led 
to a radical shift in the party's thinking, as Thorpe states: `The First World War 
marked a significant change in Labour attitudes towards the wider world. Put simply, 
the war proved that the latter was a potentially dangerous place that could not be 
ignored. Opting out was not an option. This was recognised by Labourites at all 
levels. '79 Additionally, the three notable majority Labour governments (1945-1951 
and 1997-2001/2001-2008) were all indelibly shaped by WWII and the divisions 
caused by the invasion of Iraq (2003). Furthermore, Britain's position as one of the 
leading industrial nations requiring the export of goods and the import of raw 
materials, and the strategic location on the edge of the Atlantic, the North Sea, the 
Channel, and within easy reach of the Mediterranean, reflected in an extensive 
maritime tradition, made further nonsense of the idea that Labour could remain 
singularly domestically focused, especially as a party of national government. There 
was also the fact that when Labour first assumed the office of government in 1924, 
Britain was in possession of an Empire encompassing a fifth of the globe and a fifth 
of its peoples, with encroaching competition from European and international rivals a 
pressing reality and responsibility. The net result of all these factors was that 
`Therefore even if Labour had wanted to ignore the wider world, it would have found 
that the wider world would not necessarily ignore it. '80 And yet however, there is, to 
this day, still something of a legacy of that domestic tradition in debates between a 
focus on domestic and/or world issues. Evidence of this legacy perhaps found, for 
example, in that few Labourites citing Labour's greatest post-1945 achievements 
would reference the party's role in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) or the United Nations in the same vein as the National Health Service 
(NHS). Conversely, and perhaps reflecting another sea change in emphasis, how 
79 Corthom, Paul & Davis, Jonathan [Editors] (2008: 6) The British Labour Party and the 
Wider World: Domestic Politics, Internationalism and Foreign Policy, Introduction, Andrew 
Thorpe, (London: Tauas Academic Studies) 
80 Ibid., (2008: 2) 
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many chroniclers will cite the marked reductions in child poverty, school class sizes 
and hospital waiting lists achieved by New Labour against the shadow of the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan? 8' 
As with a number of other `isms' (pacifism, pluralism, internationalism) the Labour 
Party's position on nationalism was not straightforward. From the party's founding in 
1900 to the period during and immediately after the 1914-1918 war, the British 
Labour Party was not entirely averse to nationalistic traits. As the historian Ray 
Douglas notes: 
`The Labour Party's emergence in the aftermath of the Great War as Europe's 
leading champion of internationalist doctrine was neither a necessary, nor even 
a likely, consequence of its self-identification as a movement of the 
democratic left. To the contrary, the socialist tradition out of which Labour 
emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century was marked by a strong 
'82 element of British nationalism ... 
83 
8' The approach of Labour to foreign affairs is invariably shaped by the components derived 
and located in the origins and history of the party. As Vicker's states: `The Labour Party was 
born out of domestic discontent, and its policies - to a greater extent forged in opposition up 
until the 1940s - tended to reflect this. Because of these two factors, Labour's foreign policy 
reflected the party itself, the beliefs and standpoints of the various groups that came together 
to create it, and the dynamics between them, rather that necessarily the external world and 
experience and appraisal of international affairs. ' 81 Vickers, Rhiannon (2003: 32) Chapter 2, 
The main political influences on the development of the Labour Party's attitudes towards 
international affairs 
82 Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 14) The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939- 
1951, Chapter 1, 'Hay 'a League Onward': The Labour Critique of the Nation State, 1900-39, 
(London: Routledge) 
83 This nationalist marking is still evident: John Kampfher notes during the only Labour 
speech on foreign affairs in the 1997 election campaign, Tony Blair's reference `I am proud 
of the British Empire' was only exercised at the lat minutes. Kampfher, John (2003: 4) Blair's 
Wars, Preface, (London: Free Press) 
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One of the primary motivations for this perspective was the fact that `Few members of 
the British democratic left, moreover, considered foreign affairs to be more than a 
diversion from the real business of improving living conditions for the proletariat. ' 94 it 
was, however, in the sobering aftermath of the industrial killing that characterised so 
much of the First World War that the narrow notion that the Labour Party could retain 
nationalistic tendencies was significantly amended; as Clement Attlee stated, the 
`most prominent feature in that back-ground is the consciousness of Britain's 
insularity. '85 And further, that while `Socialists in all countries are united by a 
common rejection of the doctrines and ideals of militarism and imperialism, '86 as 
Attlee says: 
`Socialists were not really agreed on policy. There were those who rejected all 
national feeling, and sought to substitute for it allegiances to an international 
movement. There were others who thought rather in terms of the workers 
gaining control of the governments of their states and collaborating together as 
national units in a world commonwealth. '87 
However, while the debates about nationalism ensued amid sections of the party, after 
the early 1920s `... the mainstream of the Labour movement had swung round in 
favour of the ideal of an international government as the ultimate aim of socialist 
foreign policy. '88 And the principal vehicle to achieve this aim was to be the League 
of Nations, with certain provisos: `The Labour Party committed itself to a `League 
foreign policy' but also insisted that `The League must preserve its character of an 
association of governments as long as existing States retain anything like their present 
conception of sovereignty, and I fear they will do so for a long time. '89 
" Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 14) 
85 Attlee, Clement (1937: 119) The Labour Party in Perspective, Chapter VIII, Foreign 
Policy, (London: Victor Gollancz) 
'* Ibid., (1937: 119) 
87 Ibid., (1937: 204) 
88 Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 14) 
89 Sylvest, Casper Beyond the State? Pluralism and Internationalism in Early Twentieth- 
Century Britain, International Relations, 2007, Vol. 21, Issue No. 1,2007, pp67-85, p. 74, 
(University of Southern Denmark). Further complexities surrounding Labour and related 
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As Douglas says of the complexities of reconciling nationalism with socialist 
internationalism, the Labour Party having `built up its foreign policy upon a firm 
foundation of internationalism, 90 asserting that national sovereignty and nationalism 
itself were in the process of becoming extinct, '91 he concludes that `In the closing 
years of peace, therefore, the Labour Party found itself impaled on the horns of an 
ideological dilemma - one that could be resolved only by abandoning internationalism 
altogether, or reformulating it in such a way as to permit its achievement by other than 
co-operative and consensual means. '92 
Debates within the Labour Party on internationalism and nationalism extended to the 
components of the party drawn from the trades unions and affiliated organs like the 
socialist Zionist Party, Poale Zion. Collette argues the basis of support for political 
figures relating to nationalism and internationalism are noted by Sylvest: `There is some 
evidence to suggest that `nations', and to a lesser extent `nationalism', carried positive 
connotations that made them compatible with internationalism, while patriotism slowly lost 
its progressive and radical associations and became tied to an uncritical attitude towards the 
state summed up in the phrase `my country, right or wrong'. Thus, in the early 1920s 
internationalist could still maintain that the nation-state was the fundamental building block in 
any civilised form of politics. .... 
both socialists and liberals had come to see the state 
domestically as a central arbiter performing a range of ordering functions. And order was 
arguably the key word in British politics at this tumultuous time. It was perhaps so for the 
Labour Party, which professed that its British version of socialism could achieve domestic 
political order without creating anything resembling the tyranny of the proletariat. By the 
early 1920s the distinct socialist pluralism of [George D. H. ] Cole and [Harold] Laski had 
reverted to philosophical individualism, and this focus on the individual in turn oriented 
pluralism towards domestic political problems like poverty and education. International 
political questions were only treated tangentially. ' Sylvest, Casper (Vol. 21, No. 1,2007, 
pp"67-85, p. 75-76) 
90 In this thesis the definition of `internationalism' is that as prescribed by Douglas See: 
Douglas, Ray (2004: 5) and Vickers: `Internationalism, broadly defined, is the desire to 
transcend national boundaries in order to find solutions to international issues. ' Vickers, 
Rhiannon (2003: 5-6) 
91 Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 1) Introduction 
92 Ibid., (2004: 15) 
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Zionism stemmed from `the British Labour Movement's sense of internationalism, of 
worker's solidarity and sense of common identity transcending class consciousness. ' 
As such, `British Labour's internationalism was not anti-nationalistic, because 
workers' acknowledgements of class imperatives sprang from understanding their 
position in their own society and from their struggle for citizenship. James Middleton, 
Labour Party secretary, expressed it thus: `The socialist does not substitute 
internationalism for nationalism, but building on a genuine nationalism, stretches out 
to socialists in other lands and seeks to build up a wider policy of internationalism. '93 
As confusing as Middleton's assessment seems, additionally, in the context of 
Labour's socialist internationalist ideology and principles, it was remarkable that what 
Collette calls a `nationalist vision'94 - political Zionism - found support among some 
Labour and related figures, affiliated organs like the trades union movement, and 
eventually, the Socialist International. In terms of equating the nationalism of political 
Zionism with socialist internationalism, Collette says: `The controversy points both to 
the difficulty of understanding others' visions and to the complexities of the terms 
nationalism and internationalism when used by socialists, '95 concluding in the period 
of the 1930s at least, `the dichotomy of nationalism and internationalism was not 
resolved but glossed over. '96 
It is claimed that in the post-1945 era internationalism ceased to be a core ideological 
tenet for Labour, and more an article of faith. In the aftermath of the decline and fall 
of the league of Nations and the events of WWII, and the belief faltered that 
nationalism would evaporate as the world moved towards an ideal of a single world 
socialist government, the Labour Party once again embarked upon the task of defining 
93 Collette, Christine & Bird, Stephen [Editors] (2000: 72) Chapter 4, Christine Collette, Ze 
soleil'du socialisme commence a se lever sur le monde' [The sun of socialism is beginning to 
rise on the world]: The Utopian Visions of Labour Zionism, British Labour and the Labour 
and Socialist International in the 1930s, quoting, James and Lucy Middleton's papers, Ruskin 
Collection, Ruskin College, Oxford, Middleton to Charles Irving, `an ex-Tory voter', 12 
April, 1929, MID 23/11. 
94 Ibid., (2000: 71) 
9' Ibid., (2000: 71) 
96 Ibid., (2000: 87) 
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how the traditional internationalist position of the party might be squared with the 
grim post-1945 realities. As a response, Labour opted to re-define the pursuit of 
internationalism in the belief that an array of international and supranational political 
institutions (United Nations, NATO, Commonwealth and European Economic 
Community, EEC) devised to acknowledge the post-1945 realities, could curtail the 
worst excesses of the sovereign nation state, while retaining the firm British identity 
and the solidarity of a national consciousness which had sustained the country through 
five years of warfare. 97 
From circa 1919 to 1939, the mainstream of Labour's foreign policy-makers founded 
their approach on the traditional `Liberal model of international society' (the 
predominant model of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). A key 
concept of this philosophy is quoted by Douglas: 
`This doctrine asserted that human beings were inherently specific; that they 
shared a common set of interests; and that conflicts between nations were in 
consequence a violation of the `natural' order. The fact that wars nevertheless 
took place was explained in terms of an external defect in the international 
system - secret diplomacy, capitalist rivalry, the private manufacture and sale 
97 Although Labour's post-1945 foreign policy-making rested in part with the United Nations, 
opposition to such organs and policies still existed. While Laski and others conceded that 
`socialism by itself would not eradicate the nation state' Lamb, Peter (1999: 332) such 
socialist voices and notions - as Anthony Crosland observed in 1956 - were in a nuclear 
super-power era `like an echo from another world' Lamb, Peter (1999: 335): `Instead of 
challenging the existing configurations of power within and between states, the UN, he 
argued, only confirmed both. `We cannot rest content', he stressed in The Crisis in Our 
Civilisation `until we have a genuine world government expressing, through the direct choice 
of peoples, in a parliament responsible to them, the will of the common folk, instead of being 
dependent, like the United Nations, upon the sovereign wills of nation states which express, in 
all vital matters, the purposes of their ruling classes and subordinate to those purposes the 
interests of the common people. ' Lamb, Peter Harold Laski (1893-1950): Political Theorist of 
a World in Crisis, Review of International Studies, 1999, Vol. 25,329-342. pp. 334 
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of armaments, the scramble for colonies, or some combination of these factors 
- interfering with the normal harmonious pattern. '98 
Amid the disintegration of relations that was about the condemn Europe, and much of 
the globe, into the calamity of the First World War, and the benefit of hindsight, the 
decision by Labour's first generation of foreign policy theorists to set their stall on the 
international society model of Liberalism seems naive. Nevertheless, the emergent 
model of internationalism - what Douglas calls `Whig internationalism' - fashioned by 
the post-1914 Labour theorists, distinguished itself by rejecting the concept of laissez- 
faire economics, viewed as a significant contributory factor belying the aggressive 
competition between sovereign states. Instead, advocating the pursuit and adoption of 
international laws to establish order and bring regulation to the hitherto conflicting 
interests, generated the `open season' consequences of unfettered free-market 
capitalism. A further defining component feature would be located in the setting of 
the internationalist model of the British Parliamentary system of governance; after all, 
the case was argued, not only had the democratic socialists invested their political 
beliefs, but had not this single body politic exemplified its ability to unify disparate 
conflicting nations and peoples into a single entity? The British Labour Party's path to 
socialism, directed via the parliamentary system, was to be used as a model by which 
to achieve world governance via the forum of the League of Nations. 
It was to be through the medium of the League of Nations - the `Parliament of Man' - 
that the divisive competitive nature of sovereign nation states and related 
identification and loyalties of the peoples therein was to be superseded by a truly 
international organisation, with the result that nationalism would be replaced by a 
higher supranationalism. 99 However, it was the collapse of the League of Nations in 
1939 that shook the core internationalist ideals underpinning some two decades of 
Labour's approach to foreign policy-making. Not only had the belief that 
internationalism and the related Woodrow Wilson doctrine of national self- 
98 Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 5-6), quoting, H. Butterfield, (1931: v) The Whig Interpretation of 
History, (London: Bell) 
99 For an expression of this internationalist doctrine based on the UK Parliamentary model in 
1946 by Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee, see: Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 6-7) 
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determination dissipated (both concepts widely considered to lead via independence 
to interdependency, and finally to a socialist international order located in the Co- 
operative World Commonwealth of Nations), but the catastrophic scale of the failure 
in the face of Japanese militarism, Fascism and Nazism, and the disintegration of 
states into open conflict determined a fundamental re-appraisal of Labour's foreign 
policy and decision making. ' 00 
After the political disaster of the inter-war years and the grim aftermath of the Second 
World War, a sense of optimism surrounded Labour's election to government in July 
1945, in the expectation that a socialist party might apply a socialist approach and 
agenda to foreign affairs. As Peter Weiler says: 
`Labour took office in 1945 amid high hopes that its socialist message could 
be applied abroad as well as at home. ... it was widely believed that, once on 
its own, Labour would play a different role in world affairs. Let Us Face the 
Future, the party's election manifesto, pledged to `apply a socialist analysis to 
the world situation. ' In fact, as has been frequently observed, the 1945 Labour 
government never considered whether a `socialist analysis' could be applied to 
foreign affairs but maintained continuity with the policies of previous 
100 Labour's support for the League of Nations generated difficult decisions and radical policy 
changes. The Leagues decision to impose sanction on Fascist Italy in 1935 after the invasion 
of Abyssinia for example: `Since the end of the Great War, and particularly in the peaceful 
international climate of the mid- and late 1920s, pacifism had fitted comfortably within the 
more loosely pacifist Labour Party. During those years Labour had consciously viewed itself 
as a party of peace with its overriding foreign policy objective as the achievement of 
disarmament. However, from 1933 the rise of Nazism ... made it necessary for Labour to 
rethink its position. Arthur Henderson ... worked to commit the party to collective security 
through the League of Nations. Nevertheless, until 1935 Labour's gradual endorsement of 
collective security sat uneasily with the position of the much-respected veteran pacifist, 
George Lansbury, as party leader. ' Corthorne, Paul The Labour Party and the League of 
Nations: The Socialist League's Role in the Sanctions Crisis of 1935, Twentieth Century 
British History, Vol. 13, No. 1,2002, pp. 62-85, p. 63 
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governments. In consequence, as we have seen, the government aroused much 
opposition among its own followers. ' 101 
The idea that Labour would apply a socialist foreign policy had been reinforced by the 
efforts of a major Labour related socialist theorist figure, Harold Laski (National 
Executive Committee Chairman). Laski stated in the month of Labour's election to 
government, `I want to emphasize that the Labour Party is at no point committed to 
the doctrine of continuity in foreign policy ... because we have no interest in 
continuity of Conservative policy. ' 1 02 Nonetheless, in the wake of the cataclysmic 
failure of the League and the harsh post-1945 realities in Britain and across the globe, 
Labour made a fundamental reappraisal of its basis for foreign policy-making. What 
resulted is what Douglas calls, `muscular' internationalism' 103 The key reason being, 
as Douglas says: `By the middle of the war, then, more and more Labour 
policymakers were arriving at the conclusion that the basic building-block of 
international society in the future was, and could only be, the Great Powers. ' 104 The 
basis of the doctrine was to be the dominance of a few Great Powers; Britain, by 
virtue of its high moral authority (viewed to be derived from standing `alone' against 
Hitler in 1940) and its democratic socialist and parliamentary traditions (not to 
mention a significant colonial power -a position and status Attlee and Bevin wished 
to retain), was to be among them. However, not only was there resistance to this 
concept from within the party, but Labour also grossly overestimated the degree of 
influence it derived from its moral credentials. Additionally, it overplayed its 
perceived value as a power residing somewhere between the excesses of capitalism 
and Communism. This overstating was particularly apparent in the near bankruptcy of 
the country and the near total financial reliance on the USA, at a time when Britain 
was still in possession of huge costly overseas territories with a pressing domestic 
agenda. The result was the rejection of the `muscular internationalist' concept by 
101 Weiler, Peter (1988: 189) British Labour and the Cold War, Chapter 6, Manufacturing 
Consensus, (California: Stanford University Press) 
102 Ibid., (1988: 189), quoting, Harold Laski, The Times, July 3,1945, cited by Fitzsimmons, 
Foreign Policy, p24, notes, p. 43 
103 Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 8) 
104 Ibid., (2004: 9) 
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Labour as the economic leverage of the United States translated into an awesome 
political power that only gained greater currency with the onset of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, with anti-communism a majority position within the party, this 
effectively directed Britain and Labour to support unilateral policies emulating from 
Washington and the UN as a consequence. '°5 
Objections aside, the notion of power residing in the orbit of a few select states 
holding permanent authority over less powerful states to achieve collective security 
became the founding principle and structure of the United Nations. This selective 
power was primarily located in the supreme authority of the Security Council over the 
General Assembly, which was in essence what Labour figures like Clement Attlee and 
Ernest Bevin106 envisaged despite resistance from related figures like Leonard Woolf 
and Harold Laski, who firmly argued such a position was a violation of socialist 
doctrine. 107 A core theme of this Anglo-centric `muscular internationalism' was to be 
what Douglas describes as the following: 
`The powers demanded for the organisation thus included the ability to 
eliminate troublesome national minorities by transferring entire populations; to 
decide which states were viable and which were no longer consistent with the 
interests of `civilisation'; to regulate and where necessary override the 
domestic policies of national governments; ... Within this `British-American 
world order', the task of providing guidance and leadership to a European 
105 This U. S. leverage was particularly prevalent with regards to the political and economic 
pressure wielded by President Truman towards Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin to grant 
100,000 immigration certificates to Palestine for Jewish holocaust survivors. 
106 Ernest "Ernie" Bevin (b. 1881-d. 1951) MP: (Wandsworth Central, 1940-1950), (Woolwich 
East, 1950-195 1); General Secretary, Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU) 
1922-1945, President, Trade Union Congress, (TUC) 1937. 
107 As the academic Howell argues, Attlee and Bevin's favourable tendencies to nationalism 
extended further in that the `[Harold] Wilson governments emphasised bi-partisanship in 
foreign policy and had enduring attachment to nationalism and real-politik over a socialist 
foreign policy or even liberal idealism. ' Vickers, Rhiannon (2003: 3) quoting, David Howell, 
David (1976: 144-149/267-274) British Social Democracy: A Study in Development and 
Decay, (London: Croom Helm) 
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continent bankrupt physically and morally would fall naturally to Britain, 
which, according to the future Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, combined 
greater political maturity than any other nation with a unique moral authority it 
had earned by its lone stand against Nazi dictatorship in 1940. '108 
It was amid these extraordinary external circumstances and this kind of thinking - 
contradictory in terms of socialist ideology and principles - that allowed Labour to 
adopt the 1944 Post-War Policy Statement advocating the transfer - ethnic cleansing - 
of the Palestinian Arabs from Palestine drafted by Hugh Dalton, 
109 approved by 
conference, Harold Laski and others, as a resolution to what they viewed as two 
`troublesome national minorities' - one in the Middle East (the Palestinian Arabs), and 
one in Europe (the Jewish victims of Nazism). 
Relatedly, there is a school of thought among Labourites that prefers, for ideological 
reasons, to portray Indian independence and the withdrawal from Palestine as having 
been conducted under the auspices of a negotiated plan in accordance with the 
securing of British strategic interests. As Warde notes, as a result in large part of its 
`socialist traditions' the `British Labour Party has always been divided' and is 
`perhaps, subject to more contradictory restraints' 110 when it came to the question of 
the empire and foreign affairs generally. In reality, Labour's departure from India and 
Palestine was early evidence of Britain's diminishing power, not muscularity, as the 
undignified hurried exits were clearly a response to two unsustainable and 
ungovernable situations. Concession to Indian, Arab and Jewish nationalism led to 
Labour seeking to retain its economic viability and world influence in the Middle East 
108 Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 8) 
109 Dr Hugh Dalton (b. 1887-d. 1962) MP: (Peckham, 1924-1929), (Bishop Auckland, 1929- 
1931,1935-1959); Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1929-1931, Chancellor, 
1945-1947. 
110 Warde, Alan (1982: 1) Consensus and Beyond. - The Development of the Labour Party 
Strategy since the Second World War, (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
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as a player with experience and in possession of bases in Aden, Egypt and the Gulf 
region and states. "' 
However, it was the 1956 Suez debacle that was to prove the eventual catalyst which 
ended Labour's subscription to muscular internationalism and, with it, the belief that 
the remnants of Empire and Commonwealth as an organ of sovereign states had the 
ability to influence world affairs. Although Labour continued to place energy and 
resources into colonial development and the Commonwealth, Harold Wilson broke 
with Hugh Gaitskell's112 anti-European credentials and re-applied for membership of 
the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1967 (the same year Wilson announced 
the decision to withdrawal British forces from major bases East of Suez), with the 
result that the party increasingly directed its basis of foreign policy-making towards 
the EEC. It was also the appointment of the arch pro-European - Roy Jenkins 
13 
- as 
Chancellor (1967-1970) and the distancing in British-US relations caused by the 
Vietnam War that opened the avenue to Europe for Labour from which the likes of 
David Owen - as Foreign Secretary (1977-1979) - would increasingly direct foreign 
policy issues, particularly those of the Arab-Israel conflict, with the potential that all 
its inherent historical legacies and problematics for Labour arising from the 
psychological, ideological and political aspects of the essential dilemma, would be 
diluted and shared in a European forum. 
Although the debates concerning the role of internationalism and nationalism in 
foreign affairs and policy-making continued throughout the post-1945 era (as they had 
indeed persisted in the inter-war period), Vickers identifies what is argued to be the 
core principles of Labour's approach, located in the support for international organs: 
111A crucial feature differentiating Labour policy towards Palestine from India is that in the 
case of India Labour was relatively free to determine policy; in Palestine it was restricted by 
the Balfour Declaration as enshrined within the terms and conditions of the mandate. 
112 Hugh Gaitskell (b. 1906-d. 1963) MP: (Leeds South, 1945-1963); Labour leader, 1955- 
1963; Chancellor, 1950-1951 
113 Roy Jenkins (b. 1920-d. 2003) MP: (Southwark Central, 1948-1950), (Birmingham 
Stechford, 1950-1977); Deputy Leader 1970-1972, Chancellor, 1967-1970, Home Secretary 
1974-1976. 
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`While states operate within a system of international anarchy, reform of the 
system is possible because states have common interests and values. This 
change is only likely to be secured through the construction of international 
institutions with which to regulate economic, political and military relations 
between states. ... states 
belong to an international community and that each 
state has a responsibility to work towards the common good of the 
international system, to work in the `international' interest rather than purely 
in what it perceives to be national interests. ... international policy and 
governance should be based on democratic principles and universal moral 
norms, ' that `collective security is better than balance of power politics' and 
the `international working class and socialist solidarity' derived `more directly 
out of socialist ideology. ' 114 
Often, the net result of this amalgam of ideology and politics is, as Vickers concludes: 
`Feelings of kinship with workers overseas were engendered not only from 
socialist belief in the need for international working. class solidarity but also 
from the impact of Nonconformist beliefs in the brotherhood of man. This led 
to concern with imperialism and of conditions in the British empire and, at 
times, support for nationalist movements and for national self-determination, 
which was often at odds with Labour's belief in Britain's continuing world 
and imperial role. Indeed, Labour's policy on colonial affairs was usually 
confused and inconsistent. ' 15 
Labour's commitment to the concept of an internationalist community in its historical 
and contemporary approaches to foreign affairs and policy-making is illustrated by the 
incorporation of internationalism into the sacred text of the party - the Constitution. 
The effect of a constitutionally defined position is that for the most part Labour's 
moral principles transcend the myriad of issues and concepts that have accompanied a 
century of Labour's existence, securing the party's support of the League of Nations 
and its successor, the United Nations (and by association, the principles of 
14 Vickers, Rhiannon (2003: 5-8) 
115 Ibid., (2003: 8) 
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international law). Despite a constitutionally defined position, in terms of foreign 
policy-making, at least two major aspects of foreign policy-making made Labour 
vulnerable with regards to its relations with political Zionism, as Vickers underlines: 
1) `foreign policy tends to be made in reaction to external events rather that as a result 
of internal policy development, ' and 2) `foreign policy is rarely made by bills passed 
through Parliament, and this tends to isolate it from the kind of scrutiny and 
legislative control that other policy areas are subject to. ' 116 Not only was the subject 
of political Zionism and Palestine troubling for Labour as a party, (individual Labour 
MPs and related figures), but for the left-wing of the party in particular (not least, 
because traditionally it was within the left-wing that many orthodox socialists resided, 
many of whom were also pro-political Zionism). As Stephen Howe stated, `There has 
been no single international issue on which British socialists, and indeed socialists in 
all countries, have been more deeply divided than the question of Palestine. " 17 Howe 
argues, however, that the dilemma has not been exclusively the preserve of the left- 
wing: `Attitudes to Zionism and to the contending claims of Jews and Palestinians 
have cut across most of the conventional distinctions of left and right. ' 118 119 One of 
the central reasons for this dilemma was that `On the other hand, Zionism was itself in 
a literal sense a colonialist movement, establishing settlements in and claiming 
territory already inhabited by another people. ' 120 On the other hand, Howe continues: 
`There was also within the British left a current of support for Arab 
nationalism. In Palestine, however, support for Arab self-determination came 
into direct conflict with Jewish claims: two movements, each evoking 
principles central to the anti-colonialist ethos, appeared irreconcilable. No 
wonder that Fenner Brockway [Independent Labour Party], ordinarily more 
16 Ibid., (2003: 2) 
17 Howe, Stephen (2007: 148) Chapter 4 
118 Ibid., (2007: 148) 
119 Although the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) was also a deeply divisive subject for the 
Labour Party and the left-wing in particular, the relatively short duration of the conflict and 
the advent of WWII assured that it was consumed by subsequent events and issues. 
120 Howe, Stephen (2007: 149). Howe adds, `Some at least of the early Zionist leaders 
themselves explicitly saw their project as part of the European colonial mission. ' Howe, 
Stephen (2007: 149) 
37 
Introduction 
prone even than most British anti-colonialists to see decolonisation as a simple 
matter of right and wrong, confessed himself bemused by the Palestinian 
issue: `To most problems one can apply general principles, but to Palestine - 
no. By no other question have I been so puzzled. ' 121 
Howe points to further sources of the dilemma facing Labour and related figures from 
pro-political Zionism and Palestine: 
`There were strong historical links between the Zionist lobby (many of whose 
leaders were themselves socialists) and the British labour movement. There 
was widespread sympathy for Jewish national aspiration on the left, 
compounded by admiration for the socialist experiments undertaken in the 
kibbutzim, the Histadrut (Jewish trade union federation), and Mapai and 
Mapam (the Zionist labor parties). Such feelings, generally stronger on the left 
than among Labour right-wingers, were given great impetus and urgency by 
the Shoah [Holocaust] and the post-war plight of European Jewish 
refugees. ' 122 
Additionally Howe states that, the `Palestinian question divided the left on unfamiliar 
lines. The majority was swayed primarily by emotional sympathy with the sufferings 
of the Jewish people, by admiration for the socialist convictions of many Zionists (as 
opposed to the conservatism of much of the Arab leadership), ' the result being a 
`conviction that British opposition to Zionism stemmed from the desire to maintain 
British power in the region and from racism in the Foreign Office. These feelings 
outweighed suspicions aroused by US support for the Zionist cause, the exclusivist 
nationalism of the latter, concern for Palestinian Arab rights.... ' 123 
In addition to the `feelings, ' in other words the psychological aspects of the dilemma, 
generated in particular by Labour's empathy with socialist Zionism, what Garaudy 
121 Howe, Stephen (2007: 149), quoting, Fenner. Brockley (1942: 291) Inside the Left, 
(London: Allen & Unwin) 
122 Ibid., (2007: 149) 
123 Ibid., (2007: 152) 
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disparagingly called a `curious "Zionist socialism, s124 a further quandary for the left- 
wing arose as a result of the fact that the main publications of the left-wing - Tribune 
and the New Statesman were generally both pro-political Zionist: `Tribune and those 
closely associated with it, led by [Aneurin] Nye Bevan 125 and Jennie Lee, '26 gave very 
extensive coverage to the Palestinian issue from a consistently pro-political Zionist 
standpoint. The New Statesman's treatment of the issue was less prominent and more 
cautious; but it too adopted a pro-Zionist stance as it had done throughout Kingsley 
Martin's editorship. ' 127 It was also the case that the Manchester Guardian and the 
more commonly read, Daily Herald, took a largely pro-political Zionism stance. Even 
so, the debates within the left-wing, beginning in the 1930s, contained both pro- and 
anti-political Zionism arguments and positions. On one level, `British socialists placed 
much hope in the prospect for a coming together of Arab and Jewish working-class 
movements' as the political Zionist enterprise improved economic conditions for 
Palestinians; while on another level, `Some on the left believed the Zionist project to 
be in essence a tool of imperialism, encouraged by international finance capital. ' 128129 
124 Garaudy, Rodger (1983: 102) The Case of Israel: A Study of Political Zionism, Part Two, 
From the Zionist Mythology to the Politics of Israel, I, Internal Policy: Racism, Israel as a 
Colonial Entity, (London: Sharouk International) 
us Aneurin "Nye" Bevan (b. 1897-d. 1960) MP: (Ebbw Vale, 1929-1960); Shadow Foreign 
Secretary, 1956-1959; Deputy Leader, 1959-1960. The son of Welsh Non-conformists - 
Baptist and Methodist - Bevan left school aged 13 to become a miner. 
126 Jennie Lee (b. 1904-d. 1988) [Baroness Lee of Asheridge, 1970] MP: (North Lanarkshire, 
1929-1931), (Cannock, 1945-1970); Minister for the Arts (1964-1970) playing key role in 
founding the Open University; Lee was married to Aneurin Bevan (1934-1960). With Bevan, 
Lee first travelled to Israel in 1954 and saw what Foot called the `whole stirring spectacle' 
(Foot, Michael (1973: 419) and as Lee says, `especially the achievements of the kibbutz 
movement. ' Lee, Jennie (1980: 197) My Life with Nye, Chapter 19, Once More into the 
Wilderness, (London: Jonathan Cape); Bevan viewed the Palestinian predicament in classic 
economic terms: `The Arab knows how much help Israel gets from the outside. It is essential 
that he should also be able to call on the resources of the more advanced nations or in his 
resentment, like a modem blind Samson, he will pull down the pillars of his society about his 
own ears - and about ours in the process. ' Foot, Michael (1973: 420) 
f27 Howe, Stephen (2007: 15,1) 
12' Ibid., (2007: 149) 
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And even when the Labour leadership or government changed policy positions, the 
divisions and dilemmas continued. As noted in the post-1945 era, when political 
aspects of the dilemma began to gradually replace the ideological aspects: `In general 
the sharpest criticism of the government's about-turn came from left-wing (and often 
Jewish) Labour backbenchers, led by Sydney Silverman, 130 William Warbey, '3' Ian 
Mikardo, 132 and Maurice Orbach. 133 These critics included individuals who, on some 
other foreign policy issues, attacked Bevin from positions near to that of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain. But on Palestine, whereas the Communists and 
their closest supporters within the Parliamentary Labour Party was predominantly 
anti-political Zionism, this left-wing group of MPs wholeheartedly supported partition 
and the Jewish demands. Others on the left, though, were by now having second 
thoughts. ' 134 Arguably, the dilemma fuelling Labour's debates were assisted by the 
psychological aspects identified earlier in this Introduction, what Howe identifies as 
121 In 1930, the debates within Labour regarding the party's position on nationalism and in 
relation to political Zionism surfaced at the annual party conference, where a resolution 
establishing a `new orthodoxy' designed to check questioning voices of concern caused by the 
alignment of socialist Labour with the nationalism of political Zionism was passed. At the 
1929 conference the assertions of a leading pro-political Zionist Labour figure - John 
Middleton - that `No enduring divergence of interests exists between the Jewish [political 
Zionism] and Arab [Palestinian] working populations in Palestine' and a general promotion of 
the concept that political Zionism was a form of socialism ensured the resolution was passed. 
As such, as Kelemen states: `It embodied the central claim of Labour Zionism that Jewish 
nationalism in its socialist variant - which advocated that the Jewish working class take 
control of the economy through its trade unions and co-operatives - could embrace the 
interests of the Arab masses. It was, in other words, to be considered as a nationalism that had 
the virtues of class politics. This was the essence of the Labourist discourse on Palestine. ' 
Kelemen, Paul (January 21,1996: 77) 
130 Sydney Silverman (b. 1895-d. 1968) MP: (Nelson and Colne, 1935-1968) 
13' William Warbey (b. 1903-d. 1980) MP: (Luton, 1945-1950), (Broxstowe, 1953-1955) and 
(Ashfield, 1955-1966) 
132 Ian Mikardo (b. 1908-d. 1993) MP: (Reading/Reading South/Reading, 1945-1959), and 
(Poplar/Bethnal Green and Bow, 1964-1987) 
133 Maurice Orbach (b. 1902-d. 1979) MP: (Willesden East, 1945-1959) and (Stockport South, 
1964-1979) 
134 Howe, Stephen (2007: 151) 
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`personal contact, ' and the misinformation - `imperfect information' - that combined 
to inherently advantage the political Zionists and disadvantaged the Palestinian Arabs, 
as an occidental cultural prejudice fermented among some Labour figures in favour of 
European derived political Zionism against the oriental Palestinians, as Howe further 
states: 
`The choices, which might necessarily have to be made on the basis of very 
imperfect information, would reflect prior patterns of personal contact as well 
as ideological considerations heavily coloured by British experience and 
alignments. This in turn meant that patterns of access to European languages, 
travel, education, and political ideas among colonials heavily determined their 
relations with British anticolonialists. Thus associates ... were predominantly, 
followers... of Israeli Jews rather than Palestinian Arabs. ' 135 
It is hardly surprising, then, that from a multitude of infinitely complex and 
fluctuating factors surrounding the debates on socialism and nationalism, Howe 
concludes that the contradictions and dilemmas were generated as much by the 
complexities within Labour's left-wing, and as a consequence, `A mould had been set, 
of bitter left-wing discord over the Middle East, which was to persist at least into the 
1990s. "36 Equally perhaps, it is not that surprising that a similar debate took place 
within the political Zionist movement as to what type of socialism and nationalism 
political Zionism should subscribe and aim to attain. 
In an address to the Twelfth Zionist Congress of 1921, the theological philosopher 
and theorist of political Zionism - Martin Buber137 - told delegates of the need to 
`guard the spiritual and moral integrity of Zionism in the face of the political 
complexities of building a National Home under the aegis of an imperialistic power 
and, especially, in the face of the resolute opposition of the Arab population of 
13s Ibid., (2007: 236-237) Chapter 6, The Movement for Colonial Freedom, 1954-1964, part 
II, Aims and Ideals 
136 Ibid., (2007: 153) 
137 Martin Buber (b. I 878-d. 1965) a cultural Zionist and advocate of a bi-national resolutionist; 
born in Austria, Buber arrived in Palestine in 1938. 
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Palestine. Buber reminded the congress that there are distinct types of national self 
assertion, and that in attending to the just needs of the Jewish people, Zionism should 
be wary of assuming the posture of a self-righteous, egocentric nationalism. Such a 
posture, which he dubs `hypertrophic' nationalism, he warns, would vitiate the very 
cure - the restoration of national dignity and spiritual renewal - that Zionism seeks to 
offer the ailing Jewish people. Moreover, a myopic preoccupation with the problems 
of one's nation invariably narrows one's moral consciousness, obscuring the humanity 
of other peoples, especially one's adversaries. The resultant exaltation of nationalism 
as morally self-sufficient principle distorts the original purpose of nationalism: to heal 
the afflictions on one's nation and thereby enable it to serve the higher ideal of human 
kind. ' 138 And just in case there was any confusion, Buber stated further: 
`What I am going to deal with is the unambiguous demarcation of a kind, a 
degenerate kind, of nationalism, which of late has begun to spread even in 
Judaism. ' 1 39 
What Buber's address illustrated was not just the complexities and weight of the 
situation in Palestine, Europe and Russia for the Jews, but also the question as to what 
type of nationalism the political Zionism movement should aspire to attain. As a 
Jewish non-Marxist socialist and political Zionist residing in Palestine, Buber was not 
only aware of the growing prominence of the more extreme strands of Jewish 
nationalists (revisionist Zionists) drawing support from events like the 1920 Palestine 
riots and Russian pogroms; he was also deeply conscious of the position of the British 
Labour Party - rapidly emerging as a major political force - to the Jewish nationalism 
embodied in political Zionism. 
140 However, attempting to reconcile the nationalism of 
'3a Mendes-Flohr, Paul [Editor] (2005: 47) Martin Buber: A Land of Two Peoples: Martin 
Buber on Jews and Arabs, Editor's prefatory notes, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 
139 Ibid., (2005: 48) 
Buber was in close contact with Josiah Wedgwood who informed him of Labour's likely 
intension towards Palestine. Buber asks: `What path do the men of the Labour Party 
advocate? ' adding with a wry note that `The Zionists ... would deceive themselves if they 
believed a Labour government would view Britain's interests in Palestine differently. On the 
other hand, a Labour government would likely seek to hasten the policy of decolonisation of 
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political Zionism with the negative consequences for the Palestinians and Palestine 
was, as with many Labour and related figures, to occupy Buber until his death in 
1965. Elie Kedourie claims that, `Nationalists make use of the past in order to subvert 
the present, ' 141 citing the political Zionist's attempts to transform Judaism into a 
national identity, an undertaking not without its critics from within the ranks of 
religious Jews: 
`One instance of this transformation of the past occurs in a letter written 
against [political] Zionism by an orthodox Rabbi of Eastern Europe in 1900. 
Dzikover Rebbe contrasts the traditional view which the community of Israel 
had of itself, and the new nationalist interpretation of the Jewish past. 
Bitterness gives his speech a biting concision, and ... exhibits in a clear and 
striking manner the operations of nationalist historiography, as well as the 
traditional interpretation which it has challenged. `for our many sins, writes 
the Rebbe, `strangers have risen to pasture the holy flock, men who say that 
the people of Israel should be clothed in a secular nationalism, a nation like all 
other nations, that Judaism rests on three things: national feeling, the land and 
the language, and that national feeling is the most praiseworthy element in the 
brew and the most effective in preserving Judaism, while the observance of the 
Torah and the commandments is a private matter depending on the inclination 
of each individual. May the Lord rebuke these evil men and may He who 
chooseth Jerusalem seal their mouths. " 42 
Concluding, Kedourie says that `In Zionism, Judaism ceases to be the reason d'etre of 
the Jew, and becomes, instead, a product of Jewish national consciousness. ' 143 
Additional perspectives on the array of nationalisms attributable and adopted by the 
the imperial realm, allowing a great measure of self-rule in its colonies and territories. ' 
Mendes-Flohr, (2005: 68) 
141 Hutchinson, John & Smith, Anthony D. [Editors] (1994: 51) Oxford Readers: Nationalism, 
Chapter 8, Elie, Kedourie, Nationalism and Self-Determination, (New York: Oxford) 
142 Ibid., (1994: 51) Chapter 8, Elie, Kedourie, Nationalism and SelfrDetermination. 
143 Ibid., (1994: 51) quoting, Israel Domb, (1958) The Transformation: The Case of the 
Neturei Karta, (London: Hamadfis) 
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political Zionists at various stages in the philosophical development of the movement 
are in evidence and cited. Maxime Rodinson wrote in 1973: 
`Zionism is an ideological movement of vast scope which has acquired a 
history that is already old and for which precursors can still be found. It has 
always taken many forms and has encompassed numerous divergent 
tendencies, as can be seen from even the slightest glance at its tormented and 
tumultuous history, at the schisms and splits it has produced, and at the fierce 
internal struggles that have marked it. In addition, as with any ideological 
movement, one must differentiate between ideal principles and variants that 
crop up in internal tendencies and with the passages of time, the implicit or 
explicit motivations of the masses of followers, the strategic and tactical plans 
of leaders, the fulfillment of these plans (which is always only partial and 
which always comes about in somewhat unforeseeable circumstances), the 
consequences of these plans, etc. ' 144 
The `Zionisms' to which Rodinson refers are the various and numerous `nationalisms' 
of the left, right and everything in between. He nevertheless concludes, `Yet overall 
characterization are possible' 
145 by stating, `Only a minority of Zionist political 
leaders sincerely and resolutely set as their goals the bi-national state, equally 
balanced between two ethnic groups, ' adding, `the Zionist leadership only accepted it 
with the intention of getting round it, of using it to set up a situation that would some 
day make inevitable the emergence of this Jewish state that was always in their 
thoughts but never (officially) on their lips. "46 The net consequence of the tussle 
within the Zionist movement as to what brand of nationalism would best suffice the 
agenda for Palestine was officially adopted in 1942 at a meeting at the Baltimore 
Hotel New York, and it was the extreme type of revisionist Zionism that was 
sanctioned by the political Zionist leadership. 
'µ Rodinson, Maxime (1980: 36) Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? In What Way is Israel a 
Colonial Phenomenon? (New York: Monad Press) 
145 Ibid., (1980: 36) 
146 Ibid., (1980: 61) 
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As the literature shows, the debates on nationalism and political Zionism among 
Jewish and Gentile Labour and related figures certainly preceded those referenced by 
Howe, and even those of Buber. Several studies examine the debates and dilemmas 
encountered by British Jews and respective communities. For example, the academic 
historian Rubinstein says that nationalism and Labour-political Zionism relations were 
not without tensions as Labour MPs and Jewish communities `found their loyalty 
seriously strained, ' not least, by events in 1945-1949 when Attlee and Bevin were 
considered to be working `actively against Zionist aspirations in Palestine' and 1956, 
after `Hugh Gaitskell's condemnation of the Suez invasion' 
147 initiated by Israel. 
Loyalties were also strained elsewhere: Labour's left-wing, traditionally the most 
supportive political section, was also struggling with the realities of Jewish 
nationalism in relation to socialism. As David Cesarani states: `With few exceptions, 
the Left [including Labour] utterly rejected Jewish nationalism in the form ... of 
Zionism. ' Concluding, that much of the support that had existed was maintained: `As 
long as Israel appeared to embody left-wing aspiration, this ambivalence was latent. 
Once Israel departed from its socialist trajectory and in effect demanded acceptance 
for what it was, and not what the Left hoped it might become, the trouble started. 
While mainstream old left grudgingly accommodated itself to Israel's existence, the 
far left and New Left saw no redeeming features in Israel. ' 148 And one of the reasons 
for that arising position, as Gershon Shafir says, lies in the fact that, `At the outset, 
Zionism was a variety of Eastern European nationalism, that is, an ethnic movement 
in search of a state. But at the other end of the journey it may be seen as a late 
instance of European overseas expansion, which had been taking place from the 
sixteenth through the early twentieth centuries. 
"49 
147 Rubinstein, W. D. (1982: 18) The Left, the Right and the Jews, Chapter 1, The Pattern of 
Jewish History, The Jewish Community in Britain, (London: Croom Helm) 
I" Cesarani, David '(2004: 79) The Left and the Jews: The Jews and the Left, Chapter 11, 
Conclusions, (London: Labour Friends of Israel) 
141 Shafir, Gershon (1996: 8) Land, labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
1882-1914, Introduction. Settlement and Nationalism, (California: University of California 
Press) 
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A collection of academic papers (Collette and Bird, 2000) gives a much broader 
perspective of the debates on socialism, internationalism, nationalism and colonialism 
within Labour and the trades union movement, and Jewish communities. If 
nationalisms were problematic for Labour, the added dimensions of Jewish and Judaic 
histories and experiences were to add further complications. As Collette and Bird 
state: `It was natural that not only were Jews inspired by, but that they initiated 
revolutionary and socialist ideas; not only did they participate in, but they led the 
early left-wing movements. Their messianic culture and their constant experience of 
religious oppression made such ideas more meaningful to them. Not all were 
[political] Zionists by any means and to many this nationalistic concept contradicted 
the very basis of socialism. '150 This predicament was particularly notable in the 
British Jewish communities caught between the conflicting and rival interpretations of 
histories, and ideological concepts. 
What Douglas, Howe, Vickers and others provide are various accounts of the events 
and debates of what amounts to two narratives: one is about policy-making and 
policy; and the other is about colonialism. They provide a clear, chronological 
investigation and analysis of the ideological and political aspects comprising Labour's 
historical difficulties equating concepts like internationalism with nationalism and 
colonialism. But they add very little by way of answers to the understanding as to why 
the contradictions are resolved in the way they are by analysing the role played by the 
backgrounds, experiences and motivations of the Labour and related figures 
concerned. As such, the ideological and political aspects are arguably incomplete, as 
is the account and the resulting understanding. 
Key sources which can help explain this dimension of the historical relationship 
between the Labour Party and political Zionism is the plethora of diaries, memoirs, 
and autobiographies of key Labour figures. These include the extensive diaries of 
Tony Benn, Barbara Castle, Richard Crossman and Hugh Dalton (edited by Ben 
Pimlott), a dozen volumes of memoirs, including George Brown, and those of key 
Jewish MPs like Ian Mikardo, Sydney Silverman, Emanuel Shinwell, Greville Janner 
150 Collette, Christine & Bird, Stephen [Editors] (2000: 1) Introduction 
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and Gerald Kaufman. A significant array of academic studies have captured many key 
Labour and related figures, including biographies of Harold Wilson (Ben Pimlott, 
1992), Harold Laski (Issac Kramnick and Barry Sheerman, 1979), and Alan Bullock's 
definitive three volume biography of Ernest Bevin (1960,1967 and 1983); Kenneth 
0. Morgan covers the lives of Labour Leaders and Lieutenants from Keir Hardie to 
Neil Kinnock (1987), and in more detail, James Callaghan (1997) and Michael Foot 
(2007), as well as the wider history of the Labour Party (1984). 
Of course, each individual manuscript or volume of diaries offers insight only to the 
period in which the individual concerned was engaged with Labour Party politics. All 
manner of considerations are required in their inclusion and the analysis and 
conclusion, not least their accuracy. However, collectively they can give an insight 
into the motivational or personal dimensions in terms of understanding the role played 
by factors such as career jealousies and dislikes, degrees of relevant experience, or 
not, as the case may be, as well as their limitations in terms of perspectives 
(frontbench and backbench status, for example), and simply ignorance. A fine 
example of this psychological element and its influences is the fact that Aneurin 
Bevan's firm pro-political Zionist stance had as much to do with his `ambition and 
jealousy'151 as it did with socialist ideology because, as Hugh Gaitskell says, `his 
actions are determined far more by emotional reactions, particularly anger and 
pride'' 52 - in this case, his intense personal dislike of Ernest Bevin. ' 53 
ist Williams, Philip M. (1979: 165) Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography, quoting, Hugh 
Gaitskell, Chapter 6, Minister of Fuel and Power, (London: Jonathan Cape) 
152 Ibid., (1979: 333) Chapter 11, Foreign Affairs and the Disintegration of Bevanism 1954-5, 
quoting, Hugh Gaitskell, Diary, a. October 6,1954 
153 Aneurin Bevan's authorised biographer, Michael Foot, says `He [Bevan] was almost a 
Zionist' by early 1954. Foot, Michael (1973: 419); Foot attributes Bevan's `abiding friendship 
for Israel' as a consequence of his relations with Israeli Labor figure Yigal Allon (b. 1918- 
d. 1980) and British businessman, Israel Sieff (b. 1889-d. 1973). Foot, Michael (1973: 546) 
Chapter 14, Suez, 1956-1957. Patricia Hollis, Jennie Lee's biographer, says it was Israel and 
Rebecca [Becky] Sieff `from whom Nye and Jennie learnt their Zionism. ' Hollis, Patricia 
(1997) Jennie Lee: A Life, Chapter 7, Life with Nye, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
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Alternative approaches (other than socialist discourse or historical survey) were 
considered. Initially, given that this was a thesis about policy, I examined various 
approaches to policy-making, specifically foreign-policy since political Zionism 
reflects an external concern. However, these could offer little to a study which 
covered a party, rather than a government, and did not provide explanatory 
frameworks which could include internal party dynamics, British Parliamentary 
system issues and the impact of Israeli/Palestinian dynamics at any given point in 
time. Moreover, the type of data which was available served to shape the method 
ultimately adopted. 
Methodology 
Given the merits and limitations of the bodies of literature discussed above, the 
method ultimately chosen for this thesis was therefore to locate contemporary policy 
within an historical framework. Labour relations with political Zionism clearly go 
back to the earliest days of the party, and have ideological, political and 
personal/psychological dimensions which all need to be explored as evolutionary 
rather than static phenomena, not least because the fortunes of both the Labour Party 
and political Zionism have altered over time. The relatively limited periods of time 
covered by the existing literature is a key factor restricting knowledge and therefore 
an understanding of relations. The detailed accounts and analysis provided in these 
time-frames is, for the most part, therefore, restricted to including the events, issues 
and questions surrounding the party and those Labour MPs and related figures within 
what are essentially snap-shots of whoever happens to be in the frame at the time. 
And while this can generate a general sense, the literature does not provide an account 
and analysis of all the personal motives of the key Labour and related figures as they 
developed over time, which is an important, if not crucial factor in attempting to 
understand the basis and nature of Labour-political Zionist relations. 
It also quickly became clear from the literature that there has never been within the 
Labour Party single, clear, unitary ideological position on political Zionism and that 
to focus only on intellectual debates within the party would be to ignore, the greater 
part of the relationship's tangible existence. It was equally clear that focusing 
primarily on policy-making mechanisms and party institutions would ignore the 
crucial part played by the personal interpretations and prioritisation of the individuals 
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who pressed for specific policies. Although the literature gives an account of the 
intellectual debates and the practical politics, and while this is often accompanied by 
numerous references to the `human motivations' the `emotional' and `personal' 
factors that hint at the existence of a more personal response and reasoning behind the 
ideological and political aspects of relations, there is very little by way of account and 
analysis as to the consequences of these personal characteristics and motivations in 
terms of the actual personalities from which they originate, particularly in terms of 
their ability to influence Labour colleagues and indeed, at times, Labour positions and 
policy. 
Thus, whilst at various times both the ideological debates and political practices are 
introduced in the thesis, the main focus is on the key figures who, in the absence of a 
coherent, unified, ideological position on political Zionism, intervened to steer the 
party in directions dictated by their own personal ideological, psychological and 
political persuasions, whether that be the more orthodox pro-Israel approach of 
Harold Wilson, or the more pragmatist pro-neutralist one of Neil Kinnock, for 
example. 
As has been said, considerable attention has been given to the eras before New 
Labour, since New Labour policy-making has, in many demonstrated ways, been a 
continuation and consequence of the historical legacies left by previous generations as 
they sought to respond to the momentous events of their time. It has been argued, 
above, that precisely because New Labour's relationship with political Zionism is not 
solely ideologically based, but also draws upon the psychological and political 
inheritances of old Labour, it cannot be extracted out of the historical context, a 
context which has been continuously and progressively shaped over an extended 
period, and whose roots have relevance even today. The consequence of this has been 
that, structurally, the thesis may seem overly lengthy on the historical aspects of 
policy-making, and the reader is asked to understand New Labour as a contemporary 
manifestation of the Labour Party, and not as a new phenomenon. Again, this is a 
contestable proposition but which the researcher thinks justified by the arguments and 
evidence presented later in the thesis. 
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In covering the historical period, and in attempting to examine the key roles played 
by individuals in shaping policy in the absence of a unified ideological party position 
which might have been manifested in more official party documents, the thesis was 
forced to rely heavily on biographies, autobiographies, diaries, memoirs, letters and 
speeches of Labour MPs and related figures; monographs detailing Labour Party 
history and policy in specific epochs, the Labour Party's own publications, manifestos 
and annual conference reports; and the texts recorded in Hansard of Parliamentary 
debates. In order to cross-check the data from these sources with current 
understanding within the party, and also to provide new data on the very 
contemporary (New Labour) era, the researcher sought additional material, including 
a questionnaire distributed to all Labour MPs and a series of interviews with Labour 
MPs and Labour related figures. 
It can be argued that neither autobiographies nor biographies offer objective historical 
data: in both cases the past is interpreted for the reader, usually with a view to 
presenting the subject in either a particularly favourable or a specifically critical light. 
Autobiographies in particular often represent a writer's justification of their own past. 
It is possible that political figures will seek to enhance their own role in affairs, or to 
avoid exposing themselves to searching criticism where their actions were less 
admirable. They are also selective in what they chose to present as important 
information and what they leave out. Thus the reader may be drawn into a process of 
selectivity and prioritisation of data. Political figures might also be swayed in 
constructing their narratives by outstanding loyalty to their party, or the government 
of which they were part, although for the most part the autobiographies used were 
composed once individuals were retired or out of office and therefore such constraints 
were less than they might have been. Nonetheless, autobiographies are essentially 
subjective texts and have to be regarded in that light. 
Relying on biographies and even some historical accounts can present similar 
problems. For example, a biographer or historian chooses his or her subject because a 
judgement has already been made regarding the importance of the subject and its 
virtues (or vices). Around half the biographies used here were written by individuals 
themselves affiliated with the Labour Party or the individuals they were profiling. 
Thus, their interpretations are also biased by political perspective and personal view. 
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Filtering out these biases in the material is a challenging task for the researcher. 
Nonetheless, these sources provide a crucial `inside story' which has not been 
previously examined or evaluated in its entirety. They are written by individuals who 
are in unique positions in terms of their access to information and their capacity to 
interpret it, at crucial times and in informal, as much as formal, locations for the 
relationship to be manifested. The thesis will show how personal preferences, beliefs, 
antagonisms, jealousies, career competitiveness, and interpretations of events were 
crucial in determining Labour Party relations with political Zionism and policy 
responses to events, things which simply would not have been visible if the thesis had 
approached the question from the perspective of published intellectual debates or 
institutional policy-making processes only. 
Questionnaires and Interviews. 
Richard Burden's154 assertion that `it may prove difficult to get enough detailed 
information"55 proved, in the first instance, to be the case in relation to an interactive 
questionnaire sent via email to each Labour MP (hard copies were posted to MPs with 
no email). Although accompanied by a supporting cover note from David Treisman 
(Labour Party General Secretary) requesting a response, only five from over 400 MPs 
responded. Of the reasons given, constituency and parliamentary time and demand 
factors, a policy of not responding to questionnaires, and the sensitivity of the subject 
were frequently cited for non-participation. ' 56 
On the basis of a poor response and the reasons cited, it was decided to abandon the 
questionnaire and focus instead on a series of interviews. Initial requests for 
interviews fared little better: from thirty requests only David Watkins, Richard 
'' Richard Burden (b. 1954) MP: (Birmingham Northfield, 1992-present); chair of the 
Palestine All-Party Parliamentary Group, and has twice held the posts of Parliamentary 
Private Secretary (PPS) between 1997 and 2001. 
Iss Burden, Richard (30.01.1997: 1) Letter: Burden- Nelson, (House of Commons) 
156 Although support for the questionnaire was secured from David Treisman the 
Parliamentary Labour Party was under formal instruction not to respond to un-approved 
questionnaires to prevent the reoccurrence of responses being interpreted as reflecting Labour 
policy. 
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Burden and John Heppell' 57 (the researcher's constituency MP) were forthcoming. 
Heppell agreed to ask personally six Labour MPs and related figures of the 
researcher's choice to participate in an interview; only after further direct contact did 
further Labour MPs and related figures agree to be interviewed. In the case of Neil 
Kinnock and Robin Cook this took over six months of negotiations and organisation 
via private secretaries and intermediaries. Although the primary problem was the 
other commitments of the interviewees, once again, the subject matter proved highly 
sensitive. The researcher was aware that interviewees would a) be eager to present 
themselves in the best light, b) be wary of committing themselves to an (unknown) 
person on such a politically sensitive subject and, c) be obstructed in some cases from 
full disclosure while a member of a serving governing party. Material gained from 
interviews was therefore treated with appropriate regard for the need for 
corroboration. 
Interviewees were chosen on the basis of the following: 
a) Their current or previous official positions within the party and the degree to 
which this offered them access to information and key discussions. In 
particular, individuals who held key posts at key points in time within party 
and/or government. 
b) Their known interest in, and position on, political Zionism, Israeli-Palestinian 
politics, and Middle Eastern affairs. A balanced mix was sought of individuals 
favourable to one side or the other. 
c) A balanced mix of front and backbencher MPs. 
d) Individuals who have worked or currently do work for the Labour Party on a 
consultancy or advisory basis. 
e) Individuals who have worked or currently work for lobby groups (either for 
Israel or for the Palestinians/Arabs) in Westminster. 
f) Representatives of the Palestinian and Israeli embassies in London (the Israeli 
ambassador declined). 
g) Journalists with specialisms in this field. 
15' John Heppell (b. 1948) MP: (Nottingham East, 1992-present); Vice Chamberlain of the 
Household, 2005; Government Whip, 2001,2005 
52 
Introduction 
The researcher paid particular attention to ensuring a balance was secured in the 
overall number of people from the political Zionist or anti-Zionist camps who were 
interviewed. Nevertheless, to a degree the interviewee sample was self-selecting by 
virtue of the willingness or unwillingness to take part, and was not sufficiently large 
as to represent a statistically significant sample. It was not, however, the intention of 
the interviews to provide that kind of information. 
The interviews were semi-structured, principally to allow for the diversity of their 
various roles and positions to be fully explored, but also because the nature of the 
subject meant that they were often keen to pursue particular lines of discussion over 
others, and some flexibility was needed. All interviews were one-offs, lasting 
approximately one to one and a half hours. They were all tape recorded with the 
interviewees' permission, and a transcription was offered (but in no case was this 
offer taken up). The interviews with MPs variously took place either in their 
Westminster offices or constituency offices. Interviews with other individuals took 
place in their organisational offices/workplaces. Although it is possible that more 
informal environments might have added incrementally to the willingness of 
interviewees to engage with sensitive aspects of the discussion, it was the researcher's 
impression that this was unlikely a significant factor and that interviewees had already 
made up their minds about what they would and would not say. 
It was undoubtedly the case that the interviews were shaped by the interviewees' own 
sensitivities to the issues under discussion. There was a general reluctance to discuss 
some issues: for example, current Labour MPs were reluctant to comment negatively 
on current government policy, or on fellow colleagues, particularly since at the time 
when the interviews were taking place it still seemed that a fmal peace agreement 
between Israel and the Palestinians might be forthcoming (2002-2005). Some 
interviewees insisted on the questions being submitted prior to interview; others 
refused to answer some questions on grounds of sensitivity and/or the desire not to be 
quoted publicly. However, the interviewees were often willing to discuss issues often 
in great detail but strictly for `background purpose. ' It was very often difficult to 
direct the interview under these circumstances. 
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The most evident limitation of the questionnaire/interview data arises from the 
relatively small number of Labour MPs prepared to participate in either the 
questionnaire, or in an interview. The only way this factor could be circumvented was 
by targeting figures who were both senior and held relevant position in the Labour 
Party and/or government (Neil Kinnock, Robin Cook and Baroness Symons), and 
who had not generated biographies, diaries or other such sources. The limitations 
were also bypassed by securing further contacts from the interviewees that led to 
additional interviews and correspondences that were conducted by email, letter or 
telephone. Despite all these problems, the final list of interviewees and the data 
gained from them was, in my belief, fairly reflective of the issues under discussion. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is constructed in two parts. The first part (Chapters 1-4) provides the 
necessary historical account of the Labour-political Zionist relationship for which this 
introduction chapter has so far argued, dividing the period from the establishment of 
the Labour Party in 1900 until the creation of New Labour in 1994 into four 
consecutive periods. These have been determined according to identifiable stages in 
the evolution of both the Labour Party itself and the Zionist project and its 
consequences). These are by no means simple demarcations to make, and it is 
acknowledged here that there are overlaps and continuities which traverse periods. 
However, at some point practical decisions had to be made as to what they 
demonstrate and conclude. 
The second part of the thesis addresses the era of New Labour, by drawing upon the 
information gathered and the lessons learned in previous chapters. Thus its format is 
slightly different, in so far as one chapter is devoted entirely to the issues surrounding 
the party leadership of Tony Blair himself, while a second addresses the Labour 
relationship with political Zionism. The specific objectives of each chapter are as 
follows. 
Chapters One, Two, Three and Four identify and draw out the significance of 
understanding policy-making in terms of a trajectory rather than a final objective, at 
least in the case of political Zionism and the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Secondly, they 
demonstrate the existence of an essential dilemma posed for the Labour Party, which 
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arises from the contradictions between a largely pro-political Zionist consensus 
formulated on the back of perceived common origins, related religious philosophies 
and shared socialist ideologies and the emerging realities on the ground in Palestine 
and later Israel (which included the dispossession and suppression of an indigenous 
peoples, the Palestinians). The thesis demonstrates that the essential dilemma was 
primarily but not exclusively ideological, and that it cannot be understood without 
reference to the psychological dimensions which arise for individuals out of the 
perceived common origins and related religious philosophies. Moreover, the political 
aspects - the need for key Labour MPs and related figures to respond to political 
realities arising from events and status as opposition or governing party - needs to be 
taken into account as well. 
Thirdly, they indicated the importance of key individuals in shaping policy, as they 
moved to fill the void left by the absence of a clear and consistent ideological position 
which could accommodate both pro-political Zionist empathy and socialist ideology. 
Finally, it was not only key individuals but also the events and developments - both 
within the party itself and in the broader national and international environment - 
which served to shape party policy. In the chapters these are identified as internal and 
external determinants. 
Chapters Five and Six apply these strands of understanding to the era of New Labour. 
Chapter Five focuses in depth on Tony Blair himself as the architect of New Labour 
and its foreign policy, while Chapter Six examines the implications for party policy 
towards political Zionism, and the Israel-Palestinian question. 
The thesis concludes that New Labour under Blair has pursued a policy trajectory in 
favour of negotiated compromise, in effect continuing a process of deviation from the 
party's early adamantly pro-political Zionist policy trajectory. However, there remain 
within the party, and particularly within the leadership, political Zionist consistencies 
that carry over from the historical old Labour era into New Labour and which act to 
direct that trajectory away from a genuine resolution of the essential dilemma which 
has plagued the Labour Party for over a hundred years and which presents itself in the 
contradictions between an historic empathy with political Zionism akin to a family 
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relationship on the one hand, and Labour's socialist and humanitarian ideological 
principles. 
In sum, the thesis asserts that the essential dilemma is a psychological, ideological and 
political condition located in British Labour Party and related figures, resulting from 
unique factors in their relationship with political Zionism. This condition is composed 
from three core aspects, which also form the basis and nature of the British Labour 
Party's relationship with political Zionism. The three core aspects are psychological, 
ideological, and political. While these three core aspects are distinctive in themselves 
and possess distinctive components, they also share common components and 
characteristics, and as such they relate, influence and interact with each other. The 
source of the three core aspects and their respective components are primarily located 
in what this study refers to as the common origins, the related religious philosophies, 
and the shared socialist ideology. The details of the components comprising the three 
core aspects are as follows. 
1) The psychological aspects are essentially derived from the common origins which 
are composed of numerous factors that are shared by Labour and political Zionism; 
these include the emergence of the Labour Party and political Zionism in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, with the founding principal objective of furthering the social, 
economic and political position of a designated section of British society, the working 
classes (Labour), and the Jewish community (political Zionism). Additional factors 
include the common histories, backgrounds, locations, predicaments, exclusions, 
persecution, exploitations, deprivations and experiences of the working classes and 
Jews. Further psychological commonalities stem from the related religious 
philosophies (Christianity and Judaism) which occurs primarily between Labour's 
Christian socialists and the link political Zionism makes with Judaism and Palestine 
(the Christian Holy Land). Although religion was an important common factor in the 
emergence and development of both the Labour Party and political Zionism, there 
were significant differences of emphasis: while Judaism was a keystone of political 
Zionism philosophy (in that Jewishness was an essential qualification, and the central 
aim of political Zionism was to establish a `Jewish' entity in Palestine via `Jewish' 
immigration and settlement), religion was not a tenet of Labour Party ideology, 
objectives or membership, although Christianity, notably in the shape of Christian 
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socialism and a significant contribution from Methodism, was a consistent factor in 
Labour's identity and development. Further components emanated from an amalgam 
of organisational and personal factors: organisationally, the Labour Party had 
numerous Jewish MPs, non-Jewish Labour and related figures had Jewish colleagues 
and constituencies with sizable Jewish communities located in major cities from 
London, Manchester and Glasgow which in small or large part supported political 
Zionism; more personally, key figures - Herbert Morrison, Hugh Gaitskell and George 
Brown - for example - though Gentiles, married Jewish partners. 
2) The ideological aspects are principally derived from the shared socialist ideology 
located in the stated socialist identity, aims and principles of the Labour Party, and the 
socialist sections of the political Zionism movement (Poale Zion, Mapai, Mepham, 
and Avoda - the Labor Party of Israel). Apart from the shared socialist ideology 
Labour and political Zionism share additional related socialist components such as 
affiliations with trade unions and their umbrella organs, the Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) and the political Zionism equivalent, the Histadrut, the co-operative movement 
and the kibbutzim; and on a broader international perspective, the Socialist 
International and the Zionist Organisation. 
3) The political aspects are largely derived from the fact that both the Labour Party 
and political Zionism are in the first instance political movements. The political 
aspects came into increasing significance as Labour developed into a party of 
government (1924 and 1929-1931), elevating Labour from the political fringe of 
opposition to a position of higher influence, and ultimately national and international 
power; relatedly, relations were increasingly influenced by political aspects as Labour 
governments were required to produce policies that accounted for British national and 
strategic interests as well as those of the party's socialist ideology. An international 
political dimension was imposed by the empire, the League of Nations Mandate for 
Palestine for which Britain was responsible (1920-1948). 
Although the earliest period of relations with political Zionism were largely free of 
controversy, they were ostensibly based on ignorance, misconceptions and 
misinformation (emulating from political Zionism's propaganda), along with elements 
of cultural prejudice and expediency, which resulted in the intrinsic contradiction 
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located in Labour's socialism, and political Zionism's specific type of nationalism 
generally being submerged. However, the essential dilemma condition expanded and 
accelerated as the emerging realities of political Zionism (as a colonial, para-military 
nationalist organ) and Palestine (as possessing an indigenous population comprising 
Christians, Jews and Muslims) emerged during the inter-war years (1918-1939) to 
expose the ideological and political contradictions these realities represented for the 
socialist Labour Party and related figures, and thus the basis and nature of Labour- 
political Zionism relations; this became increasingly prevalent during the periods 
when Labour was the party of government (1924,1929-1931, and 1945-1951), but the 
continuity of the essential dilemma has remained throughout (circa) a century of 
Labour-political Zionism relations. 
Thus, this thesis further asserts that not only is the psychological aspect of seminal 
importance in itself - in terms of understanding the basis and nature of Labour- 
political Zionism relations, - but that it is also an integral factor influencing the 
remaining core aspects. The omission of an in-depth investigation and analysis of the 
source and influence of the psychological aspect also makes the resulting conclusions 
and understandings of the ideological and political aspects, and the relationship 
generally, incomplete. Ultimately, New Labour's foreign policy-making and relations 
with political Zionism - the Labor Party of Israel - cannot be understood in 
abstraction, without reference to this historically evolving but still unresolved 
essential dilemma. 
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Chapter 1 
Historical Era: 1900-1944 
Common Origins, Related Religious Philosophies, 
Shared Socialist Ideology and the Essential Dilemma 
(1900-1944) 
Introduction 
This chapter identifies and accounts for the origins, sources and evolution of the 
essential dilemma. This essential dilemma is understood to be a psychological, 
ideological and political condition which exists among British Labour Party MPs and 
related figures, resulting from unique factors in their relationship with political 
Zionism. The origins and source of the essential dilemma condition are located in the 
psychological and ideological aspects and components. The psychological aspect 
arises from the perceived common origins and its primary element, the related 
religious philosophies (Christianity and Judaism), and the ideological aspect that stem 
from the perceived shared socialist ideology of Labour and sections of the political 
Zionist movement. Both the psychological and the ideological aspects defined the 
initial basis and nature of relations between Labour and political Zionism. The 
evolution of the essential dilemma occurs with the emerging realities of both Palestine 
and the nationalistic para-miltary and colonialist characteristics of political Zionism 
amid the consequences of these realities for the Palestinians; particularly as these 
realities posed a contradiction for Labour's socialist identity and principles, thereby 
forging a contradiction in terms of sustaining the close and supportive basis and 
nature of Labour's relations with political Zionism. 
As such, the essential dilemma is principally - but not exclusively - an ideological 
dilemma. The chapter shows, however, that the concept cannot be understood as an 
ideological dilemma alone, but that there are important political aspects to the 
dilemma (particularly as Labour assumes the office of government), and significant 
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psychological dimensions which are at times more prescient than the strictly 
ideological and/or political dimensions. 
The chapter offers an account of the Labour Party's early responses to political 
Zionism, in addition to the events which shaped the basis and nature of relations in 
the period nearing the end of WWII. The chapter demonstrates how these early 
responses were predicated on the perceived common origins of Labour socialism and 
political Zionism. These common origins stimulated a deeply emotional as well as an 
ideological affinity between the members of the respective movements which shaped 
Labour Party and related figures responses to political Zionism, Palestine, the 
essential dilemma and its evolution. 
The chapter further demonstrates the crucial part played by (Christian) Zionist 
sentiments among crucial Labour Party leaders, who were able to mediate those 
responses in the absence of a `natural' and unified ideological response from within 
the party. Key individuals within the party identified with political Zionism on the 
basis of a religious philosophy which they believed had much in common with Zionist 
aspirations for a `return' to the Holy Land. The combination of perceived common 
origins and Christian or pro-Zionist sentiments played their part through the 
psychological responses of individuals within the party to political Zionism. 
Ultimately, however, an inability to reconcile psychological support for political 
Zionism, and a perception of shared progressive (even socialist ideology) with the 
anti-imperialist ideological underpinnings of socialist belief created the essential 
dilemma to which this chapter refers. 
The chapter charts the development of this essential dilemma as Labour responded to 
a combination of internal and external determinants. Internal determinants refers to 
factors derived specifically from the Labour Party's own development (events, issues, 
status as opposition or governing party, and personalities) while external determinants 
refers to those factors and events beyond the direct influence of the Labour Party, 
including developments in Palestine itself and the impact of two World Wars. 
From this early stage, the chapter demonstrates the crucial role played by key 
individuals within the party, who were able to sway policy on the basis of their own 
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personal commitments and empathies in the absence of a coherent and unified 
ideological party response. The ideological response of the party might initially have 
seemed clear, given the perceived common origins and progressive character of 
political Zionism. However, as evidence mounted that political Zionism was 
formulated through an essentially nationalist and colonialist movement, the 
ideological contradictions left the party divided and its policy incoherent. Into this 
vacuum stepped those individuals whose personal commitments were based on the 
psychological factors mentioned above. They were the principal agents in directing 
policy and thus become the focus of our study in this chapter, rather than the 
institutional organs of the Labour Party and the trade unions that might normally be 
assumed to be the focus of a study about the formulation of policy. 
The British Labour Party in the early years: Foreign Policy and Reconciling Socialism 
with Nationalism 
`The Labour Party is a characteristically British production differing widely 
from Continental Socialist Parties. It is the product of its environment and of 
the national habit of mind. It grew out of the practical necessities of society 
rather than from any abstract theory. "58 
The British Labour Party was founded in 1900. Originally called the Labour 
Representation Committee (LRC)'59 
the LRC changed its name to the Labour Party in 
1906. The LRC and Labour Party proper emerged as a product of sections of left-wing 
trades unions and a collection of socialist political parties. These socialist parties 
included the Social Democratic Federation, 16° the Fabians Society'6' and the 
ua Tracey, Herbert (1948: 1) The British Labour Party: Its History, Growth Policy and 
Leaders, Clement Attlee, Forward, Volume 1, (London: Caxton) 
'" Labour Representation Committee (est. February 27,1900) at a conference attended by the 
trades unions affiliated to the TUC and a number of socialist political parties, societies and 
movements. 
160 Social Democratic Federation (SDF) (est. June 7,1881) [originally Democratic Federation 
until 1884 (DF)] was the first British socialist party. 
161 Fabians Society (est. January 4,1884) a socialist intellectual group promoting gradualist 
and reformist socialism, as opposed to revolutionary socialism. 
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Independent Labour Party 162 which agreed - along with the unions and TUC - at a 
specially convened conference to form the LRC (Labour Party). All of these organs 
became affiliated to the LRC (Labour Party). 
The components of the Labour Party comprised the Parliamentary Labour Party 
(PLP), affiliated trades unions, socialist societies and the Co-operative Party 
(1920), 163 and later, Constituency Labour Parties. Labour's decision and policy- 
making organs on a formal national level included the National Executive Committee 
(NEC), party conference, and the National Policy Forum, but the final decision and 
policy-making remained with the Parliamentary Labour Party leadership (Prime 
Minister and Cabinet). 
Labour's agenda and policy focus were almost entirely domestic. Although Labour 
was nominally an internationalist socialist party, the realities of the immense domestic 
challenges facing the party's few MPs (franchise extensions, education, health and 
welfare) with limited resources and parliamentary experience, and a largely 
impoverished constituency meant foreign affairs was very much a secondary 
consideration, if not a distant luxury. As the historian K. D. Brown states: 
`[George] Bernard Shaw insisted that he had no time to concern himself with 
foreign policy before 1914 because he was too much preoccupied with ... 
working out a practical programme for English socialists and establishing a 
Parliamentary Labour Party. In the years before the Great War, very few 
socialists took any interest in Foreign Affairs. "64 
'62 Independent Labour Party (est. January 14,1893) (ILP) Democratic Socialist party, its 
Christian socialist founder Keir Hardie became the first ILP and British socialist MP in the 
1892 General Election. 
163 Co-operative Party (est. 1920) socialist party its candidates stand jointly with Labour as 
Labour-Co-Op candidates in general elections; 27 were elected in 1997. 
164 Brown, K. D. [Editor] (1985: 268) The First Labour Party 1906-1914, Chapter 12, Labour 
and Foreign Affairs: A Search for Identity and Policies, (London: Croom Helm) 
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The Labour Party had joined the Second International in 1907, in line with the 
proposition that the working classes of the world shared common interests in the 
historic struggle against the capitalist classes. In real terms, however, the most 
pressing foreign policy considerations for the party were derived from Britain's 
imperial status. Whilst socialism was clear on the identification of imperialism as an 
advanced stage of capitalist, left-wing intellectuals like John A. Hobson165 and Henry 
Noel Brailsford166 understood imperial diplomacy as a sophisticated form of 
commercial rivalry and thus not the appropriate domain for socialist activity. An 
additional paternalist dimension to the debate was contributed by George Bernard 
Shaw, 167 who proposed that the `White Man's Burden' lay not in debate over whether 
to possess empire or not, but rather in how to manage Empire in a civilised and 
civilising manner. In general, however, such discussions were confined to leftist 
intellectual minorities. The large part of the Labour Party was uninterested in, and 
ignorant of, foreign affairs. Additionally, unlike the Conservatives and Liberals the 
Labour Party had little or no prior experience of international affairs, with the 
consequence that the party as a whole, and even the great intellectual figures within 
the Labour Party, devoted little time and effort towards the subject. The Labour 
leader, Robert Clynes, 168 described Labour's foreign policy aims in the years up to 
1937 as follows: 
165 John Atkinson Hobson (b. 1858-d. 1940) a British economist and critic of imperialism; 
Hobson's magnum opus, Imperialism: A Study (1902) argued the basis of imperialism was to 
secure new markets, influencing Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism, (1951). 
161 Leonard Woolf (b. 1880-d. 1969) was a political theorist, author, civil servant and publisher; 
joined the Labour Party and the Fabian Society, circa, 1914. 
11 Henry Noel Brailsford (b. 1873-d. 1958) a British Labour related figure, the son of a 
Methodist preacher, Brailsford was a left-wing journalist and foreign correspondent for The 
Manchester Guardian, specializing in Egypt. An Independent Labour Party (ILP) member 
(1907-1932) he unsuccessfully Labour candidate in the 1918 general election; noted for his 
anti-colonial work Rebel India (1931) and articles for the New Statesman and Tribune. 
167 George Bernard Shaw (b. 1856-d. 1950) Irish playwright and socialist; a Fabian and 
pamphleteer, he helped establish the Labour Party. 
I" John Robert Clynes (b. I 869-d. 1949) MP: (Manchester North East), (Manchester Putting, 
191&1931,1935-1945); Labour leader, 1921-1922; Home Secretary, 1929-1931. Born in 
Oldham, the son of a labourer Clynes left school, aged 10, to work in a cotton mill. 
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`The foreign policy of Labour has always been to remain friendly with other 
nations equally, not favouring one above the other. ' 1 69 
Common Origins: The Labour Party and the Political Zionism Movement 
A notable exception to this alleged disinterest in foreign affairs arose as the Labour 
Party developed a response to the rise of political Zionism in the early twentieth 
century. A crucial factor in determining the basis and nature of relations between the 
Labour and political Zionist movements were their perceived common origins. The 
vast majority of Labour's support was derived largely from the industrial urban slums, 
and the need to emancipate and amend the conditions of working-classes were similar 
to the origins of political Zionism which drew its support from the predominantly 
poor Jewish communities and the attempts to improve social, economic and political 
conditions among the Ghettoes of Europe and the Russian Pales. 
1 70 In terms of their 
common origins the alignment between the socialist ideologies and agendas of Labour 
and political Zionism was also assisted by the associations and familiarity between the 
working classes which included many Jewish communities. 
From the earliest beginnings the relationship between the British Labour Party and 
organised political Zionists in Britain was based on some common characteristics. 
Both the Labour Party (1900) and the Zionist Organisation (1897)17' were founded 
I" Clynes, John Robert (1937: 245) Memoirs 1924-1937, Chapter XIX, 1935-1937 - Trouble 
in Palestine -A country promised to two races - Lawrence of Arabia versus Lord Balfour - 
War in the Holy Land, (London: Hutchinson) 
169 Ibid., (1937: 216) Chapter XVII, 1932-1935 - Britain's Foreign Outlook, Storm Clouds 
over Europe 
170 A territory or jurisdiction surrounded by hostile people and/or power. Used to denote 
British held territory in fourteenth and fifteenth century Ireland, a Pale of Settlement referred 
to Tsarist Russia where areas allocated to Jews; demarcated by a post or stake called a Pale, 
Jews were forbidden to pass, hence the English language term, `beyond the Pale. ' 
"I The Zionist Organisation (ZO) was established by political Zionists at the First Zionist 
Congress, Basle, Switzerland (August 29-31,1897), as an umbrella organisation for the 
Zionist movement. The congress was organised by Theodor Herzl (ZO President, 1897-1904) 
and Max Simon Nordau (b. 1849-d. 1923). The ZO was re-named the World Zionist 
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within a few years of each other. The primary motivations for their founding were in 
many respects similar in that the Labour Party was formed by social pioneers based in 
London who wanted to improve the lives of the working-classes in terms of 
education, health, political and employment rights. Similarly, the political Zionist's 
wanted to improve the social, economic and political conditions of Jews in Europe 
and Russia. Although important contributions were made by rural agrarian 
communities, the Labour Party and that part of the political Zionist movement which 
developed in Britain arose predominantly in the sprawling industrial slums, notably 
London, Manchester and Glasgow; these cities were also home to the majority of the 
Jewish communities, many of them immigrants to Britain having fled persecution in 
Eastern Europe and Russia. 
The work of Robert Roberts captures this shared predicament as he said of his own 
experience of the Jewish poor of Manchester (c. 1900-1925) `The Jews, twenty 
thousand strong, dwelt in an area adjacent to ours, some in poverty so appalling that it 
shocked even . us. 
' 1 72 And the fictionalized predicament presented by Jewish 
assimilation and Christian Zionism conveyed in George Eliot's Daniel Deronda were 
followed by the more overtly socialist publications such as Robert Tressell's Ragged 
Trousered Philanthropist (1914) and George Orwell's Road to Wigan Pier (1937). 
The Labour Party emerged from a combination of trades unions and the industrial 
working class. The Labour movement was defined by public demonstrations, strikes 
and non-violent confrontation to improve social conditions and achieve political 
parliamentary reform, building on the earlier work of the ' Chartist movement and 
others. 173 The reaction of the state towards the Chartists in handing down judicial 
Organisation (WZO) in January 1960. British Jewish support for political Zionism was 
minimal, in response, the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland was established in 
1899 to which Chaim Weizmann (ZO President, 1921-1931,1935-1946) became attached. 
172 Roberts, Robert (1971: 171) The Classic Slum: Salford in the First Quarter of the Century, 
Chapter 8, Culture, (London: Pelican) 
"' The Chartist movement (c. 1838-1848) advocated political and parliamentary reform 
including universal male suffrage (Men over 21), secret ballot voting, a parliamentary salary 
and abolition of property qualification for election to Parliament, annual Parliaments and 
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sentences of penal servitude and/or transportation for life174 and the violent repression 
of public gatherings and political demonstrations like that at Peterloo175 were also 
directed at union activists exemplified by the Tolpuddle Martyrs, 176 and as such were 
not that dissimilar to the discrimination, repression, pogroms and banishment to the 
Pales and Ghettos experienced by the Jews in Eastern Europe and Russia. 
Both Labour and the political Zionists were closely aligned to the Trades Union 
movement. The Labour Party was born from the activities and sponsorship of the 
unions, and many of its early MPs were union members and leaders. As a 
consequence of this shared trades unionism and political background, the first official 
links between the Labour Party and political Zionism were established. Both the 
delight and recognition of the linkage, the achievements and future potential resulting 
from the Labour-political Zionism alignment are adequately acknowledged by James 
S. Middleton (Labour General Secretary 1935-1944)' 77 as he declared: 
equal electoral districts. See: Chase, Malcolm (2007) Chartism: A New History, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press) 
14 See: Clarke, Marcus (1970) The Term of His Natural Life, (London: Penguin), and, 
Hughes, Robert (1988) The Fatal Shore: A History of the Transportation of Convicts to 
Australia 1787-1868, (London: Pan Books) 
"s Peterloo Massacre: St Peter's Field, Manchester (August 16,1819) an open public meeting 
attended by 60,000 organised by the Manchester Patriotic Union Society campaigning for 
parliamentary reform was charged by cavalry and yeomanry killing eleven, and wounding 
500. 
176 Tolpuddle Martyrs: a group of nineteenth century labourers transported to Australia for 
swearing an oath to the Friendly Society of Agricultural Labourers, and early trade union. 
Although the 1799 Combinations Act prohibiting the formation of unions had been repealed 
in 1824, a 1797 law prohibiting oaths was invoked to deport the society's members. 
"' James Smith Middleton (b. 1878-d. 1962) was Assistant Party Secretary, 1900-1935; pro- 
political Zionist Labour related figure, Morgan Phillips (b. 1902-1963) succeeded Middleton 
as General Secretary (1944-1961); Phillips was Chairman of the Socialist International 1948- 
1957. 
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`Labour [Labor] Zionism178 is the greatest revolutionary force in 
modem Jewish history. It has carried out one of the most amazing 
Socialist experiments in our time. It is a movement that has a 
message for Jew and non-Jew alike. ' 1 79 
For the `romantic socialism of the middle-class' and the industrial workers frustrated 
with the `blinkered gradualism' of the formal party political structure, `utopia was 
planned collectivism. ' 180 Nowhere in the first decades of the 20th century was 
collectivism epitomised more purely than in the Kibbutzim, 
'8' the Histadrut'82 and the 
rural agrarian Labor Zionist colonies of Palestine, as identified and witnessed by a 
swath of Labour MPs including Ramsay Macdonald, Josiah Wedgwood, 
183 Herbert 
Morrison and Henry Snell. 
The association between political Zionism and socialism had not always been explicit. 
`When the first Zionist Congress met in Basle in 1897, there had been no mention of 
Socialism. "" At this stage, political Zionism was orchestrated primarily by Western 
European Jews who shred Herzl's bourgeois characteristics. Nonetheless, socialist 
ideas were rapidly spreading among East European Jews, attracted by the promises of 
Russian socialism. Writers like Nikolai Chernyshevsky, 185 Nachman Syrkin and Dov 
"s Labor Zionism refers to the socialist section of the broader political Zionism movement. 
179 Levenberg, Schneier (1945: 8) The Jews and Palestine: A Study in Labour Zionism, 
quoting, James Middleton, Preface, (London: The Narod Press) 
'°° Jefferys, Kevin (2002: 172) Labour Forces: From Ernest Bevin to Gordon Brown, Chapter 
10, Tim Bale, Barbara Castle, (London: I. B. Tauris) 
Ian The Kibbutz movement is an agricultural collective community that blends the ideologies 
of socialism and political Zionism into what is commonly referred to as Labor Zionism. 
182 Histadrut (Jewish Federation. of Labor) est. 1920: The Zionist and Israeli equivalent of the 
Trades Union Council (TUC). It is nominally socialist but excludes Arab/Palestinian workers. 
133 Josiah Wedgwood (b. 1872-d. 1943) MP: (Liberal till 1919, then Independent Labour Party) 
(Newcastle-Under-Lyme, 1906-1942). 
III' Laqueur, Walter (1972: 270) A History of Zionism, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson) 
185 Nikolai Chernyshevsky (b. I 828-d. 1889) a Russian born philosopher and journalist, the son 
of a priest, and author of What is to be done? (1863), a novel written in prison, viewed as a 
blueprint for political radicalism, admired by Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. 
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Ber Borochov, pioneered the intellectual and synthesis of socialism and Marxism with 
the Jewish struggle for national emancipation and it was not long before socialist 
Zionism became a prominent political force within the Zionist Organisation and the 
wider political Zionist movement. Borochov in particular argued that the Jewish 
proletariat would be unable to participate in the global class struggle under its current 
oppressive status and that only once national emancipation had been achieved, could 
it then contribute fully to the wider struggle. As Jewish settlers moved in increasing 
numbers to Palestine from Russia and East Europe in the early twentieth century, this 
ideological socialism acquired more practical dimensions, resulting in the 
establishment of Labor Zionism under the political leadership of individuals like 
David Ben-Gurion186 (later prime minister of Israel), a brand of political Zionism 
which emphasised collectivism, voluntarism, and internationalism. Although these 
were largely ideals to be applied specifically to the Jewish `redemption' of the land in 
Palestine, they had much in common with the ideals of the British Labour Party, 
eschewing the more militant positions of communism and far-left politics in favour of 
community-based political action. 
An additional factor supporting the alignment of Labour and political Zionism arose 
from the fact that many Labour figures were Christian socialists. The Old Testaments 
and the New Testaments of the bible were a binding force in that Labour figures were 
relatively aware - and in some cases fluent in knowledge - of the Jewish faith and 
ancient historical experience; as a result of their Christian education and faith, Labour 
figures were often more familiar with the history, culture and maps of the ancient 
Hebrews and Palestine than their own histories. This is what may be termed the 
related religious philosophies aspect of the common origins. (Ironically, the religious 
and Messianic branches of Zionism, derived from the Judaic faith of the Old 
Testament, which recounted the `return of God's Chosen to the Promised Land, ' had 
little in common with socialism and were themselves at odds within the World Zionist 
Organisation, and all forms of Labor and Marxist Zionism). 
'86 David Ben-Gurion (b. 1886-d. 1973) political Zionist leader, born Plonsk, Poland [Russian 
Empire] arrived Palestine 1906. PM of Israel [Labor]: 1948-1953,1955-1963. 
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In stark contrast to the common origins and related religious philosophies between 
Labour and political Zionism, there were virtually no comparable factors from which 
to form a Labour-Palestinian relationship of any such equivalence. Apart from the 
domestic focus and widespread ignorance and apathy towards foreign affairs within 
Labour, there was also the fact that - unlike the basis of Labour's relations with 
political Zionism, there were few comparable political ideological aspects upon which 
a Labour-Palestinian relationship could be based; and certainly none based in Britain. 
Although there were a few examples of Labour figures who had knowledge and 
experience of Palestine and the Palestinians (Ramsay MacDonald c. 1922 and Thomas 
S. B. Williams c. 1924, for example), the crucial fact that there were initially no 
resident Palestinian or Arab communities in Britain meant that no common origins 
and identities were formed. 
Similarly, although there were significant Palestinian Christian communities in 
Palestine, there were no Labour figures that were of Palestinian origins, or even the 
Muslim faith (the religion of the vast majority of Palestinians), while in contrast 
numerous Jewish figures held office within the Labour Party and therefore political 
Zionists had potentially more natural internal advocates. Furthermore, few, if any, 
Labour figures would have undertaken Islamic studies at school or university with the 
result that the commonalities Judaism and Christianity shared with Islam as three 
great monotheistic faiths that also shared the Prophets of Abraham, Moses and Jesus 
was largely lost therefore as a basis for Labour-Palestinian relations premised on 
related religious philosophies. Additionally, Jewish assimilation had a long and 
established history due in part after Oliver Cromwell'97 had amended the Laws 
preventing Jews from taking residence in England and serving in Parliament. In 1858 
the removal of the disqualification of orthodox Jews was revoked, leading to the 
election of the first orthodox Jew to Parliament, Lionel Rothschild. ' 88 As a result 
187 Oliver Cromwell reversed Edward I `Edict of Expulsion' (1290) banishing Jews from 
England in 1657. The purge led to 300 Jewish executions in the Tower of London and the 
compulsory wearing of a yellow segment of cloth identifying Jews -a tactic later adopted by 
the German Nazi regime (1933-1945). 
lu Lionel Nathan de Rothschild (b. 1808-d. 1879) was elected as Liberal MP in 1847; 
Rothschild's refusal to swear an oath on the Christian Bible excluded him until 1858 when a 
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Jewish figures were a feature of British political life and wider diplomatic service and 
society culminating in the Premierships of a Jewish born Benjamin Disraeli, 189 and 
succeeded by such notables as the Rothschild family and figures like Chaim 
Weizmann190 and Herbert Samuel. '9' 
As for much of British society, Palestine - where any thought or awareness existed at 
all in the Labour Party, - was often viewed in terms of a biblical romanticism through 
almost mythical coloured spectacles. These perceptions of Palestine were sustained by 
the experiences and works of writers, painters and travellers among the missionaries, 
artists and military-diplomatic personnel that served to create an image of a people 
and landscape somehow locked in time - that in terms of its reflective value of the 
actual realities was largely nonsense. For example, it was the seventeenth century 
English Poet - George Sandys (b. 1578-d. 1644) - who introduced the notion of 
Palestine as `a land that flowed with milk and honey; and no part empty of delight or 
profit' 192 into a western consciousness already receptively fertile imaginings extracted 
from the bible and a Christian based education. Bishop Reginald Heber's Lamentation 
over Palestine poetically reflects this popular empathy felt by Christians and Jews to a 
land lost to time and Islam: 
`Reff of thy sons, amid thy foes forlorn, 
While cold oblivion, `mid thy ruins laid, 
Bill revoking the requirement to use the Christian term `God' - Rothschild used Hebrew 
Elohim - allowed him to take his seat. 
'" Benjamin Disraeli (b. 1804-d. 1881) Conservative PM: 1874-1880,1868; born of Jewish 
parents Disraeli was baptised aged 13 into the Church of England (1817). 
190 Chaim Weizmann (b. 1874-d. 1952) was leader of the Zionist Organisation, 1921- 
1931/1935-1946, and the first President of Israel, 1948-1952. 
19' Herbert Samuel (b. 1870-d. 1963) was a Liberal politician and diplomat; first High 
Commissioner to Palestine (July 1,1920-August 25,1925). See: Wasserstein, Bernard (1992) 
Herbert Samuel: A Political Life, (Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Samuel, Herbert (1945) 
Memoirs, (London: Cresset Press) 
192 Said, Edward W. (1992: 11) The Question of Palestine, quoting, Richard Bevis, Making 
the Desert Bloom: An Historical Picture of Pre-Zionist Palestine, The Middle East New 
Letter, Vol. 2, February-March 1971, pp. 4, (London: Vintage) 
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And mom the captive land you loved so well. "93 
How the common origins and related religious philosophies were reflected in key 
Labour and related fi ug res. 
It is possible to identify the influences of the common origins, shared socialist 
ideology and related religious philosophies upon the thinking and positions of key 
Labour figures of the inter-war period. Following the death of the first Labour Leader 
- Keir Hardie 
' 94 
- in 1915, the most significant Labour figure to encapsulate all the 
factors comprising the common origins and related religious philosophies of Labour's 
support for political Zionism was Ramsay MacDonald. For over a decade MacDonald 
presided as chairman and leader of the party. His role at Labour's helm also coincided 
with some of the most dramatic events and issues in the conflict between the 
Palestinians and the political Zionists over Palestine, which was to have profound 
consequences for the basis and nature of relations between Labour and political 
Zionism. 
MacDonald was Foreign Secretary at the same time that he was Prime Minister during 
the Labour minority government of 1924. The former Labour leader, John Robert 
Clynes referring to Ramsay MacDonald's tenureship as Foreign Secretary in 1924 
said the following: 
`While he was with us, his foreign policy was the Labour one of mutual 
friendship with all other nations. ' 195 
193 Campbell, F. (1824: 2-4) Beauties of the British Poets; with Notices, Biographical and 
Critical, quoting, Rt. Rev. Reginald Heber, Lamentation over Palestine, Volume II, (London: 
Richard Edwards) 
194 Although James Keir Hardie (b. 1856-d. 1915) MP: (West Ham South, 1892-1895; Merthyr 
Tydfil, 1900-1915) died before he could become acquainted with political Zionism, the 
conversion to Christianity of the party's first leader (1906-1908) provided an early foundation 
in the related religious philosophies aspect of Labour-political Zionist relations. Hardie was 
born in Lanarkshire, Scotland, left school aged 11, to be a miner, he was chairman of the 
Independent Labour Party (1893-1900,1913-1914), and the Labour Party (1906-1908). 
1" Clynes, John Robert (1937: 245) 
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MacDonald was relatively well informed on the issues of the Jewish question, 
political Zionism, Palestine and the Middle East generally. As such he was reasonably 
well placed to consider Labour's policy position, as well as crafting a response to 
issues and events as they arose and developed during his lengthy tenureship. 
As the Labour Leader, MacDonald had undertaken a tour of the Middle East in 
1922.196 The primary purpose of the visit was to make an assessment of the countries 
and territories acquired by Britain at the conclusion of the First World War in 1918 
and which had previously resided within the jurisdiction of the Sultanates of the 
borders of the Ottoman Empire; the tour was to incorporate Palestine, administered 
since 1920 by the British under a League of Nations mandate. MacDonald had been 
among the first Labour figures to establish contacts with the various organs of the 
political Zionist movement, in this case, Poale Zion members Shlomo Kaplansky' 97 
and Berl Katznelson. 198 Before his departure he used these contacts to express his 
interest in the Jewish labor movement and political Zionism in general. 
MacDonald documented his visit to Palestine in a 1922 pamphlet publication, A 
Socialist in Palestine, which provides an early and invaluable insight into his personal 
response to the visit and the activities of political Zionism in Palestine. " What is 
immediately apparent - even in the context of the early 1920s - is the swooning 
biblical and lamenting prosaic style employed: 
`After wandering I seem to have come home, for I feel as familiar with this 
place as I do with the benty hillocks of Lossiemouth [Scotland]. I write in a 
room at Nazareth, and for days I have been in places where I have lived 
Philip Snowden and Josiah Wedgwood travelled with MacDonald to Palestine in 1922 
197 Shlomo Kaplansky (b. 1894-d. 1950) was a founding figure of Poale Zion, a World Union's 
representative to the Socialist International and a leading proponent of bi-nationalism. 
I% Berl Katznelson (b. 1887-d. 1944) was a key intellectual founder of labor Zionism; born 
Bobruysk, Russia, he arrived in Palestine in 1909. 
In addition, R. MacDonald also wrote articles for the Zionist Organisation of America's 
publication, New Palestine, that clearly convey the biblical dimension: The Great Return: The 
Alluring Call of Palestine, (May 5,1922); A Pilgrim's Impressions of Palestine, (June 23, 
1922); and The Great Jewish Return, (January 24,1924) 
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without setting foot in them before. Places which I have now seen as though I 
had, in dreams, dwelt in them for as long as I can remember., 200 
For Ramsay MacDonald, as a deeply committed Christian, with a childhood steeped 
in a religious education and studies, the visit to Palestine felt neither the first or an 
unfamiliar experience, - but a `return' to something familiar. This affinity with 
Palestine in large part based on the religious component is directly related by 
MacDonald to the related Jewish experience - the `calling' - and by linking their 
salvation as a justification for the political aspect of Zionism in referencing the plight 
of Jews elsewhere denied rights and protection in Europe and Russia. As MacDonald 
says: 
`The Jew seeks a national home in Palestine not only because he is denied a 
home elsewhere, but because Palestine has always been calling to him from 
his heart and he must go. '201 
A measure of the depth of MacDonald's early commitment to political Zionism can be 
gleaned from his account of the historic components of western prejudice and 
persecution towards the Jews. It was this that stimulated the idea and led to the 
development of political Zionism in the first instance, and for MacDonald it provides 
the source of a scathing criticism of those Jews who do not embrace the new political 
Zionist ideology as an opportunity to address the historic and ongoing injustices: 
`He [the anti-political Zionist Jew] is the person whose views upon life make 
one antisemitic. He has no country, no kindred. Whether as a sweater or a 
financier, he is an exploiter of everything he can squeeze. He is behind every 
ill that governments do, and his political authority, always exercised in the 
dark, is greater than that of parliamentary majorities. He has the keenest of 
brains and the bluntest of consciences. He detests Zionism because it revives 
200 MacDonald, Ramsay (1922: 9) A Socialist in Palestine, (London: Poale Zion) 
20' Ibid., (1922: 5) 
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the idealism of his race, and has political implications which threaten his 
economic interests. '202 
203 
The academic Joseph Gorny claims Ramsay MacDonald was a `complex personality' 
possessing a `contradictory nature, combining religious tendencies and sober 
rationalism, idealistic zeal and calculating political opportunism, humanism and 
snobbish arrogance , 204 and that his [MacDonald's] laments of the metaphysical, 
spiritual singularity of Palestine also account for his views on the nature of the 
political Zionism: 
`... that as a national concept and a social movement, Zionism could not be 
comprehended without recognition of the romantic spiritual ties between the 
Jewish people and Palestine. '205 
2°2 Ibid., (1922: 7) 
203 A consequence of visits to Palestine (and later Israel) and the European, Western 
(occidental) origins and cultural characteristics of many political Zionists, key Labour figures 
across the generations saw their own histories, experiences, cultures and societies reflected in 
what socialist Zionism was creating in Palestine, and later Israel: a national society moulded 
on Western and European models, notions of civilisation and technical advancement, which 
clearly illustrate culturally based perceptions of superiority and prejudice towards the Orient. 
As, for example, Ramsay MacDonald conveyed in 1922: `When one walks through Te-Aviv . 
... 
One feels as though this place were across no sea, as though it were a short railway 
journey from London or any other Western town. It might be an English watering-place with 
a Continental touch about it. ' And similarly, why in 1958 Richard Crossman thought the 
`Zionist philosophy' was essential to the `renaissance of the Arab world. ' Collette, Christine 
& Bird, Stephen [Editors] (2000) Chapter 3, Deborah Osmond, British . Jewry and Labour 
Politics, 1918-39, quoting, Ramsay J. MacDonald (1923: 12-13) In Palestine Now, in Simon, 
Leon & Stein, Leonard [Editors] Awakening Palestine, (London: John Murray), and, 
Crossman, Richard (1960: 104) A Nation Reborn: The Israel of Weizmann, Bevin and Ben- 
Gurion, Chapter III, The First Ten Years of Independence: David Ben-Gurion VIII, (London: 
Hamish Hamilton) 
Gorny, Joseph (1982: 30) 
Ibid., (1982: 30) 
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MacDonald was accompanied on his 1922 visit to Palestine by Chief Whip, Arthur 
Henderson, 206 Philip Snowden207 (newly elected backbencher), and Josiah Clement 
Wedgwood. Norman Rose described Wedgwood as the `foremost patron of Zionism 
in England. '208 Of his generation Josiah Wedgwood was the Labour figure most 
familiar with Palestine and the Zionist venture therein; as well as travelling there with 
Ramsay MacDonald and Arthur Henderson in 1922, he returned in 1926-1927 and 
1933. Wedgwood defined political Zionism and how it might be adopted into 
Britain's wider interests in the Middle East as follows: 
`The object of Zionism is to increase, perhaps create, the self-respect of a 
scattered and submerged race. The supreme work of statesmanship, or of 
philosophy, is to raise man's self respect. All virtues come there from. When 
Theodor Herzl started Zionism he knew what he was about, and the stuff he 
had to work on. But I had never heard of Zionism till I saw political and 
strategic virtue in a buffer State between Germany Turkey and British Egypt 
and Africa. '209 
2" Arthur Henderson (b. 1963-d. 1935) MP: (Barnard Castle, 1903-1918), (Widnes, 1919- 
1922), (Newcastle-Upon-Tyne East, 1922-1923), (Barnsley, 1924-1931); Labour leader 1908- 
1910,1914-1917,1931-1932; Foreign Secretary 1924-1931, and again 1933-1935; Nobel 
peace prize Laureate (1934). Born in Glasgow, Scotland, Henderson left School aged 12, 
converting from Congregationalism to Methodism. 
Philip Snowden had accompanied Ramsay MacDonald to Palestine in 1922; although a 
pro-political Zionist figure he was not - unlike R. MacDonald - apparently sufficiently moved 
by the experience to recount the events or his impressions in his exhaustive memoirs 
[Snowden, Philip Viscount (1934) An Autobiography, 2 Volumes, (London: Nicholson and 
Watson)], and neither did his biographers: Cross, Colin (1966) Philip Snowden, (London: 
Barrie & Rockliff); and, Layboum, Keith (1987) Philip Snowden: The first Labour 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, (Bradford: Bradford Libraries & Information Services) 
20 Rose, Norman The Seventh Dominion, The Historical Journal, Vol. XIV, Issue No. 2, June 
1971, pp. 397-416, p. 399 
20 Wedgwood, Josiah C. (1940: 132) Memoirs of a Fighting Life, Chapter VIII, Backs to the 
Wall, (London: Hutchinson & Co) 
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Rose says that a great deal of the interest and `factors that prompted Wedgwood, and 
many of his contemporaries, to champion the Zionist creed' arose from the Protestant, 
non-conformist tradition '21 
0 and also as a result of what Rose identifies as bringing 
`Western civilization to the desert. '211 As Wedgwood himself asserts, there is a direct 
correlation with the ideology and aims of the socialist Labour Party and the political 
Zionism movement: 
`Zionism is doing for the Jews what the Labour Party seeks to do for the 
British working class. '212 
Wedgwood was introduced to political Zionism from the perspective of what he 
viewed as the creating of a `Jewish Palestine'213 in April 1916, as a result of military 
service during the Gallipoli campaign in Turkey. But it was in the following autumn 
after a meeting with the novelist Dorothy Richardson that he became fully persuaded 
of the concept, as he says, it was at that point `I first came to hear of Zionism as a 
creed. '214 215 As a result of this meeting with Richardson, and a first meeting with 
Chaim Weizmann in December 1916 (after Lloyd George had seconded Weizmann to 
the war effort in his capacity as a Chemistry Professor), Wedgwood turned a desire to 
assist the Zionist agenda for Palestine into a practical dimension. Soon after that series 
of meetings and the confirmation of his conversion to political Zionism, Wedgwood 
210 Rose, Norman (1971: 399) 
211 Ibid., (1971: 400) 
212 Wedgwood, Josiah C. (1928: 119-121) The Seventh Dominion, (London: Hutchinson & 
Co) 
213 Wedgwood, Josiah C. (1940: 118) Chapter VIII 
214 Ibid., (1940: 132) 
215 Assessments of Dorothy Richardson's commitment to political Zionism vary: Fromm 
says, `She herself was neutral about it [political Zionism]' Fromm, Gloria G. (1977: 76) 
Dorothy Richardson: A Biography, (Urbana: University Illinois Press); And `she too 
supported this cause' are two perspectives, though Rosenberg states it was the influence of 
Benjamin [Berg] Grad a Jewish Russian exile and `ardently Zionist' who greatly influenced 
Richardson and Wedgwood's position towards Zionism. Rosenberg, John (1973: 28) Dorothy 
Richardson: The Genius they Forgot, (London: Duckworth) 
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undertook a meeting with leading British and Zionist figures, which resulted in a 
document that epitomised what became the essential dilemma for Labour. 
While the Balfour Declaration of 1917 bears the name of the British Foreign Secretary 
- Arthur Balfour216 - it is less well known and recorded that 
it was Wedgwood who 
organised and assisted in motivating the leading figures of the day into actively 
facilitating a Jewish Home in Palestine, notably by helping to `devise a plan' to secure 
a British `legal' commitment to that political Zionist goal. Wedgwood conveys the 
circumstances from which the declaration arose with a retrospectively breath-taking 
nonchalance: 
`A little luncheon to devise a plan, which plan ultimately became the Balfour 
Declaration, took place in the Reform Club - just Rufus Isaacs, 
217 Neil 
Primrose, 218 I, and (I think) James de Rothschild, not then M. P., but Neil's 
shadow. Mark Sykes discovered Zionism about the same time as myself, 
though I was never intimate with him till after the Sykes-Picot treaty219 was 
signed. '22° 
2'6 Arthur James Balfour (b. 1848-d. 1930) MP: (Manchester East, 1885-1890); Conservative 
leader, 1902-1911; PM: 1902-1905; Foreign Secretary, 1916-1919. 
217 Rufus Daniel Isaacs [1's Marquess of Reading, 1926] (b. 1860-d. 1935) was Liberal 
politician and jurist, Ambassador to USA (1918-1919) and Foreign Secretary (1931). 
218 Neil Primrose (b. 1882-d. 1917) Liberal politician. J C. Wedgwood states before Primrose 
was killed in the Gaza campaign it had been `understood between Mr. Lloyd George and him 
that he should be the first High Commissioner for Palestine. Had he survived, the whole 
history of Palestine would have been very different - not least because the Hon. Neil Primrose 
would have made a Jewish Palestine respectable in the dull eyes of snobbish military 
opinion'. Wedgwood, Josiah C. (1940: 133) Chapter VIII, Backs to the Wall. 
219 Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) was secretly signed by Sir Mark Sykes (b. 1897-d. 1919) a 
Conservative political and diplomatic advisor and the French diplomat Francois Georges- 
Picot to divide the-former Ottoman Turkish territories in the Middle East between the British 
and French governments ignoring previous promises of independence to Arab leaders. 
20 Wedgwood, Josiah C. (1940: 132) 
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Six months before the November 1917 Balfour Declaration was eventually made 
public, and in the same period after the `luncheon' at which the declaration was 
devised, Wedgwood had undertaken an active public campaign on behalf of political 
Zionism, which he was to develop and continue over the coming decade. Although 
evidently deeply committed, Wedgwood freely admitted he was still quite ignorant of 
the complete character of political Zionism: 
`In June 1917 I was speaking for the [Zionist] cause in London with much 
fervour and little knowledge, based chiefly on my American visit and our need 
for help from the Jews of the world. Later [after the United States joined WWI 
in 1917] we welcomed ... the first Jewish regiments in arms, from America - 
they who were promised land in the Promised Land and never got it. '221 
Although a significant number of senior Labour colleagues shared Wedgwood's firm 
opinions in favour of political Zionism (notably Ramsay MacDonald, Arthur 
Henderson and George Lansbury), these views were not universally appreciated 
within the party, as Wedgwood noted of the Labour Leader - John Clynes - in 1922: 
`The Labour Leader was by no means pleased with my Zionist views on 
Palestine. '222 
Nonetheless, Wedgwood continues to develop the Zionist contacts he made in the 
mid-1920s during subsequent visits to Palestine: 
`I spent the Christmas [parliamentary] recess of 1926-7 wandering the Near 
East. In Palestine the whole Zionist organisation entertained us from Dan to 
Beersheba, and I dispensed good advice to all, from Trades Unions to 
Governors. I found the worst British Administration in the whole Empire, and 
the best Jews in the world. '223 
221 Ibid., (1940: 133) 
222 Ibid., (1940: 177) Chapter V, India and the Front Bench 
2" Ibid., (1940: 194) Chapter XI, Eclipse 
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As a `consistent supporter of Zionism'224 there appears to be little or no contradiction 
between Labour's socialism and the nationalist colonialism of political Zionism in 
Joshua Wedgwood's vision for Palestine, particularly, as many Labour figures 
believed, if the transfer of land and political power to the political Zionists in 
Palestine was a passive, gradualist and non-violent process that delivered economic 
benefits to the wider population and communities. 
The role played by Poale Zion and the shared Socialist ideology 
Although the role and influence of leading political Zionists like Chaim Weizmann 
had a significant affect on the basis and nature of early relations between Labour and 
political Zionism in Britain, the establishment in Britain of the socialist Zionist 
political party, Poale Zion, and its affiliation to the Labour Party presented a major 
Zionist achievement contributing towards the movement's key agenda of creating a 
Jewish-Zionist entity in, or from Palestine. 
Apart from the close links and influence of Poale Zion to Labour figures and the 
party, arguably the most influential aspect of Labour-Poale Zion relations occurred in 
the role the socialist Zionists party played in affirming the `socialist' ideological 
identity and credentials of the wider political Zionism movement and its activities in 
Palestine. As a `socialist' Zionist party, affiliated to the Second International, Poale 
Zion was able to retain not just an influence at the highest levels of the Labour Party, 
but crucially, as the evidence from Palestine of the existence, resistance and negative 
consequences for the Palestinians of the Zionist agenda for a Jewish state gradually 
emerged, along with the growing realities of the nationalist, colonialist and para- 
military character of political Zionism, it was Poale Zion which assisted in retaining 
the notion among Labour figures - largely ignorant of the actual realities of Palestine 
and political Zionism - that what was being attempted in Palestine by the political 
Zionists was indeed socialism being undertaken by socialists; and significantly, that 
the responses of the Palestinians, where they were know about at all, arose from 
Linthwaite, Jacqueline M. (1960: 139) Zionism and British Policy in Palestine: With 
Special Reference to the Period 1914-1947, (The University of Nottingham) quoting, Norman 
A. Rose, (1973: 1) The Gentile Zionist: A Study in Anglo-Zionist Diplomacy, (London: Frank 
Cass) 
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nothing more than the provocations of the elitist, land-owning `feudal and reactionary 
leaders of the Palestine Arabs. '225 
The inauguration of the British Branch of Poale Zion in 1905 occurred at the same 
time that the Parliamentary Labour Party came into existence in the 1906 General 
Election, winning 29 seats. On the basis of perceived common origins and a shared 
socialist ideology, relations between Labour and Poale Zion blossomed until by 1920 
Poale Zion had not only become a World Confederation, but more significantly - in 
terms of its ability to influence Labour figures and the party's decision and policy- 
making process, had become officially affiliated to the Labour Party. 
Poale Zion's affiliation to Labour was underwritten by a bedrock of Jewish support 
for the Labour Party. As the Labour MP - Ian Mikardo - explains: 
`Many [Jewish immigrants] joined the Labour Party, especially in local 
government. While some of the specifically Jewish trade unions 
lingered on for a while (the longest survivors was the London Jewish 
Bakers' Union), the great majority of the Jewish workers joined, and 
took an active part in, the national trade unions, notably in the needle- 
trades and in cabinet-making. '226 
In addition to the links Poale Zion had acquired within Labour and the Trades Union 
movement, the British branch of this socialist Zionist party had maintained important 
close links to what became the World Zionist Organisation (WZO), as well as the 
Histadrut (Federation of Jewish Labor in Palestine - the Zionist equivalent of the 
British Trades Union Council, TUC). Gomy states: 
`Poale Zion had become an organised and effective lobby, producing 
information leaflets and campaign evens from the onset of the war in 1914; 
Local Secretary J. Pomeranz and the Jewish Times Editor Morris Meyer were 
225 Eastwood, Granville (1977: 98) Harold Laski, Chapter 4, American - India - Israel, 
quoting, -Yaakov Morris [no reference provided], (London: Mowbrays) 
226 Mikado, Ian (1988: 40) Back-Bencher, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson) 
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vociferous activists responsible for making the Labour Party and trade union 
movement aware of Zionist aspirations, and in establishing contact with 
leaders of both organs. ' 227 
Gorny continues: 
`The Manchester based Zionists led by Harry Sacher claim it was 
predominantly their efforts that pushed the issue of the Jews and Palestine 
onto Labour's political platform. Additionally, it is suggested the leading 
publication the `New Statesman, ' read among the British political elite and 
which carried Jewish and Zionist articles from 1913 onwards may also have 
had an effect upon the Labour Party leadership; and further consideration must 
be given to the special humanistic climate generated by war and the desire to 
create a more equal and just society. '228 
Although official Labour foreign Policy remained in the control of the Colonial 
Secretary, Lord Passfield (Sydney Webb), and party leader, Ramsay MacDonald, this 
did not prevent the more vociferous Labour supporters of political Zionism from 
attempting to direct Labour's policy further towards the more specific support for a 
Jewish State, and away from the 1917-1920 position stated in the War Aims 
Statement advocating the more vague notion of a `return' of the Jews to Palestine. 
Zionist influence from within Labour and outside had some notable supporters and a 
degree of success in relation to this issue. As early as 1920 leading figures from the 
Executive Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Parliamentary 
Committee of the Trades Union Congress229 signed and presented to Lloyd George 
(then attending the San Remo Conference) what had originally been an NEC 
resolution referring to Palestine becoming a Jewish national homeland, which they 
I Gomy, Joseph (1983: 8) 
2n Ibid., (1983: 8) 
2" The Committee included: John Clynes (Vice-Chair of Labour in the Commons), H. S. 
Lindsay (Secretary PLP), W H. Hutchinson (Chair, Labour Executive), Arthur Henderson 
(Chief Whip), G. H. Thomas (Chair TUC) and Charles William Bowerman (Secretary, 
Parliamentary Committee of the TUC). 
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insisted was `in harmony 230 not only with the Balfour Declaration, but also Labour's 
1917 statement (the pro-political Zionist claim was evidently in error as the War Aims 
only gave support to a Jewish `return, ' and not a Jewish Homeland or state). 
The political Zionist leader Berl Katznelson states the methodology for securing the 
continuation of Labour's support should include: 
`The good relations between the Palestinian and British movements should be 
carefully fostered by propaganda efforts, and Labour representatives should be 
invited to visit Palestine to see for themselves what is being achieved there. 231 
Although a number of key events arose to severely challenge the basis of the 
relationship between Labour and Poale Zion during the difficult inter-war years (not 
least the 1929 riots in Palestine, 1930 White Paper, and Whitechapel and St. Georges 
by-election), good relations were nevertheless maintained and for the most part 
thrived, particularly among some key figures within the party. This was due in large 
part to the efforts of British based Poale Zion figures. As James S. Middleton 
conveyed in late 1944 the basis and nature of relations as the calamity of the 
Holocaust was rapidly emerging: 
`For 25 years Poale Zion in this country has been affiliated to the Labour 
Party. During this period much has been accomplished to bring home to 
British socialists the aims and objects of [political] Zionism - the preservation 
of racial and religious tradition on the one hand and, on the other, the necessity 
of developing Palestine as a real Homeland where the oppressed may find 
refuge and where active young idealists can, by the sweat of their brows, build 
up a real Commonwealth where the interests and good will of the people are 
paramount. 9232 
'0 National Executive Committee Report, April 20,1920, Vol. 18, (London: Labour Party) 
Gorny, Joseph (1983: 25) quoting, Berl Katznelson, Mapai archives, December 20,1921, 
and January 23,1922, (London: Frank Cass) 
232 Levenberg, Schneier (1945: 5) Forward, quoting, James Middleton, (August 1944) 
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Poale Zion's affiliation to the Labour Party and its influence therein upon relations 
was not the only political Zionist success: in September 1920 a recommendation was 
put forward that representatives of Poale Zion be co-opted onto Labour's Advisory 
Committee on International Affairs (ACIA). This appointment would have given 
Poale Zion figures further access and potential influence over a key body in Labour's 
approach to decision-making on foreign policy. Although the recommendation was 
eventually rejected, the fact that it was even suggested and considered illustrates the 
closeness, the level of access and degree of influence this political Zionist group had 
within important sections of the Labour Party. 
233 234 
The affiliation of Poale Zion to Labour and its attendance at Labour Party conferences 
meant the group was able to regularly re-emphasise the socialist link between Labour, 
the Labor Zionists and their settlements in Palestine, and the mainstream political 
Zionist movement as a whole. This role became particularly important as the 
emergent realities of Palestine and political Zionism became more commonly known 
among Labour figures as the 1920s and 1930s progressed, and especially at the time 
when Labour was the party of government (1924,1929-193 1) and directly responsible 
for policy. Poale Zion's quintessential role and achievement was to continuously 
reiterate the socialist dimension in the basis of relations between Labour and political 
Zionism in Britain to a Labour Party increasingly exposed to contradictory evidence. 
In terms of accounting for the increasing resistance of the Palestinians to political 
Zionism, a key tactic of Zionist approach was to explain the disturbances within the 
context of socialism, and by emphasising the `socialist' credentials of Labor Zionism 
233 Labour's relationship with Poale Zion is arguably unique: Poale Zion's early affiliation to 
Labour -a position denied the Communist Party of Great Britain, - facilitated a potential for 
influence far beyond Poale Zion's political and numerical weight, gaining access to leading 
Labour and union figures, the NEC and TUC, and bodies like the Socialist International. See: 
Collette, Christine & Bird, Stephen [Editors] (2000: 72-82) Chapter 4 
234 In comparison to Poale Zion's affiliation to the Labour Party the Second International, est., 
1889, (the predecessor to the Socialist International, est., 1923), refused affiliation citing 
Jewish separatism and nationalism; Poale Zion was later admitted - with Labour's assistance - 
as a Palestinian party and nationality. 
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in terms of a force for furthering the cause of all working-classes in Palestine, - both 
`Jew' (Zionist) and `Arab' (Palestinian). And that the resistance to this `socialist' 
venture arose not from the Palestinian workers and peasants, but from the land- 
owning elites prevalent among the Palestinian leadership. 
A central reason for the successful alignment of political Zionism - and Poale Zion in 
particular - with Labour resulted from the perception of a shared socialist ideology, 
and what the academic Paul Kelemen identifies as the `Party's ideological 
predisposition, '235 - its socialism. But also because the political Zionists were careful 
not to expose British politicians, including those of Labour, to the more mainstream 
and Revisionist sections of political Zionism - that were far from socialist; it was 
generally relatively moderate political Zionist like Chaim Weizmann to whom 
political figures were introduced. As the academic historian Paul Johnson says: it was 
Weizmann who `banked all his emotional coin in their [British politicians] hearts and 
on the whole drew a decent dividend'236 to become the human face of political 
Zionism for British politicians and Labour figures; the less moderate like David Ben- 
Gurion, and the Revisionists such as Vladimir [Ze'ev] Jabotinski237 - whom Ben- 
Gurion rancorously called `Vladimir Hitler', 238 - Avraham Stern, Menachem Begin239 
and alike remained largely aloof and at a distance in Palestine. 
Labor Zionism with its nominally socialist ideology was presented to Labour figures 
as representing a progressive and civilizing force in Palestine. In contrast, and in an 
explanation for the negative response of the Palestinian resistance to political 
Zionism, it was claimed the resistance emulated from an ignorant, backward people, 
235 Kelemen, Paul (January 21,1996: 83) 
236 Johnson, Paul. (2001: 425) A History of the Jews, Chapter 6, Holocaust, (London: Phoenix 
Press) 
237 Vladimir [Ze'ev] Jabotinski (b. 1880-1940) Revisionist Zionist became leader of the right- 
wing Zionists after Theodor Herzl's death in 1904. Born in Odessa [Russian Empire] Ukraine, 
Jabotinski arrived in Palestine circa 1919-1920 to found the Irgun, the Jewish militant Zionist 
groups (1931-1948). 
23$ Johnson, Paul. (2001: 446) 
2" Menachem Begin (b. 1913-d. 1992) born in Brest-Litovsk, [Russian Empire], Belarus, 
arrive in Palestine 1942. Israeli PM [Likud bloc]: 1977-1983; Gahal Party leader, 1965-1983. 
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led by a reactionary and feudal landowning class that feared their traditional control 
over Palestinian workers and peasants was threatened by the `socialist' ideology and 
working-class solidarity of Labor Zionism. This class-struggle perception was wedded 
to aspects of cultural prejudice located among some Labour figures who also viewed 
the Palestinians (where they existed at all) generically as `Arabs' who were invariable 
perceived as lagely nomadic in that they were assumed to be Bedouin, and therefore 
insignificant as a transient people. 'As such, the case for political Zionism and its 
agenda for Palestine were supported and propagated by numerous Labour figures, as 
in this case, MP Charles Roden Buxton240 who states: 
`I cannot admit the contention that the people [the Palestinians] who for the 
time being occupy a certain portion of the earth's surface are necessarily 
entitled to exclude from it others [the Zionists] who could use it better for the 
good of the whole. ' 241 
In addition, some of the more contemptible opinions of the Palestinians within Labour 
circles were conveyed by the pro-political Zionist related figure Henry Noel 
Brailsford who questioned `The right of a handful of degenerate semi-savages to 
exclude millions who live by tilling the soil which they neglect. '242 
The Labour Party before and after the 1917 Balfour Declaration 
If the Labour Party's policy towards political Zionism before 1917 had been shaped 
by the common origins derived from the shared socialist ideology and related 
religious philosophies of key individuals in the party, the 1917 Balfour Declaration 
with its promise to facilitate a Jewish home in Palestine was to dramatically raise the 
spectre and development of the essential dilemma that this policy position represented 
by way of its innate contradictions. 
140 Charles Roden Buxton (b. 1875-d. 1942). MP: ILP (Ashburton, 1910), LP (Accrington, 
1922-1923), and (Eiland, 1929-1931) 
241 Kelemen, Paul (January 21,1996: 73) quoting, Charles Roden Buxton, Daily Herald, 
January 19,1918, p. 73 
242 Kelemen, Paul (January 21,1996: 164) quoting, Henry Noel Brailsford, A League of 
Nations, (1971) [First Edition] 
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On the 31st October, 1917 the War Cabinet authorised Earl Balfour (Conservative 
Foreign Secretary in the Wartime Coalition) to issue a letter to Lord Rothschild243 
(leader of the British Jewish community) expressing the British government's 
sympathy with the aims of political Zionism, and committing the government to the 
creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The declaration stated: 
`His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine 
of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country. )244 
"I am a Zionist"245 announced Balfour246 in a Cabinet meeting. The personal 
announcement -a year before the 1917 policy statement that committed the British 
government to facilitating a Jewish National Home in Palestine - by the author and 
243 Lionel Walter Rothschild (b. 1868-d. 1937) of the Rothschild banking family, Liberal and 
Liberal Unionist MP (Aylesbury, 1899-1910), active political Zionist and close associate of 
Chaim Weizmann, Rothschild was the recipient of the letter from Arthur Balfour (Foreign 
Secretary) committing Britain to facilitate a Jewish National Home in Palestine (the Balfour 
Declaration, November 2,1917). 
244 Balfour Declaration, Arthur Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild (November 2,1917) 
las Segev, Tom (2001: 41) One Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British 
Mandate, quoting, Chaim Weizmann's letter to Ahad Ha'am, 14-15 December, 1914, Stein, 
Leonard [Editor] (1975) The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, (Jerusalem: Israel 
University Press), Vol. VII, pp. 81 ff, (London: Abacus). Segev says Balfour considered 
`Zionism was an inherent part of his Christian faith. ' Segev, Tom (2001: 41) 
246 Barbara Tuchman says of Balfour: `In Balfour the motive was Biblical rather than 
imperial. If the Biblical culture of England can be said to have any meaning in England's 
redemption of Palestine from the rule of Islam, it may be epitomized in Balfour.... ' Tuchman, 
Barbara (1984: 311) Bible and Sword: England and Palestine from the Bronze Age to 
Balfour, Chapter XVII, Culmination: The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 
(London: Phoenix) 
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one of the architects of the Balfour Declaration, was not a position confined to the 
political elite: Lloyd George (Liberal), Winston Churchill (Liberal - Minister of 
Munitions 1917-1919) and Labour's own Ramsay MacDonald were but a few of the 
many Christian Zionist Parliamentarians who subscribed to the philosophy of political 
Zionism, and the Zionist movement's agenda for world Jewry and Palestine. As 
Churchill exclaimed: 
`We think it will be good for the world, good for the Jews, British Empire, but 
also good for the Arabs who dwell in Palestine and we intend it to be so.... 
they shall share in the benefits and progress of Zionism. '247 
Labour had made its first formal policy statement relating to political Zionism at the 
August 1917 party conference in the War Aims Memorandum. The policy statement 
came two months before the government's official publication of the November 
Balfour Declaration. Labour's pronouncement committed the party to the creation of a 
`Free State' of Palestine into which the Jewish people may `return' unhindered. 
Although the conference was specially convened to mark the success of British forces 
in the Middle East that included the capture of Jerusalem, the notable difference 
between the Labour and government position was that the Labour Party did not 
support the establishment of a Jewish Home or State, just the principle of Jewish right 
of `return. ' Although Labour's commitment to a `return' was approved by conference 
to become Labour policy for the post-1918 war period, it did not include the adoption 
of a key objective of political Zionism - the creation of a Jewish Home or State, but 
by accepting the principle of `return' Labour did effectively sanction a major tenet of 
political Zionism: the process by which a Jewish minority could eventually become a 
majority. As Joseph Gorny says: 
`The British Labour movement demands for the Jews in all countries the same 
elementary rights of tolerance, freedom of residence and trade, and equal 
citizenship that ought to be extended to all the inhabitants of every nation. It 
241 Fromkin, David (1989: 519) A Peace to End All Peace, quoting, Martin Gilbert (1978) 
Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume, Volume 4, Part 2, July 1919-March 1921, 
(Boston: Houghton Muffin) p. 1420, (London: Penguin) 
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furthermore expresses the opinion that Palestine should be set free from the 
harsh and oppressive government of the Turk, in order that this country may 
form a Free State, under international guarantee, to which such of the Jewish 
people as desire to do so may return, and may work out their salvation free 
from interference by those of alien race or religion. 249 
Labour's qualified support for the Balfour Declaration was based on the following 
criteria: 1) protection for Jews in all countries while not advocating directly that Jews 
emigrate to Palestine; 2) independence for Palestine - as a `Free State' - from the 
Ottoman Empire; 3) the Jews should `return' to Palestine only should they wish to, 
and not as a result of forces or duress; 4) there was no direct reference to Palestine, 
and no reference to political Zionism; similarly there was no direct reference to the 
Palestinians. It is also noteworthy that as early as 1917, Labour had consciously 
decided to refrain from giving direct support to a Jewish Home in Palestine; this may 
have reflected the view - held by prominent figures in Labour - that Judaism did not 
constitute a nationality, and therefore could not equate to a right to a state, and/or 
additionally that political Zionism was a nationalist ideology and movement. Labour's 
memorandum was approved in December 1917 by a Special Conference of the 
Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress convened in London. It was later 
adopted by a conference Of socialist and Labour Parties of Allied countries in London 
in February 1918. However, on the election of Labour to government in 1929 it was 
Balfour's Declaration that formed the basis of British policy, not the Labour 
memorandum. It was the Labour Leader, Ramsay MacDonald, who, having identified 
the fundamental contradictions - and the likely negative consequences - located in the 
wording of the declaration, gave the following assessment: 
`A double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand, and 
to the non-Jewish population on the other; and it is the firm resolve of His 
Majesty's Government to give effect, in equal measure, to both parts of the 
2'" Gorny, Joseph (1983: 7) quoting, Schneier Levenberg (1945: 204-205) Labour Peace 
Aims, The Times, August 11,1917 
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Declaration and to do equal justice to all sections of the population of 
Palestine. '249 
Nonetheless, the reality was that Labour was also attempting to `reconcile the 
irreconcilable. '250 Inevitably, unable to satisfy the competing aspirations of both 
Palestinians and political Zionists Labour figures - and as a response to the common 
origins and the essential dilemma, - chose to support the political Zionist. As 
academic Carl Brand states: 
`Although predisposed to favour the Zionists, it [the Labour Party] honestly 
sought an equitable solution satisfactory to both parties. [However] Anyone 
who cited the two parts of the Balfour Declaration was regarded as an enemy 
by those who saw only one. The concept that one could be both pro-Arab and 
pro-Jew was inconceivable to either claimant. 251 
A central problem for Labour remained that a greater number of key figures were in 
support of political Zionism as opposed to those who were ignorant, unaware or 
uninterested, or indeed those advocating the implementation of Woodrow Wilson's 
Peace Conference 14 Points which included the right of self-determination for peoples 
emerging from colonisation. As if the contradiction enshrined in the Balfour 
Declaration were not problematic enough, they were further compounded by the 
inclusion from the wording of the declaration into the League of Nations Mandate for 
Palestine in 1920. 
The contradictions posed to Labour by the Balfour Declaration were not entirely 
exclusive: seasoned political figures, diplomats and administrators had their doubts as 
to not only the `legal' credibility of the British position, but furthermore the moral and 
249 Brand, Carl Fremont (1974: 144) The British Labour Party: A Short History, quoting, 
Ramsay MacDonald, Hansard, House of Commons, April 3,1929, [237], col. 1466, 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press) 
2S0 Taylor, A. J. P. (1990: 407) English History 1914-1945, Chapter XII, Appeasement 1936- 
39, Palestine, (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
25) Brand, Carl Fremont (1974: 145) 
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ethical dimensions also. Even those at the core of the decision and policy-making 
expressed their reservations, as Edward Keith-Roach (British Pasha of Jerusalem) 
illustrates: 
`My misgivings about Palestine became deeper. The more I read the official 
papers of 1914-20 the sharper grew my doubts. Every standard seemed to have 
been sacrificed to expediency. I had known little of international or political 
matters. But I was certain that the standard of rectitude established by, and 
expected from, bankers and manufactures, was far higher. 
I asked myself the questions: Is Great Britain being really honest to the Arabs? 
To the Jews? To herself? The questions gnawed at my conscience and refused 
to be silenced. '252 
Foreign Policy. Socialism and Nationalism after the Great War (1914-1918) 
The Great War impressed upon many in the Labour Party the need to formulate a 
more coherent socialist position on foreign policy, not least the fact that the working- 
classes had comprised most of the casualties in incomprehensible numbers2S3 The 
basic belief in the unity of the working classes remained, but leftist intellectuals now 
argued that - for as long as nationalism and the nation-state remained a salient, if 
hopefully diminishing force - some greater authority was needed to preserve order and 
stability from the threats posed by capitalist elites. Thus emerged the principled 
internationalism of Labour leaders like Keir Hardie inspired by the writings of John 
A. Hobson who also influenced MP Sydney Webb and related figures Henry Noel 
Brailsford and Leonard Woolf, 2M among others. Collectively they advocated a 
Council of All Powers, which would pursue collective security and provide the 
mechanism for a developing supranationalism which would eventually replace the 
252 Huncidi, Sahar (2001: 12) A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians 
1920-1925, quoting, Edward Keith-Roach (1994: 92-93) Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a 
District Commissioner under the British Mandate, (London: 1. B. Tauris) 
253 Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 14) 
254 Leonard Woolf (b. 1880-d. 1969) was a political theorist, author, civil servant and publisher, 
joined the Labour Party and the Fabian Society, circa 1914. 
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narrow interests of state-based nationalism. The left of the party, personified in this 
case by Ramsay MacDonald, were clear that such a body should not simply be a Great 
Power Alliance but rather a genuine effort to promote the common interests of 
populations around the world. Not surprisingly then, the Labour Party in the post-war 
era would commit itself to the formulations and institution of the League of Nations 
as both a diplomatic and a utopian instrument. 
However, it became evident during the 1920s and 1930s that at the same time Labour 
was becoming increasingly tied by the issues of its own nation, the party attempted to 
further develop its national appeal as it also became an increasing participant in the 
mechanisms of parliament, and latterly of government. Moreover, nationalism was not 
altogether reviled by the Labour Party. An instinctive empathy with underdogs led 
Henry Brailsford to argue: 
`The right of every nationalist to defend its liberty and its identity against 
conquest, is a right which Socialism has always been the first to respect and 
will be the last to abandon. '255 
Brailsford articulated the party's belief that small, weak states had a right to resist 
conquest and that every person had a right to national independence. The League of 
Nations was to be the forum for ensuring this through the collaboration and collective 
effort of member states. Ironically, however, it was not clear to the Labour Party at 
this point in time how this commitment would embroil them in the ideological 
dilemma that it subsequently did. 
The British Mandate for Palestine256 
iss Douglas, Ray M. (2004: 76) Chapter 3, Internationalism or Anti-Nationalism?: Backbench 
and Backroom Visions of World Order, 1939-45, 'Self-Determination' Assailed quoting, 
Henry N. Brailsford, (1914: 185) The War of Steel and Gold. - A Study of the Armed Peace, 
(London: Bell) 
256 After the capture of the Ottoman Turkish Middle East in 1915-1918, Palestine came under 
civil rule of the British government. The formal League of Nations Mandate of Palestine was 
approved in July 1922 and came into effect in September 1923, ending in May 1948. 
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`One of the most troublesome legacies left us by the War [1914-18] was the 
administration of Palestine. ... The grave 
disputes between Jews and Arabs 
in Palestine flared up into open warfare - or rather extensive massacre, and 
Britain, had to draft regiment after regiment to the Holy Land. '257 
It had been fortuitous for the Zionist movement that Britain was awarded the Mandate 
for Palestine by the League of Nations. If the 1917 Balfour Declaration provided the 
political Zionists with Britain's `legal' approval for a Jewish Home in Palestine, the 
1920 League of Nations mandate provided the international ratification for the 
venture. 258 However, the British administration of Palestine was beset by problems 
and disturbances from the onset. Riotous disturbances between Palestinians and 
political Zionists in Jaffa in 1920259 and 1921260 led to a British inquiry, which was 
2S7 Clynes, John Robert (1937: 243-246) Chapter XIX 
258 The inherent contradictions located in the text of the Balfour Declaration were virtually 
identical in the terms of the mandate. As Malcolm Yapp says: `Article 2 stated that the 
mandatory power should establish "such political, administrative and economic conditions as 
will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home. " Article 6 obliged the mandatory 
power to facilitate Jewish immigration and encourage settlement by Jews on the land. Both of 
these articles also contained provisions that the rights of other sections of the population [the 
Palestinians] should not be prejudiced but the thrust of the mandate was plainly towards the 
fulfillment of the Zionist programme. ' Yapp, Malcolm E. (1996: 124) [Second Edition] The 
Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995, Chapter 4, Palestine and 
Transjordan to 1950, (Harlow: Longman) 
259 The 1920 riots (April 4-7) occurred during the Nebi Musa (Spring Festival), initiated to 
ensure a Muslim presence in Jerusalem during the Christian Easter pilgrimage to the Holy 
Land. A Commission of Inquiry - the Palin Commission - (which was never published) 
attributed the violence to Palestinian frustrations over the non-fulfillment of promises of 
independence and fear of political and economic consequences of political Zionism. 
N0 The 1921 Jaffa Riots (May 1-7) resulted from an attempt to prevent the Jewish Communist 
Party (later Palestine Communist Party) from holding a May Day parade from Jaffa to Tel- 
Aviv. The Haycraft Report concluded the riots resulted from Arab aggression but that the 
political Zionist was not doing enough to `mitigate the Arab's apprehensions' regarding the 
Zionists agenda for Palestine. 
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published as the Statement of British Policy in Palestine (the Churchill or British 
White Paper) of 1922.261 
Winston Churchill -a staunch Christian pro-political Zionist - had been `surprised' to 
learn from Herbert Samuel (British High Commissioner to Palestine) that the `Arabs 
had been provoked to riot by a hard core of Jewish Communists. '262 However, 
Ramsay MacDonald and Labour had been moved to a re-assessment of their policy on 
political Zionism and Palestine as a result of the first direct contact between a serving 
Labour leader and a Palestinian political figure during the visit to London by a 
deputation of the Supreme National Committee of Palestinians led by [Musa Kazem 
Pasha] Jamal al-Husseini263 (July 1921). Husseini's presentation of the 
Arab/Palestinian position in Palestine made a favourable impression upon some 
Labour members, and in conjunction with the report of the government inquiry led to 
Labour's decision to re-affirm its position on the Balfour Declaration and the 
mandate, but with the added provision of a dual emphasis on both `Jews and Arabs'; 
as Labour's Chief Whip and pro-political Zionist MP, Arthur Henderson stated: 
The Labour Party believes that the responsibility of the British people in 
Palestine should be fulfilled to the utmost of their power. It believes that these 
responsibilities may be fulfilled so as to ensure the economic prosperity, 
political autonomy and spiritual freedom of both Jew and Arabs in 
Palestine. i264 
261 The Churchill White Paper, Command Paper 1700, July 3,1922, was named after Winston 
Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 13,1921-October 19,1922 
262 Gilbert, Martin (2007: 73) Churchill and the Jews, Chapter 7, Building on the Balfour 
Declaration, (London: Simon & Schuster) 
263 Jamal al-Husseini (b. 1893-d. 1982) a Palestinian politician he became Secretary to the 
Palestinian Arab Action Committee Executive in Palestine (1921-1934) and the Supreme 
Muslim Council 1928-30. 
2' Gorny, Joseph (1982: 39) quoting, Arthur Henderson, Statement on Behalf of the Labour 
Party, November 1922, Schneier Levenberg, (1945: 207) 
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The Palestinian-political Zionist riots in Jaffa 1920 - what Josiah Wedgwood called 
the `pogroms in Palestine'265 - and those that followed in 1921 and 1929, 
demonstrated that the indigenous Palestinians were apparently far from being grateful 
for the claimed `benefits' of political Zionist colonisation and enterprise; indeed they 
were actively and broadly opposed to its imposed activities. The advent of Palestinian 
revolt forcibly challenged the claims of early Labour related pro-political Zionists, 
such as Henry N. Brailsford, MPs Charles Buxton, and Josiah Wedgwood, that the 
Palestinian Arabs had neither a distinct identity nor an attachment to the land, or the 
earlier Zionist assertion that Palestine was empty - with the exception of the Bedouin. 
For Labour and successive British governments, the 1922 Churchill White Paper266 
formed the official basis of policy in Palestine for nearly a decade, and was stated as 
being the British government's interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. Although the 
primary purpose had been to clarify the British government's position on the Balfour 
Declaration and to placate the Arabs after the 1920 riots, the paper was rejected by the 
Palestine Arabs and accepted by the political Zionists (the Zionists acceptance was 
primarily based on the fact that the paper had not abandoned the concept of a Jewish 
Home in Palestine after the disturbances of 1920 and 1922). 
With the exception of a Palestinian General Strike in March 1925 (called to 
commemorate the visit of Lord Balfour residing over the inauguration of the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem) there was then relative calm in Palestine for several years. 
Under the protection of the British, Jewish/Zionist settlement in Palestine thrived in 
the period from 1924-1928; the period which included the first Labour (minority) 
265 Wedgwood, Josiah C. (1940: 116) Chapter IX, An Ishmaelite in Clover 
m Following `apprehensions, which are entertained by both sections of the Arab [Palestinian] 
and by sections of the Jewish [Zionist] population' of Palestine, resulting from the precise 
meaning of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, Winston Churchill (Colonial Secretary) published 
the 1922 (June 3nd) White Paper with the specific purpose of clarifying the precise terms of 
the Balfour Declaration. The key clarification and thus affirmation of the governments policy 
intension stated that the Jewish National Home should be founded `in Palestine' and that 
`Palestine as a whole should not be converted into a Jewish National Nome. ' 
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government (January to November 1924). However, as David Watkins267 notes, the 
relative calm in Palestine did not prevent the first voice of dissent within the 
parliamentary party over Labour's support for political Zionism being recorded in a 
1924 parliamentary debate. The Labour MP Dr Thomas S B. Williams268 who had 
personal experience of Palestine questioned the morality and logic of Labour's policy 
position stating: 
`The Palestinians were already in their national home and that it was most 
unjust to subordinate their rights to those of people whose national home it had 
never been. '269 
The `profound moral malaise'270 posed for Labour also found resonance in the wider 
Arab context of western colonialism in the Middle East. As with Williams, Arab 
figures had long been able to distinguish between the indigenous Jews of Palestine 
and the Jewish immigrants from elsewhere. As Abdul Azzam271 illustrates: 
267 David Watkins (b. 1925) MP: (Consett, 1966-1983). A co-founder, chairperson (1974) and 
Treasurer of the Labour Middle East Council (LMEC) (est. 1969), and a member, Executive 
Committee, Joint Vice-Chair, Joint Chair, and Director (1983-1990) of the `All Party' 
Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) (est. 05.07.1967). An 
author and pamphleteer on Middle Eastern history and affairs, Watkins is viewed 
`internationally as an acknowledged authority on the Middle East, ' the British Labour Party's 
relationship with political Zionism, the State of Israel, the Palestinians, and the question of 
Palestine. Widely travelled in the Middle East, Watkins remains an active speaker and 
lobbyist. Watkins, David (1992: back cover) Palestine: An Escapable Duty, (London: Alhani 
International Books) 
2" Dr Thomas Samuel Beauchamp Williams (b. 1877-4.1927) MP: (Kennington, 1923-1924) 
269 Watkins, David (1996: 112) Seventeen Years in Obscurity: Memoirs from the Back 
Benches, Chapter 6, The Middle East, quoting, Dr Thomas S. B. Williams, Hansard, July 29, 
1924, cols 1951-1958, (Lewes: The Book Guild) 
270 Crossman, Richard (1960: 59) 
271 Abdul Rahman Hassan Azzam (b. 1893-d. 1976) Egyptian diplomat, nationalist, pan- 
Arabist and the first Arab League Secretary General, (1945-1952) 
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`Our brother has gone to Europe and to the West and come back something 
else. He has come back a Russian Jew, a Polish Jew, a German Jew, an 
English Jew. He has come back with a totally different conception of things, 
western and not eastern. '272 
Azzam continues: 
`The Zionist, the new Jew, wants to dominate, and he pretends that he has got 
a particular civilizing mission with which he returns to a backward, degenerate 
race in order to put the elements of progress into an area which has no 
progress. Well, that has been the pretension of every power that wanted to 
colonise and aimed at domination. The excuse has always been that the people 
are backward and that he has got a human mission to put them forward .... 
The Arabs simply stand and say "No". We are not reactionary and we are not 
backward. We are not going to allow ourselves to be controlled either by great 
nations of small nations of dispersed nations. '273 
Despite the general support in the party for Labour's pro-political Zionism 
memorandum, not all views were unequivocally supportive. As the bi-national state 
concept began to gain favour among Labour figures, the British political Zionist 
began to assert pressure in favour of their own cause: a Jewish state in Palestine. 
At the 1928 Second Commonwealth Labour Conference in London, during the debate 
on Self-Determination for Colonized Peoples, Poale Zion's Yitzhak Ben-Zvi274 and 
Dov Hoz275 argued that Palestine was an exceptional case requiring `national 
272 Crossman, Richard (1960: 59-60) quoting, Azzam Pasha (Secretary to the Arab League) 
Anglo-Commission, Cairo, 1945 
273 Ibid., (1960: 59-60) 
274 Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (b1884-d. 1963) historian and leading figure in the labor Zionism 
movement, born in Poltava, Ukraine arrived in Palestine 1907, and became President of Israel 
(1952-1963). 
rs Dov Hoz [Hos] (b. I 894-d. 1940) was a leading figure in the labor Zionism movement and 
the Haganah [Jewish paramilitary organisation in mandate Palestine]; bom in Orsha, [Russian 
Empire] Belarus, arrived in Palestine 1906. 
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autonomy' and that independence at a time when Jews were in a tiny minority would 
actually threaten the progress of Jewish labour and political Zionism in Palestine. 
`Concluding it was vital to foster further relations with Labour through information, 
and personal contacts'276 in order to assist in facilitating this challenge to autonomy, 
Poale Zion dispatched Hoz to Britain in order to promote more active Labour-Zionist 
relationship on the basis that the socialist Zionism agenda in Palestine was being 
jeopardized by concessions to the Palestinian Arabs and their leadership. 
In June 1929, Labour formed its second minority government, which was to last until 
August 1931. During this period, Labour's relations with the political Zionists were to 
decline as a result of the emerging realities and the growing recognition within the 
party of the contradictions posed by political Zionist colonisation of Palestine and 
Labour's socialist ideological principles. Something of this shift in relations is 
captured by David Ben-Gurion, the Leader of the political Zionism movement and the 
Federation of Jewish Labor (the Histadrut) in Palestine, as he conveys a survey of 
British political Parties and their pro-political Zionist credentials in the period from 
1917 to 1931: 
`Of the three parties of the British Parliament, the Labour Party was the 
friendliest to the Zionist cause and the most faithful to the Balfour Declaration. 
The heads of the Party - Ramsay MacDonald, Arthur Henderson, George 
Lansbury, and others - were loyal supporters of the Zionist idea. 
It is extremely strange, therefore, that the most serious and painful attacks on 
the Zionist enterprise took place in the 1930s during the second Labour 
government, headed by the same MacDonald who had published enthusiastic 
articles [A Socialist in Palestine] praising Zionism after his visit to the Land of 
Israel [Palestine] in 1922. '277 
276 Gomy, Joseph (1983: 42) quoting, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi 
277 Ben-Gurion, David (1971: 44) Israel: A Personal History, Chapter 1, The Rebirth of a 
Nation, After Centuries of Pioneering, a State is Established, (New York: Funk & Wagnalls) 
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The change in Ramsay MacDonald and Labour's position on political Zionism arose 
from a number of factors, not least of which was a series of very real challenges to the 
British mandate government in Palestine itself, for which the Labour government was 
now responsible. 
On August 30th, 1929 Beatrice Webb wrote: `It seems that the Labour Party has a 
particular talent for foreign affairs. '278 The previous day the most violent riots to date 
had occurred in Palestine which were about to plunge Labour - and Beatrice's 
husband Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield) - into one of the most taxing and persistent 
issues for the coming three decades. 
The 1929 Palestinian-political Zionist riots arose once more as a result of a Zionist 
demonstration 279 and a dispute in Jerusalem over the Wailing Wall. The disturbances 
spread to Hebron and Safed. Although the trigger for the violence had been a religious 
based confrontation, the underlying tensions were the result of Palestinian and 
Zionists agitation concerning the establishment of a Jewish Home in Palestine. The 
British government ordered a Commission of Inquiry - the Sir Walter Shaw 
Commission of Enquiry - which recommended a further investigation into the specific 
question of Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Hope-Simpson Royal Commission 
(1930). This was followed with a further enquiry into immigration which led to the 
1930 Passfield White Paper28° restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine's economic 
absorptive capacity and Ramsay MacDonald's letter ignominiously withdrawing the 
278 MacKenzie, Norman [Editor] (1978: 318) The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb: 
Volume 3, Pilgrimage 1912-1947, Beatrice Webb to Elizabeth Haldane, August 30,1929, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
279 The 1929 riots were triggered when `a group of [Zionist] youths, contravening the orders 
of the Jewish leadership, had marched to the Western Wall, unfurling a Zionist flag and made 
fiery speeches. ' Kramnick, Isaac & Sheerman, Barry (1979: 274) Harold Laski: A Life on the 
Left, (London: Hamish Hamilton) 
280 The Passfield White Paper - Palestine, Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government 
in the United Kingdom, Command Paper 3692, October 1,1930, replaced the 1922 Churchill 
White Paper as formal statement of policy for Palestine. 
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policy in the face of Zionist pressure. Labour MP Richard "Dick" Crossman281 said of 
the events: 
`The first sign of this recognition that the Mandate could not work was the 
British reaction to the pogroms of 1929. As became normal in such 
circumstances, a Commission was duly sent to Palestine and Sir John Hope 
Simpson reported in 1930. 
Even before the report was issued, the Labour government publicly declared 
its intension to suspend immigration, an intention confirmed when Sidney 
Webb, by now Lord Passfield, issued his notorious White Paper. This was one 
of the rare occasions when Chaim Weizmann's liking for the British ruling 
class destroyed his judgment. As soon as he had succeeded in forcing Ramsay 
MacDonald to withdraw the White Paper, he assumed that he had permanently 
defeated the British enemies of Zionism. '282 
Political Zionists were concerned by Labour's response to the riots. To the political 
Zionists, the events of August represented definitive evidence that only a separate 
Jewish entity in Palestine would prevent further strife, a position the Zionists assumed 
Labour would share. But the response of Labour was seen to reflect an increasing 
awareness among Labour figures as to the complexity of the situation in Palestine, a 
growing suspicion as to the extent of political Zionist aspirations and the true 
character of the movement, and increasing awareness of the resistance to the British 
and political Zionists by the Palestinians. 
The 1930 Passfield White Paper marked what has been termed `Labour's apparent 
hostility to Zionism. '283 The paper stated the government's policy on the basis of the 
Shaw and Simpson's Reports which only served to underlined the concerns of the 
Zionist movement that Labour and the British were too committed to the duel `Jew' 
and `Arab' aspects of the Balfour Declaration and mandate requirements. The key 
2$I Richard "Dick" Crossman (b. 1907-d. 1974) MP: (Coventry East, 1945-1974) 
282 Crossman, Richard (I 960: 64) 
20 MacKenzie, Norman & MacKenzie, Jeanne [Editors] (1985: 168) 
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references in the 1930 paper incorporated the position that the British government had 
a dual commitment to both peoples; that the primary obligation towards the Jews 
related to the Jews in Palestine (not those of the Diaspora, as emphasized in the 1922 
White Paper); that the scale of Jewish immigration to Palestine would depend on the 
economic position of the entire population; and crucially, that there was no room for 
mass Jewish immigration to Palestine (without negating the status of the existing non- 
Jewish community). 
Labour MP - Hugh Dalton - conveys what comes close to political satire as the 
controversy over the 1930 Passfield White Paper expanded into a wave of protests 
from Labour MPs in support of political Zionism. As a young, newly elected MP, 
Dalton observed the results of what he went on to describe as this `Palestine fuss'284 at 
a private meeting in the family home. His 'Uncle -)285 - pro-political Zionist Arthur 
Henderson (Foreign Secretary) - attempted to address the immediate impact of the 
paper by establishing a Parliamentary Committee to review the practice and policy of 
the Cabinet and Foreign Office amid the resulting difficulties of negotiating between 
the Zionist leaders and Sidney Webb: 
`Uncle raised Palestine urgently. The Jews all over the world, and in 
Whitechapel particularly, where a by-election is pending, are off their heads 
with indignation. Passfield, Uncle and King Albert are appointed on a 
committee to go into the question and, if possible, meet the Zionist leaders. 
The Cabinet also decided that, in future, all Colonial Office pronouncements 
on Palestine are to be submitted to the Foreign Office before publication. But 
this is shutting the stable door after the horse. '286 
Dalton continues: 
284 Pimlott, Ben [Editor] (1986 [a]: 166) The Political Dairy of Hugh Dalton 1918-40,1945- 
60, (London: Cape) 
285 "Uncle" was Arthur Henderson's political nickname; there was no family relationship 
between Henderson and Hugh Dalton. 
266 Pimlott, Ben [Editor] (1986 [a]: 126) quoting, Hugh Dalton, Thursday November 6,1930 
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'10.30 I find Uncle closeted with Weizmann and [Lewis] Namier. 287 He has 
taken charge of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine and is negotiating with 
the Jews, who won't meet [Sidney] Webb [Lord Passfield] or Colonial Office 
officials. 
10.50 The Jews are in the Ambassador's waiting room examining a suggested 
formula. Ronald comes in and says that Passfield wants to see Uncle urgently. 
... 
Uncle says, `Tell him I will meet him in the Court outside at 11.20 and 
walk down to the House with him. ' Obviously he mustn't come here and run 
into the Jews in the passage. 
10.55 Ronald returns and announces that `Lord Passfield is here. ' 
Consternation! The Jews are still in the waiting room, but may emerge at any 
minute. Passfield is put in Selby's room down the side passage, to wait till 
they have gone. French farce scene! In the end no collision occurs. '288 
This quote demonstrates the close personal relations between key Labour figures and 
prominent Jewish exponents of the political Zionist cause, the most important of 
which was undoubtedly Chaim Weizmann. 
Despite the eventual withdrawal of the Passfield Paper (post February 1931), the 
Zionist movement suffered a severe shock and lost a great deal of faith in both British 
policy generally and its relations with Labour more specifically. Nonetheless, Labour 
287 Sir Lewis Bernstein Namier (b. 1888-d. 1960), a Polish born English historian (Professor, 
Manchester University), became a political Zionist in 1920; his 1927 pamphlet directed his 
`emotional fascinations' and `transfused his thoughts on Zionism' stating `Great Britain, 
world Jewry, and the Palestinian Arabs would all benefit if Palestine were incorporated into 
the British Empire as a Seventh Dominion. He advocated the scheme as the only one able to 
foster a healthy symbiosis between the land's two distinct populations. ' Julia Namier (1971: 
201-202) Lewis Namier: A Biography, Chapter 11, Consorting Together, 1924-1929, 
(London: Oxford University Press) Namier was Chaim Weizmann's close associate until 
relations soured after Namier's conversion from Judaism to Anglicanism. 
288 Pimlott, Ben [Editor] (1986 [a]: 128-129) quoting, Hugh Dalton, Wednesday November 
12,1930 
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pro-political Zionist figures continued to influence Labour policy, none less so than 
Henry Snell MP, 289 who had been a member of the 1929 Palestine Commission and 
who was to go on to assume a crucial role on behalf of political Zionism in later years. 
Henry Snell, described as a `strong ethical socialist, 290 stated his role on the 1929 
Commission was the `most thrilling event of my life, and I shall always regard my 
visit to the Holy Land as a rare and rich experience. 291 Snell's memoirs provide a 
vivid demonstration of the combined role of a Christian education and faith, a 
socialist ideology and poverty-stricken working-class background, and how these 
factors came to influence his response to an official visit to Palestine, and his 
subsequent influence on Labour Party policy towards Palestine. Echoing the 1922 
romantic style of Ramsay MacDonald, Snell wrote as he approached Jerusalem: 
`Only twice in my life have I been overcome by a sense of awe on 
approaching a great city. One of these occasions was when the train slowly 
emerged from the hills, and I caught my first glimpse of the walls of 
Jerusalem. Then through my own emotions, I realized something of the 
ecstasy felt by countless pilgrims and crusaders as from the summit of Mizpah 
they first saw the walls of the Holy City. I, too, almost cried aloud: My feet 
shall stand within thy gates, 0 Jerusalem. '292 
While the Commission's Majority Report of March 12,1930 recommended 
restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases, Snell submitted his own 
Minority Report stating that he not only disagreed with the main findings of the 
majority report, but also asserted that the Zionist's activities far from being 
economically detrimental to Palestine, it was in fact advantageous and beneficial. 
289 Henry Snell [Baron Snell 1931] (b. 1865-d. 1944) MP: (Woolwich East, 1922-1931) 
290 MacKenzie, Norman & MacKenzie, Jeanne [Editors] (1985: 212) 
291 Snell, Henry (1938: 237) Men, Movements and Myself, Chapter XV, Work in Parliament, 
(London: J. M. Dent & Sons) 
292 Ibid., (1938: 171) Chapter XI, The Ethical Movement: Switzerland and Italy 
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`I had the misfortune to arrive at conclusions concerning the evidence which 
was presented to us, which my colleagues did not share.... But they did not 
see the problem as I saw it.... I took a more serious view than they did of the 
responsibility of the Arabs and Moslem leaders for the campaign of incitement 
which had preceded and, as I believe, provoked the disturbances, and I had no 
doubt in my mind that the fears and passions of the Arab peoples had been 
awakened and inflamed for purely political ends. '293 
The 1930 Passfield White Paper based on the majority report of the Commission, 
represented a change in the British Labour government's policy, and generated not 
only the first major political crisis between the Labour Party and the Zionist 
movement, but the first significant division with the Labour Cabinet and wider party. 
The pro-political Zionist revolt against the Labour leadership was remarkably 
successful in achieving a decisive and swift reversal of policy. By February 1931 their 
efforts had born fruit in the shape of what was christened by the Palestinians as the 
`Black Letter. ' Whilst the letter from Ramsay MacDonald to Chaim Weizmann 
(February 13,1931) reaffirmed the government's right to control Jewish immigration 
in relation to the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine, the public confirmation 
that the Labour government would honour the commitments of the Balfour 
Declaration and Palestine mandate to `facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage 
close settlement by Jews on the land' was viewed by the political Zionists as a 
abrogation of the 1930 Passfield White Paper, and the restoration of the British 
commitment to creating a Jewish entity in 
294 
293 Ibid., (1938: 238-239) 
294 Although Ramsay MacDonald's letter was read to Parliament, recorded in Hansard, and 
widely considered as a rescinding of the White Paper - clarification that Jewish immigration 
would not be restricted was viewed as a reversal - the explicit re-emphasis upon protecting the 
rights of the Arabs (enshrined in the Balfour Declaration and terms of the Palestine mandate) 
was retained; the re-iteration of the Hope-Simpson investigation into the 1929 riots 
identifying the employment by political Zionism of only Jewish labour was damaging the 
economic development of the Arab population was further evidence for Labour of the non- 
socialist aspects of political Zionism and its consequences for Palestine. 
103 
Chapter 1 (1900-1944) 
This went a long way to averting a major confrontation between the Labour Party and 
the Zionist movement and marked the point when Ramsay MacDonald finally ceded 
to the political Zionist concept of a separate Jewish entity in Palestine. It was also a 
powerful example of the ability of the political Zionists to influence Labour policy at 
the highest levels. 
The Whitechapel By-Election of 1930 
By now, there was a growing realisation among Labour figures that there was not 
only a resident, distinct Arab people in Palestine, but also that political Zionism and 
its agenda for Palestine as a socialist venture was at best questionable, and at worst 
entirely in error. The shared socialist ideology included apparently contradictory 
components. Despite the progressive elements in socialist Zionism, and the 
emancipating aspects of political Zionism, the Zionist movement was increasingly 
looking like a nationalist and colonial organ that was determined to apply its agenda 
for creating a Jewish State in Palestine despite consequent Palestinian exclusion and 
dispossession. The tensions of this contradiction came to the fore in the Whitechapel 
By-Election of December 1930. 
As the academic historian Allan Bullock says, what would `normally have appeared a 
safe constituency for a Labour candidate was transformed by the publication of the 
government's White Paper. '295 The socialist Zionist party in Britain - Poale Zion - 
decided to protest against the White Paper by supporting the Liberal candidate - 
Barnett Janner - and the political Zionist and Liberal leader Lloyd George, who was 
committed to open immigration to Palestine. Poale Zion in association with other 
Zionist and Jewish groups campaigned for the Liberal candidate among the large 
Jewish communities in Whitechapel and its neighbouring district St. George, and 
helped to establish the Palestine Protest Committee. Although Labour retained the 
seat, albeit with a much reduced majority, and while factors like unemployment, 
related to the Wall Street crash (1929), played a role, that reduction certainly assisted 
in Labour losing the seat at the subsequent General Election of 1931. 
295 Bullock, Alan (1960: 455-456) The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin: Volume 1, Trade 
Union Leader 1881-1940, (London: Heinemann) 
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The Whitechapel example held many lessons for a number of key Labour figures (not 
least MPs Sidney Webb and Ramsay Macdonald, but also the young Clement 
Attlee296 and Ernest Bevin). 297 It established that when Labour and political Zionist 
interests diverged, the political Zionists were not only prepared to challenge Labour in 
debate, but were able to achieve a very reasonable degree of success in influencing the 
British Jewish communities to abandon their traditional pro-Labour voting loyalties. 
Far from being socialist, for the political Zionists the nationalist agenda triumphed 
over class interests; also, there were similar Jewish communities in Glasgow, Leeds 
and Manchester as well as elsewhere in London which were as important, particularly 
at a time when local and national elections were close fought affairs. 
298 
Clement Attlee had been working in the Jewish communities of East London and took part 
in the election campaign. The Labour candidate - James Henry Hall - had been sponsored by 
the TGWU and personally supported by Ernest Bevin, the union's local leader. 
Z" Dov Hoz [Hos] dispatched from Palestine, was able to convince Ernest Bevin, General 
Secretary to the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) with fifteen sponsored 
Labour MPs in the Parliament, to support the Zionist position against the 1930 White Paper 
by informing Ramsay MacDonald that `his boys' would vote against the Bill; as a minority 
government reliant upon Liberal support - led by the staunch pro-Zionist Sir Herbert Samuel - 
MacDonald had little choice but to reverse government and Labour Policy by appointing a 
staunch pro-political Zionist, Arthur Henderson to head a Cabinet Committee with a remit to 
re-interpret the paper's recommendations into a pro-political Zionist statement. 
298 While the significance of the Jewish vote is largely confined to local elections, the 
importance is increased during closely fought general election: February 1950 (Labour 
majority 5), October 1964 (Labour majority 4), and October 74 (Labour majority 3). 
According to Ross, a point not lost on New Labour in 1997: `the Jewish community told them 
[New Labour leadership] that unless you change your policy on the Middle East and became 
more balanced then the Jewish community would keep voting Conservative. Now I can tell 
you there are 31 seats that can change just like that if people vote a certain way. Stephen 
Twigg (Labour MP, Enfield Southgate, 1997-2005), how did he beat Michael Portillo? 
Because the Greek-Cypriote vote came behind him. There are some constituencies where 
there is a large enough Jewish community to swing the vote: they are mainly Leeds, London 
obviously, probably Manchester. ' Ross, Ernest (16.09.2004: 7) Interview: Ross-Nelson, 
Portcullis House, London 
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The Whitechapel by-election might in fact have been more symbolic than genuinely 
threatening for relations between Labour and British political Zionists. Academic Paul 
Kelemen argues that the natural dispersal of the Jewish communities meant the actual 
potential for a `Jewish vote' affecting Labour policy towards Palestine was 
`minimal. '299 He also states that the Whitechapel event was more likely an isolated 
case and a high-water mark for Poale Zion, particularly in terms of its political 
influence upon Labour policy. 
The Proposal to Partition Palestine 1937 
As Labour moved back into opposition in 1931, profound and far-reaching events on 
the international stage demanded new responses. The German 1933 General Election 
results that brought Adolf Hitler's National Socialists to power were in many ways a 
world away from Palestine. Fascist regimes had come to power in Italy (1922)300 and 
Spain (1939)301 along with the ascendancy of the anti-Semitic Joseph Stalin following 
Lenin's death in 1924, all factors contributing to the flight of Jews seeking safety in 
the United States, Western Europe and elsewhere; although relatively few sought 
refuge in Palestine, 
302 this large influx of Jewish immigration to Palestine became a 
major factor in the Palestinian revolt. 303 
299 Kelemen, Paul (January 21,1996: 84) 
300 Benito Mussolini regime was not initially anti-Semitic, but under increasing Nazi influence 
Mussolini issued the Manifesto of Race (July 1939) that removed Italian citizenship from 
Jewish Italians prompting a rebuke for the fascist leader from Pope Pius XXII. 
301 Although Jews fought the Fascist regime in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, anti- 
Semitism was not an official policy of the Fascist leader Francisco Franco; Spanish Jews, and 
Jewish refugees from Europe and elsewhere were protected. 
302 Prior to 1920 Jewish immigration to Palestine barely exceeded 5,000 annually; between 
1924-1925 and 1932-1939 the figure exceeded 10,000, and 30,000 during 1925,1933-1936; 
an exact correlation with the rise of Fascism, Stalinism and Nazism in Europe and Russia. 
See: Al-Hassan, Khaled (1992: 100) Grasping the Nettle of Peace: A Senior Palestinian 
Figure Speaks Out, Appendix 16. The Influx of Jewish Immigrants into Palestine, 1919-42, 
(London: Saqi Books) 
303 The Palestinian Revolt (1936-1939) began as a general strike in Jaffa (Yaffa) in response 
to the killing of Sheik Izz ad-Din al-Qassam (1935), and a significant increase in Jewish 
immigration and land purchases as a result of the Nazi persecution of Jews. 
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The 1937 Peel Commission (or Palestine Royal Commission) of Enquiry (November 
11,1936 - January 18,1937) into the further violent disturbances in Palestine after the 
beginning of what became the 1936-1939 Palestinian revolt came to represent a major 
advancement in the political Zionist cause, although it did not seem so at the time to 
the Zionist themselves. The Commission led by the Conservative Earl Peel (William 
Wellesley Peel) concluded that changes to the terms of the Mandate for Palestine were 
required in order to address the conflict between Jews and Arabs. The `Jews and 
Arabs' were unable to live peaceably together and the only option, the report 
concluded, was Partition. 
04 
The report recommended the mandate be eventually abolished. And that apart from 
Jerusalem (determined as an International City under British protection) and a land 
corridor from Jerusalem to the Mediterranean, the remaining land was to be divided 
between the `Arabs' and `Jews. ' The Partition proposal for the first time gave the 
political Zionists the defined boundaries of a Jewish National Home. The political 
Zionists were divided themselves on whether to accept the Partition Plan, ultimately 
opting to continue negotiations; the Palestinian representative delegation rejected the 
proposal. It was in this post-1937 period that Richard Crossman stated `Tiny Palestine 
was a battlefield now of contending world forces, '305 which while exaggerated, given 
Europe's slide towards WWII, has strong resonances particularly as both Britain and 
what became the Axis powers sought to secure the wider Middle Eastern region. 
3°' In a pre-cursor to the Rita Hinden school of thought (See: Chapter 1), Susan Lawrence, 
sub-committee member to the Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions, directed a 
memorandum in January 1937 on Palestine policy (just as the Peel Commission was 
concluding its inquiry), stating the growing economic disparity between Jews and Arabs in 
Palestine resulted from neglect by the mandatory administration, and a substantial increase in 
investment in health services, education and agricultural modernisation would improve the 
economic condition of Arab peasants: See: Lepskin, Fred Lennis (1986: 50). Susan Lawrence 
(b. 1871-d. 1947) MP: (East Ham North, 1923-1924,1926-1931); Chair of the Labour Party 
and NEC member, 1929-1930, was a contemporary of R. MacDonald and A. Henderson, a 
Fabian and active in the Women's Section of the Labour Party. Lepskin says Lawrence was a 
`very effective Zionist partisan. ' Lepskin, Fred Lennis (1986: 17) 
aos Crossman, Richard (1960: 65) 
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During this developing conflict the political Zionist cause was ardently pressed within 
the Labour Party by leading figures such as Hugh Dalton and the Labour-related 
figure Harold Joseph Laski 306 The longevity of Dalton's political career (1925-195 1) 
and high office (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1945-1947) spanned many key events in 
Labour-political Zionist relations; much of that career was recorded in memoir and 
extensive volumes of diary accounts. Dalton's biographer - Ben Pimlott - considered 
him to have been the `firmest supporter of Zionism within the Labour leadership. ' 307 
Dalton's activities were conducted amid a number of contemporary pro-political 
Zionist Labour colleagues, notably, Arthur Creech Jones, 308 Susan Lawrence, William 
Gillies (Head of Labour's International Department and Overseas Secretary), Morgan 
Phillips and Arthur Greenwood. 309 
Dalton's interest in political Zionism began while he was an economics lecturer at the 
London School of Economics (LSE) (1919-1924/1931-1935), of which Dalton said of 
his students, `A surprisingly large number, considering its small population, came 
from Palestine. ' 310 311 Notwithstanding the energetic support of key Labour figures 
like Dalton for political Zionism, and despite the fact, as Brand notes, that `In Britain 
306 Harold Joseph Laski (b. I 893-d. 1950) rejected political Zionism in 1911 on the basis that 
Jewish nationalism contradicted his Socialist beliefs. He assisted the Zionists only to further 
British-American relations, and as Michael Newman says because `support for Jewish 
settlement was, at the time [c. 1925], the more common position in the Labour Party ... 
he 
therefore believed that he was adopting a socialist position. ' Newman, Michael (1993: 125) 
The 1929 riots acted to nudge Laski further towards supporting political Zionism. 
307 Pimlott, Ben (1985: 388) Hugh Dalton, (London: Jonathan Cape) 
308 Arthur Creech Jones (b. 1891-d. 1964) MP: (Shipley, 1935-1950) and (Wakefield, 1954- 
1964); Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1946-. 1950; and Under-Secretary of Stated for the 
Colonies, 1945-1946. 
309 Arthur Greenwood (b. 1880-d. 1954) MP: (Wakefield, 1932-1954); Deputy Leader, 1935- 
1945. 
310 Dalton, Hugh (1953: 111) Call Back Yesterday: Memoirs 1887-1931, (London: Frederick 
Muller) 
311 Hugh Dalton notes: `When some thirty years later I visited what was now the State of 
Israel, I found old students of mine occupying many key positions. Moshe Sharett ... was 
now Foreign Minister of Israel. ' Dalton, Hugh (1953: 111) 
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Jewish voices were numerous and influential; Arabs there were negligible, 
312 there 
was continuing evidence of discontent within Labour over the prevailing sympathy for 
political Zionism at that time. As Brand again says: 
`In spite of generous sympathy for the Jews, however, there was reluctance to 
accede to extreme Zionist demands at Arab expense. '313 
314 
The result of this Labour disquiet meant that the passage of the partition policy 
through Parliament was a messy affair that divided parties, the government and 
opposition alike. As a young Harold Wilson conveys: 
`The main debate ended at midnight. Churchill then rose to move his 
amendment. Clement Attlee for the Labour Opposition sought to prevent a 
vote being taken. His objection to the Churchill amendment was that it would 
seem to bind the House to a decision `here and now' to accept partition. 
It was not a Party matter, simply one of finding the best way of dealing with 
the issue `in the interests of the Arab people, the Jewish people and the whole 
world. '315 
312 Brand, Carl Fremont (1974: 144) 
313 Ibid., (1974: 144) 
314 There were other questioning voices in immediate partition period: the Scottish trade 
unionist and socialist Alexander Gossip (b. 1862-d. 1952) General Secretary, National 
Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association (NAFTA), claimed that while the `interests of 
the Jewish and Arab workers in Palestine are identical' Knox, William [Editor] (1984: 125) 
Scottish Labour Leaders: A Biographical Dictionary, quoting, Alexander Gossip, Labour 
Party Conference, Edinburgh, 1936, (Labour Party Report (1936), 220, (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream Publishing) the government was `using these Jewish comrades who are being 
persecuted so unmercifully by Fascism at the present time' in order to further the 
Government's own strategic and imperial interests. `The Arabs have been in Palestine for 
over 1,000 years. Their consent has not been asked. ' Knox, William [Editor] (1984: 125) 
quoting, Alexander Gossip 
315 Wilson, Harold (1981: 85) The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel, 
(London: Weidenfeld, Nicolson & Michael Joseph) 
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For some Labour figures however, the 1937 White Paper represented nothing less 
than a "Middle Eastern Munich, "316 for which the new Labour leader drew much 
criticism. 
In 1935, and for the next two decades, the baton of the Labour Party leadership had 
been passed to Clement Attlee. As Labour's newly appointed Campaign Manager for 
the East London borough in the 1920s, Attlee experienced the realities of diverse 
Jewish constituents in the socially deprived environment of the capital's East End. 
317 
It was at this time that Attlee displayed his stiff opposition to the 1922 Aliens Bill, 
which he viewed as an attempt to prevent Jewish refugees from emigrating to Britain. 
However, although Attlee had links with the British Jewish community, he never 
accepted that Judaism - as a religious faith - constituted a national identity, as claimed 
by the political Zionism movement. As such, Attlee could never accept the principle 
of a Jewish State, even though he was content to support Jewish immigration to 
Palestine on the historical basis that Palestine was an important focus of Jewish 
religion and culture. 
In his first major act involving Labour-political Zionist relations 1935, Attlee put his 
name to an official Labour election statement reiterating the party's commitment to 
the `return' of Jews to Palestine. Ultimately however, and with his view implacably 
set on the premise that a religion did not equate to a national identity, Attlee's 
approach was motivated by political expediency that pivoted round the perennial 
concern for party unity. Although Labour's official position on the 1939 White Paper 
was essentially to direct the subject and issues arising from Palestine before a 
Parliamentary Joint Select Committee before committing Parliament and Labour to a 
policy, and the re-emphasis on the efforts to secure a negotiated settlement via the 
Round Table Conference, Attlee's concern was to keep a highly contentious, emotive 
and volatile issue from becoming a party issue with the potential for division and 
distractions. 
316 Crossman, Richard (1960: 65) 
317 Clement Attlee was mayor of metropolitan borough of Stepney (1919), becoming Labour 
MP for the East London constituency of Limehouse, Stepney in 1922. 
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Labour World War Two, and the ideological response 
As it was, the party was stricken by the crisis which World War Two represented to 
its foreign policy position. The optimism and belief in the commonality of working 
classes across nations was devastated by the evidence of popular support for Fascism 
in Europe, and by the tide of support for Hitler as German armies swept into Poland 
and Eastern Europe. The party had itself been bruised by Conservative taunts of a lack 
of patriotism in its ability to formulate a response other than appeasement at home 
(despite its enthusiasm for militant struggles elsewhere, including in Spain). Small 
states were clearly unable to defend themselves, and the League of Nations had 
entirely failed to do the job for them. In short, the world was less benign than had 
been assumed and the task of preserving order (including the values which the British 
held dear) had to be passed to an international authority with teeth, the decisions of 
which would be upheld by the Great Powers. 
The utopianism of internationalism was thus abandoned, and Douglas has argued that 
the war therefore enabled the Labour Party to be fully reconciled with its own country 
and with nationalism in its patriotic, rather than jingoistic, form. 318 The threat of 
national extinction was sufficient to propel the party into an accommodation of 
socialism and British national interests without reservations, a position which would 
hold in the years following the war. 
The War-Period Coalition 
The Labour Party's participation in the coalition government (1940-1945) was its first 
role in government since 1931. During this period Jewish and Palestinian terrorist 
attacks upon the British forces and administration continued, leading Attlee to push 
Churchill to review British policy. As Attlee says: 
318 See: Douglas, Ray M. (2004) Chapter 5, Utopia Deferred. * The Attlee Administration and 
the United Nations, 1945-51 
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'There is every probability of our being faced with violent action by either, or 
both, Jews and Arabs. We shall have a thankless task of keeping order and will 
be blamed by both sides, 319 
The War Cabinet agreed with Attlee that a Cabinet Committee be appointed to 
determine a strategy that could be formally adhered to. The Cabinet also sanctioned 
an extension to the period allowed for Jewish immigration, and also put forward 
Cyrenaica and/or Tripolitania (Libya) or Eritrea as alternatives for Jewish settlement. 
In December 1943 the War Cabinet's Palestine Committee reported that it upheld the 
recommendation for Partition on the lines of the 1937 Peel Commission's Report 
(ownership of the Negev was to be decided), and again in October 1944 the 
Committee reported that it viewed that `Partition should be carried out whatever the 
opposition from Palestine. '320 While the War Cabinet - which included Attlee - still 
favoured some form of partition as late as 1944, it had already been conceded that in 
light of Roosevelt's unequivocally pro-political Zionist addresses during his 1944 
Democratic re-election campaign, that the United States would be taking a decisive 
diplomatic and active role. This almost certainly meant the restrictions on Jewish 
immigration and land purchase would be lifted. Britain (and Attlee) wanted the United 
States to assist and finance the situation in Palestine without incurring too much 
interference in the management of the Middle East and the Suez Canal. 
Although the Labour Party was `officially pro-Zionist'321 and additional Cabinet and 
backbenchers were becoming more firmly supportive of Palestine as a Jewish state, 
Attlee retained his belief and position, arguing that conceding Palestine to the Zionists 
was not a viable basis for a policy. At worst, Attlee viewed the political Zionists in 
Palestine as `reckless fanatics'322 who would undermine wider British interests in the 
Middle Eastern region, and their ideology antagonized Attlee's detestation for all 
319 Burridge, Trevor (1985: 250) Clement Attlee: A Political Biography, quoting, Clement 
Attlee, Cabinet Memorandum, June 1943, (London: Cape) 
320 Ibid., (1985: 253) 
321 Bethell, Nicholas (1979: 147) Chapter 5, Partition and Terror 
322 Ibid., (1985: 251) 
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forms of `extreme nationalism. ' 323 Moreover, largely as a result of his experience of 
British Jewish communities he was not a `great enthusiast for the idea that Palestine 
was the one place for the Jews. '324 It is also evident that Attlee came to absorb a fact 
that many generations of Labour and related figures failed to appreciate fully, the 
affinity the Palestinians had for Palestine. As Attlee says: 
`... you might think that an Arab struggling to keep alive on a bare strip of 
sand would jump at the chance of going to Iraq or somewhere else where there 
was more opportunity for a better life. But oh no. One patch of desert doesn't 
look very different from another patch of desert but that was the one they 
wanted - their own traditional piece. They have this attachment to one place 
'3zs and nothing else will do. 
Labour's 1944 Post-War Policy Statement 
Irrespective of Attlee's pro-Jewish but anti-political Zionism position, it was 
nevertheless under his leadership and while Labour was a member of the WWII 
Coalition (1940-1945) that the party adopted its most pro-political Zionist policy 
against the background of the emerging horrors of the Holocaust. Although the 1944 
policy initiative had hard-core party support it was led and championed by Hugh 
Dalton. 
Dalton had by now become a senior Labour figure in his own right: between March 
and December 1944 Dalton drove the drafting of the Labour Party's International 
Post-War Policy Statement (1944) and the crafting of the campaign to secure its 
adoption as policy. Although the statement's primary focus was understandably 
consumed by issues in Europe, as Clement Attlee stated `Europe came first, '326 the 
323 Ibid., (1985: 249) 
324 Ibid., (1985: 248) quoting, Clement Attlee (1967: 40), Interview, The Granada Historical 
Records 
325 Williams, Francis (1961: 182) A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Post-War 
Memoirs of The Rt. Hon. Earl Attlee. Based on Private Papers and on a Series of Recorded 
Conversations, Chapter 12, Danger for the Middle East, quoting, Clement Attlee 
326 Ibid., (1961: 176) 
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document contained a small but significant reference to Palestine. Even before the 
statement was made known to the party, Dalton recalls in a sentence that clearly 
shows he understood the significance and thus likely reaction of the Foreign Office 
and the few Labour figures with knowledge and experience of the actually realities of 
Palestine and political Zionism, - the `informed quarters: ' 
`I all but tell them [Noel-Baker and Chaim Weizmann] that I have drafted a 
very hot paragraph for the Labour Party on post-war Palestine. '327 
Dalton's statement began by questioning the previous British policies, which had first 
allowed, then prevented Jewish immigration to Palestine as the government responded 
to sporadic violent events in Palestine and the responses of the various channels of 
pro-Arab and pro-political Zionist groups: 
`Here, ' we declared, `we have halted half-way, irresolute between conflicting 
policies. But there is surely neither hope nor meaning in a `Jewish National 
Home' unless we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in 
such numbers as to become a majority. 
There was a strong case for this before the war. There is an irresistible case 
now, after the unspeakable atrocities of the cold and calculated German Nazi 
plan to kill all Jews in Europe. '328 
The overt proposal to allow the Jews to become a majority in Palestine, with all 
accompanying implications, was radical enough in itself. But it was the following 
section of the statement that contained the most significant aspects of Labour's Policy, 
as Dalton continues: 
`Here, too, in Palestine surely is a case, on human grounds and to promote a 
stable settlement, for transfer of population. Let the Arabs [Palestinians] be 
I" Pimlott, Ben [Editor] (1986 [b]: 720) The Second World War Dairy of Hugh Dalton 1940- 
45, quoting, Hugh Dalton, Wednesday, March 8,1944, (London: Cape) 
328 Dalton, Hugh (1957: 425-426) 
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encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated 
handsomely for their land and let their settlement elsewhere be carefully 
organised and generously financed. '329 
The proposal to transfer the Palestinians amounts to advocating ethnic cleansing. 330 
Dalton reconciled this proposal - and presumably in an effort to allay his own 
dilemma of conscience - on the misguided assertion that: 
`The Arabs have very wide territories of their own; they must not claim to 
exclude the Jews from this small part of Palestine, less than the size of Wales. 
Indeed, we should examine also the possibility of extending the boundaries by 
agreement with Egypt, Syria and Transjordan. '331 
In the contextual magnitude of a ruined Europe, Dalton claims the section on 
Palestine cause barely a ripple within Labour or conference. But the Conservative, 
Oliver Stanley, said, this was `Zionism plus plus. '332 For Dalton what mattered was 
that what he called a `strongly pro-Zionist' statement became policy. In the numbing 
climate of the Holocaust however, Dalton states he had little trouble securing the 
approval of the NEC or the Cabinet: `I put this in my draft and persuaded my 
colleagues to accept it - Laski expressed most emotional gratitude. '333 
329 Ibid., (1957: 426) 
330 In the context of 1944 the proposal to transfer the Palestinians was not a unique or isolated 
practice and policy: significant Kurdish (1915), Turkish and Greek populations had 
experienced similar fates; and the partition of the Indian sub-continent into Pakistan and India 
in 1947 was to follow with the transfer of millions. 
33' Childs, David (1992: 48) [Third Edition] Britain Since 1945: A Political History, Chapter 
3, Colonial Retreat and Cold War, War in Palestine, quoting, Hugh Dalton, (1957: 425-426) 
The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931-1945, (London: Frederick Muller), (London: Routledge) 
332 Pimlott, Ben (1985: 390) Chapter XXIII, Planning for Post-War, quoting, Hugh Dalton 
Dairies, April 28,1944 
333 Dalton notes the extent of Harold Laski's gratitude: `Indeed, Laski had embarrassed and 
surprised me at the first meeting by saying how wonderful he thought it all was, and nearly 
weeping over my Palestine Paragraph, on which he afterwards wrote me a most emotional 
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Apart from Hugh Dalton, it was the response of the Labour related figure of Harold 
Joseph Laski that is perhaps one of the most significant. Laski had by now fully 
converted to political Zionism despite having initially rejecting the philosophy in 
1911. As his biographer Granville Eastwood notes: 
`Laski was not actively involved in the Zionist movement during the critical 
days of struggle between it and the British government. For many years he had 
kept his distance, partly due to [socialist] ideological reservations [about 
Jewish nationalism]... It was only after the terrible news reached England that 
the Nazis had really murdered six million Jews was there a change in Laski's 
attitude to the movement of Jewish national liberation. '334 
Harold Laski was a member of the National Executive Committee (NEC) from 1936, 
and served as chair of the party from 1945 to 1946. He also succeeded Dalton as the 
335 
chair of the NEC International Sub-Committee. As an intellectual colossus and 
and effusive letter. ' Pimlott, Ben [Editor] (1986 [b]: 732) quoting, Hugh Dalton, Wednesday, 
April 5,1944 
Dalton notes the reaction of the Conservative Oliver Stanley was less favorable: `Oliver 
Stanley comes to see me to say how very disturbing is our Palestine paragraph in I. P. W. S. 
[International Post-War Settlement]. It is tacked on, he feels, rather un-naturally, to a long and 
helpful statement on Europe. It will not, he hopes, be much played up in our propaganda. I 
say that I don't think it will. But I remind him that the Labour Party has always taken a pro- 
Jewish line in parliamentary debates for many years. He is afraid that it may do harm in 
Palestine, both by encouraging the Jews to believe that the next British government, which 
they think may well be a Labour government, will do everything for them, and equally by 
unsettling the Arabs. ' Pimlott, Ben [Editor] (1986 [b]: 739), quoting, Hugh Dalton, 
Wednesday, April 26,1944 
334 Eastwood, Granville (1977: 95) quoting, Yaakov Morris 
335 On succeeding Hugh Dalton as chair of the International Sub-Committee of the Party's 
National Executive, Henry Pelling says: `One of his first tasks was to interview 
representatives of Poale Zion, the Jewish Socialist Organisation, which was far from happy 
with British policy in Palestine. Laski largely shared their views and accompanied some of 
the leaders to a private meeting with [Clement] Attlee, [Ernest Bevin] and George Hall, the 
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prodigious writer, there are few figures to rival Laski within the Labour Party in terms 
of his contribution to socialist theory and its practical application via policy. 
Dalton's biographer Pimlott notes that six months after its publication, and while the 
section on Europe divided personalities in the party into bitter acrimony, the section 
of the statement on Palestine had an easy passage into Labour Policy: 
`At the December 1944 Party Conference, this extraordinary declaration 
aroused no interest. Nobody raised Palestine, or the possible difficulties that 
disposing of `this small area' ... might involve. In the end the whole 
document was accepted by Conference without a vote. '336 
In conclusion, the Post-War Statement and its adoption as policy were arguably as 
significant as any other statement on Palestine by a British political party; and 
certainly as a statement of policy by Labour. By late 1944 and early 1945 - and in the 
wake of the Holocaust - the pro-Palestinian safeguards had been abandoned by 
Labour to the extent that as Pimlott says: 
`It had become a kind of unofficial Balfour Declaration. ' 337 
Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this chapter points to an extraordinarily protracted and 
complicated range of factors, issues and events which contributed to the development 
of an essential dilemma for Labour Party members in their efforts to construct policies 
towards political Zionism and Palestine during the period from 1900 to 1944. 
Colonial Secretary, at which little satisfaction was obtained as to a redirection of policy. ' 
Pelling, Henry (1984: 47-48) The Labour governments 1945-51, (London: Macmillan) Laski 
held the chair until June 1946 when it passed to the more moderate figure of Philip Noel- 
Baker. 
136 Pimlott, Ben (1985: 390) quoting, Labour Parliamentary Archive Centre Records 
(LPACR), 1944, pp. 4-9,140 
337 Ibid., (1985: 498) 
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The basis and nature of relations between Labour and political Zionism movement 
has been shown to derive from the perceived common origins, related religious 
philosophies (the psychological aspect and component of the essential dilemma) and 
shared socialist ideology (the ideological and political aspect and component of the 
essential dilemma) of their members. 
The common origins aspect emerged from the similar social, economic and political 
circumstances that gave rise to the founding of the Labour Party in 1900 and the 
political Zionist Organisation in 1897; the exclusion of the working-class from the 
franchise were little different from the exclusions of Jews from aspects of society 
elsewhere, and the urban and rural deprivations of the classic slums, the Pales and 
ghettos were one and the same. The related religious philosophies aspect refers to the 
perception among many Labour figures that, in their Christian faith, they shared a 
common religious background, faith, education and principles with the Jewish `Old 
Testament' peoples. Together these two aspects merged to create a psychological 
dimension to the responses of Labour Party figures to political Zionism and events in 
Palestine. 
The shared socialist ideology is an equally ambiguous factor. In the early stages, 
when Labour figures were largely ignorant of the place and peoples of Palestine, and 
orientalist in their assumptions, it seemed to them that the progressive, socialist 
elements in the Zionist movement were their natural class allies and their socialist 
ideological brethren. It was this component of the early support within the party for a 
pro-political Zionist position that was increasingly tested by the realities of British 
imperial policy and political Zionist colonisation of Palestine. 
The `socialist' Branch of the political Zionist movement - notably Poale Zion - 
worked hard to sustain the conviction of Labour figures and the Labour party in 
favour of the political Zionist agenda. This identification of Labour as a socialist party 
with that of the socialist Labor Zionism misled Labour figures into supporting 
political Zionism as a concept and movement as a whole, even though the `socialist' 
credentials of Labor Zionism were questionable, its objectives and methods evidently 
at variants with socialist doctrine. The pro-political Zionist consensus within the party 
was increasingly challenged during even this early period by the emerging realities on 
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the ground in Palestine. The violent disturbances in Palestine in 1920,1921 and 1929 
challenged a number of core understandings and factors underpinning the basis and 
nature of relations between Labour and political Zionism, most crucially that 
Palestine was `an empty land for a people [the Jews] without land. ' The subsequent 
series of government enquiries and their reports led to a growing awareness among 
Labour figures that the vast majority of Palestine's people were specifically 
Palestinian (as opposed to generically and more conveniently Arab), and that they too 
had an attachment and claim to Palestine. These disclosures led some Labour figures 
to review their political Zionism, and others to state that attempting to create a Jewish 
State in Palestine in the face of these realities amounted to colonialism, and could in 
light of the Palestinian resistance, only be achieved by exclusion, dispossession and 
force. If that was the case, then political Zionism was not a socialist movement and 
the venture in Palestine was not being conducted by socialists. In this sense, Labour 
figures were presented with an ideological conundrum, adding new dimensions to the 
essential dilemma. 
The Labour Party had to develop its policy in practice, not in abstract, to respond to 
the evolving external context. In particular, the chapter showed that World War I, the 
League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, the often violent resistance of the 
indigenous Palestinian Arab population to political Zionist colonisation, the rise of 
Fascism and Nazism in Europe and the Holocaust of World War II, all acted to force 
the Labour Party to develop its policies towards political Zionism and Palestine itself. 
These external determinants of Labour policy were matched by internal determinants. 
The perceived common origins, related religious philosophies and shared socialist 
ideologies initially combined to act upon individuals within the Labour Party and 
create an essentially pro-political Zionist consensus within the party, and more 
particularly, within the Labour Party leadership. The leadership was also aware of the 
electoral importance of British Jewish communities and the need to be responsive to 
the appeals of Jewish Zionist organisations like Poale Zion and the Zionist 
Organisation. The Palestinian Arabs, in contrast, had no lobby voice within the party. 
Where Labour Party policy deviated from its political Zionism, it did so as a result of 
the exigencies of government, as opposed to the relative freedom of opposition 
benches. Thus we can argue that a further dimension to the essential dilemma lies in 
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its political component, the need to define policy with due regard for domestic and 
international political exigency at any given point in time. 
The impact of this essential dilemma was to become more significant with time. With 
Labour's meteoric rise from the party's founding in 1900 to its forming of 
governments in 1924,1929-1931 and participation in the 1940-1945 coalition, came 
the necessity to equate traditional pro-political Zionist sympathies within the party, 
with British national interests that were at times better served by policies with which 
the Arab populations of the Middle East could be at least sympathetic. In opposition 
the influence of the essential dilemma - that inability to reconcile the historic 
sympathies with political Zionism with the denial of an indigenous population's rights 
to self-determination - was limited to being an almost entirely internal party affair 
between Labour figures and over the policy position of the party; in government the 
consequences of the essential dilemma were exacerbated by the added complexities 
deriving from the duty of a government to maintain and advance British national and 
strategic interest. The contradictions could perhaps best be seen through the actions of 
leading party figures like Ramsay MacDonald who were caught in the web of 
government national responsibilities, on the one hand, and the confines of an assumed 
common socialist and biblical alignment with political Zionism, on the other. The 
consequence was the shenanigans, dithering and blunders that surrounded the 1930 
White Paper and the Whitechapel debacle as Labour at first resolved to promote the 
primacy of British interests (as prescribed by the views of the Colonial Office), only 
to reverse the decision in the face of a protest from the pro-political Zionist Labour 
and related figures. 
In the closing years of WWII, Labour's struggle with the essential dilemma appears 
to have climaxed into a stunning capitulation to its political Zionist component, going 
so far as to advocate the transfer of the Palestinians from Palestine to neighbouring 
territories in order to accommodate the mass immigration of Jewish survivors of the 
Holocaust from Europe. This dramatic shift was more a result of the dedicated 
activities within the party of a few key pro-political Zionist Labour and related 
figures, notably Dalton and Laski, playing heavily on the natural post-Holocaust 
sympathy with the plight of the Jews, than it was to any considered effort to address 
120 
Chapter 1 (1900-1944) 
the essential dilemma. The latter remained, temporarily obscured by the chaos of the 
post-war world, but nonetheless still in evidence, and still largely unresolved. 
Throughout the period, the Labour response to political Zionism was formulated 
within the context of an evolving approach towards foreign policy as a whole, 
underpinned by debates within the party about the relationship between socialism, 
nationalism, and national rights to self-determination. Early disinterest and ignorance 
of foreign affairs, combined with paternalistic and orientalist world views, allowed the 
progressive attributes of political Zionism, as portrayed by socialist Zionists, to be 
foremost in the minds of Labour figures. However, as a more robust political 
intellectual response was required to the threats posed by militarism and colonialism 
to the internationalist order to which Labour had signed up during the inter-war 
period, and as the evidence of a Palestinian national desire for self-determination 
became more visible, so the dilemmas presented by Labour support for political 
Zionism became more evident. Unable to reconcile the intellectual gaps, and faced by 
rising violence in Palestine from all sides, it was inevitable that Labour would 
ultimately hand the problem to the international authority of the United Nations. 
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Chapter 2 
Modem Era: 1945-1993 
The Evolution of the Essential Dilemma (1945-1962) 
Introduction 
This chapter illustrates the ongoing impact of the essential dilemma and Labour's 
failure and/or unwillingness to reconcile the irreconcilable and address the double 
promise made to Arabs and political Zionists in relation to Palestine. It identifies and 
examines the internal and external determinates which influenced the basis and 
nature of relations between the Labour Party, political Zionism in Britain, and the 
new state of Israeli in the period from 1945 to 1962. It demonstrates that, despite the 
growing evidence of the essential dilemma which this relationship generated, and in 
spite of apparent policy alterations, in fact a fundamentally pro-political Zionist policy 
trajectory was maintained by Labour, due not least to the preferences and positions of 
prominent leadership and other Labour figures. However, the chapter also 
demonstrates that during this period, the salience of the various components of the 
essential dilemma, the psychological, ideological and political, altered from the 
previous era. Whilst previously the psychological dimension had been the pre-eminent 
problematic for the party in so far as there existed a generalised sympathy with 
political Zionism based on the perceived common origins and related religious 
philosophies, in this era the momentous events in Europe, and the requirement that 
Labour's first majority national government respond to them effectively in the 
national interest, meant that the ideological and political dimensions of the essential 
dilemma became more pre-eminent. The psychological dimension retained a 
significant role, not least in the sympathy generated for the victims of Nazi 
persecution, but events and Labour policy were sufficiently `unhelpful' to the political 
Zionist cause as to generate the evolution of a more concentrated group of committed 
lobbyists within the party for political Zionism and latterly for the State of Israel. 
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The Labour Party's First Majority Government (1945-1951)338 
Undoubtedly, a key internal determinant of Labour's relationship with political 
Zionism, as with everything else, was its election to power as a majority governing 
party in 1945. 
Domestically the good news was that Labour had secured an electoral victory with a 
huge landslide majority. Beyond that the picture looked decidedly grim: the country 
was in grave financial jeopardy of bankruptcy with a chronic balance of payments 
deficit at a time when reconstruction needs were at a height. The war against Japan 
continued and the socialist Labour government presided over austere economic and 
social conditions, epitomised by a harsh rationing regime. Abroad, the British 
overseas possessions in 1945 still encompassed a vast territory at a time when the 
necessary finances and manpower presented a stark contradiction to the availability of 
finance and the unwillingness of service personnel to remain in active service. Added 
to this was the clamour of nations within many of those territories to attain self- 
determination, not least the Indian Sub-Continent (which quickly developed into open 
struggles for independence via another painful process of national partition), 
additionally Malaya, Egypt, Persia, Kenya and Aden all vied to shake off British 
colonial rule. All this culminated in a typically British crescendo in the shape of the 
weather, which conspired to produce two of the severest successive winters of the 
century, depleting already depleted coal stocks precipitating a national energy crisis as 
train lines froze and live stock perished in the fields. 
Not surprisingly, amid these pressingly desperate circumstances and an empire that 
still encompassed a fifth of the globe and its peoples, Palestine did not initially feature 
too prominently on Labour's immediate list of concerns, a situation that would change 
all too quickly, particularly with the on-set of the Cold War. 
The election of the Labour Party with a landslide majority had been celebrated among 
Labour's pro-political Zionist figures and the wider Zionist movement generally. As 
Kingsley Martin says: 
331 Between 1945 and 1951 Labour formed two majority governments; the first 1945-1950, 
the second with a majority of five February 23,1950 - October 25,1951. 
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`If Labour's victory in 1945 seemed to British Socialists a sight of the 
Promised Land, to Jews everywhere the words could be used in a direct and 
non-symbolic sense. For the Jewish people the return to Palestine was the 
eternal dream; Zionists had two generations of strenuous work behind them, 
and since 1918 they had relied on the Labour Party's specific pledge to give 
reality to the Mandate's obligation to establish a Jewish National Home in 
Palestine. '339 
The Labour Party in 1945 was identified as being `overwhelmingly pro-Zionist. 340 
The expectation that Labour would swiftly reverse the 1939 White Paper and its 
severe restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine was particularly understandable 
given Labour's 1944 Post-War Policy Statement committing the party to facilitating a 
Jewish State in the whole of mandate Palestine. However, as historian Ben Pimlott 
says: 
`When in July the unexpected happened and a Labour government was 
elected, there was dancing in the streets of Tel-Aviv. The euphoria was short- 
lived. Within a few days of taking office, Labour had abandoned its 
commitment. '341 
The sense of high expectation at Labour's election to government was based on the 
political Zionist's knowledge that they had the support of Labour figures at the 
highest levels of the Labour Party. However, once in government, the Labour Party 
elite seemed more inclined to pragmatism than idealism, this is particularly true of 
Ernest Bevin, - the new Foreign Secretary. 
As a coalition or opposition party, Labour could be more idealistic with its policies 
towards political Zionism; as a party in government the wider responsibilities and 
I" Martin, Kingsley (1953: 206) Harold Laski 1883-1950: A Biographical Memoir, Chapter 
X, The Jewish Question, (London: Victor Gollancz) 
NO Healey, Denis (1990: 89-90) The Time of My Life, (Harmondsworth: Penguin) 
Pimlott, Ben (1985: 391) 
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duties to national and strategic, rather than the party's perceived interests, imposed 
enormous demands upon leadership individuals. Sections of the party implored them 
to apply the policies on Palestine adopted in 1944. In the context of the immediate 
aftermath of the Holocaust and the continuing plight of survivors languishing in 
European detention camps, the decision by Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin (Foreign 
Secretary) and Cabinet to abandon the 1944 policy seemed particularly harsh. 
Winston Churchill's opinion that the `Labour Party had lost its zeal for Zionism 342 is 
further elaborated by academic historian, Martin Gilbert: 
`On taking charge of British foreign policy on 27th July 1945, Bevin set 
himself against allowing into Palestine the 100,000 survivors of the Holocaust 
... 
He also set himself against Churchill's assurances to the Peel Commission 
eight years earlier that the British contemplated, in due course, a Jewish 
majority and a Jewish State in Palestine. These were severe blows to the half 
million Jews of Palestine, and those Jews waiting in DP [Displaced Persons] 
camps in Europe to be given refuge there. '343 
For Bullock, the reasons for Bevin's position were explained thus: 
`The key to the change which took place in Bevin's - and the Labour 
Government's - attitude is to be found, I believe, in two things: the direct 
responsibility which he and other Labour ministers had for the first time to 
take for British policy in Palestine and the Middle East, and the much greater 
difficulties which Palestine presented in 1945 than it had for any of Bevin's 
predecessors. 344 
342 Gilbert, Martin (2007: 249) Chapter 22, '1 shall Continue to Do My Best' 
343 Ibid., (2007: 249-250) 
3" Bullock, Alan (1983: 166) Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951, Chapter 4, First 
Encounters, (London: Heinemann) 
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The historian David Child's claims that once Attlee and Bevin were in office it seems 
the historically close and friendly ties between the Labour Party and British political 
Zionists ceased to be a decisive consideration, 345 with the consequence that: 
`Of all the controversies over external affairs Palestine was the one that caused 
the Attlee government the most bitter recriminations with its own supporters. 
It is the issue most frequently mentioned by Labour survivors of the period as 
having been mismanaged by their government. ' 346 
But while the Labour Leader and the Cabinet as a whole were prepared to affirm 
British interests over those of the party on the Palestine-political Zionism question, 
the majority of the party residing upon the backbenches evidently was not. In many 
ways it was the extremes represented by Labour's policy positions in 1944 and the 
adoption of the 1939 White Paper position in 1945 which caused most exasperation 
among pro-political Zionist figures. Not surprisingly Hugh Dalton was one of the 
most vociferous of these disgruntled figures. As the first post-1945 Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Dalton claimed he `continued to feel a sense of personal responsibility 
towards the worst victims of Nazi atrocities. ' 347 As he says: `On August 1st I wrote: 
`In the twelve months since our election victory [July 1945] events in Palestine have 
not gone well. ' 348 
For pro-political Zionist Labour figures like Hugh Dalton, Ian Mikardo, Herbert 
Morrison, Harold Laski and Richard Crossman, the villain behind this Labour 
abandonment of political Zionism was the foreign minister, Ernest Bevin. Their 
combined angst was to culminate in the backbench revolt of January 1949. 
345 Childs, David (1992: 46) 
346 Ibid., (1992: 46) 
347 Pimlott, Ben (1985: 498) 
348 Dalton, Hugh (1962: 145) High Tide and After: Memoirs 1945-1960, Chapter XVI, 
Palestine, (London: Frederick Muller) 
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Ernest Bevin: A Controversial Foreign Minister 
As the illegitimate son of a district rural nurse, and orphaned aged 8, Bevin had left 
school at 11 to rise from a poverty-stricken background and a rudimentary secondary 
education, through the bear-pit of the trade union movement to become Labour's first 
post-1945 Foreign Secretary. 349 In terms of social mobility he was the embodiment of 
the party's origins and ethos. Despite his personal failings, within the party he was 
generally well respected, if not revered. 
350 And as Bevin's definitive biographer - 
Allan Bullock - says: `No voices were raised in question when ... his ashes was 
placed in Westminster Abbey, ' in what Attlee called this `ancient shrine of our 
nation. 351 
As Foreign Secretary, Bevin attempted to apply a maxim that had stood him in good 
stead for his entire political career: that in all disputes there has to be compromise, 
and that all parties have an ultimate interest in avoiding and/or resolving conflict. 
Within the sphere of industrial relations that may be an acceptable measure. What 
many have since argued is that Bevin's fatal error was to apply this compromising 
" Bullock says of Bevin's appointment: `less than twenty-four hours before ... 
Bevin had 
believed he was going to the Treasury, and the Foreign Office had expected that Dalton would 
succeed [Anthony] Eden as Foreign Secretary. It was only the previous afternoon that Attlee 
finally decided to switch them. ' Bullock, Alan (1983: 3) Chapter 1, The World in the Summer 
of 1945. Attlee's decision - in part at least - is attributed to H. R. H. King George VI: `I asked 
him whom he would make Foreign Secretary and he suggested Dr Hugh Dalton. I disagreed 
with him and said that Foreign Affairs was the most important subject at the moment and I 
hoped he would make Mr Bevin take it. ' Chaitani, Youssef (2002: 16) Dissension Among 
Allies: Ernest Bevin's Palestine Policy between Whitehall and the White House, 1945-47, 
Chapter 1, Ernest Bevin: The Man, his Middle East Vision and Palestine, quoting, King 
George VI diaries, in Sir John Wheeler-Bennett's, The Life of King George VI, Harold Wilson 
(1981) The Chariot of Israel, p. 125, (London: Saqi Books) 
35° Ernest Bevin's Permanent Private Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Roderick Barclay, 
said of "Ernie Bevin" that he was `by a long way the most remarkable of my various chiefs. ' 
Barclay, Roderick (1975: xi) Ernest Bevin and the Foreign ice 1932-1969, (London: 
Latimer) 
351 Bullock, Alan (1983: 835). Bevin also received honorary degrees from Oxford and 
Cambridge Universities. 
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formula to the Palestine-political Zionism equation, a situation not `open to 
compromise'352 by either side. However, as with previous and subsequent Labour 
Foreign Secretaries, Bevin was relatively inexperienced for the post of Foreign 
Minister, and particularly for this dispute. 353 Bullock states: 
`The truth is that until he became Foreign Secretary himself Bevin had never 
taken an interest in Palestine or the Middle East. '354 
As such, he proved open to the change that his subsequent policies were predicated on 
his own supposed anti-Semitic leanings. 
Ian Mikardo, an active pro-political Zionist and experienced Labour MP stated 
unequivocally: 
`My own single attempt to have a talk with Bevin was a disaster, and I came 
away from it with the discovery that he was not only anti-Zionist but also anti- 
Jewish. '355 
Mikardo claims that the origins of Bevin's anti-political Zionism arose from the 
Whitechapel356 experience, and that this had developed into a `fanatical hatred' for the 
Zionist Jews in Palestine, manifesting into an `obsession which finally led him into 
the humiliation of having to give up the Palestine mandate because his operation of it 
had become a miserable, abject, irredeemable failure. '357 Adding that Bevin's position 
" Weiler, Peter (1993: 170) Ernest Bevin, (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
353 On becoming Foreign Secretary, Bullock states Bevin could not `conceal his 
disappointment' at not being Chancellor. Bullock, Alan (1967: 394) The Life and Times of 
Ernest Bevin: Volume 2, Minister of Labour 1940-1945, Chapter 12, The 1945 Election, 
(London: Heinemann) 
354 Bullock, Alan (1983: 166) 
353 Ian Mikardo (1988: 97) Back-Bencher, Chapter 7, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson) 
356 Whitechapel and St George By-Election (1930) See: Chapter 1. 
357 Mikardo, Ian (1988: 98) 
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also emulated from an intense dislike for anyone who `defied him so openly and so 
successfully. '358 
Mikardo believes anti-Semitism also extended to the Labour Prime Minister, Clement 
Attlee, with subsequent negative consequences for a number of key careers, including 
Mikardo's own. 359 Mikardo cites as evidence the account of an Inner-Cabinet meeting 
conveyed to him at which a suggestion that Ian Mikardo and Austen Albu be given 
Ministerial posts was rejected by Attlee `apparently on racial grounds as `they both 
belonged to the Chosen People, and he didn't think he wanted any more of them. 360 
While noting that Mikardo is uncertain of the origins of this `antisemitism of 
Attlee' S, 361 he suggests: 
`It may have derived from his contacts with Jews during the many years he 
spent in the East End; it may have been a fallout from his long-running bad- 
tempered disagreements with Harold Laski, who would be in Attlee's bad 
books not merely as a Jew but also as an intellectual and doctrinal socialist; 
and it may have been a transference from Ernest Bevin, by whom he was 
always greatly influenced and who as Foreign Secretary developed a bitter 
hatred of the Jews because a few thousand of them successfully defied him, by 
running the gauntlet of his warships, to get out of concentration camps in 
Germany and join their own, and welcoming, people in Palestine, and because 
in the end he had to admit defeat at the hands of the Palestinian Jews and leave 
others to solve a problem which he couldn't solve because he never 
understood it. ' 362 
In contrast to the claims by figures like Mikardo that Bevin was anti-Jewish and anti- 
political Zionist, the equally staunchly political Zionist Herbert Morrison (later 
Foreign Secretary) said: 
35" Ibid., (1988: 98) 
359 Ibid., (1988: 4) Preface 
360 Ibid., (1988: 4) quoting, Ben Pimlott (1985), Hugh Dalton, (London: Jonathan Cape) 
361 Ibid., (1988: 4) 
362 Ibid., (1988: 4) 
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`When he was thwarted he could say things and take steps which in retrospect 
he probably regretted. The time when the Stem and other terrorist gangs began 
causing trouble in Palestine was a case in point. Before that he was whole- 
heartedly in favour of co-operating with Jews to help them build up their 
national home. '363 
Morrison continues: 
`He was excessively annoyed when events showed that big sections of the 
Jewish population did not appreciate his idea of how they should achieve 
national independence. Only then could it be said that Bevin became anti- 
Jewish. He was never anti-Semitic in the sense of having racial hatred. 064 
Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin undoubtedly came under sustained pressure from 
pro-political Zionist elements within the party in the period 1945-1949. In addition to 
Hugh Dalton and Harold Laski, one of the most notable pro-political Zionist Labour 
MPs was Sydney Silverman. As the Foreign Office Under-Secretary of State (1946- 
1950), Christopher Mayhew365 says that in the post-1945 period the greatest source of 
pressure for a policy change on Jewish immigration to Palestine came from this 'left- 
wing' Labour MP: 
363 Morrison, Herbert (1960: 272-273) Herbert Morrison: An Autobiography by Lord 
Morrison of Lambeth, Chapter 20, I Become Foreign Secretary, (London: Odhams) 
1 Ibid., (1960: 272-273) 
365 Christopher Mayhew (b. 1915-d. 1997) MP: (Norfolk South, 1945-1950), (Woolwich East, 
1951-1974). Mayhew says his `conversion to Socialism owed little or nothing to my religious 
upbringing, or compassion for working-class people. Nor was it due to intellectual 
conviction', but like `many middle-class Socialists, as a reaction to the `tyranny of my public 
school. ' Mayhew, Christopher (1969: 14) Forward, Party Games, (London: Hutchinson) 
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`The deputations were almost always well-informed, articulate, demanding, 
passionate and ruthless. The most formidable of their spokesmen, without 
question, was Sydney Silverman. 366 
Of Jewish origins and parentage, Silverman's relationship to Judaism is described by 
his biographer, Emrys Hughes: 
`Although he was not religious-minded and did not worship, he combined a 
profound and sincere respect for the Jewish faith with a strong feeling for 
Jewish history and tradition. '367 
Another of Silverman's biographers, A L. Easterman, describes the combined 
influence of his socialism and religious philosophy as follows, 
`My Socialist friends who will applaud my efforts for Socialism must agree it 
means nothing if it does not mean the relief of the persecuted and the 
oppressed, and the fact that I too am a Jew does not, I hope, disqualify my 
efforts when the Jews are the immediate victims. '368 
Easterman said in a eulogy to Silverman in 1969 that the experience and plight of 
Jews in Europe and Russia that resulted in Silverman's family flight from Romania 
and his own early conversation to political Zionism as a result: 
`In his early youth, he joined the Zionist Movement in Liverpool. This was the 
era when millions of Jews in Russia, the largest Jewish Community in the 
world, were under the thrall of Tsarist anti-Semitic terrorism, confined by laws 
to Pales of Settlement, denied civil rights, subject incessantly to the antipathies 
of State and Church, and to physical attack, pillage and murder.... 
I Mayhew, Christopher (1987: 116) Time to Explain: An Autobiography, Chapter 9, Bevin 
and Palestine, (London: Hutchinson) 
36' Hughes, Emrys (1969: 216) Sydney Silverman: Rebel in Parliament, quoting, A L. 
Easterman, Sydney Silverman: A Jewish Estimate, (London: Charles Skilton) 
3" Ibid., (1969: 82) Chapter Nine, Plea for the Jews, quoting, Sydney Silverman 
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As a Jew, Sydney was revolted by savage onslaughts on his fellow Jews for no 
reason other than blind hatred of their race or religion. As a socialist, he was 
infuriated and repelled by the inhumanity and injustice inflicted on his people . 
... He saw the 
Zionist movement for a Jewish National Home in Palestine as 
the one radical, practical solution of `the Jewish problem. '369 
Furthermore, the horrors of the Nazi genocide and the plight of Jewish survivors 
crystalised Silverman's pro-political Zionist position within the Labour Party. In April 
1945 as part of an All-Party Parliamentary Delegation, he travelled to Bergen-Belsen 
concentration camp. The experience, says Hughes, left him `sickened and horrified; 
the memory of it remained with him all his life. '370 
Sydney Silverman's fervent commitment elevated him into one of the most active and 
vocal pro-political Zionist Labour figures. His criticisms of Labour policy and Bevin - 
of whom he said `called himself a Socialist'371 - became increasingly strident. As a 
consequence, and as with other Labour figures,, it has been suggested that Silverman's 
political Zionism ultimately denied him a Ministerial position in the 1945-1951 
Cabinet: 
, it is true that he acquired a reputation in Parliament of being awkward and 
difficult, too assertive and opinionative, but of his ability there was no doubt 
and those who knew him best thought it was a mistake on [Clement] Attlee's 
part to leave him out.... Bevin was not enthusiastic about Jews and Sydney 
had an idea that his activities on the Jewish problems were against him, and 
said so freely to his Jewish friends. '372 
369 Ibid., (1969: 216-217) quoting, A L. Easterman, Sydney Silverman: A Jewish Estimate. 
370 Ibid., (1969: 84) 
371 Ibid., (1969: 85) quoting, Sydney Silverman 
372 Ibid., (1969: 90) Chapter 10,1945 Labour Government. Hughes says: `Another story is 
that his name was included in a list of possible ministers but that Herbert Morrison had 
objected. Would Sydney Silverman have made a good Cabinet Minister? The trouble with 
Sydney was that he was honest, out-spokenly, aggressively, uncompromisingly, intellectually 
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This accusation is found elsewhere in the politics of the moment. It is frequently cited, 
particularly among political Zionist figures, that - apart from his supposed anti- 
Semitism - one of key reasons for the extent of Labour disquiet over Palestine was 
that Bevin was `tragically miscast as Labour's Foreign Secretary'373 and that the post 
should really have gone to Hugh Dalton. As the historian Archie Potts conveys: 
`Hugh Dalton would have been far better, first of all because he really did 
know a lot about foreign affairs; secondly because he knew how to manage the 
Foreign Office officials, instead of being run by them; thirdly, because he was 
capable of learning from experience and correcting his mistakes; fourthly 
because he would listen to the views of backbench colleagues instead of 
treating any criticism or comments as an insult and relying on blind trade 
union loyalties and the power of the block vote to impose on the Labour Party 
the Churchillian policies that the Foreign Office had induced him to adopt. '374 
The influence of the Foreign Office on Bevin came under scrutiny in arguments that it 
was viewed by leading Labour figures, and Dalton himself, that he had been 
overlooked by Attlee for the post of Foreign Secretary. Dalton and others claimed this 
was as a result of his pro-political Zionist sympathies and actions. 
`Bevin came to foreign affairs without knowledge, and hence without 
preconceptions. Dalton by contrast was regarded as `viewy' because of his 
pro-Zionist stance on Palestine, .. It was 
feared that, on such matters, he might 
be reluctant to take advice. ' The trade union leader's [Bevin] later reputation 
among diplomats as a great Foreign Secretary owed much to his readiness to 
honest, which might have proved awkward for any government. ' Hughes, Emrys (1969: 89- 
90) Chapter 10,1945 Labour Government 
313 Saville, John (1993: 81) The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour 
Government 1945-46, Chapter 2, Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary: Attitudes, Work 
Patterns, Health, (London: Verso) 
374 Potts, Archie (2002: 99) Zilliacus: A Life for Peace and Socialism, Chapter 15, Into 
Parliament, (London: Merlin) 
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be `put on the right line'. ... 
Attlee came to believe that Dalton's appointment 
to the Foreign Office would cause serious trouble within the service. '375 376 
Dalton himself attributed Bevin's Palestine policy to the anti-Semitism thesis: 
`He [Bevin] suffered, however, from an inhibition due to his belief, which I 
heard him more than once express, that "Jews are a religion, not a race or a 
nation. " And I heard [Clement] Attlee several times express the same 
opinion. '377 
Similarly Harold Wilson agreed: 
`It is not too strong a phrase to say that Ernie was anti-Semitic. In his policy 
for Palestine and the Middle East generally, he never accepted the conference 
commitments and election pledges of the Labour Party [1944 Post-War 
'378 Statement]. 
In sum, the academic historian Stephen Haseler claims that the `Labour movement 
lived with Ernest Bevin in a state of confusion', and that what really wrangled the 
pro-political Zionists in particular was the fact that Bevin's anti-Zionist policies `cut 
deeply across many traditional socialist attitudes to foreign affairs, '379 most 
particularly a historical sympathy and commitment by Labour to political Zionism. 
375 Ibid., (1985: 413) 
376 Ben Pimlott claims it was rumoured that Attlee had been warned by a Cabinet colleague - 
Bridges - `not to appoint Dalton because several senior Foreign Office men would resign if he 
did so. ' Pimlott, Ben (1985: 413) 
377 Dalton, Hugh (1962: 147) Chapter XVI, Palestine 
378 Wilson, Harold (1986: 125) Memoirs: The Making of a Prime Minister 1916-64, 
(London: Weidenfeld, Nicolson & Michael Joseph) 
379 Haseler, Stephen (1969: 112) The Gaitskellites: Revisionism in the British Labour 
Movement 1951-64, Chapter 6, The Spectre of Ernest Bevin, (London: Macmillan) 
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The Labour Revolt against Attlee and Bevin begins. 
Infuriated by what he saw as Labour's neglect of both the Jewish refugees and the 
commitments made in the 1944 statement, Dalton initially blamed the Foreign Office 
for unduly influencing Bevin380, an assessment largely agreed with by Pimlott: 
`The new Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was quickly won over by his 
officials, and the 1939 White Paper became the Palestine policy of the new 
government. Bevin had taken no part in the wartime discussions on Palestine. 
He was made rapidly aware of the strong resistance that would result in the 
Arab world, with Palestine and outside it, if Jewish immigration was not 
strictly controlled. In addition he had little sympathy for the aspirations of the 
Jews. 391 
It is also claimed that in part Bevin's policy resulted in particular from the undue 
influence of the renowned Arabist Sir Harold Beeley. 382 Beeley was appointed 
Secretary of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry on Palestine (1946), 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 1955 and Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign 
Office 1956-58 and was chief advisor to Ernest Bevin on Palestine and Middle East. 
John Longrigg said this of him: `Harold Beeley's reputation, and the high esteem in 
which his colleagues in Britain and abroad held him, rests mainly on his role as one of 
the most influential creators and practitioners of British policy in the Middle East 
during the thirty-odd years after the end of the Second World War. He recognised, 
perhaps earlier than others, that a romantic notion of desert hawks and black tents was 
an unreliable basis for policy. '383 
He read our material and within a few weeks he came to the conclusion, I 
think purely on intellectual grounds, that the traditional Labour Party policy 
was wrong. It's not true that Bevin was "got a grip of' by the Foreign Office. 
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But it was only by becoming a minister in charge of a department that he could 
become fully informed of the issues. j384 
Hugh Dalton nonetheless developed a valuable ally in an unexpected quarter: Richard 
[Dick] Crossman, one of the foremost socialist intellectual left-wing figures of the 
post-1945 generation. Crossman was appointed by Ernest Bevin to the 1946 Anglo- 
American Commission, in part, because he had little or no previous knowledge or 
experience of the subject of Palestine and political Zionism, and as such, Bevin 
assumed he would conclude that the Palestine Policy based on British interests and 
close Arab ties would prevail. But for Crossman, his involvement in the 1946 enquiry, 
established to find a common Anglo-American position on the solution for Jewish 
displaced persons in Europe (and to stymie American-imposed increases in Jewish 
immigration into Palestine), catapulted him into the field with unexpected results. 
Crossman's biographer - Anthony Howard - says `he seems to have fallen in love with 
the country straight way. His sympathies, though, were not engaged by one side alone 
, ass As Crossman himself explained: 
`I arrived in Jerusalem straight from Dachau, quite overwhelmed by the need 
of European Jewry to return home. After travelling across Germany and 
Austria in the winter of 1945, I did not need to be taught the Jewish case. I 
knew it by heart and from the heart. '386 
Despite the undisputed impact of the Holocaust and the ongoing plight of survivors, 
the situation in Palestine also evidently made a deep impression upon Crossman as he 
realised on his arrival that the Palestinians were being overridden in order to facilitate 
a Jewish State via mass Jewish immigration: 
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`What stuck in my gullet was the idea that British troops should be used to 
hold the Arabs down while the Jews were given time to create an artificial 
Jewish majority. '387 
It was the personality to assess the situation for himself, and Crossman's impeccable 
socialist credentials that were also noted by the political Zionists. In a revealing quote, 
the contradictions posed by the realities of the political Zionist's agenda to replace the 
Palestinians in Palestine and socialism are all too evident in a brief sent to Weizmann 
by an American Zionist in advance of Crossman's arrival in Palestine: 
`There is no one on the British delegation that you have to fear except Dick 
Crossman. He's the brainiest of the lot, the most sophisticated, the most 
intelligent -a real socialist and a leftist socialist at that. He is a man to be 
watched and feared. '388 
However, Zionist concerns proved unfounded. Sympathy for the plight of Jewish 
victims of Nazism proved the stronger argument for Crossman than the dispossession 
of the Palestinians. Crossman embraced partition within days of his arrival. As 
Howard says, `In truth, there will always be a difficulty about following the exact 
details of Dick's conversion to the Zionist cause. '389 But whatever the source of the 
`Damascus road 9390 experience, he concludes, `Zionism was to remain one cause to 
which Dick remained constant throughout his life. 391 The effect in terms of his 
ascendancy to the head of the pro-political Zionist lobby and his influence upon 
Labour figures was profound and protracted. As Howard further states: 
`Dick was driven to the conclusion that, if he was to bring about any change in 
the Foreign Office attitude, he would have to fight the government in order to 
3aß Crossman, Richard (1960: 54) 
3sa Howard, Anthony (1991: 119) quoting, Meyer Weisgal, briefing to Chaim Weizmann, 
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get it. That summer he launched what was to develop into a three-year 
campaign (1946-1949) which eventually vindicated his own initial instincts in 
favour of partition as the only viable solution to the problems of Palestine. '392 
Crossman found little sympathy for his new found views with Attlee and Bevin, who 
had already decided not to act on the report. Additionally indeed, Hugh Gaitskell 
claims that Crossman fell from Bevin's favour because on his return from the 
Committee he `quarrelled with the Foreign Office. He did not keep in touch with 
them. He developed views of his own, and started giving expression to them, without 
making sure they agreed with him. '393 
Influences upon Labour Party Leadership and Policy 
There can be little doubt that the Foreign Office did indeed influence Bevin's 
judgment. They knew well that if Britain were to retain its position as the `paramount 
power in the Middle East' it would require the `goodwill of the Arab states as hostile 
to Zionist claims as the Palestinian Arabs. '394 Alan Bullock quotes the findings of the 
Labour government's own commission on Palestine: 
`The Middle East is a region of vital consequence for Britain and the British 
Empire. It is also the Empire's main reservoir of mineral oil. The attitude of 
the Arab states to any decision [regarding Palestine] is a matter of the first 
importance. Protection of our vital interests depends, therefore, on the 
collaboration from these independent states. Unfortunately the future of 
Palestine bulks large in Arab eyes ... 19395 
But whilst Labour Ministers struggled with the realities of national interest, the 
Holocaust had served to strengthen the empathy within the ranks of the party and the 
392 Ibid., (1991: 125) 
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backbenches for the cause of political Zionism. As Mayhew and journalist Michael 
Adams noted: 
`On short-term human grounds, the case for unrestricted immigration [to 
Palestine] was overwhelmingly strong. Scores of thousands of desperate 
Jewish people, fleeing from the scene of their wartime nightmare in Europe, 
were being channelled by Zionist organisations towards Palestine. Most of 
them were destitute and many were physically or mentally crippled. How 
could any civilised government, let alone a British Labour government, fail to 
admit them? Never before or since have I known a more distressing task than 
that of defending the government's immigration policy to outraged deputations 
of Zionists. These deputations were almost always well-informed, articulate, 
demanding, passionate and ruthless. '396 
The essential dilemma which had increasingly troubled Labour figures in the 1917 to 
1944 period as the awareness of the realities of political Zionism and Palestine 
became gradually more apparent, was checked among some Labour figures by the 
Holocaust and the plight of survivors. The immediacy and emotiveness of the 
collective European guilt over the victims of Nazi genocide seemed more urgent than 
the consequences for the Palestinians of a Jewish state in their lands, and more 
compelling then the Labour Government's own practical assessments of British 
national interest. The ideological dimension of the essential dilemma could 
furthermore be placated through the party's own analysis of post-war colonial policy. 
The Labour Party had initiated a post-war colonial policy review in response to the 
changing international circumstances and the clamour for self-determination and 
independence that occurred after 1945. The Review became a mechanism whereby 
Labour's socialist credentials could be aligned with the possession of overseas 
territories, and the efforts to retain them as Dominions via economic development and 
financial investment. 
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One of the most prominent Labour policies during the post-1945 period was thus the 
economic development of the colonies to facilitate the conditions for greater 
autonomy (Dominion and Commonwealth status) and eventual independence: until 
1948 this policy included Palestine. The leading exponent and architect of this policy 
was Rita Hinden. 397 Hinden was the embodiment of a Labour related figure with 
impeccable socialist credentials. As Morgan says, `She was a deeply moral person, 
and her vision of socialism was a reflection of this passionately ethical outlook. '398 
`When she turned her pen to such themes as poverty in the third world... she 
wrote with heart and soul as well as with considerable intellectual power. 399 
400 
Hinden was a relatively rare type among Labour figures: having personal experience 
of the religious, political and the cultural aspects of the Palestine-political Zionism 
conflict. Although her commitment to political Zionism waned and eventually ended, 
her essential position remained located in the belief that the Zionist enterprises in 
Palestine - as with the British ventures elsewhere in the Empire - were basically 
397 [Rebecca] Rita Hinden (b. I 909-d. 1971) 
398 Morgan, Kenneth O. (1987: 239) Labour People. Leaders and Lieutenants: Hardie to 
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Press) 
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beneficial to the indigenous peoples, particularly in the context of economic 
development and financial investment. Hinden had published in 1942 an appraisal of 
the economic development and benefits to the native peoples achieved by Zionist 
colonisation of Palestine. This not only advanced the Zionist's justification for 
establishing a Jewish/Zionist State in Palestine, but also in the justification for the 
negative consequences for the Palestinians of being dispossessed and subsumed by an 
immigrant population. For Hinden: 
`The economic development of Palestine has been one of the few triumphs of the 
Versailles world; in many respects the rate of progress has been unequalled and in 
all respects the approach has been bold and original. Unfortunately, economic 
progress had been overshadowed by political conflict, and the world had come to 
think of Palestine in the years before the war as a battleground or warring 
nationalisms, a hotbed of murder, rioting and rebellion. But, if there is a lesson 
the opening-up of Palestine can teach to other colonies, that lesson must be taught 
Jewish colonisation in Palestine has achieved its economic success ... '401 
The central premise of Hinden's economic and social assessment of Palestine became 
a blueprint for Labour post-war approach to the colonies: `a model of what may be 
achieved. '402 But perhaps more importantly in terms of the contradiction between 
socialist principles and Zionist colonialism, it also firmly founded the notion within 
sections of the party that colonisation was essentially justifiable, particularly if the 
resulting economic development were beneficial to the country and its native 
contingent. 
The Backbench Revolt of 1949 
While success in redirecting Bevin and Attlee remained limited, rather more success 
was made among the backbenches, culminating in the revolt in January 1949. 
Between 1945 and 1949 the Labour Party had tussled with the issue of Palestine and 
political Zionism. Unable to reconcile Palestinian and political Zionist differences, 
401 Hinden, Rita Palestine and Colonial Economic Development, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 
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and with increasingly violent attacks on the British by armed political Zionist and 
Palestinian nationalists forces, and apparently contrary to its long-standing support for 
the political Zionist cause, the Labour government referred the `Palestine problem' to 
the United Nations (August 1947). The Palestine mandate concluded after the 
subsequent November 1947 UN Partition Plan precipitated the division of Palestine 
into Jewish and Palestinian territories, the withdrawal of the British and the 
establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948. For those among the Labour Party 
who were committed to the political Zionism of the 1944 statement, the UN referral 
had represented Bevin's greatest betrayal; whilst the subsequent establishment of 
Israel ironically 'represented their greatest victory, even if it represented a defeat for 
Bevin and Britain in Palestine, what Bethell calls a `David-and-Goliath outcome. '403 
Even after the creation of Israel in May 1948 and the departure of the British in 
August, the issue continued to cause problems for the party and Labour figures. A 
great deal of these difficulties for Attlee and Bevin were generated by the specific 
lobbying group of pro-Israel Labour MPs led by Hugh Dalton and Richard Crossman; 
one of their activities is captured during an Adjournment Debate on whether Britain 
(Labour) should recognise the State of Israel in July 1948. A Front Bench MP - 
Christopher Mayhew - was required to explain the government's policy: 
`In the Official's Gallery, over to my left, my Private Secretary, perhaps my 
soul supporter present, would be silently praying that I would stick to my 
brief. And behind me, wide-awake, well-informed, passionate, articulate and 
aggressive, would be a group of twenty or thirty pro-Israeli Labour members. 
Most of them would be Jewish. Sydney Silverman, Maurice Edelman and Ian 
Mikardo would surely be among them, even at eight o'clock in the morning; 
and also Israel's most brilliant non-Jewish supporter, Dick Crossman. '404 
The political Zionist lobby within the Labour Party comprised a number of prominent 
gentile and Jewish pro-Israel MPs; at the heart of this group was Ian Mikardo. 
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Thomas [Tam] Dalyel1405 claims: `If [Richard] Crossman was the intellectual of the 
`old left', then Ian Mikardo, above all, was its arch-manoeuvrer. He joined the Labour 
Party and Poale Zion in the late 1920s, giving his first public address in 1922, aged 
13, to the Portsmouth Zionist Society. Thus began a lifelong commitment to political 
Zionism and Israel, a cause shared by those with similar stories to tell, such as Sidney 
Silverman and Harold Lever. 406 407 
The experience of Mikado's parents in Eastern Europe was to shape his whole 
political life. His parents had come to Britain as refugees from the Tsarist Empire in 
the nineteenth century. Mikardo conveys the circumstances of their flight: 
`The poverty and bleakness of life within the Pale was one of the potent 
incentives to emigration. But there were many others, including periodic 
famines and epidemics of cholera. Every few years the anti-semites of the 
tsarist peoples erupted into pogroms of murder, rape, pillage and arson, and 
every such wave, such as the massive Kishinev pogrom of 1903, added a sharp 
stimulus to the urge to emigrate. '408 
The extended families of both Mikardo's parents disappeared during the European 
Holocaust. Of his mother's family at the end of the. 1939-1945 war Mikardo states 
`there was no trace; '409 his father's extended family fared little better: 
`During the war Kuto [Nr Lodz, Poland] was fought through twice: I went 
there a year or so after the end of the War to look for any trace of my cousins 
and found only rubble and silence. Doubtless they met their end either in battle 
or in air-raids or at Auschwitz. '410 
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Meanwhile, the debates and division within Labour continued intermittently and to 
varying degrees from 1945 to into 1949. Gaitskell's biographer, Philip M. Williams, 
quoted the future Labour Leader Hugh Gaitskell as he conveys a sense of the tensions 
the subject caused for individuals, section and the party generally: 
`Outside Europe, the great issue at the moment [1949] was Palestine, where 
Ernest Bevin's policy outraged Labour's Zionist traditions. Here Gaitskell, in 
his moderate fashion, sympathized with the feelings .... 
1 '4 
Approaching the first anniversary of Israel's founding, the issue of the British 
government's - Labour's - recognition of the Hebrew State re-invigorated debate and 
exposed - once again - significant divisions within the party. Having failed to draw a 
line under the subject of Palestine-political Zionism, Hugh Gaitskell (Minister of Fuel 
and Power) recounts that Aneurin Bevan had forewarned him that `there will probably 
be a lot of trouble about Palestine in the party. '412 It was an accurate prediction by 
Bevan, as Gaitskell recounts: 
`The Debate took place on the Adjournment and the Tories decided to vote 
against the Government. About 60 Labour M. P. s abstained. Fortunately the 
Whips had done their stuff and we had a majority of about 90. I think a good 
many of those who abstained on. our side did not realise they were really 
risking the fall of the Government. On the other hand I must confess to some 
sympathy with their point of view. A13 
Gaitskell's account of the parliamentary rebellion by 60 Labour MPs against the 
leadership's policy position - not recognising Israel for fear of jeopardising wider 
British interests by offending the Arab States - illustrates that the strength of pro- 
41 Williams, Philip M (1979: 165) 
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Israel sentiment within the party at that time, although Gaitskell also notes that there 
were additional motivations behind the intense lobbying in favour of the rebellion: 
`Nye [Aneurin] came out quite openly against [Ernest] Bevin and seemed to 
be anxious to start an intrigue to get rid of him.... I think most of us feel 
fairly critical of the foreign policy. Nye was particularly indignant because 
apparently there had been a considerable attack on Bevin in the Cabinet, as a 
result of which it was agreed that we should recognise Israel. In return for this 
concession [to] which Bevin unwillingly acceded, he demanded and got a 
resolution of confidence in his Palestine policy. He then, according to Nye, 
gradually tried to slip out of the recognition decision .... However, we have 
now recognised Israel and if only the peace negotiations are successful it looks 
as if that particular trouble. will be over. If they are not ... the Government 
will be a good deal more cautious over, what so many people believed to be, 
their pro-Arab policy. 414 415 
The gradual capture of Bevan by the political Zionist movement was another major 
coup: as the archetypal socialist and vehement long-standing political opponent of 
Ernest Bevin - largely as a result of domestic policy and ideological differences - he 
was a double-barrelled asset. As Morgan notes: 
`Aneurin Bevan alone kept the flag of the left-wing socialism aloft throughout 
- which gave him a matchless authority amongst the constituency parties and 
in party conference. Bevan certainly had many points of dissent from the rest 
of the Cabinet. In foreign affairs, ... as a constant critic on Palestine. '416 
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The Labour Party in the 1950s and the Suez Crisis 
After Labour's defeat at the 1951 General Election, there followed a period of thirteen 
years in opposition. In 1955 Hugh Gaitskell assumed the party leadership with 
Attlee's retirement, only to be confronted - in 1956 - by one of the largest British 
foreign policy crises in living memory. 
By 1956 Colonel Abdel Nasser (Prime Minister and later President of Egypt), who 
had risen to power via a military coup, had assumed not only the mantle of champion 
of the Palestine issues and the Palestinian cause but, as the head of the largest and 
most advanced Arab State, he had additional ambitions to represent the entire Arab 
region of the Middle East in the face of continuing European colonialism and 
imperialism. In response to rising tensions along the Egyptian-Israeli border, Nasser 
ordered the blocking of the Straits of Tiran in September 1955 to Israeli shipping 
bound for the Israeli port of Eilat. The withdrawal of an offer by the United States and 
British to fund the building of the Aswan Dam led Nasser to respond by nationalising 
the Suez Canal. 417 In response to these growing antagonisms between Egypt and 
Israel, Gaitskell initially appeared to prefer a policy reflecting Labour's historic 
affiliation with political Zionism and now with Israel, as Gaitskell's biographer - 
Geoffrey McDermott - recounts: 
`He [Gaitskell] recalled that the 1955 Labour Party conference had come out 
overwhelmingly in favour of a defensive alliance with Israel. He could not 
pretend that even now the danger was entirely over. `I agree with our friends 
from Poale Zion (the affiliated union of British Jews) that we must not forget 
the rights of Israel and Israeli shipping. '418 
However, when in late October 1956 Israel launched a pre-agreed assault on Egypt 
providing the calculated pretext for Britain and France to invade Egypt under the 
417 For a comprehensive account of the political, diplomatic and military aspects of the Suez 
affair see: Kyle, Keith (1992) Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East, (London: 1. 
B. Tauris) 
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guise of keeping the two warring sides apart, while protecting a strategic global 
interest - the Suez Canal itself, the Labour Party was again caught in the tangled web 
of its own essential dilemma. At the level of its ideological dimensions, the British 
Prime Minister, Antony Eden, had clearly committed Britain to an underhand and 
essentially colonialist act which met with international approbation, not to mention 
American frustration (the US voting in the United Nations to censure the aggressors). 
Yet, Labour was unable to unequivocally condemn the British invasion. In 
condemning the assault by Britain, France and Israel on Egypt, Labour would be 
forced to criticise Israel and Labor Party with which Labour had deep long-standing 
sympathies and empathies, combined with long-term and close associations. 419 
Gaitskell himself chose a position that amounted to little more than a fudge. At a 
personal level, he supported Israel, but he `nevertheless felt able to reconcile this with 
an insistence on opposing any military action which was not sanctioned by the 
Security Council of the United Nations. 420 Unwilling to cast Israel as the unprovoked 
party, he chose to identify Nasser as the villain, and despite his discomfort with the 
British involvement, Gaitskell emphasised the latter as the `greater evil. ' Williams 
conveys an assessment of Gaitskell's thinking: 
`Britain had a major legitimate interest in the Canal, for most of her oil came 
through it and nearly half the ships using it were British. While nationalisation 
alone gave no justification for imposing an international solution by force, the 
manner in which Nasser had acted showed he had an ulterior aim: to score a 
prestige triumph over the West and so promote the expansion of Arab 
nationalism - or the aggrandisement of Egypt. 
421 
Adding: 
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`Gaitskell never believed in the `Third World' right or wrong, or approved of 
ambitious military dictators when their skins were dark; and his sympathy for 
the Israelis, felt by most Labour people since the 1930s, had been keen since 
his visit in 1953. '422 
Emulating a response by Labour figures extending to the early 1930s of categorising 
Arab leaders as Nazi or Fascists, Gaitskell had no hesitation in emulating Anthony 
Eden in associating the actions and intentions of the Egyptian leader - as a greater 
pan-Arab nationalist - with those of Hitler towards Czechoslovakia and Poland in 
1939 - to attain `mastery of the Middle East: '423 
`It is all very familiar. It is exactly the same that we encountered from 
Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war. AN 
Plaudits of Gaitskell's parliamentary address stated he `spoke for England' and `not 
for your party only. '425 Other key Labour figure with sympathies for Israel regardless 
of the follies of the Suez invasion and Gaitskell's policy position reflected the strength 
of support for political Zionism within the party which had undoubtedly prevailed 
since the death of Ernest Bevin. Due to the on-set of illness Bevin had been replaced 
as foreign secretary in early March 1951426 by Herbert Morrison, an avid political- 
Zionist. Morrison himself was not without his critics: 
`Despite such a broadening of his horizon, his views on foreign affairs were 
superficial. He was not a fluent speaker of another language, nor did he read 
foreign literature. He was not knowledgeable about the history and culture of 
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other countries and he never studied in-depth problems of international policy. 
He simply had not the time to make himself a specialist. He formed his views 
of foreign policy without the detailed analysis he gave to home policies, 
tending to accept the conventional line of the party, which fitted neatly into the 
set of attitudes he had acquired before 1914. '427 
With regards to the Middle East specifically, Hugh Dalton said of Morrison: 
`[Herbert] Morrison's touch was erratic in the Middle East. As an old patriot 
of Zionism with many links with the Jewish community in London, he did not 
greatly like the Arabs (including the non-Arab [Persian] Iranians, for this 
purpose). Added to this was his residual imperialism which led him to refer in 
1946 to the `jolly old empire. '428 
Kenneth Morgan claims that Morrison's long-standing political Zionism and anti- 
Arabism led him to give support to Israel's actions during Suez: 
`In 1956 it was to -move him to warm enthusiasm for the Anglo-French [Israel] 
attack on Egypt. '429 
Indeed, Morgan continues: 
`Morrison was passionately pro-Israel and in recent years had spoken up 
strongly in her [Israel's] defence, urging the British government to guarantee 
her frontiers and supply her with sufficient arms to deter the surrounding Arab 
states which consistently boasted of her impending genocidal annihilation. 
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Before leaving for the United States in September he called on Eden at 10 
Downing Street, to restate his support for the government's tough policy. '430 
Other Labour members were less convinced, one of them being the shadow Foreign 
Secretary, George Brown. 431 
`The problem facing the Shadow Cabinet from 26 July onwards in one way 
was not easy, not least because Hugh Gaitskell and George Brown [Shadow 
Foreign Affairs] had been for years in basic disagreement about the Middle 
East. Hugh Gaitskell was close to the Israelis, George was regarded by many 
pro-Jewish Labour MPs as a `raging Arab. ' It is true that he was closer to a 
number of Arab leaders, and was indeed later shattered almost to the point of 
tears when King Feisal and Huri-es-Said of Iraq were murdered. '432 
In relation to Suez, Harold Wilson says of Brown, Labour, and his own position: 
`When the Suez war began, George [Brown], in all fairness and within his 
rights, was able to insist that, as they had agreed that the party could not 
support aggression, the fact that the Israelis struck first meant that the PLP 
could not support them. Both of them, however, and indeed all of us, were 
agreed that we could not support any resort to war which did not receive UN 
approval. '433 
One of the youngest rising MPs in the Labour Party at this time was Tony Benn. 434 
His response to Suez and the Labour leadership's position exemplified many of the 
contradictions felt by Labour figures. Tony Benn's biographer - Jad Adams - 
43° Donoughue, Bernard & Jones, George W. (2001: 546) 
431 George Brown (b. 1914-d. 1985) MP: (Belper, 1945-1951,1955-1970); Deputy Leader, 
1960-1970. 
432 Wilson, Harold (1981: 248) 
433 Ibid., (1981: 248) 
434 Anthony "Tony" Wedgwood Benn (b. 1925) MP: (Bristol South East 1950-1961,1963- 
1983), (Chesterfield, 1984-2001) 
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identifies the source of the dilemma felt by Benn at the time as a moderate political 
Zionist backbench MP - then on the soft left-wing of the party: 
`Why did he [Benn] pay such attention to colonial affairs? Partly it was his 
father's influence - the former Secretary of State for India had always been an 
international politician. He was automatically on the side of the independence 
movements. "I had anti-imperialism in my bloodstream, " he said, "the old left- 
liberal position. My interest was aroused when I was in Africa and the Middle 
East during the war. Colonialism had to end.... It wasn't a very popular cause 
to take up except with the constituencies. 9435 
With such a perspective, it was not surprising, as Adams continues to point out, that: 
`Suez was a particular embarrassment to the Labour Party. Almost everyone in 
the party agreed in principle with Nasser's act of nationalisation, but even Nye 
Bevan was so critical of Nasser that it was impossible for him wholeheartedly 
to oppose Eden. `Nasser's a thug, ' he said, `and he needs to be taught a 
lesson. ' 
In a speech of bitter denunciation on 2 August, Gaitskell compared Nasser to 
Hitler and Mussolini. He was wildly cheered by the Conservatives but heard in 
near silence by the benches behind him. Benn wrote in his diary, `I felt sick as 
I listened. I wanted to shout "shame. " I very nearly did buttonhole him 
afterwards and say that his speech had made me want to vomit. '436 
aas Adams, Jad (1992: 95) Tony Benn, Chapter 8, The Cold War and Colonial Freedom, 
(London: Macmillan) 
436 Ibid., (1992: 117) Chapter 10, The Suez Campaign quoting, Tony Benn, November 5, 
1956, (Benn is recalling the event on August 2,1956) 
151 
Chapter 2 (1945-1962) 
The moderate backbench left-wing MP - Denis Healey, 
437 
- meanwhile responded 
with consternation at the role of the British, French and Israeli governments in their 
collusion to attack Egypt: 
`In the whole of my political life I have never been so angry for so long as I 
was during the Suez affair. '438 `The strength of my feelings over Suez led me 
at least to speak like a human being with emotion, rather than like a soulless 
automaton. '439 
Although Aneurin Bevan was a leading pro-Israel MP, by 1956 he had become aware 
that Israel was not to be considered beyond reproach with regard to its conduct: 
`I am not saying for a single moment that the Israelis did not have the utmost 
provocation. What we are saying is that it is not possible to create peace in the 
Middle East by jeopardising the peace of the world. '440 
Ultimately, the Labour leadership settled on a policy position that sheltered under the 
commitment to the United Nations and to which all the party, whether the committed 
lobbyists for political Zionism or anti-colonial leftists, could commit. In the 
Commons debates themselves, as academic Leon Epstein says: 
`Labour's arguments in the House of Commons were based heavily on the 
wrongfulness of acting outside the United Nations and finally in defiance of 
the United Nations. Here Labour was consistent. .. . '441 
43' Denis Healey (b. 1917) MP: (Leeds South East, 1952-1955), (Leeds East, 1955-1992); 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, 1970-1972,1980-1987; Secretary of State for Defence, 1964- 
1970; Deputy Leader, 1980-1983. 
438 Healey, Denis (1990: 169) 
439 Ibid., (1990: 174) 
440 Campbell, John (1994: 322-323) Nye Bevan: A Biography, (London: Hodder & Stoughton) 
quoting, Aneurin Bevan, News Chronicle, November 5,1956 
441 Epstein, Leon D. (1964: 80) British Politics in the Suez Crisis, (London: Pall Mall) 
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Many ardent lobbyists for political Zionism in the party were less content with the 
equivocation in the support for Israel. Apart from leading Jewish MPs like Ian 
Mikardo, Sydney Silverman and Emanuel Shinwell, 442 Epstein claims that during the 
Suez crisis the `element of potential disaffection consisted of the 17 Labour MPs who 
were Jews, or at least of the several who were active and devoted Zionists. '443 
However, when it came to the crucial parliamentary vote to support the UN position, 
Epstein says: 
`They too supported the Labour critique after some initial doubts and 
ambiguity. ' None of this group ... deliberately abstained in the crucial 
division ... 
'444 
In sum, Labour's policy through the course of Suez was to move from Gaitskell's 
initial sympathy with Eden's decision on the basis of Nasser's provocation with Israel, 
to a position that no action could or should be taken without United Nations approval 
and support. This showed that the party had to work through the issues arising from 
the incompatibility of political Zionist sentiments within the party (and particularly 
among key leadership figures and a vocal committed caucus of lobbyists) and socialist 
commitments to an anti-imperialist struggle against invaders of all persuasions. The 
answer for Labour was not to confront the dilemma directly, but to move the agenda 
to one with which they could all identify and to which they were all - as socialists - 
committed, the primacy of the United Nations as the location for dispute arbitration. 
Conclusion 
In some respects the period from 1945-1951 represents a high water-mark in Labour- 
political Zionism relations. Yet they were also arguably the most contentious years in 
Labour's transformation from what was said to be a policy overwhelmingly in favour 
of political Zionism policy position and party consensus, to a policy position which 
442 Emanuel [Manny] Shinwell [Baron Shinwell, 1970] (b. 1884-4.1986) MP: 
(Linlithgowshire, 1922-1924,1928-193 1), (Seaham, 1935-1950) and (Easington, 19501970); 
Minister for War, 1947-1950; Minister of Defense, 1950-1951 
443 Epstein, Leon D. (1964: 79) Chapter 5, Parliamentary Conflict 
40 Ibid., (1964: 79) 
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favoured a solution based on diplomatic compromise and realpolitik on the one hand, 
and less contentious ideological positioning on the other. 
Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin inherited what was a largely an idealist Labour 
foreign policy based on the decidedly pro-political Zionist 1944 Post-War Statement. 
The 1944 policy position had been formulated while Labour was a member of the war 
coalition government, amid a party distracted by colossal world events and deeply 
vexing domestic circumstances while Labour was still relatively ignorant of foreign 
affairs generally, and Palestine and political Zionism in particular. The writing of the 
statement by Hugh Dalton and contributing influence of Harold Laski ensured that 
Labour policy was overtly pro-political Zionist. The core elements of the policy in 
establishing a Jewish/political Zionist state in all of mandate Palestine and beyond, 
and the encouragement of the Palestinians to vacate Palestine and transfer elsewhere, 
were extreme even by the standards of the era. Yet for the Labour pro-political Zionist 
figures the essential dilemma generated in part by the realities of political Zionism 
and the consequences for the Palestinians was overridden by the calamity of the Jews 
in the Holocaust and the plight of Jewish survivors, which morally surmounted any 
consequences that might occur for the Palestinians. 
However, on Labour assuming power in July 1945, the 1944 policy was overtaken by 
events. The idealism of 1944 was replaced by the realism of government 
responsibility. Attlee, Bevin and the Foreign Office deemed that those greater 
interests lay with the wider Middle East, notably with the Arab states and peoples, and 
Islamic regions of the Indian sub-continent, Malaysia and South East Asia. For 
Labour and related figures who were not pro-political Zionists, the essential dilemma 
was superseded by the need to maintain and advance British national and strategic 
interests that were seen as requiring a favourable position towards Arab opinion 
concerning Palestine. Thus, the internal determinants of governing and the external 
determinants of the post-war world and British national interests converged to subvert 
the pro-political Zionist policy of 1944 as the political aspects overrode the more 
ideological and psychological aspects upon which the policy was based. Within the 
Labour government the tussle to affect policy and the party consensus led to the 
emergence of an identifiable group of pro-political Zionism/Israel Labour figures who 
were determined to challenge Attlee, Bevin and the Foreign Office pro-British 
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interests position. For many of them, Bevin's pragmatism was better understood as 
anti-Semitism. As an internal determinant of Labour policy, however, Bevin's 
motivations were matched by intra-party squabbles over the distribution of key posts 
and by personality clashes among the key figures of the party. 
The early external determinants of the period included the Jewish anti-British 
terrorism which so alienated Attlee and Bevin from the political Zionist cause, the 
engagement of the United States in the issue which demanded a British response, the 
ongoing need to find a resolution for the Jewish displaced persons languishing in 
camps in Europe, the influence of the Foreign Office and its officials on the party 
leadership's thinking, and the contrasting influences of Zionist lobbies and Arab 
embassies. 
Once out of government, the party was relieved of the need to balance pro-political 
Zionist sympathies with real politik. However, a reversion to a pro-political Zionist 
position was made complicated by the collusion of Israel in 1956 in a last British 
imperial adventure. Under the influence of pro-Israel support among the leadership, 
and intense lobbying by a section of the backbenchers, Labour avoided the evidence 
of the irreconcilability of its pro-political Zionism with its anti-imperialist agendas by 
demonising Nasser as a provocative dictator on the one hand, and - as with Palestine 
in 1947 - referring the matter to the authority of the United Nations. But while the 
essential pro-political Zionism of Labour policy remained unchallenged, the Suez 
debacle had forced many in the Labour Party to recognise the essential dilemma that 
such a policy represented. 
In terms of the essential dilemma, it could also be argued that Ernest Bevin with his 
refusal to abandon his belief - and therefore Labour's policy position - that a lasting 
resolution required an equal emphasis upon the case of the `Arabs' [Palestinians] as 
well as the Jews and Zionists, was in some ways an attempt to address the socialist 
ideological contradiction which undoubtedly troubled Bevin. On accepting that his 
and Labour's position on Palestine - in the context of Britain's dire economic post- 
war predicament - relied on the support of the Americans, and realizing that as a result 
of Zionist pressure this American support would only be forthcoming if the political 
Zionists were given everything they demanded, Bevin, in the face of an American 
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`refusal to form a common front over the Palestine question, '445 still refused to 
enforce a policy upon the Palestinians which he felt inherently unfair. In an effort to 
diminish the influence of the essential dilemma, and avoid jeopardising the `special 
relationship' further, he handed the issue to the United Nations, and Britain withdrew 
from Palestine. 
There is also little doubt that the greatest contribution to the psychological aspect of 
the essential dilemma in this period was generated by the Holocausts and its Jewish 
survivors, and the increasing violence and British casualties in Palestine. However, 
despite the tremendous sympathy these events and predicaments generated in Labour 
and related figures, the role of the ideological and political aspects of the dilemma 
were also evident as additional key figures realised the contradictions between 
socialism and the realities of political Zionism and its agenda for Palestine, 
particularly as the consequences for the Palestinians and British strategic interests 
became ever more evident and related to the anti-colonialism and Arab nationalisms 
of the post-1945 era. 
aas Maclean, Donald (1970: 45) British Foreign Policy since Suez 1956-1968, Chapter 2, 
Anglo-American Relations, The Special Relationship, (London: Hodder & Stoughton) 
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Chapter 3 
Addressing the Essential Dilemma (1963-1979) 
Labour Party Deviations and Open Parliamentary Rebellion 
Introduction 
The Middle East in the period from 1963 to the close of the 1970s was characterised 
principally by two wars in 1967 and 1973. While changes in the Labour leadership 
from Hugh Gaitskell to Harold Wilson, James "Jim" Callaghan 446 and Michael 
Foot, 447 largely ensured continuity of a pro-political Zionist position from the head of 
the party hierarchy, the evidence presented here suggests that the party experienced a 
progressive deviation away from the traditional pro-Zionist consensus and policy 
trajectory principally as a result of these external determinants (wars). 
This chapter illustrates that while Israel's attack on Egypt during Suez had certainly 
raised a few discerning eye-brows among Labour figures, a significant deviation 
process began to develop in earnest in large part as a result of the 1967 `Six-Day' War 
and the ideological contradictions the war raised inside the party. This deviation 
process continued to expand and accelerate in the following decade as a result of the 
1973 war, culminating with a section of the party eventually erupting into an open 
parliamentary rebellion in 1973, in a `show case' rejection of the Labour leadership's 
pro-Israel policy preferences. Further external determinants which accelerated this 
deviation process included: the election of the right-wing Likud bloc to government in 
Israel in 1977 and the parallel electoral decline of the Labor Party of Israel. These 
external events occurred in conjunction with a number of important internal 
°46 James "Jim" Callaghan (B. 1912-d. 2005) MP: (Cardiff South, 1945-1950), Cardiff South 
East, 1950-1983) (Cardiff South and Penarth, 1983-1980); PM: 1976-1979; Foreign 
Secretary, 1974-1976; Chancellor, 1964-1967; Labour leader, 1976-1980) 
" Michael Foot (b. 1913) MP: (Plymouth Devonport, 1945-1955), (Ebbw Vale, 1960-1992); 
Labour leader and leader of the Opposition, 1980-1983. 
157 
Chapter 3 (1963-1979) 
determinants, most notably the establishment of two lobby groups: the Council for the 
Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) (1969), and the Labour 
Middle East Council (LMEC) (1969). 
The reorientation of some Labour figures positions was visible in the language which 
abounded in internal party discourse and specifically the reversal of the `David versus 
Goliath' vocabulary which had previously characterised the Israel-Arab debate. The 
end result was a dramatic shift in the party's overwhelmingly pro-political 
Zionist/Israel consensus, and subsequently, policy, particularly after 1973, to a more 
balanced position. As was noted in 1997, Labour-Israel relations by the early 1980s 
had changed so significantly that it was described as being `a time when some in the 
Labour Party worried that to confess to being a friend of Israel counted you amongst 
the politically incorrect. '448 
In terms of the essential dilemma condition the 1967 and 1973 wars proved to be an 
important and lasting influence as any lingering conceptions that the psychological, 
ideological and political components of the condition had been allayed with the 
foundation of Israel in 1948 were re-ignited by the re-emergence of the Palestinians as 
a key component of the wider Arab-Israel conflict. The result was that Labour was 
once again compelled to face and attempt to address the psychological, ideological 
and political components of the essential dilemma. This predicament was 
compounded by two wars that threatened British national and strategic interests as 
Labour's neutrality and efforts to secure. Arab oil supplies and trade with Arab states 
contrasted with efforts to maintain the party's traditional pro-political Zionist position. 
The Premiership of Harold Wilson 
If Clement Attlee as party leader was the defining Labour figure from 1935 to 1955, 
Harold Wilsoe9 was a similarly defining leading figure from 1963 to 1976. The 
second longest serving Leader and Prime Minister in Labour's history, Wilson had a 
448 Blair, Tony Speech: Tony Blair the Labour Friends of Israel, December 9,1997, Labour 
party Press Release, (London: Labour Party) 
449 Harold Wilson (b. 1916-d. 1995) MP: (Ormskirk, 1945-1950), (Huyton, 1950-1983); PM: 
1964-1970,1974-1976; Labour leader, 1963-1976. 
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brilliant undergraduate career at Oxford as an economist which secured an early post 
in the 1945 government as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works. 
In terms of the Israel-Palestinian issue, Wilson is viewed by Watkins as the `most pro- 
Israeli prime minister there had ever been'45° and as such, any account of the basis 
and nature of relations between Labour and political Zionism (Israel) in the context of 
the Israel-Palestinian conflict must incorporate the origins, influence and legacies of 
Harold Wilson, not least because his deep, long-standing interest, but also his 
influence that extended into retirement and to Wilson's successor as Labour leader, 
James Callaghan. While his predecessor Hugh Gaitskel1451 was considered to be pro- 
Israel in a `moderate fashion'452 Wilson was widely known to be staunchly pro-Israel. 
The three key biographies on Harold Wilson453 testify that the origins of this pro- 
political Zionism/Israel position are as complex as they are protracted. Wilson is 
known to have disliked being referred to as a Zionist, yet his established sympathies 
for political Zionism and later the State of Israel, generated some interesting 
observations. As Philip Ziegler said of Wilson during his university experience: 
`Wilson was abnormally free of racial prejudice except in so far as it was a 
racial prejudice to find Jews generally more attractive than the rest of 
mankind. '454 
The most detailed insights come not from the numerous biographies, but Wilson's 
own writings. The Chariot of Israel (1981) is a swirling and weighty account of 
Labour's relations with political Zionism and Israel from the mid 1930s to the 1980s 
written almost entirely from Wilson's own perspective. In addition to an historical 
overview, the book provides some detailed evidence as to the developmental process 
°S0 Watkins, David (06.07.2003: 10) Interview: Watkins-Nelson, Surrey, London 
451 Harold Wilson succeeded Acting Leader - George Brown (January 18-February 14,1963) - 
as leader after Hugh Gaitskell's sudden death from Lupus Erythematosus aged 56. 
452 Williams, Philip M (1979: 165) 
453 See: Pimlott, Ben (1992), Morgan, Austen (1992) and Ziegler, Philip (1993) 
454 Ziegler, Philip (1993: 76) Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx, 
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that brought Wilson and ultimately Labour to a point of greater deviation and open 
rebellion during his tenure of the party, something not witnessed since 1949. 
Wilson plainly defines the origins of his pro-political Zionism as being founded in the 
related religious philosophies aspect of the essential dilemma: 
`In Britain, as in the United States, there has been and is very strong support 
for Israel and her people, from politicians and communities extending far 
beyond the relatively small number of Jews who are citizens. 
How far this is due to admiration for the courage and tenacity of the Israelis, 
how far - as is currently true in my own case - it is in part a response to the 
teaching of religious history in our day schools and Sunday schools, chapels, 
'ass churches, kirk and conventicles, I would find it hard to say. 
As one of the most devout Christian Labour leaders since Ramsay MacDonald, 
Wilson's personal account continues to illustrate what he sees as the numerous 
associations between the ideals of socialism and beliefs of Christianity with those of 
Judaism and political Zionism. The religious aspects are as immediate and significant 
as they are numerous; the very title 'The Chariot of Israel' is taken from the Old 
Testament456 and further biblical references and associations occur throughout, 
particularly in the recounting of Jewish religious history: 
`The Lord will set His hand again the second time to recover the remnant of 
His people .... He will set up an ensign for the nations, and will assemble the 
dispersed of -Israel, and gather together the scattered of Judah from the four 
corners of the earth. '457 
4 Wilson, Harold (1981: ix) Preface 
456 The Holy Bible, Kings, Chapter 2, Verse 12, King James Version 
as. Wilson, Harold (1981: 197) Chapter 7, Eretz Israel, quoting, The Holy Bible, Isaiah, 
Chapter 11, Verse 11, King James Version 
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The depth of Wilson's Christian beliefs during his political career is well known and 
recorded outside the confines of his own accounts. Seldon claims that until the 
leadership of Tony Blair (1994-2007) the inclusiveness of Wilson's religious faith 
was arguably unique in the post-1945 era: 
`Since 1945 the only Labour leader to refer to religious beliefs and practices in 
relation to active politics was Harold Wilson, who is described as a 
`Congregationalist' that claimed he became a socialist 'because he was a 
Christian. ' He appointed ten practising believers to his Cabinet in 1964, and 
asked for a service to be organised in the House of Commons chapel after the 
1964 General Election to bless the new government. '458 
What is less clear is how Wilson's Christian faith translated into unswerving support 
for political Zionism and Israel, particularly when it became obvious that the Zionist 
agenda for Palestine contradicted some of the basic ideological principles of 
socialism, and indeed Christian philosophy. In The Chariot of Israel a key part of 
Wilson's pro-political Zionist argument is derived from the historical origins of both 
the related religious philosophies aspects of the Labour-political Zionist relationship 
and the political sources of Zionist influence resulting from their shared socialist 
ideology. The most notable example is the reference to the Conservative Foreign 
Secretary - Arthur Balfour - with whom Wilson very obviously aligns himself on 
religious grounds - if not entirely politically in domestic politics then certainly in 
relation to political Zionism: 
'Balfour's interest in the Jews and their history was lifelong. It originated in 
the Old Testament training of his mother, and in his Scottish upbringing. As 
he grew up, his intellectual admiration and sympathy for certain aspects of 
Jewish philosophy and culture grew also, and the problem of the Jews in the 
modem world seemed to him of immense importance. ' 459 
458 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 515) 
459 Wilson, Harold (1981: 34) quoting, Blanche E C. Dugdale, (1939: 433) Arthur James 
Balfour, Volume I, (London: Hutchinson) 
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The most important aspect of Arthur Balfour's Christian pro-political Zionism was its 
early effect on Wilson. As Wilson states: 
`He [Balfour] always talked eagerly on this, and I remember in childhood 
imbibing from him the idea that Christian religion and civilisation owes to 
Judaism an immeasurable debt, shamefully ill repaid. 9460 
As an academic reviewer of The Chariot of Israel Mark Lytle says that Wilson `relies' 
for `much of his material' upon the Peel Commission Report of 1937. '461 There are a 
number of notable factors which suggest why Wilson refers so frequently to the 1937 
report: for example, it contained an in-depth account of ancient biblical and religious 
history of the Jewish people, which firmly establishes their protracted identity with 
Palestine - the `Land of Israel'; secondly, and perhaps most importantly in terms of 
both contemporary and modem political reasons, the Report advocated the 
partitioning of mandate Palestine into `Jewish' (Zionist) and `Arab' (Palestinian) 
states, thereby achieving the central aim of political Zionism -a Jewish State in 
Palestine, a decade before the partition of the country was actually adopted by the 
United Nations in 1947. Wilson claims the 1937 Report presented an ideal 
opportunity to resolve the Palestinian-political Zionism question, which he says was 
regrettably not taken: 
`As we have seen, the ultimate solution for Palestine did involve partition. Had 
this been accepted from the start Britain [and the Labour government] need 
not have gone thorough the agonies of 1945-7. But not only was Bevin 
violently opposed to the concept until it was forced upon him, but it became 
clear that the British Mandate itself was not compatible with a partition 
solution. '462 
460 Ibid., (1981: 34) 
461 Lytle, Mark Hamilton (1983: 121) quoting, Harold Wilson, (1982) The Chariot of Israel. 
Britain, America and the State of Israel, Political Science Quarterly, Book Reviews, Vol. 98, 
issue No. 1, pp. 120-121 
462 Wilson, Harold (1981: 44) 
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That withstanding, in terms of securing an understanding of how the thinking and 
development of British and Labour policies contributed to the establishment of Israel 
(Wilson's stated purpose of the book), as Lytle states, `Scholars looking to Wilson for 
insight into British policy are likely to be disappointed. '463 Whatever the origins and 
basis of Wilson's pro-political Zionism, as Labour Leader and Prime Minister the 
influence and demands of the wider party and crucially British national and strategic 
interests were also a defining factor in shaping Wilson and Labour's position towards 
the Israel-Palestinian/Arab conflict from 1963 to 1980. 
Wilson became party leader in 1963, and Labour was elected to government in 1964. 
With the precariousness of the British economy and its reliance on Middle Eastern oil 
with trade of paramount importance to Britain's balance of payments and Labour's 
promised domestic spending agenda, foreign affairs in relation to the 
Arab/Palestinian-Israel conflict were close to mind from the onset, and became 
increasingly so as the Middle East slid towards yet another war. As a political 
economist Wilson was only too aware of the significance of Britain and Labour's 
position with regards to the Arab-Israel conflict and its potential consequences, 
notably for curtailing Labour's domestic initiatives promised at the General Election. 
In the months leading to the June 6,1967 Six-Day War, Wilson described the 
situation in the Middle East between Arab states, the Palestinians and Israel, as the 
`smouldering crisis' that was beginning to `reach danger-point. '4M Continuing: 
`From the spring of 1966 there had been a succession of incidents on Israel's 
borders, some from the Palestinian refugees in Jordan. Some of these were 
referred to the Security Council, whose membership was qualitatively and 
quantatively unbalanced to the disadvantage of Israel. '465 
Although by his own admission a firm supporter of Israel, as the situation deteriorated 
Wilson increasingly came to support the neutrality of the United Nations position as 
463 Lytle, Mark Hamilton (1983: 121) 
4" Wilson, Harold (1971: 394) The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record, 
Chapter 21, May-June 1967, (London: Weidenfeld, Nicolson & Michael Joseph) 
465 Ibid., (1971: 394) 
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British interests seemed threatened by an escalation of the conflict into open warfare. 
This position between personal commitment and wider political duty came to be a 
defining characteristic of Wilson's premiership: he was a pro-Israel figure who was 
not averse to accepting the need to adopt a pro-British interest position if required, 
even if that contradicted those of Israel. 
The Prelude to War 
On the eve of the out-break of the 1967 war, eruptions of a kind were already taking 
place in terms of debate between Labour figures and the pro-Israel sections of the 
party. The left-wing intellectual Richard [Dick] Crossman (Leader of the House) 
narrates the interchange of opinions and positions that took place via the medium of 
television: 
`on tonight's Panorama programme where the viewers were shown 
Christopher Mayhew interviewing Colonel Nasser in the friendliest possible 
way and Manny Shinwell staging a furious row on behalf of the Israelis. 
Considering that he [Mayhew], as Minister of War, supported all Ernest 
Bevin's worst excesses in Palestine it's staggering to listen to speeches he now 
makes. '466 
Crossman continues: 
`But it was nice to put the record straight with [Aharon] Remez [Israeli 
Ambassador to Britain], especially as I did so in the presence of John Silkin 
[Labour Chief Whip 1966-1969], who of course is a Jew and at this moment a 
fanatical pro-Israeli. It's interesting because his father is completely anti- 
Zionist and has brought up his sons without any Jewish religion or Jewish 
sense of nationhood as pukkah Englishmen. '467 
' Crossman, Richard (1976: 364-365) The Dairies of a Cabinet Minister, Volume II, Lord 
President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1966-68, Monday June 5, 
1967, (London: Hamish Hamilton & Jonathan) 
467 Ibid., (1976: 364-365) 
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In addition to those more public spats there were equally volatile differences of 
opinion within the Cabinet. As again Richard Crossman recounts: 
`At our weekly meeting with Burke [Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary] and 
the P. M. I noted that Harold was trying to avoid talking to me about a number 
of awkward topics I wanted to raise. One of them was George Brown's refusal 
to let me be the Minister representing us in Israel at the Balfour Declaration 
celebrations on November 4`h, 1967. I'd sent Harold a memorandum 
describing what had happened about this invitation. The Israeli Foreign Office 
had invited the P. M. to attend and said that if he couldn't go they wanted me. 
Harold had passed this letter to George and the Foreign Office had quickly got 
in a proposal that Ted Short should be the man. I said this was very tart 
because they had asked specifically for me. George then minuted me that he 
objected very strongly to a speech I had made to a Zionist organisation in 
London. To this I replied by letter asking him to send the text of the offending 
passage. To this I got the following reply: 
I should like you to understand my principal objection is not the 
reports of what you are alleged to have said, though from the point of 
view of Arab reaction it doesn't much matter whether they are accurate 
or not. The real trouble is that the presence of a Cabinet Minister of 
your seniority would make difficulties for us in the Arab world. 
Goodness knows, we have enough of these already. '4" 
In response Crossman wrote to Wilson: 
`I am sorry to worry you with this but the attached minutes from the Foreign 
Secretary compels me to do so. He states he cannot permit me or any other 
senior Minister to celebrate the Balfour Declaration in Israel for fear or 
repercussions in the Arab world. If this is true that our relations with the Arabs 
depend on appeasing them to this extent the situation is depressing indeed 
468 Ibid., (1976: 281) Friday March 17,1967 
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since I doubt whether in the worst days of the Bevin regime it was as bad as 
that. But frankly I believe the Foreign Secretary is doing himself and his 
Department an injustice by suggesting that our relations with Israel have to be 
conducted within these extra-ordinary narrow confines in order to sustain our 
Arab policy. Perhaps we could have a word about it? '469 
Wilson's reply to Crossman - via his Private Secretary Marcia Williams470 - was as 
follows: 
`He [Harold Wilson] feels you should sort this out with George or raise it at 
Cabinet. 471 
Crossman stated in a conclusion to Wilson's reply: 
`But I didn't. I realised that if I wanted to stay in Government I'd got to accept 
it. '472 473 
469 Ibid., (1976: 282) Friday March 17,1967 
ago Marcia Williams' influence is claimed to have extended to the appointments from the 
Foreign Office staff to Wilson's Private Office Team, as in the case of Oliver Wright in 1974. 
As Kavanagh and Seldon state: `Wright's appointment was almost strangled at birth by the 
Political Secretary, Marcia Williams. He had already established himself as an outstanding 
young diplomat destined to go to the top of the FCO ... 
But he was also an Arabist; Mrs 
Williams was a staunch pro-Israeli ... a rearguard action 
had then to be fought to preserve his 
appointment when his credentials became known to Mrs Williams. She often attempted to get 
favoured Israelis into Number Ten over the heads of the Private Office, but Wilson, while 
happy to see large numbers of Israelis, had become increasingly wary of seeing those she was 
promoting. ' Kavanagh, Dennis & Seldon, Anthony (1999: 114) The Powers Behind the Prime 
Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number Ten, Chapter 4, Harold Wilson (1974-76), 
(London: Harper Collins) 
47 Crossman, Richard (1976: 282) Friday March 17,1967 
472 Ibid., (1976: 282) 
473 As Richard Crossman says, as is custom, Harold Wilson may have considered divergent 
opinions, `But even though he is balancing forces in the Cabinet rather than ordering them, he 
has, in my view, tremendous power - something which any Cabinet Minister is aware of every 
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The exchange between Crossman, Brown and Wilson is evidence of the divergence of 
very often firmly held and defended views and positions within the Cabinet on this 
issue. But as Crossman also concludes, despite these differences of opinion, a Cabinet 
consensus must eventually be determined in order to arrive at a policy. In this case, 
reality was such that ultimately British national and strategic interests - irrefutably 
tied to Middle Eastern Arab oil reserves - took priority in terms of the Cabinet (party) 
consensus and policy position over the more pro-Israel position derived from 
individual and tradition Labour-political Zionist relations. As the academic, Jonathan 
Spyer notes: 
`[Harold Wilson] among the most pro-Israeli of British politicians' could not 
always determine the decision of Cabinet. '474 
The Cabinet consensus throughout the 1967 war and its aftermath was that British 
interests were paramount and that the various pro-positions regarding the 
Arab/Palestinian-Israel conflict also had to be placed within the context of 
international law and the United Nations. This consensus was undoubtedly in part the 
product of Wilson's Foreign Secretaries, Patrick Gordon Walker (October 1964- 
January 1965), Michael Stewart (Jan 1965-Aug 1966 / Mar 1968-Jun 1970) 475 and 
day of his life. I am aware I am there at the Prime Minister's discretion. The Prime Minister 
can withdraw that discretion on any day he likes without stating a reason. ' (Crossman, 
Richard (1972: 63) Inside View: Three Lectures on Prime Ministerial Government, Lecture 2, 
Decision-taking in Number 10 and Whitehall, (London: Jonathan Cape) 
474 Spyer, Jonathan An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy towards Israel, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, Issue No. 2, June 2004, pp. 10 
ass Michael Stewart (b. 1906-d. 1990) MP: (Fulham East, 1945-1955), (Fulham, 1955-1979) 
went on to become Foreign Secretary twice under Harold Wilson. Stewart served in Palestine 
in WWII and unusually for Labour revered the Foreign Secretary post, stating, `the politician 
who will refuse the Foreign Office is not yet born. ' Stewart, Michael (1980: 138) Life and 
Labour: An Autobiography, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson). Stewart's positions on the Arab- 
Israel conflict were relatively clear as he states: `In the last resort my sympathies were with 
Israel. ' Stewart, Michael (1980: 212). Although from the vantage point of 1980 he stated after 
the 1967 war: `Nor, I think, did Israel take sufficient account of the complaints of the Arab 
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George Brown (August 1966 - March 1968). All three had interesting and relevant 
knowledge and experience of the Middle East and Arab-Israel conflict. 
Wilson's first Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, had personal experience of 
the Nazi genocide. He had visited Belsen shortly after its liberation, a visit that was to 
leave a profound, life-long impression upon him as a poignant quote from his diaries - 
chosen by his editor Robert Pearce - captures the memories and images: 
`Gordon Walker believed that the concentration camp "is one of the exclusive 
characteristics and manifestations of our age. It is one of the distinguishing 
marks of the twentieth century. " The only historical parallel he could think of 
was the slave ships. "They too had violin players to keep the cargo quiet. "476 
Gordon Walker had also gained a relatively early experience of the Palestinian and 
Arab dimensions to the conflict with Israel. While Labour was in opposition he had 
undertaken a visit to the Middle East (27 December 1953 - 21 January 1954) as part 
of a parliamentary delegation; the visit included the Jordanian-administered West 
Bank. In his diary entry records Gordon Walker describes the plight of some `30,000' 
Palestinian refugees at Aquabat Jabr camp and their dire predicament: 
`The mud huts are well built and clean. Deaths are concealed in order to keep 
up ration claims. Two doctors and six nurses do admirable work in a shed- 
people brought under her rule by the outcome of the Six Day War, and it may be this neglect 
that has made the claims of the Palestinians so much more extensive and violent today than 
they were in the 1960s. On lesser, but important issues, Israel put herself in the wrong; on the 
great issue of her statehood and security she was overwhelmingly in the right. ' Stewart, 
Michael (1980: 212-213) 
476 Pearce, Robert [Editor] (1991: 15-16) Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries, quoting, 
Patrick Gordon Walker, The Lid Lis, (1945), (London: Victor Gollancz), (London: The 
Historians) See: Pearce, Robert (1991: 134-161) Chapter 5, Belsen Concentration Camp, 
1945,17-23 April 
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clinic. Most of the disease is due to under-nourishment. Children who are ill 
are given supplementary rations. '477 
Gordon Walker had also been made aware of how the Palestinian's perceived their 
position politically, and who they viewed as primarily to blame for their status as 
refugees - successive British governments, and in particular those of Labour. Gordon 
Walker learnt that far from being manipulated by their Arab hosts -a claim 
persistently made by Israel, - the Palestinians themselves had chosen to remain 
refugees in Jordan as a deliberate policy to avoid being assimilated into the 
neighbouring Arab states in order to preserve their distinct Palestinian Arab identity 
and thereby prevent their claim to Palestine from being negated. 
As an experienced Cabinet Minister, Gordon Walker provides insight into the 
workings of government in decision and policy-making. He describes the theoretical 
and actual realities that stem from the role of the party leader and Prime Minister, the 
Cabinet, and the backbenchers of the party in the context of foreign affairs, and in 
particular the Arab-Israel situation in the period leading to the 1967 war: 
`The truth is that the Cabinet and the Party inside and outside Parliament do 
indeed find the Prime Minister an indispensable asset and that this gives him 
eminent power. But equally the Prime Minister cannot dispense with Party, 
Parliament and Cabinet. Occasionally a great matter of policy may be dealt 
with by a partial Cabinet: but the normal, regular and natural procedure is for 
the Cabinet to discuss and decide all great issues and emergencies - such as the 
Arab-Israel war. [In order to attain a consensus prior to policy] 
On all such matters the Prime Minister's views will carry great weight with 
members of the Cabinet; but he cannot, like an American President, ignore 
47 Ibid., (1991: 117) quoting, Patrick Gordon Walker, Chapter 7,5-6 January 1954, In 
opposition, 1952-55: Party Strife and Commonwealth Affairs 
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their views. The Prime Minister can exercise his greatly enhanced powers only 
if he carries his Cabinet with him. '478 
The relatively even-handed Gordon Walker was to be replaced as Foreign Minister by 
George Brown. Brown was in many ways a unique figure in terms of Labour-political 
Zionist/Israel relations. Having become interested in the Middle East shortly after 
Labour lost office in 1951, Brown answers a self-imposed question as to the origins 
and reasoning behind his interest in his memoirs: 
`What first prompted me to become deeply interested in the problems of the 
Middle East I do not know? It is a question I have often asked myself, and for 
all my probing I cannot wholly answer it. Some part, unquestionably, is due to 
my feeling for British interests in the area, and the impact of those interests of 
events in the Arab world. Some part is certainly due to my oddly inherited 
Irish background, which made me an anti-imperialist and gave me sympathy 
for other people who were trying to throw off the yoke of imperialism - 
sympathy and, I hope, understanding of the dangers of throwing out the ox 
with the yoke. '479 
George Brown was a deeply religious man. The `Church' he wrote, is a `major 
influence in my life. Faith gives you a basis for living for tomorrow as well as for 
today. 9480 Religious faith also provided the basis and meaning to his socialist 
ideological beliefs: 
`I got - and get -a deep satisfaction from the beautiful ritual of the Church. I 
learned to be a good catholic - not a Roman Catholic, but a catholic in the true 
and original sense of belonging to `one catholic and apostolic church. I had 
long discussions with Father Sankey, about God, about people, about social 
478 Walker, Patrick Gordon (1970: 96) The Cabinet, Part Two, Chapter 5, Evolution of the 
Cabinet, Role of the Prime Minister, (London: Cape) 
"' Brown, George (1971: 227) In My Way: The Political Memoirs of Lord George Brown, 
Chapter 12, Reflections on the Middle East, (London: Book Club Associates) 
480 Ibid., (1971: 29-30) Chapter 1, Political Apprenticeship 
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justice. That gives you, I suppose, what is called a conscience. It teaches you 
how important the Sacrament is. '481 
Brown's induction to the Palestinian perspective of the Arab/Palestinian-Israel 
conflict occurred relatively early in his career while on a visit to the Middle East in 
December 1951. It was initiated by a relationship with Emile Bustani (a Lebanese 
Christian business tycoon whose family originated from Palestine). The Labour MP 
Mont Follick482 had suggested Bustani approach Brown with a view to advancing the 
Palestinian/Arab perspective within the Labour Party via a delegation that Brown 
might agree to facilitate. Bustani and the visit evidently made an impression on 
Brown: 
`He [Bustani] was a member of the Lebanese Parliament and organised all 
sorts of political events. He was also a genuine idealist with vivid idea on how 
the Middle East could be made peaceful. Although he was a patriotic Arab, he 
was no anti-Jew. His concern when I first met him was that the people in the 
West should have some real understanding of the fact that there was an Arab 
case in the Middle East. He felt that there was general Western knowledge of 
Israel's case and of Israel's sufferings, but little conception of the Arab case 
and of Arab sufferings. It was this that had prompted him to invite us as 
British M. P. s to visit the area. '483 
Accompanied by Bustani, Brown made his first visit to the Jordanian-administered 
West Bank and East Jerusalem in early January 1952. The political, cultural and 
religious significance of the Holy Land and the Christian festive season touched 
Brown profoundly. His account has a. remarkable echoing resemblance to the earlier 
writings of MacDonald, Snell and Morrison in the 1920s and 1930s: 
484 
481 Ibid., (1971: 30) 
482 Mont Follick (b. 1887-d. 1958) MP: (Loughborough, 1945-1955) 
483 Brown, George (1971: 228) Chapter 12, Reflections on the Middle East 
484 See: Chapter 1, MacDonald, Ramsay (1922: 9) A Socialist in Palestine, and, Snell, Henry 
(1938: 243) Chapter XV, Work in Parliament. 
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`The chance of visiting Bethlehem on Christmas Eve was too great an 
opportunity to be missed. I suddenly woke up to one of the most wonderful 
sights I've ever seen. It was a frosty, bright moonlit night, and the fearsome 
road was tooled on the edge of a mountainside. In the light of an enormous 
moon we passed a string of donkeys and camels, and suddenly, right ahead in 
the cold, clear night I saw a huge star blazing in the sky. `There', said Bustani, 
`is Bethlehem' - and there was the star. 
485 
All my knowledge of the Bible scenes then came from picture books, and this 
was a picture book scene. Surely it was [Brown's emphasis] the first 
Christmas Eve. '486 
Brown's account adequately projects the deep significance of the related religious 
philosophies aspect of the basis and nature of relations. He was not, however, 
unreceptive to the progressive aspects of political Zionism and the State of Israel. In 
another memoir extract Brown says of the achievements of Israel during his first visit 
in 1955: 
`I made an extensive tour of Israel and saw the wonderful things that the 
Israelis were doing then, and are doing still, to reclaim the desert and to 
increase the fertility of the country. '487 
From 1951 onwards, Brown's interest, knowledge and contacts in the Middle East 
burgeoned. By 1955 he was considered by the Labour Leader Hugh Gaitskell (1955- 
1963) to be a `raging Arab; '488 conversely, Brown considered Gaitskell to be a 
`passionate pro-Zionist, having married into a prominent Zionist family. '489 
Gaitskell's opinion of Brown was in part based on his increasingly frequent visits to 
485 George Brown does record that `the star' as it transpired, was in fact a neon sign to a hotel. 
" Brown, George (1971: 229-230) 
487 Ibid., (1971: 232) 
488 Wilson, Harold (1981: 248) 
°" Brown, George (1971: 231). Hugh Gaitskell married Anna Dora Gaitskell (Baroness 
Gaitskell, 1964) (b. 1901-d. 1989) a Labour politician and delegate to the United Nations. 
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the Middle East and the development of close contacts with the Arab states and their 
leaders. These trips and contacts were initially undertaken following Labour's 1951 
election defeat, but continued after Brown and Labour's return to government in 1964 
and naturally accelerated after his appointment as Foreign Secretary in 1966. Brown 
recognized the impact these visits were having on his profile within the party and the 
leadership: 
`After a number of visits to the Middle East some people in the Labour Party began 
to feel that I was in danger of becoming too involved with the Arab case. Hugh 
Gaitskell was among them. He never tried to discourage me from visiting Arab 
countries, ... 
No pressure was ever put on me to desert my Arab friends, but 
490 efforts were made to enable me to meet Israeli leaders. ' 
Whatever Gaitskell and Wilson's views of Brown, or the opinions of the pro-Israel 
figures, his appointment as Foreign Secretary in August 1966 reflected the fact that 
the party leadership saw good use for his pro-Arab position on the Middle East at a 
crucial point in time. Unlike some other Labour Foreign Secretaries - notably his 
former boss and mentor, Ernest Bevin - Brown had coveted the post 
491 He had a 
genuinely passionate interest in foreign affairs and, as the political quagmire of Israel- 
Arab/Palestinian affairs progressively brewed into a storm, Brown was largely 
insulated from potential accusations of anti-Semitism, as he recounts: 
`Although married into a Jewish family, and on terms of intimate friendship 
with many Arabs, I never took on either a Zionist or an Arab colouring. I had 
490 Ibid., (1971: 30) 
491 One reasons Labour figures did not relish the post of Foreign Secretary was the isolating 
nature of the position. As Mackintosh claims: `The Foreign Secretary stands in a rather 
special relationship to both the Prime Minister and the rest of the Cabinet. With the Cabinet, 
the position is fairly constant. The Foreign Secretary is expected to conduct day-to-day 
business on his [her] own (or with the aid of the Prime Minster) keeping his Cabinet informed 
of the general lines of policy. ' Mackintosh, John P. (1962: 396) The British Cabinet, Chapter 
13, The Modern Cabinet, Senior Cabinet Ministers, The Foreign Secretary, (London: Stevens 
& Sons) 
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in fact opposed the establishment of a Zionist state of Israel in the early days 
because I was then close to Bevin and saw things through his eyes. But that 
didn't make me anti-Israeli. The state of Israel having been established, it 
seemed to me crystal-clear that the state would have to live. My Arab friends 
never expected me to take a different position. '492 
Labour's Response to the Six-Day War 
As a response to growing tensions with Israel and under pressure from his Arab allies, 
on May 18th, 1967, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt requested a withdrawal 
of 3,400 U. N. troops from the Gaza Strip, Sharm el Sheikh, and the Israel-Egypt 
border. The next day Pantanaw U. Thant (U. N. Secretary General) ordered the 
implementation of Nasser's request. 
In a statement on May 24th, 1967, Harold Wilson repeated the British government's 
policy position of regarding the Straits of Tiran as an international waterway which 
Nasser claimed as territorial water and threatened to close, and that if necessary the 
British government would support international action to ensure free navigation in the 
area, including that of Israel. To this end Wilson had sought from all maritime nations 
a declaration affirming the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway and was 
accordingly to be defended as such. Before this was finalised, however, Nasser closed 
the Straits of Tiran on June 5th to Israeli shipping precipitating a pre-emptive Israeli 
attack, during which Israel decisively defeated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian 
armed forces and occupied the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian 
Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. 
Although Britain declared its neutrality from the onset of the Six-Day War, calling for 
an immediate ceasefire, Nasser accused Britain (and the U. S. A. ) of aiding Israel. As a 
result Nasser persuaded two of the largest oil producing states (Iraq and Kuwait) to 
suspend oil supplies to Britain, a position that became a comprehensive Arab oil 
embargo until September 1967. The British position was in fact a convenient 
compromise between Wilson's ardent pro-political Zionism and Brown's 
understanding of the Arab position; it was a compromise which allowed British 
492 Brown, George (1971: 229) 
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national interests to be protected whilst allowing the party to avoid, once again, the 
realities of the essential dilemma. 
It is a general view that George Brown excelled as Foreign Secretary during the 1967 
war. Whatever his previous `colourings', in government he was prepared to firmly 
criticise the Arabs, the Palestinians and Israel, while attempting to remain securely 
behind Labour and the UN neutrality policy position. As Wilson says of him: 
`George had never joined the majority in the Labour leadership which 
supported Israel, but in the Cabinet meetings during the crisis days of May and 
June 1967 he never wavered, and indeed journeyed to Moscow and 
Washington to make his weight felt against Arab aggression. ' 493 
Labour's neutrality position was essentially based on UN resolutions. Although 
Brown was seen as a pro-Arab figure, on the basis of the illegal act undertaken by 
Nasser in blockading the Tiran Straits, the Labour Foreign Secretary had sought 
Wilson's approval to engage British forces in defence of international law and British 
interests. In the event, Wilson convinced Brown that the Cabinet, particularly Roy 
Jenkins, Barbara Castle and James Callaghan, would strongly oppose such a decision, 
and Brown backed down 
494 Nonetheless, Brown's bullishness was pleasing, and not a 
little surprising, to Israel's friends in the Cabinet. The arch-Zionist Richard [Dick] 
Grossman was especially complimentary of Brown's conduct during the 1967 war: 
`George Brown's daily statements in the House were better and better each 
day. His line was that whatever our personal sympathies Britain must remain 
neutral and be seen to make peace between the two sides. 
493 Wilson, Harold (1981: 332) 
49° Pearce, Robert (1991: 316) quoting, Patrick Gordon Walker, Chapter 9,24 June 1967, The 
Wilson Years, 1963-71: In and Out of ice 
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By now, of course, the pro-Israel feeling in the country is absolutely 
overwhelming and there is a great sense of triumph and victory. No one 
worried about the Israeli pre-emptive strike being an act of aggression. '495 
Prior to the 1967 war, Labour's wider Middle Eastern policy had somewhat ironically 
been based on a pro-Nasser strategy. The advent of war had shattered that basis. The 
pro-Nasser policy had arisen in the wake of Labour's pro-United Nations position 
which was critical of Israel, during the 1956 Suez Crisis when - as opponents of 
Conservative government policy - Labour developed relations with Nasser in the 
belief that the party had some influence upon the Egyptian leader. It was agreed 
however, by both George Brown and Harold Wilson that this policy had been the first 
casualty of the advent of war in 1967 as Labour's pro-United Nations policy was 
viewed as anti-Arab by Nasser. As Crossman says: 
`It also looks as if the whole of George Brown's pro-Nasser policy, on which 
he's been spending weeks and months, has collapsed overnight. Instead 
George and Harold have suddenly done a complete volte-face and are now 
wholly pro-Israel, seeking to persuade the Americans that we and they must 
send ships to call Nasser's buff and break the blockade without the Israeli's 
having to make war. '496 
Nonetheless, within a very short period of the war ending, Labour's perceived pro- 
Israel policy - based on support for UN resolutions - began to shift as Labour figures 
came to realise that Israel had little or no intention of using the acquisition of vast 
Arab territories to secure a peace agreement, especially if it included a resolution to 
the Israel-Palestinian dimension. George Brown was among the first to recognise this 
Israeli position, and identify and convey its likely consequences. As he states that it 
was the capture and `now annexed de facto if not formally' by Israel of `large new 
areas of Arab land'497 that led him to conclude what was for him and many others, an 
unacceptable position by Israel: 
""' Crossman, Richard (1976: 370) Thursday June 8,1967 
496 Ibid., (1976: 355) Monday May 29,1967 
49' Brown, George (1971: 233) 
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`It was clear that what Israel, or at least many of her leaders, really wanted was 
permanently to colonise much of this newly annexed territory, particularly ... 
'a9s Jerusalem and other sensitive areas. 
Brown's early recognition of Israel's intentions to retain and colonise Arab lands 
captured in 1967 and his consternation at Israel's refusal to negotiate or relinquish 
what the UN came to categorise as the `Occupied Territories', led to what many view 
as his finest political hour. 
It was as the joint-author of UN Resolution, 242, along with Lord Caradon [Hugh 
Foot] (British Minister to the United Nations and brother of Michael Foot) for which 
Brown is best remembered as he affirmed his credentials as a skilful diplomat with an 
informed touch for the complexities of the Middle East. Lord Caradon and the United 
Nations had reached an impasse in the Arab-Israel negotiations. Brown explains what 
he and Foot combined efforts eventually produced: 
`We took over the drafting of this resolution when pretty well everybody else 
had failed. This resolution set out in a carefully balanced way what Israelis 
and the Arabs would have to do to secure both peace in the Middle East and 
recognition of the State of Israel. I have been pressed many times to spell out 
exactly what the resolution meant, but I've always refused to go farther than 
what it says. It declares "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by 
war" and it also affirms the necessity "for guaranteeing the territorial 
inviolability and political independence of every State in the area". It calls for 
"withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict" and also for "termination of all claims or states of belligerency. "A" 
Brown continues: 
498 Ibid., (1971: 233) 
499 Ibid., (1971: 233) 
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`It does not call for Israeli withdrawal from `the' territories recently occupied, 
nor does it use the word `all. ' It would have been impossible to get the 
resolution through if either of these words had been included, but it does set 
out the lines on which negotiations for a settlement must take place. ' S00 
With Wilson's approval, Brown and Caradon had established that whatever the pro- 
Arab or pro-Israel positions of individuals or sections within the Cabinet or party, 
Labour's policy position in times of conflict and threats to British interests were to 
support the United Nations. This was in line with Labour's Constitutional position to 
support international organs, and it also released the party from the constraints 
imposed by the ideological contradiction posed by common origins and the essential 
dilemma, in that if Labour fell behind the UN and international law, neither Israel or 
the Arab states could direct too much criticism at individuals or the party. 
Labour's new even-handedness towards the `Arab-Israel problem' did not, of course, 
reflect the expectations of some senior Israeli Labor figures. Although Brown had 
cordial meetings with senior Israeli politicians (notably Golda Meir and Abba Eban), 
others were not so hospitable towards Brown's search for a resolution to the conflict. 
As Brown says: 
`I had talks with most of the leading politicians in Israel except [David] Ben- 
Gurion. He was one of the few political leaders in the whole world who have 
declined to meet me. He had been briefed, I suppose, about my [U. N. ] 
activities and had misunderstood them, and perhaps he had been reminded of 
my admiration for Bevin. '501 502 
50° Ibid., (1971: 233) 
sot Ibid., (1971: 232) 
502 Ben-Gurion's failure to meet Brown was likely to have resulted from Brown's well- 
publicised contacts with Arab states and the Palestinian Emile Bustani in particular; it is likely 
that Ben-Gurion was attempting to create a political distraction from Brown's efforts to bring 
Israel to negotiate on the Occupied Territories. 
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Even those Israeli politicians who agreed to meet with Brown were not always 
receptive to the idea of a negotiated settlement. As one Israeli Cabinet figure said in a 
direct meeting with Brown: 
`It's nice to see you here, it's nice of you to take the trouble to come, it's nice 
of you to be interested in our problems, but I wish to God you'd go away 
George. ' 503 
It was not only Israeli figures who rejected Labour's neutrality policy position. For 
example, although the general consensus within the party remained pro-Israel, there 
were a few pro-Arab figures who expressed their opinions and positions in 
Parliament. David Watkins recollects a speech in the House of Commons by William 
[Will] Griffiths504 before the commencement of the 1967 hostilities. Watkins' claims 
the speech became a `landmark in changing Labour attitudes'505 since Griffiths 
acknowledged the threat to British interests, but he also underlined the Palestinian 
dimension of the conflict, which had hitherto remained cloaked in the wider Arab- 
Israel struggle: 
`Will Griffiths was a respected senior backbencher who, like T. S. B. Williams 
in the generation before him, had served in the army in the Middle East. He 
had been at the battle of El Alamein [Egypt], one of the decisive turning points 
of the Second World War and he knew the region well. Shortly before the 
debate, he had visited Egypt. Called to speak in the later part of the debate, he 
pointed out that every speech so far, on both sides of the House, had put only 
one point of view, the Israeli one. There was another side to the question and 
he intended to put it. ' 5 °6 
503 Brown, George (1971: 238) quoting, Ezer Weizman (Likud, former Head of the Israeli 
military, IDF Deputy Chief-of-Staff) 
504 William Griffiths (b. 1912-d. 1973) MP: (Moss Side, 1945-1950), (Manchester Exchange, 
1950-1973) 
505 Watkins, David (1996: 114) 
506 Ibid., (1996: 114) referring to, William Griffiths, Hansard, May 31,1967, cols, 142-153 
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Watkins describes the response of the pro-Israel section of Labour to the attempt by 
Griffiths to present a different perspective on the conflict: 
`At once, he became subject to constant barracking. Hansard recorded that he 
gave way to seven interventions and the word `Interruption' was inserted into 
his speech no fewer than 23 times. 
Those of us who were there recall that those interruptions were largely 
comprised of attempts to shout him down and prevent him being heard, more 
of them coming from our own party than from the other side. He was not the 
man to be intimidated and he completed his speech. In terms of its 
consequences that was probably the most effective speech he ever made, for, 
together with disgust over the fascist-like reaction of the Israeli lobby, it set a 
new generation of Labour MPs - those who had entered the House at the 1964 
and 1966 election - thinking about the Middle East, in some cases rethinking 
and others, myself included, thinking about it seriously for the first time. ' 507 
What Watkins has actually identified and described was the beginnings of what 
became the deviation process, as Labour figures, increasingly aware of the Palestinian 
perspective, came to question Labour's traditional and often unquestioning support for 
political Zionism and Israel. The deviation process which began tentatively in 1956 
would eventually erode the pro-Israel consensus in Labour, gradually re-directing the 
party to adopt a more even-handed consensus and policy position in 1994. In his 
opinion, this developed with the realisation by a few Labour figures that there was an 
`Arab' [and Palestinian] perspective to the Israel-Arab conflict. This awareness also 
came as a result of the new demographic and parliamentary generational changes 
which occurred in the mid- 1960s with the intake of new Labour MPs aller the 1964, 
1966 and 1970 general elections, along with the decline in the numbers of the pro- 
political Zionist post-Holocaust generation of MPs - of whom a number were Jewish. 
Christopher Mayhew supports Watkins' assessment, but also indicates how far some 
Labour figures had to develop in convincing their fellow Labour colleagues to amend 
soy Ibid., (1996: 114) 
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their pro-political Zionist stance. After being introduced to the subject in all ignorance 
in 1945 Mayhew had eventually become a pro-Arab/Palestinian figure by 1963, and 
describes the reaction and consequences for some Labour figures who undertook to 
convey the Palestinian perspective - or even Arab/Palestinian side - in Parliament and 
elsewhere: 
`It is hard to convey today [1987] the bitterness with which friends of the 
Palestinians were assailed at that time [c. post-1967] by their Zionist 
opponents. The dedication of almost all Jewish people to Israel was then 
intense and unquestioning [Holocaust legacy], and this led them to assume that 
her critics must be either mad or bad; they must be anti-Semites, ... Friends of 
the Palestinians often had difficulty in making themselves heard. ' 508 
Mayhew explains further how this difficulty extended to his broader efforts to explain 
his position via the expanding medium of television, and the awkward consequences it 
could create: 
`I had many opportunities at this time to state my views on radio and 
television. I took what would be considered now a neutral line, criticizing both 
Israel and the Arabs, arguing that Britain should not intervene militarily except 
as a member of the UN, demanding justice for the [Palestinian] refugees but 
insisting that Israel had a right to live in peace with her own frontiers. 
Nevertheless, the climate of opinion was so fiercely and uncritically pro-Israeli 
that pressure soon built up among the pro-Israelis to get me off the air. A 
"round robin", signed by twenty-six of my fellow Labour MPs, was sent to Mr 
John Silkin, the Chief Government Whip. Mr Silkin, a strong supporter of 
Israel, publicly declared his official approval for the petition and forwarded it 
to the BBC. '509 
"' Mayhew, Christopher (1987: 159) Chapter 13, Supporting the Palestinians 
509 Ibid., (1987: 159) 
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For the most part, and despite the developing deviation process, in some corners of 
the party, Labour figures remained resolutely uncritical of Israel. 
1967-1973: The Arms Sales debate in the lead-up to 1973 October War 
Labour Party policy towards Israel and the Palestine question was dominated in the 
years following the 1967 war by the issue of arms sales to Israel. Although the 
leadership was deeply aware of the consequences of contributing to the regional arms 
race at a time of sustained border tensions between Israel and Egypt, and not least the 
animosity it would create among oil-supplying Arab allies, the arms industry 
remained a key active player in the British exports to the Middle East. 
In 1969, and against Foreign Office advice, the Cabinet decided to secretly supply 
Israel with Chieftain tanks. As Richard Crossman stated: `Starting in 1970/1 
Chieftains will be sold, with secrecy maintained up to that point, and it will pay the 
Israelis to keep it secret. '510 A year later (1969), the issue was raised again when two 
Cabinet colleagues, Michael Stewart (Foreign Secretary) and Denis Healey (Defence 
Secretary), produced a paper recommending that the sales be delayed. Crossman 
recounts the response: 
`Negotiations had started months ago and it was suggested that we should hold 
them up at least until September and send out a delaying communique. 
Michael was saying for the Foreign Office that otherwise we would suffer 
appalling losses if the Arabs discovered what we are doing. I don't know what 
Denis Healey really thinks; he was saying that this would shift the balance of 
power in the Middle East and that if the Israelis knew we were cancelling 
support for them the effect might be to start the war earlier. Fred Peart51' said 
sw Crossman, Richard (1977: 255) The Dairies of a Cabinet Minister, Volume III, Secretary 
of State for Social Services, Tuesday November 12t& 1968, (London: Hamish Hamilton & 
Jonathan Cape) 
S" Thomas Frederick [Fred] Peart [Baron Peart, 1976] (b. 1914-d. 1988) MP: (Workington, 
1945-1976); Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House, 1968-1970), Crossman 
describes Peart - and himself - as `fairly solid Israeli men' Crossman (1977: 251) Thursday 
November 7,1968 
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we ought to supply the arms to Israel anyway and Tony [Anthony] Crosland 
for the Board of Trade said that we really must be sensible and not supply 
them. Barbara Castle wanted to be honest with the Israelis and Callaghan in 
rather a muddled way said the same thing. '512 
Roy Jenkins took the part of the Board of Trade; arms sales would be good for 
Britain, while those more influenced by the arguments of the Foreign Office remained 
deeply opposed. With sharp differences in the Cabinet, British national interests 
prevailed - arms sales would proceed to both sides - despite the awareness of the 
potential Arab (economic) response. Again, as Crossman conveys: 
`George Brown had apparently given an explicit assurance that we wouldn't 
let the Israelis down, even though he had been warned about pressure from the 
Arabs. The Ministry of Defence had shown itself quite enthusiastic about the 
sale, which wasn't in any case to take place until 1972 or 1973. It was only 
quite recently, in the last six months, that the Arabs began to twig that we were 
about to do this and they have been working up tremendous propaganda 
against the sale. ' 513 
However, despite the decision, Michael Stewart's conclusion is indelibly telling: `We 
were trying to get the best of both worlds, to placate the Arabs by postponing the 
decision and keep the Israelis tagging along. '514 The cynicism of the final decision 
was evident in the decision to `compensate' the Arabs for the arms sales to Israel with 
arms sales for themselves. As Crossman explains: 
`Roy Mason is fanatically in favour of as much trade as possible and of our 
unloading £500 million-worth of the most modern kind of armaments on these 
poor Arabs, which is perfectly safe because they are not fit to use them. It was 
512 Crossman, Richard (1977: 467) Thursday May 1,1969 
513 Ibid., (1977: 513) Wednesday June 11,1969 
514 Ibid., (1977: 514) 
183 
Chapter 3 (1963-1979) 
the most ignominious and terrible example of a real old-fashioned Foreign 
Policy, combined with a cynical merchant of death arms sales policy. '515 
For the Israelis, Labour's duplicity and cynicism was at best, deeply disappointing, 
and at its worst, venomous. Israeli Ambassador Remez informed Richard Crossman 
that the response of Golda Meir (Israeli Labor Prime Minister) to Labour's position 
was thus: 
`I don't want to set foot in a country where there is a Labour Government 
whose name is synonymous with treachery? '516 
For much of the period preceding 1973, therefore, and despite the traditional pro- 
political Zionist positions of the Labour leadership, relations between the party and 
Israel were, and remained, troubled. The supply of Middle Eastern oil and the vast 
spending of the Arab states had proved to be a powerful force upon Labour's policy 
position, as had radical Arab nationalism; furthermore, if there were any lingering 
doubts about the waning of influence of Britain in the Middle East the evidence was 
clear that Britain `could no longer project itself as a major force in the world. '517 
Additionally and crucially for the deviation process and the development of the 
essential dilemma, Labour recognised after 1967 that the Palestinian dimension was 
an unavoidable aspect of the conflict; as the academic Gerard Chaliand noted: `the 
Israeli-Arab conflict has returned to its original dimension, which was first and 
foremost a struggle between Palestinians and Israeli. '518 519 
515 Ibid., (1977: 685) Wednesday October 15,1969 
516 Ibid., (1977: 737) Wednesday November 19,1969 
S" Dorey, Peter [Editor] (2006: 130) The Labour Governments 1964-1970, Chapter 8. 
Rhiannon Vickers, Foreign Policy beyond Europe, (Abingdon: Routledge) 
518 Chaliand, Gerard (1972: 1) Preface, The Palestinian Resistance, (Harmondsworth: 
Pelican) 
519 Whatever Wilson or Labour's preferred policy, the broader realities of Britain's position re 
the Middle East are highlighted by Donald Maclean: `Today London's ability to determine 
the course of events is very limited, a fact thrown into sharp relief by the gun flash which lit 
up this part of the world in June 1967.... The British government, which only a dozen years 
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1973: The End of An Era 
In October 1973, the Egyptian army breached the Israeli defences along the Bar Lev 
line on the East Bank of the Suez Canal. In a military attack, coordinated with the 
Syrians in the Golan Heights, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, sought to break the 
deadlock between his own country and Israel and to re-engage the United States in 
active diplomacy to resolve their ongoing conflict. The crossing of the Suez Canal by 
Egyptian forces embroiled the Middle East in the fourth major war in four decades. 
The involvement of the USA and the USSR had demonstrated the potential for Israeli- 
Arab affairs to threaten super-power stabilities at the height of the Cold War, while 
the post-war negotiations saw the use of curtailed oil supplies by the Gulf Arab states 
as a tactic to derive a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. 
As an external determinate, the 1973 October War was to prove a decisive factor in 
terms of Labour-Israel relations. It had dramatic and irreparable consequences for 
Labour's pro-Israel position, and thus for Labour's ability to confront the essential 
dilemma. The deviation process that tentatively began in 1956 and increased notably 
as a result of the 1967 war, accelerated and developed further after 1973 to such an 
extent that the following decades saw the transformation of the Labour Party 
consensus from a pro-Israel to a more balanced position in 1994, with a consequent 
impact on policy. 
Apart from the war itself, the major issue that aroused so much disruption in the party 
arose indirectly from the question of arms supplies. At the out-break of war the 
Conservative government of Edward Heath announced a neutral policy - reflecting 
that of the United Nations - in refraining from supplying arms to any combatants. This 
was bitterly opposed by Labour leader, Harold Wilson, who was deeply perturbed at 
the Arab attack on Israeli forces. He wrote in response to the assault in his 
autobiography: 
earlier would ... have been a 
leading actor, found itself in the wings. ' Maclean, Donald 
(1970: 173) Chapter 5, The Middle East, Collapse of the Caliphate 
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`THEY WERE AT PRAYER [Wilson's capital emphasis]. The whole of Israel 
was at prayer. The most sacred day of the Jewish year, the Day of Atonement. ' 
The day was sanctified by Holy writ. '520 521 
Wilson and his pro-Israel Labour colleagues set out to challenge the Conservative 
government's position. Not unreasonably then, Wilson claims that it was `Labour that 
created all the activity'522 in parliamentary debates concerning the October war. While 
Heath wanted to refrain from supplying arms to either side in the conflict, Wilson 
asserted that Britain should supply arms only to Israel. Wilson states: 
`As soon as the news of the invasion became known I telephoned the Israeli 
Ambassador to the Court of St James's, Michael Comay, and made an 
immediate appointment to see him and be briefed. Thereafter I was in contact 
with him each day to hear of the developments. 
The first thing he told me was that Mr Heath's Government had placed an 
embargo on the shipment of spares and ammunition to Israel needed for the 
Centurion tanks Britain has supplied when Labour had been in power. As soon 
as the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, returned to London, I went to No. 10 to 
press him to change Government policy on spares and ammunition. When he 
refused, James Callaghan and I took up the issues publicly. '523 
When Edward Heath rejected his arguments, Wilson took the matter to a Commons 
vote, at which he imposed a three-line whip upon his own party. He was able to do so 
not least because of the notable pliancy of James Callaghan, then Shadow Foreign 
520 Wilson, Harold (1981: 362) quoting, The Holy Bible, Book of Leviticus, Chapter 23,26-29, 
King James Version 
521 It was also Ramadan, the month of Muslim religious observance; held in the ninth month 
of the Islamic lunar calendar, commemorating the revealing of the Koran to the Prophet 
Mohammed via the Arch Angel Gabriel. 
522 Ibid., (1981: 365) 
523 Ibid., (1981: 365) 
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Affairs spokesperson. Wilson said of Callaghan who apparently, did not feel `as 
strongly' 524 pro-Israel as Wilson himself: 
`I was the Leader of the Party ... I was the boss and he supported my line. '525 
As a participating witness to the first significant parliamentary pro-Arab/Palestinian 
deviations in 1967, initiated by William Griffiths, Labour MP David Watkins gives a 
sense of the background and atmosphere within the party during the 1973 debate: 
`As soon as hostilities started, the Conservative government led by Edward 
Heath announced a policy of the immediate cessation of arms supplies to both 
sides, but a raging campaign was being conducted to line Britain up to supply 
arms to Israel. That apart, British interests were clearly affected and by All- 
Party agreement, a debate on an adjournment motion was arranged in the 
Commons. Such a debate is a procedural means to have a full debate without a 
vote which, given the circumstances, was an eminently sensible way to handle 
the situation. ' 526 
Watkins' continues: 
`However, under the leadership of Harold Wilson and the deputy leadership of 
Edward Short, an equally committed Zionist, the Parliamentary Labour Party 
was under powerful pressure to support the supply of arms to Israel. The day 
before the debate, all Labour Members received a notice from the Chief Whip, 
Robert Mellish, another committed Zionist, giving notice that subject to a 
decision of the Shadow Cabinet, a three-line whip might be issued for the 
debate, meaning three-line whip opposition to the policy of no arms to either 
side and three-line support for arming Israel. The reaction was electric. More 
524 Ibid., (1981: 365) 
525 Ibid., (1981: 365) 
526 Watkins, David (1996: 118-119) 
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than 80 members at once made clear that they would not accept the imposition 
of such a whip. ' 
527 528 
In the wider Labour and leadership context the largely unthinkable had happened: as 
75 Labour MPs abstained, many remaining in their seats throughout the division as a 
sign of protest, this was the largest Commons Labour Party rebellion relating to the 
Israel-Palestine question since the debates over partition (1947), the ignominious 
departure of Britain from Palestine in 1948, and the parliamentary rebellion of 1949 
over the British government's recognition of Israel. It was also notable not least 
because, contrary to the pro-Israel views of the leadership, the wider party sent a clear 
message in favour of neutrality and international law (UN Resolution, 242) - which is 
the basis of a more impartial position. The party consensus was evidently diverging 
among a significant section of the party in favour of this less partial stance and 
pressing for a consequent change in policy. 
Wilson confirms that the Whips were indeed met by `fierce resistance from the party 
MPs, particularly from Roy Jenkins; '529 Wilson describes how he later went on to 
bypass some of the disquiet within the party by appealing to MPs on an individual 
basis. This included Roy Jenkins: 
`Look, Roy, I've accommodated your [expletive deleted] conscience for years. 
Now you're going to have to take account of mine: I feel as strongly about the 
Middle East [political Zionism and Israel] as you do about the Common 
Market. ' 530 
527 Ibid., (1996: 118-119) 
528 Although the general point concerning the Labour leadership's difficulties in the face of an 
unprecedented pro-neutralist and pro-Arab/Palestinian rebellion is sound, there appears to be 
an anomaly in Watkins' account: if the debate on the supply of arms was without a vote, how 
was it possible to impose a three-line whip? Whips only apply to voting, not attending a 
debate. 
529 Wilson, Harold (1981: 367) 
530 Ibid., (1981: 367) 
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Wilson's pressure yielded only limited results - in this case Jenkins did eventually fall 
into line. 531 But as Wilson notes, in the Commons debate some . 15 Labour members 
voted with the Conservative government, as well as the 75 who abstained. In terms of 
an internal determinant, the pro-Israel consensus was clearly on the wane and the 
leadership was now at odds with a large section of its own party. As Watkins says: 
`In that historic vote on 18 October 1973,50 years of Zionist domination of 
Labour attitudes were ended. '532 
For many in the Labour Party the 1973 rebellion represented a `major turning 
point, '533 the end of an era. Yet the warning signs had been there for some time: 
arguably at least since 1967, arguably since 1956. The evidence for this shift is 
primarily located in the adoption by the Labour Party conference of a `new statement 
of policy, ' containing - for the first time -a sentence referring to the failure to resolve 
the Palestinian question as the root cause of the Middle East conflict, and that their 
consultation was a essential prerequisite to an search for a peaceful settlement of the 
issues. With the seismic events instigated by the 1973 war foremost in Labour minds, 
an important event appears to have gone almost unnoticed by the leadership at least. 
The statement had originated as a memorandum submitted by the Labour Middle East 
Council (LMEC) to the National Executive Committee and was almost instantly 
placed under the scrutiny of the parliamentary party system of lobbying, the party 
whips and debate: 
53' Arguably in recognition of the strength and scale of opposition to Wilson's attempts to 
place Labour behind a pro-Israel position Watkins' notes: `The outcome was an extraordinary 
decision that shadow ministers would vote against the government and that the rest of the 
party would have a free vote, nothing more than an attempted face-saving device for a 
hierarchy that knew it was beaten. ' Watkins, David (1996: 119) 
532 Watkins, David (1996: 119) 
533 Ibid., (1996: 119). As with Watkins, June Edmunds attributes the Arab-Israel wars on the 
shift towards a more neutralist consensus, but does not share Watkins' assertion that the 1973 
rebellion was an `epoch-making' (Watkins, 1996: 118) event, rather stating that the `1956, 
1967 and, especially, the 1973 wars did produce some cracks in the party's support for 
Israel. '533 Edmunds, June (May, 1998: 112) 
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`The 1970 Labour Party Conference accepted the NEC Statement which 
contained all the elements for what the Labour Party believes would be a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East and which incorporated the proposals in 
UN Resolution 242. '534 
From 7 key factors accepted by the party, only number 5 contained a reference to the 
Palestinians: `The need for a humane solution of the refugee problem as a pre- 
condition for a lasting Middle East settlement. '535 Nonetheless, the statement clearly 
illustrates that the Palestinians had by now come to at least occur in the thinking of a 
large section of the party and the decision and policy-making process. As the 1973, 
the Programme notes: 
`The other important factor in the present situation is the necessity of involving the 
Palestinian community fully in any settlement which has a chance of working. ' 536 
While the need to include the Palestinians is a notable inclusion on all previous 
Labour documents, the acceptance of Israel as an equal perpetrator of violence and 
terror is also a key development in the currency of language. As the programme 
continues to state: 
`The numerous events in recent months of terror and counter-terror carried out 
by the main protagonists .... The killing of innocent people, for whatever 
reason and wherever it takes place, cannot be condoned or defended. Effective 
action must be taken to protect potential victims of piracy, hijackings and all 
other forms of international terrorism directed against the innocent. Yet this is 
dealing with the symptoms of what is wrong rather than with the root cause 
which the failure to find a fair and humane solution to the problems of the 
Palestinian community. 
534 Labour's Programme (1973: 119) Labour's Programme for Britain: Annual Conference 
1973, Section 13, World Peace, International Order and Human Rights, The Middle East, 
(London: Labour Party) 
535 Ibid., (1973: 19) 
536 Ibid., (1973: 19) 
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Whatever the circumstances which induced them to leave their homes, 
however justified or unjustified their fears may have been; whether or not they 
were victims of the propaganda of their own leaders, the fact remains that, ... 
a body of people in the area who are dispossessed and who, until their future is 
seriously taken into account in the search for peace, will continue to act as a 
destabilising factor threatening the prospects for a peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East. ' 537 
And as such, therefore: 
`Labour remains committed in general and in particular to the terms of 
Resolution 242 and, in view of the circumstances prevailing when Labour 
returns to office, will consider how best to undertake a fresh diplomatic 
initiative to secure the application of that resolution. ' 539 
The process of recognition of Palestinian rights was enhanced still further in 1976: 
`Since then [1973] it has become increasingly clear that the rights of the 
Palestinian people must be recognised and that they must be fully involved in 
any settlement if it is to prove lasting. Unless and until their future is seriously 
taken into account ... they will remain a destäbilising factor.. , . '539 
A key and notable difference between the 1973 and 1976 policy statements was the 
inclusion of a direct and distinct reference to the Palestinians as a national group: 
`Recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people to the expression of its 
national identity. ' 540 
537 Ibid., (1973: 120) 
538 Ibid., (1973: 120) 
539 Labour's Programme (1976: 136) Labour's Programme for Britain: Annual Conference 
1976, Section 21, The Middle East and Asia, The Middle East, (London: Labour Party) 
540 Ibid., (1976: 136) 
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James Callaghan and Post-1973 Labour policy 
The man who had to synthesise this developing drive for greater even-handedness 
towards the Arab-Israel conflict with Labour foreign policy was ultimately James 
Callaghan. He made the transition from Shadow Foreign Affairs Spokesman to 
Foreign Secretary when Labour returned to office in 1974. Callaghan described his 
period as Foreign Secretary as `two happy years in this Rolls Royce of 
Departments. ' 541 Callaghan mapped out the role of the post, and his own philosophy 
regarding foreign affairs: 
`I went to the Foreign Office with fixed objectives, some of which arose from 
Party commitments and others from my own sense of priorities ... . 
A Labour Foreign Secretary cannot tilt at every windmill but he must seek to 
apply principles to foreign policy - peace, justice, human rights and human 
dignity, opposition to racial discrimination and support for the principles of 
the United Nation's Charter. He must recognise Britain's diminished 
international power, and exert his influence in those areas and organisations 
where such principles can best be furthered, while being ready to take such 
other initiatives as he can construct. He must use foreign policy to bolster 
Britain's economic strength, and in turn that will increase Britain's influence 
in international affairs. ' 542 
Callaghan's uncluttered approach to foreign affairs, - in contrast to some of his 
Labour colleagues - was highly fortuitous for a party struggling to come to terms with 
the new realisms of the post-1973 Arab-Israel conflict, in particular with the economic 
realities emerging from the suspension of oil supplies as a negotiating mechanism by 
the Arab oil producing states. Callaghan was friendly with the younger Israeli leaders 
541 Callaghan, James (1987: 294) Time and Chance, Part Four, Foreign Secretary, Chapter 10, 
(London: Collins) 
542 Ibid., (1987: 296) 
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like Shimon Peres543 and Yitzhak Rabin, 544 but also developed a deep friendship with 
the Egyptian leader, Anwar el-Sadat, whom he described as `a serious and sensible 
far-seeing man. '545 Thus his position on the Arab/Palestinian-Israel subject was well- 
informed and even-handed. Academic historian Kenneth 0. Morgan describes 
Callaghan's position thus: 
`Since the 1940s he had taken a relatively balanced view on the Israel- 
Palestinian issue. He was neither emotionally pro-Israeli as Wilson was, nor 
dogmatically anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian like George Brown. It was well 
known that an Israeli Labour leader like David Ben-Gurion always refused to 
meet Brown in person, whereas Callaghan's personal relations with the Israeli 
Labour Party were perfectly good. '546 
Callaghan himself says of his first trip to the Middle East while in opposition in 
January and February 1974: 
`I have recalled it especially because it marked the beginning of a close 
friendship between President Sadat of Egypt and myself. I had known the 
leaders of Israel well for many years, but had never previously met Sadat and 
was anxious to do so before the British general election, which seemed likely 
to take place during 1974. '547 
Callaghan explains how his trip had a `dual purpose: ' to `mend fences with Arab 
leaders in order to avoid any remote possibility that the Labour Party's close links 
with Israel might lead to an oil embargo against Britain if we won the election', and at 
543 Shimon Peres (b. 1923) was born in Wiszniew, Poland, arrived Palestine, 1934. PM: 1984- 
1986,1995-1996; Foreign Minister, 1986-1988; Vice Premier, 1988-1990; Labor leader, 
1977-1992,1995-1996, and Alignment leader, (alliance of key left-wing Parties), 1977-1992. 
144 Yitzhak Rabin (b. 1923-d. 1995) was born in Jerusalem, Palestine. PM and Labor leader, 
1992-1995; Alignment leader, 1973-1977; Minister of Defence, 1984-1990. 
545 Callaghan, James (1987: 291) Chapter 9 
546 Kenneth Morgan O. (1997: 401) Callaghan: A Life, Chapter 4,1912-1964 Backbench 
Critic, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
547 Callaghan, James (1987: 289-290) Part Four, Chapter 9, Foreign Secretary 
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the same time to `reassure Israel that we would not depart from the party's historic 
friendship for that country. '548 He continues: 
`There was of course little likelihood of our doing so with Harold Wilson as 
our leader. Indeed, when we won the election and I became Foreign Secretary 
he told me that he would not want a meticulous account of my handling of 
foreign policy with the exception of two areas - Israel and South Africa, the 
latter because of his honourable detestation of apartheid. '549 
Although Wilson remained firmly pro-Israel he had not entirely failed to absorb the 
lessons of the 1973 parliamentary party rebellion. Callaghan says Wilson had 
conveyed, via his Foreign Secretary, the position of Labour in relation to its historic 
ties with Israel to Sadat, but Callaghan also confirmed a new approach from the party 
to the Palestinians: 
`I explained to the Arab States that, while the Labour Party would not perform 
a `U-turn' in its relations with Israel, nevertheless it was my intention to 
increase our contacts with and our understanding of the Arab world, and to 
emphasis that the Party recognised that the Palestinian people had a legitimate 
aspiration. These should be settled by negotiation as a priority issue before a 
real peace could ensue. 550 
It is with a sense of irony that Sadat responds to Labour's new position on the 
Palestinians with more than a hint at the ideological contradiction between the 
socialist Labour Party's associations with Israel in terms of its policies towards the 
Palestinians. Again, as Callaghan relates: 
`Sadat was clearly pleased that I had visited him as a representative of the 
Labour Party, and remarked that it was a sadness to him that he had received 
548 Ibid., (1987: 289-290) 
sag Ibid., (1987: 289-290) 
550 Ibid., (1987: 290) 
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greater support in the past from the Conservatives despite the fact that his 
domestic aims and ideals were nearer to our own. 'ss' 
On the basis of Sadat's remarks it could be said that Sadat was more awake to the 
essential dilemma that confronted the Labour Party in its dealings with Israel, 
certainly more than Wilson was, and possibly even Callaghan. Nonetheless, the 
dilemma was by now making itself firmly and uncomfortably felt within the party to 
the degree that it was having a consequent effect in terms of an adjustment in the 
party consensus but also the trajectory of policy. 
James Callaghan. David Owen and the Camp David Peace Process 
On becoming Labour Leader in April 1976, Callaghan appointed his deputy, Anthony 
Crosland as Foreign Secretary. On Crosland's death David Owen552 succeeded to the 
post. Owen represented a new parliamentary and demographic generation of Labour 
MPs who had entered Parliament in the mid 1960s. 
As with many Labour figures, Owen possessed a deep Christian faith which also 
provided the foundations for his socialist political ideology. Apart from his father's 
occupation as a Vicar, one of the earliest religious influences occurred while a 
university student: 
`The secular aspects of life around Great St. Mary's [University Church, 
Cambridge University], the discussions, the talks, the sermons by eminent 
visitors organized by [Rector] Mervyn Stockwood [later Bishop of 
Southwark], all linking Christian values to social issues, would have attracted 
me to the Church in any case. Then, as in my childhood, and as it is now, 
going periodically to church was an important part of my life. Brought up in a 
531 Ibid., (1987: 290) 
552 Dr David Owen (b. 1938) MP: (Plymouth Sutton, 1966-1974), (Plymouth Devonport, 
1974-1992); Foreign Secretary, February 1977-May 1979 
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Christian family, influenced by my grandfather [Congregational Minister] ... . 
The unique example of Jesus Christ's life has never left me. '553 
It was not from Owen's Christian background however, that he derived his interest in 
the Middle East. Owen says his primary interest in the region was Israel, an interest 
that began to firmly develop a year after he became a Labour MP in 1967: 
`Israel has been an area of special and personal interest for me ever since my 
wife began to act as literary agent for Amos Ozssa . In 
fact, I visited Israel 
first in 1967, soon after the Arab-Israeli War. Ever since, I have watched 
carefully every twist and turn in the complicated politics of Israel itself and the 
region generally. In all that time the personalities have been as important as 
the politics for the region. '555 
During the 1973 October War Owen had taken a decidedly pro-Israel position: his 
contempt for the policy of neutrality adopted by the Conservative government is all 
too apparent. As Owen says: 
`I was appalled when the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, and Prime Minister, 
Edward Heath, refused to supply, during the actual fighting, shells for the 
Centurion tanks that Israel had bought from us. I considered it then, and still 
do [1991], the most cynical act of British foreign policy since Suez [1956]. It 
showed not just Arab influence within the Foreign Office but a total lack of 
principle in standing by one's commitments from two politicians whom I 
hitherto respected. ' 556 
I" Harris, Kenneth (1987: 14) David Owen: Personally Speaking to Kenneth Harris, Chapter 
2, Cambridge, Medical School, The Labour Party, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson) 
" Amos Oz (b. 1939) Israeli novelist and essayist, born Jerusalem, Palestine, of Polish and 
Russian Jewish parentage; a left-wing Labor apologist for political Zionism, Likud's more 
radical expansionist policies in the Occupied Territories, Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, 
and response to the 19871ntifadah influence Oz towards an Oslo agreement position by 1993. 
... Harris, Kenneth (1987: 158) Chapter 7, Disarmament and Defence, Iran and Israel 
556 Owen, David (1991: 209) Time to Declare, (London: Michael Joseph Press) 
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Owen was all too aware that Britain's - and Labour's - standing in Israel had been 
seriously damaged by the position taken in 1973. His own pro-Israel inclinations 
might have been part of the reason why Callaghan selected him for the post, 
especially in view of the all influencing spectre of Wilson. Owen notes: 
`Jim [James Callaghan] was always very conscious of the Labour Party's links 
with Israel. The party was represented in the House of Commons by a large 
number of Jewish MPs and had considerable support from Jewish voters in a 
number of seats. 
Jim felt there was a special bond between the Labour Party and the Israeli 
people. One of the expressions of that feeling was that while I was at the 
Foreign Office, I became the first [serving] British Foreign Secretary to make 
a visit to the Israeli state. '557 
Furthermore, Callaghan was conscious, as was Owen, of the continuing interest and 
influence of the, by now, retired Harold Wilson. As Owen confirms: 
`Soon after my appointment [1977], Jim [Prime Minister, James Callaghan] 
mentioned informally that Harold Wilson has said when he retired that he 
would loyally support Jim's Government even if he thought it was wrong, 
with one exception. The exception was Israel. I knew, therefore, that I had to 
watch this issue carefully. '558 
Thus, despite the evidence of a deviation from the pro-Israel consensus within the 
party, and while trying to accommodate it in part through re-establishing good 
relations with key and relevant Arab states, - one element of which was recognition of 
Palestinian rights, Callaghan's government retained an essentially pro-Israel policy 
for reasons of internal determinants in the form of a largely pro-Israel leadership, 
which despite his undoubted influence was only partly moderated by Callaghan's 
557 Harris, Kenneth (1987: 158-159) 
558 Owen, David (1991: 261) 
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pragmatic and at times constructive and close relationship with Arab leaders and 
states. 
Irrespective of the imposing influences of Callaghan and the still formidable guiding 
spirit of Wilson, the gradual but nevertheless significantly changing dynamics within 
the party on the Arab/Palestinian-Israel issue increasingly took Labour's position 
beyond the direct influence of individuals or hierarchy. This development began to 
impinge on Labour's approach to policy-making in the form of Britain's membership 
of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Regardless of the powerful pro-Israel perspectives from the highest levels of the party, 
by the early 1980s, and with Labour once more out of office, David Owen began to 
view the primary source of Arab disquiet with Britain as being the position taken 
towards the Palestinians. At the same time it was perfectly evident to Owen and 
others, that Britain's economy and reliance on Arab oil supplies had profound 
implications for British national interests - and Labour's. As a consequence, Owen 
began to view the EEC as a vehicle for registering a more equitable British position 
while bypassing some of the problems arising from offending Israel and the essential 
dilemma. As he said at the time: `Europe, not only understands their regional 
problems but is dealing responsibly with their major political concern - Palestine. '559 
And as he further elaborated the European tack: 
`It has been possible to hold an overall Community position on the Middle 
East, and to make this position more realistic in relation to the legitimate rights 
of the Palestinians than has been feasible for the US or politically acceptable 
'sbo for Britain if we had been acting alone. sb' 
 Owen, David (1981: 209) Face the Future, Part Three. Chapter 9, The Mixed Economy, 
Energy Policy, (London: Jonathan Cape) 
50 Ibid., (1981: 525) Part Five. Chapter 20, International Socialism, The Community of 
Twelve 
561 A further facility existed in the Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Co-operation 
(PAEAC) (1974) an All-Party Group promoting a greater role for the European Union in 
Middle Eastern affairs. 
198 
Chapter 3 (1963-1979) 
As Owen observes, the facility and arrival at an `overall Community position' lifted 
Labour somewhat from the direct responsibility for policy on Israel-Palestinian issues 
(some two decades before Oslo facilitated the same circumstances and opportunity); 
the collective EEC decision and policy-making ethos was similar to the Cabinet ethos 
of consensus politics which also served to counter some of the pro-Israel response 
from within the party and Israel. Furthermore, an additional mechanism to side-step 
the shadow of the essential dilemma was also derived from collective representative 
of socialist and social democratic parties in the EEC - as they were easily linked to the 
more established forum of the Socialist International. As Owen illustrates: 
`Active in the Socialist International, and a strong advocate of better relations 
between Europe and the Third World, [Bruno] Kreisky [Austrian Chancellor, 
Socialist Party] has been particularly effective in encouraging dialogue 
between Israel and the Arab World. Yasser Arafat, 562 leader of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation [PLO], 563 took part in discussions with socialist 
leaders at a Party leaders' conference of the Socialist International held in 
Vienna, under Kreisky's auspices, in February 1980", 5M 
If Europe was one important external determinant in the deviation process from a pro- 
Israel to a neutralist position for Labour and Owen, the second was the decline and 
fall of the Labor Party in Israel and the rise of the right-wing Likud bloc. 
562 Yasser Arafat (b. 1929-d. 2004). a Palestinian and leader of AI-Fatah the secular socialist 
party he joint founded in 1959. President, Palestinian National Authority (PNA), 1996-2004. 
563 The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Palestine National Council (PNC) - 
the PLO's supreme political body - were founded in 1964, and is effectively the Palestinian 
government in exile. The military wing, the Palestine Liberation Army, was established in the 
same year. The PLO and PNC are comprised of many political and religious parties (Yasser 
Arafat's Party - AI-Fatah (est. 1957) - joined the PNC in 1968), trades unions and the 
Palestinian people. Established ostensibly as a unifying body for the Palestinian Diaspora, the 
PLO was also a political and military response to the failures of Arab states to recover 
Palestine, and a mechanism to prevent complete political control by host states. 
56' Owen, David (1981: 61-62) Part One, Chapter 4, Social Democracy, The Social 
Democratic Tradition 
199 
Chapter 3 (1963-1979) 
The Israeli Labor Party had been in power, albeit in various guises, since Israel's 
founding in 1948. However a general fatigue born of the Israeli Labor Party's 
complacency in dealing with domestic issues, a series of political and financial 
scandals, and accusations of military and political incompetence in the 1973 war, led 
to the election of a right-wing bloc - collectively referred to as Likud - in 1977. Likud 
comprised some of the most extreme right-wing parties within the spectrum of 
religious and political Zionism, the core binding factor being the concept of an Eretz 
Israel (Greater Israel) based on the biblical borders of the ancient Hebrew kingdoms. 
Likud was heavily influenced by the revisionist political Zionism of Ze'ev Jabotinski 
which left little if any room for compromise with the Palestinians. 
Although the Israeli Labor Party had initiated the settlement policies in the Occupied 
Territories (and indeed had its own record of atrocities against the Palestinians), Likud 
presented a more strident and ferocious approach to the Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories and the Arab World in general, which struck a profoundly discordant note 
with pro-Israel sympathizers in the Labour Party. The Israeli Labor Party, floundering 
in the wake of its first election defeat and disorientated by its own inability to 
reconcile occupation with its socialist ideological underpinnings, initiated one 
ideological or political compromise after another. As a result, it became increasingly 
difficult for British Labour Party figures to distinguish between the policies of Israeli 
Labor Party and those of the Likud bloc. This was particularly true when the Israel 
Labor Party joined Likud in a series of coalition governments between 1984 until 
1990. As David Watkins says, in many ways Labor and Likud became `different sides 
of the same coin' in Israel. 
565 When still Foreign Secretary, Owen had noted these 
political changes in Israel and their significance for his own Labour Party: 
`The defeat of the Labour Party coalition in the Israeli elections of early 1977 
came as a surprise and a disappointment to us in the UK, and we became 
anxious when we saw that it was replaced by a right-wing government, the 
Likud coalition, dominated by the extremist Herut Party, led by Menachem 
565 Watkins, David (06.07.2003: 8) 
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Begin. 566 We knew of Begin as a fundamentalist, an autocrat, and an 
uncompromising nationalist. We also knew that he was no friend of Britain: he 
had been the leader of the Irgun in its resistance to British rule in Palestine. ' 567 
Despite the evident difficulties and his own reservations towards the man, Callaghan 
illustrated his keen pragmatism as he instructed Owen to invite Begin to Britain. The 
difference between Callaghan's relationship with Sadat and that with Menachem 
Begin could not have been greater. As Callaghan states: 
`I had met Prime Minister Begin some years earlier in Jerusalem before he 
came to office, when a conversation between us had ended in a fierce dispute, 
although as always, he never became discourteous. Later, when we were both 
in office, I decided to invite him to London [19781, a fact that he much 
appreciated in view of his desperate hostility towards Britain in the period 
preceding the establishment of the State of Israel. We had then called him a 
terrorist. He saw himself as a Jewish patriot. '568 
Owen viewed Begin's visit - perhaps somewhat naively - as an opportunity to `keep 
up the pressure on Israel to create the conditions for a settlement of the West Bank 
problem. '569 However, there were two very distinct sides to Begin and Likud which 
were to have profound consequences for the basis and nature of Labour-Israel 
relations, and the divergence process, as Kenneth Harris - Owen's biographer states: 
s66 Callaghan's decisive and rapid move towards embracing the unwanted but cold realities of 
Israeli politics was to yield some benefits in the negotiation that led to Camp David in 1979. 
As Owen states: `It is not generally known that Jim Callaghan's government played a modest 
but nevertheless valuable role in the events which led to the historic meeting between Egypt 
and Israel, September 1978, at Camp David, and also in the events which led to the signing of 
the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel the following March. ' Harris, Kenneth (1987: 158) 
quoting, David Owen 
567 Harris, Kenneth (1987: 159) quoting, David Owen 
568 Callaghan, James (1987: 487) 
16' Harris, Kenneth (1987: 160) quoting, David Owen 
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`Nobody can take from Begin his place in history as the Prime Minister of 
Israel who secured for the first time the recognition of the State of Israel by an 
Arab state [1979 Camp David Accords]. Yet it is equally true that Begin could 
never have brought a solution to the problems of the Palestinians and the West 
Bank 1570 
As a result, Owen's notions of putting `some flesh on the concept of self-rule [for the 
Palestinians] on the West Bank'571 were essentially futile. For Begin in the context of 
an Eretz Israel (literally, the Land of Israel; conceptually, a Greater or Biblical Israel) 
there was little room for compromise and even less for a resolution. `Flesh on the 
bones' of the Palestinian question was an anathema to Begin, as Owen and Labour 
came to steadily realise. 
572 573 
570 Ibid., (1987: 161) quoting, David Owen 
571 Ibid., (1987: 161) quoting, David Owen 
572 Rt. Hon Don Concannon recites an encounter with Begin and Labor figures in Israel in 
1967: `Most of the Israeli leaders used to belong to terrorist organisations: [Yitzhak] Shamir 
and Begin. One delegation that I went on we had to meet the Israeli War Cabinet, Begin was 
in the Cabinet; he was not the Prime Minister then [1967] but he and Shamir were in the War 
Cabinet. He came dashing up to me to shake my hand. I just shoved it to one side. The 
immediate reaction of everybody else in the Israeli Cabinet was that they came up to shake 
my hand for doing that to Begin. He was bloody hated by many of his own people, but then 
again so he should be. ' Concannon, Don (20.07.2002: 1) Interview: Concannon-Nelson, 
Mansfield, Nottinghamshire 
573 D. Cameron Watt offers an assessment of a number of Labour's post-1945 Foreign 
Secretaries in terms of their vocation to the post as diplomats, some of the reasons for their 
appointments and their relations to the premier: `Michael Stewart and Patrick Gordon Walker 
(though his tenure of the post was so short that it is difficult to be sure), commended 
themselves to their premiers as persons prepared to take second place to prime ministerial 
instructions into diplomacy. Several others, notably ... George Brown, James Callaghan, 
Anthony Crosland, would appear, from what is known of their personal relations with the 
prime minister they served, to have found themselves in office more for the political weight 
that they carried in wings of the parties whose support and loyalty to the premier in question 
were not altogether certain (at least to him or himself) than for any previous record of success 
in the field of foreign affairs. David Owen's promotion on the sudden death of Anthony 
Crosland ... was paradoxically 
inspired by the inverse of such calculations, the need to fill 
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For the Labour Party, Begin and Likud were something of an impediment, despite the 
conclusion of the Camp David Accords. The Israeli government's policy of rapid 
colonisation of the Occupied Territories, and the growing evidence of the brutally 
suppressive policies which accompanied that settlement, could not be attributed solely 
to the right-wing of the Israeli political spectrum: these policies had been initiated by 
an Israeli Labor government between 1967 and 1977. And even as Likud became 
more aggressive towards the Palestinians, the Israeli Labor Party was unable and/or 
unwilling to resist on either ideological or political grounds. Instead, it collaborated 
with them through participation in National Unity Governments between 1984 and 
1992. The evidence that the Israeli polity was a brutally effective colonial entity and 
one in which the Labour movement was a prime component, was hard for the British 
Labour Party to accept for many individuals, not least in light of Labour's tradition 
pro-political Zionism. In the Israeli political circumstances and whatever the personal 
preference of the leadership, it became increasingly difficult to ignore the full 
dimensions of the essential dilemma, hence Owen's advocacy that Labour position 
itself in the slip-stream of the policy obligations put forward by Europe and the 
Socialist International. 
It was not only Labour's leading figures that were increasingly aware of the 
discordances of their party's policies. In previous elections, it had been a high risk 
strategy for an MP to stand against the pro-political Zionist lobby both within and 
beyond the party. In the words of Labour MP Ernest Ross: 574 
`I mean they saw what happened to some of their colleagues after the 1967 
war after they stood up and attacked Israel, some of them lost their seats; and 
the foreign secretaryship without destroying the existing balance of the Labour Cabinet. '573 
Bullen, Roger [Editor] (1984: 124), The Foreign ice 1782-1982, Chapter 6, Watt, Cameron 
D., Foreign Secretaries as Diplomats, (Frederick Maryland: University Publication of 
America) 
574 Ernest "Ernie" Ross (b. 1945) MP: (Dundee West, 1979-2005) 
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that is always in the back of an MP's mind: am I going to lose my seat over an 
issue called Palestine? '575 
However, in the wake of the 1967 and 1973 wars and as the media came to give a 
growing and more sympathetic coverage to the Palestinians' plight, the pro-Israel 
influence upon the constituency and electorate was decreasing, as an analysis of 
British public opinion in the period illustrates: 
`Up until the early 1970s the problem was always referred to as the Arab- 
Israeli conflict or, simply, the Middle East conflict. From 1973 on, the 
problem began to be perceived differently. The Palestinians began to assume 
their role as central actors in shaping their own destiny. 
Furthermore, with the exception of the Israeli public, those interviewed in 
North America and Europe began to recognise that there is a legitimate 
Palestinian grievance. ... And, 
in spite of continued general sympathy 
towards Israel, the need to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is seen as a 
central precondition to peace in the region. ' 576 
The outstanding military success of Israel in 1967 and its less impressive but 
nonetheless successful defence in 1973, combined with the evidence of massive 
American military protection for the state, had altered public perceptions of a small, 
vulnerable country, - the `David' analogy - `surrounded' by `hostile' Arab powers, - 
the `Goliath' analogy. This was only enhanced by the evidence of Israeli settlement 
practices in the Occupied Territories and the refusal of Israel to accede to the 
requirements of international law in terms of relinquishing those lands in return for a 
resolution. Simultaneously, for the British Labour Party the harsh and ultimately 
uncompromising ideological reality had struck at the heart of Labour figures that the 
Palestinian issue was definitively identified as being a key factor for the Arabs in their 
conflict with Israel, a conflict that threatened British oil supplies and the broader 
575 Ross, Ernest (16.09.2004: 14) 
576 Zureik, Elia & Moughrabi, Fouad (Editors) (1987: 2) Public Opinion and the Palestine 
Question, Introduction, (Beckenham: Croom Helm) 
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economy. The Labour Party was forced to respond to a new reality, but found less 
resistance than previously had been the case in the electorate from whom they sought 
support. 
Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding and the Labour Middle 
East Council 
The process of deviation from the pro-Zionist consensus during this period (1956- 
1980s) was reflected in, and facilitated by, the establishment of two important pro- 
Arab/Palestinian interest groups: the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British 
Understanding (CAABU)577 (1969) and the Labour Middle East Council (LMEC) 
(1969). 578 The two groups, the first of which was an All-Party body, were formed in 
recognition that British politicians were woefully ill-informed and often deliberately 
misinformed on matters relating to the Middle East, and the Arab/Palestinian-Israel 
conflict in particular. The 1967 war had generated a new audience seeking additional 
and more balanced information. As a purely Labour enterprise the LMES, moreover, 
was dedicated to addressing the policy approach of the party itself. David Watkins 
(co-founder and chair of LMEC, 1974-1983) stated that the motive for forming 
LMEC in 1969 was as `an expression of the growing concern in the Labour Party at 
the unfair official approach to the problems of the Middle East'579 arising from the 
1967 war. In other words, LMEC was the expression of divergence of the party, or 
sections of it, from the pro-political Zionist consensus of earlier years and of the party 
leadership. The emphasis on greater equability in Labour's approach as opposed to 
pro-Arab/Palestinian purposes of the group is evidenced as follows: 
57 In addition to CAABU and LMEC a number of important groups emerged in the period 
after 1967: including Free Palestine Campaign (1969), Palestine Solidarity Campaign (1982), 
Palestine Return Centre (c. 1997), and the Palestine General Delegation to the U. K. and the 
Office of Representation of the PLO to the Holy See. 
578 Similarly, the Liberal Middle East Council (LIBMEC) (1980) and the Conservative Middle 
East Council (CMEC) (1980) were subsequently founded. 
579 Watkins, David (1975: 2) Labour and Palestine, (London: Labour Middle East Council) 
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`The Labour movement needs to establish that its interest in the Middle East is 
based on a commitment to justice and progress and not on automatic support 
of any one Party. ' 580 
Adding: 
`That LMEC will work for the implementation of United Nations resolutions 
to that effect by promoting inside the Labour movement a constructive and 
balanced view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This- is socialist thinking entirely in 
line with the Labour Party's constitutional commitment to promote peace, 
settle international disputes and defend human rights through support for the 
United Nations. ' 581 
The group explicitly acknowledged the existence and consequences of the essential 
dilemma: for the LMEC the party's relations with political Zionism represent a 
contradiction because political Zionism as a nationalistic, colonial and para-military 
movement represents a contradiction with Labour's socialism. In short, a socialist 
Labour Party does not equate to the ideology and activities of political Zionism, and 
vice versa: 
`From its inception, [political] Zionism has been a nationalistic philosophy 
which is in any case contrary to the basic concepts of Democratic 
Socialism. '582 
The LMEC was initiated and organised by an elected Executive Committee which 
organised conference fringe meetings, high profile speakers, including Palestinians. In 
addition to meetings, Labour figures supported seminars at venues around the country 
which were directed at venues related to the trades union movement; these activities 
were supported by a regular newsletter, pamphlets and other published materials, 
while noting that the overall aim remained to press for change in Labour's policy 
position primarily within the forum of parliament: 
530 Ibid., (1975: 2) 
581 Ibid., (1975: 2) 
582 Ibid., (1975: 2) 
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`Above all, we operated in parliament, constantly speaking and putting 
questions as well as lobbying ministers and fellow members, to say nothing of 
Foreign Office officials. '583 
By 1976, the activities propagating a more even-handed approach among Labour 
figures - and their criticisms of their own party - were becoming media news. In the 
Palestine Report Labour MPs David Watkins and Andrew FauldsSM (and future MP 
Peter Hain)585 586 conveyed what they saw as the historical origins of Labour's pro- 
Israel position: 
`The Labour government's attitude to the Palestinian is ambivalent, reflecting 
the Labour Party's attitude. The Party has a long standing association with 
Israel, yet is subject to growing uneasiness over the injustice perpetuated 
against the Palestinians and which is wholly at variance with the Party's 
fundamental philosophy of social justice. 587 
Andrew Faulds stated more forcefully: 
`I have argued for a number of years that the British government should take 
note of the realities of the Middle East situation, both politically and 
economically, and should adopt a policy of responding to the friendship 
towards this country that the Arab states have shown over a long period. Such 
a policy should involve a recognition of the rights of the Palestinians and of 
the PLO .... So 
far successive British governments, but most notably the 
Labour government, has declined to adopt such a course, although the 
583 Ibid., (1996: 126) 
5114 Andrew Faulds (b. 1923-d. 2000) MP: (Smethwick, 1966-1974), (Warley East, 1974-1997) 
585 Peter Hain (b. 1950) MP: (Neath, 1991-present) 
586 Emlyn Hooson (Liberal MP) contributed an essay titled, Palestine: A Case to be Heard 
587 Watkins, David (1976 [May 4, ]: 24) Britain's Vital Role in Palestine The Palestine Report, 
(Free Palestine Information Office, London and Eurabia Ltd, Media Representation / The 
Guardian) 
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diatribes of ignorance and the prejudice of the past have become more 
muted. '588 
Although there was thus a discernible change in the thinking and position of some 
Labour figures on the Israel-Palestinian question in the early 1970s, and although such 
views might have found a more sympathetic public audience than had previously been 
the case, the consequences for a Labour figure with a more impartial position could 
still be serious within the party. Frequently, the source of these repercussions came 
from pro-Israel figures, often, though not exclusively allied to external pro-Israel 
groups. Ernest Ross illustrates that as late as 1978 raising the issue of Labour's pro- 
Israel position within their constituency parties held risks: `When you did, the forces 
of reaction came down on you like a `ton of bricks. 589 Ross' experience is reiterated 
by David Watkins: 
`... during that period of the sixties and into the seventies, any Labour 
Member of Parliament who spoke out in any way critical of the Israelis, 
ferocious attempts were made to try and cause trouble in his or her 
constituency Labour Party. ' 59° 
Watkins adding that: 
`In referring to the fascist-like reaction of the Israeli lobby, I use the 
description deliberately, for their tactics were to try to destroy anyone who 
dared to question them. Another MP who was active in support of the Arab 
cause was Mrs Margaret McKay. 591 I saw examples of the obscene hate mail 
S88 Faulds, Andrew (1976 [May 14, ]: 26) Europe Ignoring the Palestinian Voice 
sss Ross, Ernest (16.09.2004: 10) 
590 Watkins, David (06.07.2003: 7) 
59' Margaret MacKay (b. 1911-d. 1996) MP: (Clapham, 1964-1970) retired from politics to 
Abu Dhabi, Emirate, United Arab Emirates. Mackay outraged Michael Stewart (Labour 
Foreign Secretary) in 1968 by staging a mock Palestinian refugee camp in Trafalgar Square 
and wearing Arab dress in Parliament to protest at the Palestinians predicament. Jordan issued 
a postage stamp to honour her protest. Stewart commented: `And I'm expected to run a 
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with which she was inundated and which included packets of excreta. A usual 
tactic was to create trouble between an MP and his or her Constituency Labour 
Party and there, she was subjected to a scurrilous campaign. '592 
Ross contributes further examples of the possible consequences for Labour figures 
that became interested and actively advocated an increased emphasis on impartiality 
or held a pro-Arab/Palestinian position: 
`Forces from within the Party, from the NEC [National Executive Committee] 
downwards would have a go at you; the media would have a go at you; things 
would start to happen; they would start to look what you were doing. If you 
were an MP they would start looking at what that MP does? If he spends an 
awful lot of time in the Public House - then perhaps the public should know! I 
am not saying there was some sort of great conspiracy; it is a lot simpler than 
that: they are just aware of the need to defend their issues, and their issues - is 
the state of Israel. '593 
In this troubled atmosphere, Labour figures advocating even-handedness found new 
allies in the emergence of a group of representatives (Ambassadors de facto) 
appointed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) stationed in the capitals of 
Western Europe. Their primary purpose was to forge contacts with political and 
diplomatic figures, - and the media. Initiated as a part of the greater reform and 
modernisation of the PLO after the largely disastrous murderous campaigns of the 
previous two decades, the representatives were also installed to facilitate the 
conveyance of PLO policy developments that placed an increasing emphasis upon 
political and diplomatic initiatives with a diminishing role for armed resistance in 
relation to Israel. 
constructive British foreign policy in the Middle East with this women's vote! ' Dalyell, Tam 
Obituary: Margaret MacKay, March 6,1996, The Independent, 
http: //findarticles. com/p/articles/mi_gn4l58/is_19960306/ai nl4029391 
592 Watkins, David (1996: 114-115) 
593 Ross, Ernest (16.09.2004: 10) 
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Over two eventful decades (1970s and 1980s) the PLO moved from the policy 
position of recovering all of mandate Palestine to proposing some form of bi-national 
or two state resolutions - that inevitably involves mutual recognition between Israel 
and the PLO. Foremost among these representatives was the PLO representative to 
London (1975-1978), Said Hammami, considered to be one of the 'PLO's most 
accomplished diplomats' and a `well-known dove. '594 He was `bitterly opposed by the 
Israeli lobby. '595 596 What these PLO representatives also came to represent - in many 
instances - were the first direct contact between Labour politicians and moderate 
Palestinians, advocating a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. 
This was in a period before either the mainstream PLO or Israel had dared utter such 
positions. These contacts also began to erode the perception of Palestinians - and 
Arabs generally - as obstinate terrorists, and gave a platform for dialogue with 
Palestinians directly conveying their history and current predicament. Thus, in 
contrast to the decline of Israel in the minds of Labour figures, as the lines between 
Labor and Likud became ever more smudged by a series of coalitions and half a 
decade in opposition, the Palestinian perspective continued to raise it profile and find 
support within Labour and Britain generally. 
A decade of Israeli Labor Party intransigence towards the Palestinians and Arab 
states, followed by the acceleration and expansion of illegal settlement building in the 
Occupied Territories and the assassination of PLO representatives like Said 
Hammami, provided further evidence to an increasing number of Labour figures that 
594 Seale, Patrick (1992: 43/49) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire, Chapter 2, Abu lyad's Obsession, 
(London: Hutchinson) 
"' Watkins (1996: 125) 
596 Said Hammami was assassinated in London ((4.01.1978) See: Seale, Patrick (1992: 46-50) 
However, the essential dilemma - which had troubled many Labour figures - also troubled 
Hammami. As Watkins' said of Hammami: `The Zionist power in the Labour Party puzzled 
and saddened him. He said ... that when we he met and talked with Labour MPs and other 
party activists, he found himself so much in agreement with their general philosophy and 
policy, which was what he wanted in Palestine for his own people, that he could not see how 
they could have ever have strongly supported the policy that denied and crushed all 
Palestinian aspirations. ' Watkins, David (1996: 126) 
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it was Israel - rather than perhaps the Palestinian and Arabs - that were the `unwilling 
partner in peace. ' This mindset among Labour figures became even more prevalent 
with the Israeli Labor Party's participation in Likud-led coalition governments when it 
became even more difficult to distinguish between Labor and Likud policies which 
generated the `different sides of the same coin' analogy within the Labour Party. The 
degree and level of the deviation was such that even Harold Wilson was to express his 
own emerging public disillusionment with Israel: 
`The impression I formed of Israel, under Menachem Begin's Government, 
was the unhappiest I have known. ... Israel at this time suffers 
from a 
theocratic and bitterly divided Government. Begin is obsessed with the 
divisive question of Jewish control over the disputed West Bank. ' 597 
Nonetheless, and with unquestionable progress, according to some Labour figures the 
work of the LMEC made slow inroads into party policy. Ernest Ross blames this on a 
claim that LMEC was dominated until 1979 by the right-wing of the party. He 
asserted that in terms of promoting the Palestinian perspective within the mainstream 
of the party and policy-making mechanism `they were not challenging the party 
leadership in way shape or form; they were not raising it at any level inside the party. 
They were not doing anything. ' 598 In recognition that the way to changing party 
policy seemed through conversion of the left-wing, LMEC made further moves to 
infiltrate and influence the trade union movement, beginning in Scotland. In 1980 the 
Trade Union Friends of Palestine was formed by Yousef Allan. 599 And, as Ross 
explains, an important development resulted: 
597 Wilson, Harold (1981: 380) 
s9s Ross, Ernest (16.09.2004: 1-6) 
Yousef Allan (b. 1952-d. 2001) a Palestinian PhD student at Dundee University (c. 1974- 
1978) was dismayed by the representation of Palestinians and PLO within Dundee University 
and Dundee West Labour Party. Allen founded Friends of Palestine Society via the Dundee 
Students' Union (1978) and Trade Union Friends of Palestine Group (TUFP) (1980) securing 
the Scottish TUC's sponsorship of a motion recognising the PLO and a secular State of 
Palestine at Labour's 1982 Annual Conference. LMEC claims it was due to Allen that `TUC 
and Labour Party policy on the Middle East underwent such a sea-change in the 1980s. ' 
LMEC (2004: 1) The British Labour Movement's support for Palestine, 
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`From that day on - and you can go back and check all the records, - and you 
will see Palestine coming on all the agendas of the Labour Party in Scotland, 
the Conference, the Scottish Trade Union Congress, the TUC, and the Labour 
Ply. , 600 
The gradual success of this manoeuvre was such that Wilson began to note the 
gradual conversion of elements on the left of the party to a stance based on greater 
impartiality: 
`Up to the time of writing, in 1980, A study of Hansard reveals some forty 
parliamentary questions, nearly all written with written answers, and with the 
barest mention in debates. Some of the later questions, again mostly written, 
show some evidence of left-wing inspiration, mostly designed to secure an 
answer critical of Israel. -)601 
Thus during this period the external determinants in the shape of the 1967 and 1973 
wars, the impact of the Arab oil wealth upon the British national economy, and the 
election of the right-wing Likud government in Israel, combined with the internal 
determinants of growing knowledge of the realities of Israel and the Occupied 
Territories within the ranks of the parliamentary party led to a greater willingness to 
challenge the pro-Israel inclinations of the party leadership. This challenge arose both 
individually and through collective activities such as LMEC and the trades unions 
(not to mention an ultimate willingness to embarrass the party with outright Commons 
rebellions) and resulted in a steady reorientation of the party consensus in favour of 
http: //www. impal. org. uk/. See: Graham, Helga The Long March: The Palestine Issue and the 
British Trade Unions, British Trade Unions and Palestine, Arab Affairs, Spring 1987, Vol., 1, 
Issue No. 3, pp. 13-25 
600 Ross, Ernest (16.09.2004: 1-6) 
601 Wilson, Harold (1981: 377) 
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even-handedness. As this deviation became more apparent, there were corresponding, 
albeit still gradual, deviations in the policy trajectory of the party. 602 
Conclusion 
What chapter 3 illustrates is that, despite the dominating leadership of Harold Wilson 
(who represented Labour's pro-Zionist traditions), the influence of key external 
determinant such as the 1967 and 1973 wars and the re-emergence of a distinct 
Palestinian dimension to the conflict, combined to further raise the spectre of the 
essential dilemma which, for many Labour and related figures at least, had hitherto 
been partially buried under the moral post-Holocaust impediment and creation of the 
State of Israel. 
It is evident in this chapter that while the primary source of the essential dilemma 
condition occurs primarily as a result of the traditional pro-political Zionism, and 
sympathy towards Israel in the post-Holocaust period, for another section of the party 
the source of the condition, for the most part, results from the Palestinian predicament 
and their role in the wider Arab-Israel conflict. Both these position, not only caused 
increasing divisions within the party and significantly assisted the deviation process 
toward an eventual neutrality consensus and policy position, but were notably 
influenced by changing demographist character of the parliamentary generations of 
Labour MPs, as newer Labour and related figures replaced the pre-war and immediate 
post-1945 generations to challenge the party's pro-political Zionist orthodoxy. 
The net effect of these external factors was exacerbated by the requirement of Labour 
as a government to secure British interests which were determined to lie with the 
procurement of Arab oil resources and trade with the Arab states, while not offending 
Israel and pro-Israel figures within the party, by adopting a more neutral position. 
However, evidence that the Palestinian dimension was increasingly acting upon the 
psychological, ideological and political components of the essential dilemma emerges 
602 June Edmund's notes that the Labour leadership `during the Wilson era' (1963-1976) were 
`persistently rejecting LMEC's attempts to affiliate' to the Labour Party. Edmunds, June 
(May, 1998: 117) 
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as the position of an increasing number of Labour MPs came to challenge the 
traditional pro-political Zionist orthodoxy of the leadership and section of the party, 
instigating a further sequence of internal division culminating in the pro-neutralist 
open parliamentary rebellion triggered by the Labour leadership's reversal to its 
traditional pro-Zionist policy position on the party's return to opposition during the 
1973 Arab-Israel war. 
In terms of addressing the source and continuity of the essential dilemma, although 
some notable and relatively successful efforts were made to address the condition, in 
actuality, this character trait of this period marks more of the beginnings of an 
addressing. Labour would lurch to the traditional Bastian of pro-political Zionist, the 
left-wing of the party, as the vying sections of the party sought to influence Labour's 
consensus and policy position. 
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Chapter 4 
Labour's Lurch to the Left: the Pro-Palestinian Anomaly 
and the Neil Kinnock Era (1980-1993) 
`One of the most significant aspects of my childhood was my mother's deep 
Christian convictions. Indeed, ... when she read me Bible stories, she always 
distinguished between the kings of Israel who exercised power and the 
prophets of Israel who preached righteousness, and I was brought up to believe 
in the prophets rather than the kings. '603 
Introduction 
The history of the Labour Party in the 1980s and early 1990s is recorded as one of the 
most turbulent, traumatic and divisive in the party's history. Four consecutive 
electoral defeats (1979,1983,1987 and 1992) encapsulated the ascendancy and 
departure of both the archetypal left-wing figure of Michael Foot and his successor 
Neil Kinnock as party leaders. Following the traumatic 'Winter of Discontent' in 
1978/79 and subsequent election defeat, the Labour Party experienced a dramatic 
lurch to the left as a reaction against the apparent failure of James Callaghan's 
centralist economic policies. 
The subsequent adoption of far-left-wing policies in the period between 1981 and 
1993 represented a unique period in Labour-Israel relations. During these years the 
party consensus and policy position became what can perhaps best be described as a 
pro-Palestinian position. The period witnessed the adoption of policies that not only 
recognised the Palestinians as a distinct Arab people with a legitimate claim to 
Palestine, but also acknowledged that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
was the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Most 
603 Benn, Tony [Editor: Ruth W intone] (2004: 3-5) Dare to be a Daniel: Then and Now, Part 
One: My Faith, Honest Doubt, (London: Arrow) 
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significantly, Labour came to support as a policy the creation of a democratic secular 
State of Palestine which effectively required the devolvement of the State of Israel. 
By late 1983, and after another general election defeat, Labour radicalism had receded 
considerably from its position to command significant support and influence. 
04 Under 
the new moderate left-wing leadership of Neil Kinnock, a radical process of internal 
reforms gradually steered the party back to a centre-leftist position. As a consequence 
of the left's decline and Kinnock's reforms, Labour abandoned its pro-Palestinian 
policy; but significantly, did not revert to its traditional pro-political Zionist position; 
instead, it gravitated towards a more equitable position as the gradual shift from the 
traditional pro-political Zionist position came to a conclusion of sorts in 1994. 
These seismic radical internal determinants were accompanied and assisted by a 
series of seminal external determinants: the electoral decline of the Israeli Labor 
party and the rise of Likud, Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and its repressive 
response to the Intifadah. The period concluded with the first Gulf War (1990-1991), 
which proved to be the catalyst in returning Labor to power in Israel and the 
opportunity for Labour in Britain to definitively address the essential dilemma in the 
wake of the Oslo and Washington Accords (1993). 
Labour's Lurch to the Left 
The 1979 General Election defeat prompted the left and far-left-wings of the party to 
capture control of Labour's supreme decision and policy-making body - the National 
Executive Committee (NEC). The election of Michael Foot, a key left-winger, as 
party leader in 1980 further assisted this rise in the influence of the left-wing, which 
was to be felt across Labour hierarchy and policy-making forums (Conference, 
Constituency Parties and Ruling Bodies), and mirrored in the trades union movement 
(its greatest manifestation coming in the form of the left-wing's influence upon the 
unions' `Bloc Vote'). 
604 Although Neil Kinnock's efforts to reduce the effectiveness of the far-left were relatively 
successful, Kinnock and Labour's struggle with left-wing radicalism continued throughout the 
1980s. See: Hayter, Dianne (2005) Fightback!: Labour's Traditional Right in the 1970s and 
1980s, (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
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It is claimed that in British politics `Prime Ministers always run their own foreign 
policy, a fact of British political history which often makes the Foreign Secretary's 
one of the more difficult of the great offices of state to hold. '605 However, as the 
academic Eric Shaw claims, the reality in both foreign and domestic policy affairs, 
and particularly prior to the reform of the decision/policy-making mechanism in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, was often more complicated, with equally complicated 
consequences: 
`Constitutionally, Labour was a highly pluralist organisation with decision- 
making powers apportioned amongst a variety of institutions: the leader, the 
shadow cabinet or front bench, the NEC, and, as possessors of large blocks of 
votes at Conference and the right to elect the majority of NEC members, the 
larger unions' ...... In 
fact, for most of Labour's history, the party was 
dominated by its parliamentary leadership whose rule rested upon right-wing 
majorities in all key institutions which gave rise to a system of integrated 
organisational control. '606 
And that furthermore: 
`After 1979 this disintegrated and bereft of the powers which it had only 
enjoyed by virtue of its grip over the NEC, the leadership lacked the 
constitutional authority to block the adoption of policies to which it was 
fundamentally opposed. It was by exercising its right to formulate policy 
statements and present them to Conference that the left NEC helped steer such 
controversial policies as unilateralism, withdrawal from the EC ... through 
Conference. ' 607 
605 Rentoul, John (2001: 420) Tony Blair: Prime Minister, (London: Warner) 
Shaw, Eric (1994: 17) The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, (London: 
Routledge) 
607 Ibid., (1994: 17) 
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Reform of the decision and policy-making mechanism, in particular the composition 
of the NEC and the breaking down of the predominance of the leadership also gave 
greater influence to the Constituency and Local Parties - often called Labour's 'grass- 
roots. ' As a result, in a few constituencies, left-wing activists found a forum from 
which to advance their more radical polices with all their related facilities and access 
to the party conference and contents of the manifesto. In addition to the local parties 
these left-wing activist directed much of their agenda and influence via the vehicle of 
the trade union membership and its supreme body the Trades Union Council (TUC). 
This occurred most notably in London, the West Midlands, Merseyside and Dundee. 
Labour MP - Austin Mitchell608 - summarises the mechanism used by the left-wing to 
influence Labour Party policy: 
`Policy would be formulated through the wishes of the activists coming up in 
resolutions passed by Conference, then welded into a Manifesto, not by the 
parliamentary Party which had abused its independence, but by a National 
Executive dependent on the Party activists. That manifesto would then become 
a binding mandate. 609 
Having secured the leading positions in the party, and captured a majority of the seats 
on the NEC, the left-wing introduced a raft of radical policies in foreign affairs. These 
included: unilateral nuclear disarmament; the withdrawal from the EEC and NATO; a 
more pro-active anti-apartheid stance; and a reduction in ties with the United States. 
However, as a result in part of some ill-judged policies on the Falklands campaign, 
Labour suffered a second electoral defeat in 1983, which led to the departure of 
Michael Foot following the earlier departure of what were considered to be some of 
the finest intellectual minds of a generation (Shirley Williams, David Owen and Bill 
Rodgers)610 in 1981, an additional major factor in Labour's 1983 defeat 611 
608 Austin Mitchell (b. 1934) MP: (Great Grimsby, 1977-present) 
60 Shaw, Eric (1994: 24) quoting, Austin Mitchell, (1983: 37) Four Years in the Death of the 
Labour Party, (London: Methuen) 
610 Williams, Owen and Rodgers were joined by Roy Jenkins who had ceased to be a Labour 
MP in 1977 and left the party in 1981; known collectively as the `Gang of Four' they founded 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (1981-1988). 
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The new leader, Neil Kinnock, and the coterie of moderate left-wingers, introduced a 
series of internal reforms to moderate and modernize the party. The extensive network 
of sub-committees, specialists and advisors which had orbited the NEC (and infused it 
with left-wing and far-left-wing inclinations) was removed, and a more streamlined 
and tightly organised system of joint Shadow Cabinet-NEC committees was put in its 
place. This gave the appearance of a partnership, but in actual fact, these reforms - as 
they were intended - returned authority to the leadership and the front bench. `The 
outcome by the end of the 1980s was a policy-making community and a set of policy 
practices of a character radically different from the previous decade. '612 
Labour's lurch to the left and the subsequent return to the centre-left can be 
understood as a crucial internal determinant in determining the basis and nature of 
relations between Labour and Israel during this period. The ascendancy to the 
leadership of the Labour Party of the pro-Israel figure Michael Foot in 1980 seemed 
to assure the continuation of the party's pro-Israel policy position, which had 
extended from Hugh Gaitskell in the 1950s and continued via Wilson (1963-1976) 
and Callaghan (1976-1979). As both internal and external determinants would 
emerge and combine, it was under his leadership that Labour came to adopt some of 
the most pro-Palestinian policies in the party's history. These policies were not only 
6' The archetypal `New Left' Labour figure - Ken Livingstone - speaking in 1987 claims the 
origins of the New Left arose from what he sees as the failures of the 1960s: `When I joined 
the Labour Party in March 1969, it was one of the few recorded instances of a rat climbing on 
board a sinking ship. I was swimming against the tide of disillusionment. All the high hopes 
of Labour's 1964 General Election victory had been squandered by the incompetence of 
Harold Wilson's first government [1964-1970]. Wilson's support for the American bombing 
of Vietnam, racist immigration legislation, as well as anti-trade union laws had triggered an 
exodus from the Labour Party. The International Socialists (now the Socialist Workers' 
Party), the Socialist Labour League (now the Workers' Revolutionary Party) and a whole 
range of single-issue groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, all gained from 
Labour's loss. ' Ken Livingstone (1987: 11), If Voting Changed Anything They'd Abolish It, 
Chapter 1, Lambeth Lessons, (London: Collins) 
612 Shaw, Eric (1994: 160) 
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diametrically opposed to those of Foot's predecessors but place an unprecedented 
strain on Labour-political Zionist relations. 
Michael Foot 
Michael Foot became the Labour Party leader in October 1980 (until October 1983). 
As a traditional left-winger, Foot's position on the Israel-Palestinian conflict was in 
many ways a classic representation of several parliamentary and demographic 
generations: after initially rejecting political Zionism in the mid 1930s, he became a 
firm pro-political Zionist in the 1939-1945 period, and fervently so during the post- 
1945 years in the wake of the Holocaust. 
Foot first came into contact with the political Zionism as a result of a 1934 visit to 
Palestine and through his brother, Hugh Mackintosh Foot613 who was then the 
Assistant District Commissioner in Palestine (1929-1938). Hugh Foot was `a little 
Solomon ruling over 300 Arab villages and a handful of Jewish settlements'614 in that 
part of the Palestine known then as Samaria, and today as part of the Israeli Occupied 
Territory of the West Bank. The visit gave Michael Foot a rare opportunity to directly 
experience Palestine at a time of growing Palestinian-political Zionist tensions, and in 
the context of the burgeoning plight of Jews attempting to flee European Fascism and 
Nazism. As the historian Kenneth Morgan says: 
`Michael quickly realized the complexities of the situation in Palestine, a 
region left in conflict and possible chaos of the ambiguous pledges to both 
communities made by Lloyd George's Government after the disastrously 
imprecise Balfour Declaration of 1917. But whereas brother Hugh, like most 
in the Colonial Service, was a warm sympathizer with the Arabs, 615 it was the 
plight of the beleaguered Jewish minority that haunted Michael all his life. '616 
613 Hugh Mackintosh Foot (b. 1907-d. 1990) [Lord Caradon, 1964] Ambassador to the United 
Nations, 1964-1970 
614 Hoggart, Simon & Leigh, David (1981: 55) Michael Foot: A Portrait, Chapter 4, Sir 
Stafford's Disciple, (London: Hodder & Stoughton) 
615 Kenneth 0. Morgan additionally notes: `Hugh Foot himself took the strongly pro-Arab line 
dominant in the Foreign and Colonial Service. In the 1960s, at the UN and in Harold Wilson's 
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During his 1934 visit to Palestine Foot personally witnessed something of the 
predicament of Jewish refugees as he travelled to Palestine on a boat from the Italian 
port of Trieste, among what he called a 'terrified tide; '617 the plight of Jewish refugees 
became a powerful influencing force in converting many Labour and related figures to 
the political Zionist cause. 
As his autobiography shows, it was not just the current situation of the Jewish 
refugees exposed to the evils of Fascism and Nazism, but the long history of Jewish 
suffering in Europe and beyond which impressed upon his young socialist mind and 
his approach to political Zionism. But significantly - and unlike so many of his 
contemporaries in the Labour Party - Michael Foot also possessed from the earliest 
stages actual experience and knowledge of the realities of Palestine, with the result 
that the pro-political Zionist argument that a Jewish/Zionist state in Palestine - via 
open Jewish immigration - would resolve what Foot termed the Jewish problem (and 
what became the Palestine problem), was at best questionable and at worst, 
fundamentally flawed, particularly in the context and his awareness that Palestine was 
far from `empty. ' As Foot himself says: 
`One doubts whether Zionism does in fact provide a solution to the Jewish 
problem. If this is the meaning of Zionism, there will be little hope of peace 
and no secure future for the Jews in a country in which neither the British nor 
the Jews will in the last resort have the dominant voice. '618 
government, he was passionately pro-Palestinian. In 1967 he largely drafted UN Resolution 
242, which for the first time attempted to check perceived Israeli aggressive incursions and 
settlements over the West Bank and Jordan. When Hugh died in 1990, Palestinian Arab flags 
were draped over his coffin, at the request of his son Paul [Foot - the journalist]. ' Morgan, 
Kenneth 0. (2007: 49) 
616 Ibid., (2007: 38) Chapter 2, Cripps to Beaverbrook 1934-1940 
61 Hoggart, Simon & Leigh, David (1981: 55) Chapter 4, Sir Stafford's Disciple 
619 Jones, Mervyn (1994: 33) Michael Foot, Chapter 2, The Making of a Socialist, quoting, 
Michael Foot, Review of Henry Mond [Lord Melchett], Thy Neigbour 1936, (London: Victor 
Gollancz) 
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Nevertheless, despite his reservations about political Zionism, and beyond the obvious 
humanitarian tragedy facing the Jews, as a socialist, Michael Foot felt an 
overwhelming solidarity with the plight of the Jewish refugees attempting to escape a 
Nazi and Fascist Europe. As such, his support for their efforts to escape was not only 
compatible with his socialist principles, but obligatory. However, beyond the urgent 
situation of the Jewish refugees and his awareness of the realities in Palestine, 
Michael Foot acknowledges the ideological contradiction arising from the common 
origins, shared socialist ideologies and the influence of the essential dilemma when as 
a socialist his support of political Zionism is troubled by the inevitable negative 
consequences for the Palestinians, as he states: 
`We have another and older tradition which it would be perilous to betray - the 
tradition of solidarity with the oppressed. '619 
As the full impact of the Holocaust and the plight of its survivors became all too 
evident, Foot's position changed significantly. His involvement and activities 
increased to the extent that by 1944 he was declaring an overtly pro-political Zionist 
position as he vigorously campaigned on the Zionists' behalf, and was prominent on 
the 1946 Anglo-Palestine Committee 620 The explanation for Michael Foot's dramatic 
conversion from a rejection of political Zionism, to a cautious sympathiser, and 
eventual lifelong pro-political Zionist position is located in European and Jewish 
history between 1939 to 1945: the case of pre-war Jewish refugees fleeing persecution 
is bad enough, the systematic industrial murder of some six-million Jews was quite 
another. It was the difference between the two cases which - despite the awareness 
and contradictions arising from Palestine - made the transformation for Michael Foot 
and many of his Labour colleagues from questioning non-committals to staunch pro- 
political Zionists. The election of Labour to government in July 1945 had raised pro- 
political Zionist expectations, expectations Michael Foot shared. As Morgan states: 
619 Ibid., (1994: 33) Chapter 2, The Making of a Socialist 
620 The Committee was chaired by Israel Sieff (Managing Director, Marks & Spencer) and 
included Frank Owen (former Liberal MP and journalist), Kingsley Martin (journalist), David 
Astor (news paper publisher) and Lord Pakenham (Earl of Longford) [b. 1905-d. 2001], the 
Prominent Labour minister. 
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`Michel Foot was among those who hoped that a potentially pro-Jewish 
Labour government would begin a new departure after the long saga of 
bitterness following the Balfour Declaration in 1917. But he was to be 
horrified by [Ernest] Bevin's policy. '62' 
Foot directed his consternation at Bevin's policies towards the Zionists using his 
strongest weapon - his writing, - as he co-authored the pamphlet A Palestine Munich 
(1946)622 in which he and other left-wing Labour and relate figures advocated Jewish 
immigration up to Palestine absorptive capacity. Morgan describes that in terms of 
convincing clarity the publication as `the most cogent statement by pro-Jewish Labour 
representatives yet written. '623 However, and as with a series of subsequent 
pamphlets, these efforts afforded little if any impact in reversing Labour's policy 
under Ernest Bevin and Clement Attlee. 
The ultimate failure of Bevin's Palestine policy and the establishment of the State of 
Israel in May 1948 'delighted 624 Foot. He became staunch friends with colleagues in 
the Israel Labor Party, such Teddy Kollek (later Mayor of Jerusalem) and with Zionist 
writers like Arthur Koestler, Jon Kimche, Evelyn Anderson and Tosco Fyvel, who 
were employed, as was Foot, on the leftist journal Tribune. 
625 626 
From 1945 until the late 1970s Michael Foot - as with many on the left-wing - 
retained his pro-Zionist credentials. In the case of Foot these were only somewhat 
modified when Tribune included a fierce debate within the left-wing of the party on 
the Israel-Palestinian issue relating to Israel's colonisation of the Occupied 
62' Morgan, Kenneth O. (2007: 119) Chapter 4, Loyal Oppositionist 1945-1951 
622 The co-authors were Richard [Dick] Crossman and Arthur Koester. 
623 Morgan, Kenneth 0. (2007: 120) 
624 Ibid., (2007: 121) 
62 Ibid., (2007: 49-50) Chapter 2, Cripps to Beaverbrook 1934-1940 
626 The Tribune news paper was founded in 1937 by two Left-wing Labour figures - Stafford 
Cripps and George Strauss - to promote an anti-Fascist non-appeasement alliance within the 
Labour Party among socialist and communists. 
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Territories. Michael Foot joined others calling on Israel to withdraw from settlements. 
As Morgan states quoting Foot: 
`The Jews, he felt, "had wrecked their own case. i627 
As with others in the Labour Party, the reason for this deviation as Morgan also says, 
have as much to do with the shift in Israeli politics away from the Israeli Labor Party 
to the right-wing Likud as they do with socialist ideological contradictions: 
`In any case, the sternly nationalist Likud-led administration seemed far 
removed from the old comradeship in the era of Ben-Gurion and the socialism 
of the kibbutz. '628 
As one of the most committed pro-political Zionists of the post-1945 era, it is with 
more than a sense of irony that Michael Foot came to preside over the Labour Party's 
most dramatic deviation in policy position since the adoption of the radically pro- 
political Zionist statement in 1944, when the party accepted at conference the most 
pro-Palestinian policy position after the capture of the NEC by the left-wing and new- 
left-wing in 1981. 
Labour's Left-Wing Agenda and Policies 
The ascendancy of Labour's left-wing initiated a range of policies which directly or 
indirectly resulted in challenges and change to Labour-Israel relations. These policies 
included unilateral nuclear disarmament, withdrawal from the EEC and NATO, 
distancing of ties with the United States and closer ties with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Bloc, along with a firmer and more pro-active stance against the South 
African Apartheid regime. 
All of these changes had consequences for Labour-Israel relations: the nuclear issue 
came to the fore after the disclosure in 1986 that Israel had become the only country 
6Z' Morgan, Kenneth 0. (2007: 49-50) Chapter 2, quoting, Michael Foot, Interview, June 7, 
2005 
628 Ibid., (2007: 49-50) 
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to possess nuclear weapons in the Middle East as a result of the 'Vanunu Affair 629 
which contrasted starkly with Labour's own anti-nuclear stance, similarly, the 
decision to distance British policy from that of the United States across a number of 
strategic subjects and regions -a shift that began for the left-wing after the Vietnam 
era of US foreign policy (c. 1962-1975) - put further water between Israel and Labour 
policy positions, particularly in light of the fact that, since 1967 and Israel's sweeping 
victory over Egypt, Syria and Jordan, the United States had concentrated on 
supporting Israel in a largely non-aligned region. Additionally, Israel's support in 
arms and technical advice for the Nicaraguan Contras and its close affiliation to the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa were also at odds with Labour's left-wing. The 
proposal to sever membership of the EEC threatened to leave Labour adrift from the 
then dominant pro-Israel position led by the influence of the West Germans as a 
legacy of the Holocaust and the 1972 Olympics attack; and finally, the decision to 
foster closer association with the USSR and Eastern Europe brought Labour within 
the influence of countries and political regimes that had been pro-Palestinian since the 
1950s and 1960s in terms of their sponsorship of the nominally secular socialist PLO 
and its ruling body, the Palestine National Council (PNC). 
However, the inclusion of these radical left-wing policies in Labour's 1983 General 
Election manifesto - what Gerald Kaufman630 called the `longest suicide note in 
history' - proved to be not only deeply unpopular with the British electorate, but 
resulted in the second general election defeat in a row, and the departure of Michael 
Foot in 1983. With the election of the more moderate left-wing figure of Neil 
Kinnock, the party leadership embarked on a modernization and reform programme 
with the primary goal of seeking to return Labour as a party of government. This 
sequence of events marked both a decline in the power of the left-wing at all levels of 
629 The revelations by Mordechai Vanunu (b. 1954) a Moroccan born Jew and Israeli citizen 
(1963) disclosed Israel's nuclear weapons secrets in the Sunday Times (05.10.1986). An 
investigation report by the BBC Newsnight programme (09.03.2006) disclosed that Harold 
Wilson's government (1964-1970) supplied Israel with plutonium, heavy water and additional 
technical intelligence and material assistance in 1966. 
630 Gerald Kaufman (b. 1930) MP: (Manchester Ardwick, 1970-1983), (Manchester Gorton, 
1983-present) 
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the party, a factor that was assisted and reflected by the isolation of the far-left 
Trotskyites like Dave Nellist in 1991, and left-wing radicals in London, Merseyside 
and Glasgow such as Ken Livingstone, 631 Eric Heffer632 and George Galloway. 633 The 
shift of Labour to the centre-left also marked the decline of support from the left-wing 
for a purely pro-Palestinian policy. However, what was really important in terms of 
the legacies of the brief but dramatic control of the party by the left-wing, and which 
reflected the wider gradualist deviation process that had been increasing evident from 
1967 and 1973, was the fact that Labour did not revert in either policy or the general 
party consensus to a pro-Israel position, a position that had always essentially been 
underpinned by the pro-political Zionist instincts of individuals; instead the party 
eventually settled under the guidance of Kinnock's pragmatism and reforms to adopt a 
neutralist stance. 
Furthermore, as the influence of ongoing conflict in Lebanon continued and the 
intervention of significant additional external determinant in the shape of the 
Intifadah occurred, as the 1980s progressed Labour's new even-handed position was 
further secured among a new leadership epitomised by Neil Kinnock, Denis Healey, 
Roy Hattersley and Gerald Kaufinan. This was assisted by the fact that Labour was 
not only taking a more moderate policy stance on the Israel-Palestine issue, but also 
because Labour figures were becoming increasingly questioning of their own pro- 
Israel stance in the wake of the emerging often irrefutable evidence of Israeli policies 
631 Kenneth "Ken" Livingstone (b. 1945) MP: (Brent East, 1987-2001) 
632 Eric Heller (b. 1922-d. 1991) MP: (Liverpool Walton, 1964-1991) 
633 Despite some very public spats between the Labour leadership and the left-wing, the 
attempt to purge Labour of left-wing influence was far from decisive: Dave Nellist (b. 1952) 
MP: (Coventry SE, 1983-1992) and Terence "Terry" Fields (b. 1937-d. 2008) MP: (Liverpool- 
Broadgreen, 1983-1992) were both eventually expelled from the Labour Party in 1991; Pat 
Wall (Bradford N), an MP with Militant connections, was elected in 1987 and remained a 
Labour MP until his death in 1990. Ken Livingstone was not expelled from the party until he 
ran for Mayor of London in 2000. Eric Heller was dismissed from the post of Minister of 
State for Social Security in 1975 for speaking against continued membership of the EEC in 
the commons, but remained an MP until his death in 1991. George Galloway (b. 1954) MP: 
(Glasgow-Hillhead, 1987-2003), (Glasgow Kelvin, 1997-2005) was expelled in 2003 for 
opposing the Iraq war. 
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in an instant media age and the contradictions this unavoidably posed for socialist as a 
consequence of the essential dilemma. 
The Labour Party's move from an overtly pro-Palestinian policy to a more moderate 
position was mostly driven by Kinnock. It was not however the result of his 
undoubted pro-Israel sympathies, but rather his abiding conviction that if Labour were 
to form a government again in the face of two successive defeats (1979 and 1983) it 
must reform and modernize; this meant abandoning the dogma of socialism and the 
excesses of left-wing and far-left-wing idealism by adopting the social democratic 
values and principles of the liberal pragmatist. Born in 1942 Neil Kinnock was the 
first Labour leader of the post-1945 and post-Holocaust generation. Although 
Kinnock possessed a detailed awareness of the Holocaust and its undoubted 
significance to Labour-Israel relations, he also had some understanding and sympathy 
with the Palestinian position. It was with these two perspectives that he attempted to 
apply his slightly more detached and entirely pragmatic approach when it came to 
generating a consensus and formulation a policy position. 
External Determinants in the 1980s 
As so often in the history of Labour-political Zionist relations, the most influential 
external determinants in the 1980s arose from conflict and war. The impact upon the 
Labour Party of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent and related 
Palestinian Intifadah in 1987 were seminal in expressing the essential dilemma and 
accounting for the shift by Labour from its traditional pro-political Zionism/Israel 
position to a policy position of neutrality by 1994. 
Israel's conduct against civilians and the non-military infrastructure in Lebanon, 
graphically displayed for the first time in frequent television broadcasts, had the effect 
of undermining much of the core Labour support for Israel, and gave added credence 
to Israel's critics within the party from both the centre-left and left-wing. Allegations 
of human rights and international law violations established new parameters for 
debate among Labour figures. The atrocities committed by Israel in all previous 
conflicts and wars which might have affected Labour-Israel relations earlier remained 
largely unknown, unrecorded or lost in the later history of the Palestinian-Zionist 
struggle. But Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon accompanied by the international 
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media became the first `TV War' in the Arab-Israel conflict; the intense media 
coverage adding to the political quagmire facing Israel leading to the analogy of 
Lebanon being Israel's Vietnam as it took till May 2000 to extract Israeli forces. 
Although Israel won the military war, the civilian death toll, estimated to be between 
15,000 and 20,000 resulting from the deliberate targeting of non-military targets like 
residential areas, hospitals, schools and electricity supplies using weapons prohibited 
by international law, was compounded by the revelations that Israel had orchestrated 
and facilitated the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps 
of Sabra and Chatila brought international condemnation and a rare United Nations 
rebuke for Israel. 
634 These events were to have a profound influence upon Labour- 
Israel relations, the policy position of Labour and the party consensus, and served to 
accelerate Labour's move towards securing a position of greater neutrality via the pro- 
Palestinian surge in the party's support for a bi-national secular state of Palestine 
expressed at the party conference in September 1982. 
Redefining Labour's Foreign Policy 
By the early 1980s the surge in left-wing idealism had been codified in a Labour 
discussion Document A Socialist Foreign Policy produced in 1981635 The 
introductory notes explicitly acknowledge the dilemmas for Labour represented by the 
Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict for Labour's Middle East policy: 
`The Middle East poses a particular problem for those seeking to understand 
Labour's policy in left /right terms. Divisions representing often strongly held 
634 See: MacBride, Sean (1983) Israel in Lebanon: Report of the International Commission to 
Enquire into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the 
Lebanon: August 28,1982-November 29,1982, (London: Ithaca Press) 
635 Labour Party Discussion Document, September 1981, p. 25, Socialism in the 80s: A 
Socialist Foreign Policy, Section 4, Middle East, (London: Labour Party), the Foreword by 
Ron Hayward (General Secretary) notes the discussion pamphlet was produced in preparation 
for the Labour conference (November 1981). It was not a comprehensive or definitive 
statement of party policy, but a record of recent party actions and proposals for further 
discussion, leading to the preparation of a detailed Socialist Foreign Policy for the 1982 
Labour programme. 
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views on the Arab-Israeli conflict do not conform to the classic left/right 
divisions in the Party. Both points of view present important interpretations of 
a basic socialist belief in the right of national self-determination and both 
present conflicting interpretations of the way in which the conflict relates to 
the international struggle for socialism. '636 
The evolution of Labour's policy positions over its own history are also described, 
including the transition from a pro-political Zionist policy: 
`Long past are the days when the Labour Party advocated a policy which, in 
the words of Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first President, `went far beyond our 
own official programme. '637 
The document recounted how the Labour Party had, since 1967, developed a more 
even-handed approach. Labour's Programme 1976 endorsed UN Resolution, 242, as a 
basis for a settlement and demanded that the rights of the Palestinian people be 
recognized and that they be fully involved in any settlement of the conflict. The 1979 
General Election Manifesto had been yet more explicitly in favour of Palestinian self- 
determination. 
`We shall work for a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict which 
would ensure the right of all parties to achieve national self-determination and 
to live in a homeland within secure and recognised borders. v638 
This latest position was reflected in the 1981 document: 
`In practice only one of these two peoples has managed to realise its aspiration 
of national self-determination in this territory, that is the Israeli-Jewish nation. 
The aim must therefore be to accommodate the aspirations of the Palestinian- 
636 Ibid., September 1981, p. 25 
637 Ibid., September 1981, p. 25 
638 Ibid., September, 1981, p. 27 
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Arab people, but not to do so in a way that would prejudice the rights of the 
Israeli Jews. 7639 
The NEC sub-committee ultimately proposed that the party support the adoption of 
the `Palestinian mini state option' -a position which was accepted by the 1982 party 
conference: 
`It is proposed that the Palestinians should establish an independent state 
within the current Occupied Territories. It is an option which upholds the 
principles of UN Resolution 242, guaranteeing territorial integrity and political 
independence and rejecting the validity of territorial conquest. 'TM0 
In further contrast to 1981, the fact that the 1982 party conference was held against 
the backdrop of Israel's invasion of Lebanon might - in large part at least - account for 
this significant reversal of previous pro-political Zionist sympathies. Evidence of the 
influence from the ongoing conflict exists in the NEC's opening motion on the Middle 
East: 
`This conference condemns the Israeli invasion of Lebanon with its horrific 
toll of death and destruction. Conference believes that the time has come for 
the Labour Party to state unequivocally its support for the fundamental rights 
of the Palestinians and its condemnation of the continuing pattern of Israeli 
aggression, and calls on the National Executive Committee to pursue this 
policy through the Socialist International. '641 
The subject of Israel's conduct in Lebanon continues to feature clearly in the 
subsequent debate as illustrated by the contribution of Labour related figure, 
Councillor Ken Fagan which is worth quoting extensively: 
639 Ibid., September, 1981, p. 28 
640 Ibid., September, 1981, p. 29 
6" Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Middle East, NEC Statement on the 
Middle East, Composite 27, September 29,1982, p. 131, Winter Gardens, Blackpool, 
(London: Labour Party) 
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`Abba Eban, the ex-foreign minister of Israel, complained a few weeks ago 
before the hideous massacres at Sabra and S[C]hatila of an absence of 
humility, compassion and restraint in the Israeli government, that a new 
vocabulary was being used by cabinet ministers - verbs such as `to crush', `to 
liquidate' and `to wipe out. ' Prime minister [Menachem] Begin referred to the 
Palestinians as two-legged animals and he pledged to cleanse Lebanon of 
them. Ariel Sharon6`'2 stated that they intended to `purify' the refugee camps. 
This phraseology has a chilling familiarity, reminding us of the atrocities in 
Europe forty years ago. 
There is something else which has a familiar ring to it: that the Palestinian 
people are a nation in search of a homeland. We can no longer ignore the 
natural justice which demands that the Palestinian people are entitled to their 
liberty, to their self-government and their independent statehood. '643 
Fagan continues: 
`As we have always opposed British colonialism in the past, so we must also 
now resist Israeli territorial expansionism. Just as early Zionism was 
committed to positive action and dedicated struggle, these are now the ideas of 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation. '6" 
Aside from the open acknowledgement of Israel's colonialist character, the speech 
was important in the degree to which it distanced the Trades Union-backed NEC from 
the Israeli leadership whilst endorsing the PLO. In a complete reversal of the currency 
of language traditionally used by Labour and British politicians to portray the 
642 Ariel Sharon (b. 1928) Israeli PM [Likud]: 2001-2006; Defence Minister, 1982-1983. 
643 Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Middle East, NEC Statement on the 
Middle East, Composite 27, Ken Fagan (Dundee City Council) September 29,1982, p. 131- 
132 
Ibid., September 29,1982, p. 131-132 
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`Arab/s' and Palestinians as Nazi and Fascists, Ted Knight (Labour Lambeth Borough 
Councillor) went much further in his criticisms of Israel: 
`Comrades, when the world was shaken by the horror of the massacre of 
Palestinian civilians, women, children and babies in the camps of Shatila, a 
parallel was drawn with the atrocities of the Nazis in the Forties. But these 
were again atrocities carried out by Nazis - the Falangist Nazis, the Falangist 
movement which prides itself on modelling its practice and philosophy on 
their hero Adolf Hitler. 
But this time it was Nazis carrying out their murders under the protection of 
Israeli guns with the agreement of the Israeli army and with the connivance of 
the Israeli government. The outrage that took place in those camps has 
followed very logically the policy that has been conducted by the Israeli 
government in the Lebanon, a policy of genocide against the Palestinian 
peoples. '645 
In the face of such a forceful NEC anti-political Zionist position, it was left to veteran 
pro-political Zionist and left-wing MP Ian Mikardo and related figure Sam Jacobs of 
Poale Zion to present the case for the Israeli Labor Party. Their approach seems to be 
based on seeking to reassert the socialist affiliations with the Israel Labor Party as an 
alternative to Likud. As Ian Mikardo says in the following: 
`I have one or two reservations about the NEC statement which is before you. 
- it calls for recognition of the PLO without requiring them to abandon their 
aim of destroying Israel by force. The emergency resolution uses in section (4) 
[Labour's support for the establishment of a democratic, secular state of 
Palestine] a formula which has now been used for some years as a euphemism 
for the total destruction of Israel. So I could not vote for that. 646 
645 Ibid., Beirut Massacre, Emergency Resolution 4, Ted Knight (Norwood) September 29, 
1982, p. 133 
`46 Ian Mikardo (Bethnal Green & Bow), September 29,1982, p. 134 
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Mikardo concludes: 
`In the two minutes left it is impossible to comment meaningfully on all the 
many complexities of the problems of the Israelis and the Arabs. ... we 
should identify ourselves with and support the great movement of protest and 
opposition to the actions of Begin and Sharon which has spread like wildfire 
throughout the whole of Israel and has recaptured the idealism of Israel's 
pioneers. The labor movement in Israel, the Labor alignment, the Official 
Opposition, has totally opposed by solid votes in their parliament the 
extension of Begin's war aims. '64' 
The case made by Mikardo and Jacobs, that there was a distinction between the 
policies and actions of the right-wing Likud and those of the Israeli Labor Party, did 
not go unchallenged as another Labour Councillor, Ian Smart, asserted: 
`There is no doubt that the Israeli Labor Party is now calling for a withdrawal 
of Israeli troops from Beirut. But there is equally no doubt that the Israeli 
Labor Party supported the invasion of Lebanon. The Israeli Labor Party 
supported the earlier massacres at Tyre and Sidon. The Israeli Labor Party 
have consistently supported repression of the Palestinian people both within 
the state of Israel and in the Occupied Territories. 649 
The points made by Smart did not find complete agreement among one of the most 
senior Labour figures, - Denis Healey, - the then Shadow Foreign Secretary. Although 
Healey did agree the following: 
`... the behaviour of the Begin government has led very many of Israel's 
friends in the outside world and many Israelis to realise that the Palestinian 
people have exactly the same right to a state of their own' as the people of 
Israel. '649 
64' Ibid., p. 134 
648 Ibid., Ian Smart (Paisley), September 29,1982, p. 136 
649 Ibid., Denis Healey (Leeds East and NEC), September 29,1982, p. 136 
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Healey believed that the Israeli Labor Party had been forced to support the invasion of 
Lebanon or risk electoral `defeat to oppose their government when it was fighting a 
war. 9650 For Healey, as for many who took a non-partisan rather than pro-Palestinian 
stand, the most salient and abiding point remained that Israel was a democratic state 
and the British Labour Party, as a socialist party, was obliged to defend that 
democracy, just as surely as it promoted the equitable rights of the Palestinians. 
Ultimately, the land-mark 1982 conference determined that Labour should adopt a 
pro-Palestinian policy position, recognising the PLO as the sole, legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people and the right to statehood and self- 
determination for Palestinians. 651 
650 Ibid., p. 137 
651 As with the Zionist Organisation and the Jewish Agency, a major contribution to Labour 
awareness and gradual shift in position towards the Palestinian perspective arose from the 
founding of the PLO and the PNC as both bodies provided a focus and forum for the 
collective national consciousness of the Palestinian Diaspora. As the academic Sayigh says, 
the Palestinian national movement (PLO and PNC) `provided the political impulse 
. 
and 
organizational dynamic in the evolution of Palestinian national identity and in the formation 
of parastatal institutions and a bureaucratic elite, the nucleus of government. '65' Sayigh, Yezid 
(1997: vii) Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 
1949-1993, Preface, (Oxford: Clarendon Press) And as Cobban notes: `If, in the late 70s or 
the early 80s, you were to ask any Fateh leader - or come to that, any member of any other 
Palestinian organisation, or practically any Palestinian at all - what the resistance movement 
had achieved after two decades of struggle, the first answer would be to the effect that the 
resistance movement had re-established the Palestinian identity [Cobban's emphasis]. `In the 
50s, ' Yasser Arafat recalled in 1979, `John Foster Dulles used to say that the new generation 
of Palestinians would not even know Palestine. But they did! The group that made the [March 
1978] operation against Israel were nearly all of them born outside Palestine, but they were 
prepared to die for it. ' `Palestine, ' said Khaled al-Hassan, `had been eliminated from the 
books and maps; the Palestinian people had been eliminated. The problem was called the 
Arab-Israeli problem: it was a border problem between states, not a question of a people 
whose rights had been infringed. Now there is a Palestinian people which is recognised.... 
This was our first achievement. ' Cobban, Helena (1990: 245) The Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation: People, Power and Politics, Chapter 11, The Irresistible Force and the 
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Although three Labour motions were carried by conference, the NEC leadership and 
the delegates were actually fairly evenly divided in terms of votes cast, suggesting 
that the party consensus was more non-partisan than pro-Palestinian. It could be 
argued that this is evidence of the depth and breadth of pro-Israel support within the 
party, particularly amid the most disadvantageous of circumstances, as evidenced by 
the continuing placement of senior and experienced pro-Israel Labour MPs in 
prominent positions, notably Ian Mikardo and the party leader, Michael Foot. 
Nonetheless, it was clear that Labour had moved dramatically from its historic pro- 
Zionist/Israel policy position, even if the resulting pro-Palestinian policy was more a 
result of the capture by the left-wing and far-left of the NEC than as a result of the 
party consensus. 
The Neil Kinnock Years 1983-1992 
Neil Kinnock was born into a mining family in South Wales. As Robert Harris said, 
he laid `claim to one of the purest working-class pedigrees a Labour leader has ever 
had. ' 652 
Kinnock succeeded Michael Foot as Leader of the Labour Party in 1983 after a 
second successive general election defeat. Although the party had elected another left- 
wing Leader, Kinnock had become convinced that the primary lessons of the defeat 
were the electorate's clear rejection of a left-wing agenda and Labour's commitment 
to socialist orthodoxy. The leadership election itself was a defeat of the `old-left' 
challenge by Tony Benn and Eric Heller by the moderate left-wing figure of Neil 
Kinnock and Roy Hattersley of the centre/centre-right 653 Kinnock's leadership and 
Immovable Object, quoting, Yasser Arafat, November 1979, and Khaled al-Hassan April 
1983, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
652 Harris, Robert (1984: 20) The Making of Neil Kinnock, Chapter 2, The Kinnock 
Inheritance, (London: Faber & Faber) 
653 Roy Hattersley (b. 1932) MP: (Birmingham Sparkbrook, 1964-1997) is another Labour 
figure with a deeply Christian background. After Labour lost the 1970 he conveyed a not un- 
typical Labour approach to foreign affairs: `My gloom was intensified by Harold Wilson's 
insistence that I should become the party's Deputy Foreign Affairs Spokesman. Working 
again for Denis Healey was some consolation - but not enough for being forced to devote my 
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Hattersley's deputy leadership (1983-1992) were widely viewed as the `dream 
ticket. '654 
On assuming the leadership Neil Kinnock commenced a `root and branch' reform and 
modernisation programme which restricted and sacrificed many of Labour's `sacred 
cows. ' A reform of the decision and policy-making body and branches of the party 
machinery (NEC, constituencies, conference) were accompanied by a distancing from 
trades unions, epitomised by Kinnocks stance during the miners' strike (1984-1985) 
and the breakdown of the union bloc vote; the extraction of the far-left `Militant 
Tendency' and the Trotskyites - Dave Nellist and Terry Fields were eventually 
removed by 1991 - signalled the depth and determination of Kinnock's applied 
pragmatism. 655 
In terms of Labour's relations with Israel, Kinnock was initially very much the 
product of a post-1967 parliamentary generation. As Labour MP Donald Anderson656 
says, positions towards Israel were changing `partly a reflection of greater 
parochialism ... and partly because of the decline in the number of Jewish MPs ... 
and the demise of those who in their earlier formative years were influenced by the 
Holocaust. '657 Kinnock's account of the understanding of history that shaped his 
positions and that of Labour contains many noted aspects classically derived from 
common origins of socialism in Britain and political Zionism more generally. 
However and similarly, as with many Labour figures, Kinnock came to be influenced 
life to a subject which I had little or no interest. What was worse, I knew that I would have to 
make constant visits to distant countries of which I knew nothing. ' Roy Hattersley (1995: 92) 
Who Goes Home? Scenes from Political Life, Chapter 5, (London: Little, Brown & Company) 
654 Westlake, Martin & St. John, Ian (2001: 237) Kinnock: The Biography, Part Three, Leader 
- Early Years (1983-7), (London: Little, Brown and Company) 
655 Peter Taafe, editor of Militant, and Ted Grant, founder of Militant Tendency, were 
expelled from the Labour Party in 1983 and Kinnock fiercely attacked Militant at the 1985 
party conference. Expulsions continued throughout the 1980s. 
656 Donald Anderson (b. 1939) Baron Anderson of Swansea 2005. MP: (Monmouth, 1966- 
1970), (Swansea East, 1974-2005) 
657 Anderson, Donald (09.03.2006: 1) Letter: Anderson-Nelson, House of Lords 
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by a sequence of external and internal determinates that moved him from a pro-Israel 
position to a pro-neutralist position by 1994. He cites his early pro-Israel interest thus: 
`My generation was still bewildered and outraged by what the Nazis had done 
to the Jews and what Stalin continued to do to the Jews. '658 
And on the broader Middle East, Kinnock states: 
`I think probably my first consciousness of the issue was Suez [1956], as it 
was for a lot of people of my generation. From, then on, I think I probably had 
a stronger inclination towards the besieged Israeli democratic state run by a 
Labor government, not just at the top, but of a co-operative, social democratic, 
democratic socialist application at the bottom, solidified with a degree of 
solidarity. Idealism? Yes, no question about that. And then when I started 
really encountering Israelis from the early 1960s onwards, largely as a 
consequence of university associations, personal friendships came into it as 
well. '659 
Kinnock located both himself, and his party in much the same way as had previous 
pro-political Zionist Labour leaders: 
`It existed from the start between the Labour Party and the Israeli Labor Party. 
Good strong relationship. No Labour Party belligerence or resentment towards 
the Palestinians, but the attitude founded on two things: one, the strong 
engagement of Jews in the. British Labour Party and the social democratic 
movement generally in Europe; secondly, the establishment of a democratic 
Jewish state. And therefore the view was of a beleaguered social democracy 
applying the co-operative principle to an unprecedented degree in the 
kibbutzim movement, therefore in policy terms essential to maintain Israel. '660 
658 Kinnock, Neil (30.01.2004: 8) Interview: Kinnock-Nelson, European Commission, London 
659 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 1) 
60 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 1) 
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With regards to the Palestinians, Kinnock says Labour's understanding came from 
two sources: `from Israel itself (and elements within the Israeli socialist parties, 
Mapia and Mapam), and later the Israeli Labor Party; ' and also from `the experiences 
of British servicemen and others who had been in mandate Palestine and had 
witnessed their dispossession. 661 That the Palestinians had and were continuing to 
suffer Kinnock had no doubts, but to no extent did this recognition in any way 
diminish the basis of Labour-political Zionist relations. Kinnock attributes much of 
his understanding of Israel-Palestinian issues to an older and more experienced 
generation of Labour MPs, notably Denis Healey and Gerald Kaufman (Shadow 
Spokesperson Foreign Affairs, 1987-1992): 
`I was very, very fortunate in that my first foreign affairs spokesperson was 
Denis Healey, who understood the need for that even-handedness, but without 
compromising on the support for Israel as a social democracy, and without 
compromising on sympathy for the Palestinian people as victims. '662 
He added: 
`[Kaufman] obviously a working class Jew from Manchester, immensely 
bright, and someone who for most if not all of his political life, right through 
to the early 1980s, had been someone who would not have flinched if you had 
called him a Zionist. I do not think he was, but he would not be outraged at 
being described as a Zionist. 663 
It is certainly significant for Neil Kinnock that his leadership coincided with the fact 
that Kaufman had become `personally disillusioned' with Israeli policy, as indeed 
had sections of the Labour Party. Although Denis Healey had always been a 
pragmatist neutralist figure, Kaufman was a traditional staunch pro-political 
66' Ibid., (30.01.2004: 2) 
662 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 2) 
663 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 2) 
664 Edmunds, June (May, 1998: 114) 
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Zionist/Israel figure. The son of a Jewish East European refugee tailor, Kaufman had 
became increasingly disillusioned with Israel's policies in the Occupied Territories 
despite his life-long political Zionist sympathies. For Kinnock, Kaufman's 
disaffection had a particular authenticity, grounded as it was in an intolerance of the 
use of violence for political purposes and a concern with the civilized protection of 
innocent victims. 
One strand of Neil Kinnock's evasive but pragmatist approach was the emphasis 
given to economic development and financial investment as a component and/or 
prerequisite to a political resolution of the conflict. This approach has its origins in the 
`Rita Hinden' school of thought and policy reforms of Labour post-colonial era, (see: 
chapter 2), but has since become the backbone of the approach to modem conflicts 
from South Africa to Northern Ireland. When Kinnock drew analogies between the 
Palestinians' predicament in Gaza and that of Black South Africans in the `Soweto, 
and Alexander townships, '665 he was pointing towards the inherent prejudices of the 
relevant regimes, as much as he was to the need to generate a `reasonable social 
infrastructure' and `some economic opportunitys666 in order to resolve the conflicts in 
question. This also enabled him to diversely apportion the blame somewhat for that 
predicament: 
`As Shimon [Peres] has always argued, if whatever Arab support is available 
to the Palestinians was coming in the form of housing, roads, education, the 
development of a port in Gaza, and the acquirement of the expertise to make 
"flowers grow in the desert" then they would be making a real subscription 
ultimately to peace. '667 
While there is ample evidence that Kinnock finds Israeli policies towards the 
Palestinians unacceptable, he evidently sees, or chooses to see, the conflict as 
essentially one of economic deprivation resulting in the poverty and despair that 
manifests into political and religious extremism and violence. Kinnock suggests, in a 
665 Kinnock, Neil (30.01.2004: 3) 
666 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 5) 
667 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 6) 
239 
Chapter 4 (1980-1993) 
classic Hindenist scenario, that a resolution towards peace could be found if `an 
economic programme to give those [Palestinian] kids jobs'668 were introduced, as 
opposed to advocating the cessation of settlement building or the establishment of a 
Palestinian State. 
The First Palestinian Intifadah 1987-1993 
If Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon was the first Arab/Palestinian-Israel `TV'- 
`media' war, then the first Palestinian Intifadah was the second. The conflict between 
Israel and the Palestinian civilians of the Occupied Territories (West Bank, East 
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) erupted twenty years after Israel captured the 
territories in 1967. In that time, Israeli settlement policies - under both Israeli Labor 
and Likud governments - had increased dramatically from none in 1967 to 50 in 1977 
and to over 200 in 1987. The related dispossession and repression of the Palestinians 
in order to facilitate Israel's colonisation and expansionist policies eventually erupted 
into open civil rebellion. The almost daily reporting and disturbing imagery of civilian 
casualties and general lack of progress in peace negotiations affected many sections of 
the party and made for concerned commentary in the House of Commons. 669 
In the midst of the Intifadah, in February 1988, against the backdrop of the thirtieth 
anniversary of the Israeli occupation, and five years into his leadership of the Labour 
Party, Neil Kinnock undertook what was described by one commentator as a 
`politically sensitive'670 tour of the Middle East. The tour included the `most 
controversial' 671 aspect, Kinnock's first visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories, 
where two months previously the Intifadah had begun on December 7th, 1987 672 
During this visit he came face-to-face with the contradictions posed by his own 
668 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 2-3) 
669 See: Nellist, Dave (22.12.1988) Israel, Hansard, col. 660; Kaufman, Gerald (30.11.1988) 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Hansard, col. 691; and Cohen, Harry (17.01.1989) Tunis 
(Ministerial Visit), Hansard, col. 158. Harry Cohen (b. 1949) MP: (Leyton, 1983-1997), 
(Leyton and Wanstead, 1997-present). 
6'o Westlake, Martin & St. John, Ian (2001: 462) 
67 Ibid., (2001: 462) 
672 The tour included a meeting with Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak, Crown Prince Hassan 
of Jordan and Prime Minister, Mr Zaid al-Rifai. 
240 
Chapter 4 (1980-1993) 
socialist ideology in contrast to the realities of Labor and Likud policies, and the 
consequences for the Palestinians. Kinnock says he was invited by the `Labor Party of 
Israel and the Histadrut. '673 He was accompanied by Denis Healey (Shadow Foreign 
Affairs Spokesperson) and Glenys Kinnock, witnessing at first hand the violence and 
counter-violence in the Occupied Territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
town of Nablus. The visit clearly made an impression. Westlake says `Kinnock was 
angered by the conditions he encountered in the Palestinian refugee camps', and in 
particular, by `intensive [Israeli] military presence. ' As Kinnock left Gaza he 
announced his thoughts in unequivocal language to the waiting media corps: 
`It is a vast slum. It is hell. There is no doubt about it. '674 
Although Kinnock adds with more than a qualifying sense of his intuitive 
pragmatism: 
`But you know anybody who has been to those camps will come away more 
pro-Palestinian than when they went in, there is no doubt about that, and that 
even includes quite a lot of Israelis. '675 
The situation in the West Bank generated similar condemnation from the Labour 
leader, especially in reference to the civilian casualties of live ammunition. As 
Kinnock states: 
`The Intifadah was still at the stage of kids throwing stones. I went to a 
hospital in Nablus [West Bank]; in the operating theatre they were obviously 
taking 2.2 rdunds out of the buttocks and back of a youngster at a time when 
the Israeli Army on the streets were not armed, - they [the Israeli army] were 
carrying base-ball bats and pick-axe handles, - and some of the Officers had 
673 Kinnock, Neil (30.01.2004: 2) 
674 Westlake, Martin & St. John, Ian (2001: 463) 
675 Kinnock, Neil (30.01.2004: 6) 
241 
Chapter 4 (1980-1993) 
2.2 practice pistols, so it was obvious where they had come from and come 
against orders; the Israeli Army had no policy to shoot. '676 
Despite Kinnock's political allegiances to the Israeli Labor Party, and the many close 
personal associations he had with Israeli Labor figures, he was moved to make a 
strong public criticism of the situation for Palestinians under Israeli rule. At a dinner 
held by the Israeli Labor section of the Israeli Cabinet, Neil Kinnock says he had a 
`wonderful row with Yitzhak Rabin'677 over Israeli policies towards the Intifadah. 
However, whatever the protestations Kinnock conveyed to the Israeli political figures 
and the media, the fact that he remained convinced that Israel represented a 
democratic state ensured that he continued to afford his continuing loyalty. This was 
conveyed by Kinnock to Yitzhak Rabin (Israeli Defence Minister) as follows: 
`Here is the good news: I was in the hospital in Nablus, I said things based on 
my eye-witnessed experience (filmed by television cameras) of what jeopardy 
Israel will put itself in if the children were reacted to like this! You and your 
people have formed a country which is the only one for several hundred miles 
in any direction that would have that on its television, so do not worry, as long 
as you do that everything is OK. '678 
Israel's democratic credentials and status perhaps explains how, in spite of Kinnock's 
outspoken criticisms to camera, the two politicians were able to hold relatively 
friendly discussions and were ultimately able to issue a joint statement on the need for 
an international peace conference. As Kinnock's biographer Martin Westlake says: 
`That they were able to do so owed much to Kinnock's international activism, 
an aspect of his political career consistently overlooked by the British media. 
The Israelis, particularly [Shimon] Peres (a close friend), [Menachem] Begin 
and [Yitzhak] Rabin, knew that Kinnock had consistently defended them and 
the democratic state of Israel throughout many years during which doing so 
676 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 2) 
677 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 2) 
678 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 2) 
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was not very popular in the Labour Party of the Socialist International [late 
1970s and 1980s]. Now he argued that the response to the Intifadah was 
understandable but extremely clumsy, with tragic results for Palestinian 
youngsters and damage to Israel's standing. '679 
In one sense, Kinnock remained a vital ally of Zionism and Israel within the Labour 
Party since, unlike many, he was able to differentiate between the Labor Party in 
Israel and Likud - in that they were not `different sides of the same coin' and, in terms 
of the Israeli Labor Party's participation in a series of National Unity coalition 
governments since 1984, Kinnock justified this on the basis that Labor figures were a 
moderating influence upon the more fundamentalist Likud-led coalition. 
In summary, Kinnock may not have agreed with Israeli policies, and he certainly had 
little sympathy or identity with Likud - Labor's coalition partners - but nevertheless as 
a pragmatist and democrat, he articulated his criticisms in a classic forerunner of 
Blairism and Clintonism: Kinnock generally accepted the realities of a situation as 
opposed to rejecting what existed on an ideological basis and thereby forfeiting any 
possibility of influence. In short, he subscribed to the ultra-pragmatist approach of 
`dealing with people and issues as they exist, as opposed to what you would prefer 
them to be. '680 
Eric Heffer and the Early Day Motion of 1988 
If Israeli suppression of the Palestinian Intifadah was one external determinant of the 
deviation from a pro-political Zionist to an even-handed consensus within the party 
during the late 1980s, the PLO's conversion to a diplomatic route to peace was 
another. This can be demonstrated by examining the Labour contribution in a 
Common's question concerning on an Early Day Motion to mark the first anniversary 
of the Intifadah (1987-1988). The motion quoted by the new far-left MP - Dave 
Nellist - recounts the influence of the PLO reforms which began in the 1970s and 
679 Westlake, Martin & St. John, Ian (2001: 463) 
680 Mencer, David (03.06.2004: 2) Interview: Mencer-Nelson, House of Commons, Tea 
Rooms, London 
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resulted in the adoption of a political rather than military resolution by the Palestine 
National Council (PNC) at the Algiers Summit in 1988: 681 
`That this House notes the speech of the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
Chairman, Yasser Arafat, at the Geneva meeting of the United Nations, and 
the declaration, at its Algiers summit, by the Palestinian National Council, of 
an independent Palestinian state; recognises the enthusiasm with which the 
proclamation was welcomed in the Occupied Territories, and the sympathy 
generated throughout the international labour movement;. .. contrasts the 
growing international support for the cause of the Palestinians, based on the 
heroism of the workers and youth in Gaza and the West Bank, with the deep 
unease of past methods of terror campaigns, hijackings and guerrillaism, and 
welcomes the recognition by the Palestine Liberation Organisation's leaders 
that those past methods have not, and would not have, forced Israel into 
submission. ' 682 
Nellist's sentiments were shared by the archetypal `old' left-wing figure of Eric 
Heffer. Heifer is a quintessential example of a new post-1945 parliamentary 
generation after being elected in 1966. He was a declared supporter of Israel on the 
basis of the `early socialist Zionists ideas, '683 his Christian roots - as Heffer says: 
`Wherever we went in Israel I could not but be reminded of the Bible and its stories. 
The whole country made religion real , '684 - and his perception of the Jewish need for a 
state in the aftermath of the Holocaust: `Labour Party members felt a special 
681 The Algiers Summit was convened in June 1988 to show Arab support the first Palestinian 
Intifadah and call for an international conference on peace in the Middle East. At a November 
meeting of the PNC in Algiers, a state of Palestine was declared based on UN Resolutions 
181, of the 1947 Partition Plan. A UN General Assembly vote accepted the declaration by 
104/2, December 15,1988, Resolution, A/RES/43/177, succeeded by the 1993 Oslo Accords. 
682 Nellist, Dave (15.12.1988) Business of the House, Hansard, col. 1088, quoting, Early Day 
Motion, No. 201, December 8,1988 
683 Heffer, Eric (1991: 126) Never A Yes Man: The Life and Politics of an Adopted 
Liverpudlian, Chapter 12, Huyton Man, (London: Verso) 
684 Ibid., (1991: 127) 
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responsibility towards the Jews and when Israel was established in 1948 all my 
sympathy was with its people. '685 
But again, as with other Labour MPs and related figures, by the 1980s Heffer was also 
a supporter of a Palestinian state, declaring in the debate that Britain had an historic 
obligation to advance a peace which served the national rights of both peoples. Heifer 
also made clear the unacceptable dimensions of Israeli occupation policies as he had 
himself led the first Labour Party delegation to visit Israel after the 1967 War, when 
Israel had assured the delegation that the `area would be in their hands for only a short 
time and they would use it as a bargaining factor for peace. '686 Twenty-one years 
later, Israel had reneged on its promises, settling the Occupied Territories with its own 
population. Heifer explained how his own disillusionment with Israel, combined with 
a move out of the ignorance which had been so dismissive of Palestinian rights, had 
led him to a non-partisan position: 
`When the delegation returned from Israel we gave reports to MPs and to the 
Labour Friends of Israel. I remained a `Labour Friend' for many years and 
spoke on their platforms at Labour Conferences. Time has changed my views. 
Today [199111 firmly believe that the Palestinians have a right to their own 
state and that Israel is simply a client of the U. S. Such socialist idealism as 
existed in Israel has more or less been destroyed. '687 
The importance of the PLO's decision in 1988 to move towards the diplomatic option 
was recognized again in the speech by David Winnick688 of the centre-left. He also 
first offered an evaluation of the evolution of the deviation process, emphasizing that 
being even-handed in approach was not an abandonment of Israel per se: 
`We know what has been happening in the Occupied Territories and on the 
West Bank in the past 12 months. We know of the injuries that have been 
caused and the deaths that have occurred. First and foremost, there is a need 
685 Ibid., (1991: 126-127) 
696 Ibid., (25.11.1998) Foreign Affairs and Defence, Hansard, col. 380 
687 Ibid., (1991: 127) 
688 David Winnick (b. 1933) MP: (Croydon South, 1966-1970), (Walsall North, 1979-present) 
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for both Israel and the Palestinians to accept mutual recognition. There is no 
solution, and there can never be a solution, based on Israel going out of 
existence, whatever the rights and wrongs of Israel coming into existence in 
1948. We know why that happened: the 2,000 years of anti-Semitism, which 
culminated in the Holocaust; and it goes without saying that I am totally 
committed to the state of Israel remaining in existence. '689 
Winnick continues to indicate the importance of Palestinian initiatives in making the 
deviation process possible: 
`Equally, Israel can never have peace and security until the Palestinians have a 
state of their own. For 40 years, the Palestinians have had no state, which is 
why I welcome the modest but useful step of the decision taken last week in 
Algiers by the Palestine Liberation Organisation. I wish that it has been more 
clear and explicit and had spelt out in so many words that it recognised the 
state of Israel. It did not go so far, but, by accepting United Nations resolution 
242, it implied that it recognised the existence of Israel. 
When we had the PLO representative in Britain, speaking recently at a 
meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 
he made it clear that the Palestinians have now reached the stage at which they 
will recognise Israel. The responsibility now rests on the Israelis, and I am 
extremely disappointed by the negative attitude taken by the Israeli 
Government last week. '690 
Winnick's testimony demonstrates that he as a centre-left figure had accepted the 
position of a two-state resolution, -a neutralist position. The PLO's own acceptance 
of a two State solution had enabled the centre-left to find common ground with the 
Palestinians - satisfying their need to show solidarity with an oppressed national 
people in their struggle for independence, but equally allowing them to maintain their 
essential support for Zionism and Israel. On the basis of that compromise, for 
6S9 Winnick, David (22.11.1988), Debate on the Address, Hansard, col. 69-70 
690 Ibid., (22.11.1988) 
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Winnick at least the essential dilemma was addressed, if not entirely resolved for 
Labour. 
The process described by Heffer and Winnick resulting from the reform of the PLO 
assisted the deviation process through to 1993 and the signing of the Oslo and 
Washington Accords. With the abandonment of the armed struggle by the PLO even 
some of Labour's best known `Friends of Israel' were converted to the cause of 
supporting a two-state resolution. Greville Janner691 who said himself that `Israel's 
foes have long regarded me as Israel's parliamentary voice, ' stated that if Labour 
were to assist in locating a resolution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict the party must 
avoid emulating the Conservative government's `folly' in hesitating to recognise the 
PLO's Algiers declaration, with a call for `the involvement of both sides. '692 Janner's 
own family had been victims of persecution in Eastern Europe; he had investigated 
Nazi war crimes whilst serving as a British Officer and witnessed the aftermath of the 
Holocaust, which converted him to Zionism in 1948 when he had `danced the Nora in 
Trafalgar Square when the UN accepted Israel's statehood. '693 
Another prominent Labour MP to advance even-handedness was Neil Kinnock's close 
parliamentary colleague, Gerald Kaufman. The impact of the PLO diplomatic 
manoeuvres on him is made abundantly clear in his comments regarding the 
Conservative government's own response to America's decision to deny Arafat the 
chance to address the United Nations General Assembly: 
`What a wriggling, snivelling response we have had from the Foreign 
Secretary [Malcolm Rifkind]. How can he offer any justification for the 
pusillanimous abstention by Britain yesterday in the Legal Committee when 
129 nations voted in favour of a modest, sensible resolution which simply 
asked the United States to reconsider what it had done? 
691 Janner, Greville (b. 1928) MP: (Leicester North West, 1970-1974), (Leicester West, 1974- 
1997) 
692 Janner, Greville (30.11.1988) Palestine National Council, Hansard, col. 694 
693 Janner, Greville (1998: 16-17) One Hand Alone Cannot Clap: An Arab-Israeli Universe, 
In the Beginning, Chapter 1, In The Beginning, (London: Robson) 
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Would it not have been a good idea to give Mr. Arafat the opportunity to state 
before the General Assembly what was implicit and clear in the Algiers 
declaration - that the PLO recognises resolutions 242 and 338 - and also what 
Mr. Faisal Awaida of the PLO said explicitly in London yesterday - that the 
PLO is ready to recognise the state of Israel? '694 
Kaufman was born in 1930 the `son of a Jewish East European refugee tailor 695 in 
Leeds. He became Harold Wilson's Political Press Advisor and was noted for sporting 
an Israeli lapel badge in Cabinet meetings during the 1967 Six-Day war. But it was as 
Shadow Foreign Affairs Spokesperson during Neil Kinnock's leadership that 
Kaufman really became noted. He was vociferously opposed to both the `old' and 
`new' left-wing of the early 1980s and was a natural reformist and moderate left-wing 
ally of Kinnock, Hattersley and Healey. He was also a Zionist and friend of Israel, 
having `fallen in love' with the country on a visit in 1961.696 Nonetheless, Kaufman 
was profoundly and increasingly aware of the country's political flaws. His two books 
on the subject, To Build the Promised Land (1973) and Inside the Promised Land 
(1986) convey the transformation of a single Labour MP from a staunch pro-Israel to 
a firm supporter of even-handed position. But they could easily account - in many 
senses - for the divergence of the consensus and policy position of the wider Labour 
Party. Kaufman was particularly critical of Israel during the First Intifadah. 
Under Kinnock and Kaufman (as Shadow Foreign Secretary), Labour published a 
Foreign Policy Review Document in 1989. Under a section entitled The Middle East, 
the party sets out a policy position regarding the Israel-Palestinian issue - the `extra 
dimension' - within the broader regional conflict. Coming in 1989, the contents 
represented policy proposals for the next general election (1991-92) (subject to the 
approval of the September party conference). When it came to the Israel-Palestinian 
question the greater balance was clear, as was evidently a pragmatic approach to 
policy. With a strong Rita Hinden school of thought in emphasis the document states: 
694 Kaufman, Gerald (30.11.1988) United Nations, Hansard, col. 691 
695 Hughes, Colin & Wintour, Patrick (1990: 109) Labour Rebuilt: The New Model Party, 
Chapter 8, Defence. Leave it to Gerald, (London: Fourth Estate: London) 
6" Kaufman, Gerald (1973: 1-2) To Build the Promised Land, (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson) 
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`To us in the Labour Party, the issues are clear. Instead of wasting vast sums 
of money they do not possess and cannot afford in fighting or preparing to 
fight each other, they should be working together to solve the problems of 
poverty, deprivation and lack of development which are endemic in the 
region. ' 697 
Despite the underling economic theme, there is a clear prevailing residue located in 
the repeated focus upon the `rights of Palestinians to self-determination' and the 
recognition that the `Palestinians have never enjoyed the democratic rights to which 
they are entitled, ' all of which demonstrate the concern to address issues once ignored 
by the Labour Party. Evidence as to the pragmatist character of the document lies in 
the reference to the concerns of both sides, but while statehood is a referenced criteria 
for both parties in terms of security - and the related threat of violence - this remains 
based on a classic culturally prejudiced Labour premise that security concerns only 
extend to Israel and that by inference Israel is the recipient of Palestinian violence and 
not the instigator or perpetrator: `It is essential that any settlement provides built-in 
guarantees, for Israel's security', particularly as Israel is `surrounded by hostile 
neighbours. ' As such, Israel has `every justification to be concerned about the 
integrity and survival of their state. '698 
However, with the developments arising from the 1988 Algiers declaration, `proper 
arrangements for Israel's security which will satisfy and reassure the Israeli 
government and people' are cited as making this prerequisite possible. Kinnock's 
non-partisan pragmatism and his increasing effort to distance and dilute the influence 
of the essential dilemma for Labour figures and policy-making, is also demonstrated 
through the distinct emphasis upon the status of the conflict within the context of the 
United Nations (international law). With the reference to the Israeli `occupied' 
territories, and a role for Europe in terms of a call for an `international conference' 
697 Musallam, Ramzi Current Labour Party policy on the Middle East, Gulf Report : The 
Economic, Geopolitical and Strategic Survey of the Gulf, Number 22, Second Year, June 
1989, pp. 24-25, quoting, Labour Party Policy Review, The Middle East, p. 24 
698 Ibid., p. 25 
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with the issue as a `major foreign policy priority'699 of the EEC, Kinnock and Labour 
are one-step removed from directly criticising Israel. Notably, as the academic 
Musallam says, despite the issues of imbalance contained in the proposed policy 
document, it was `rubber-stamped by conference delegates'70° to form Labour's 
policy-position on the conflict in the run-up to the 1992 general election and the Oslo 
signings (1993). 701 
The Leadership of John Smith and Margaret Becket 
Neil Kinnock's departure as Labour Leader occurred after the party's fourth 
successive electoral defeat in 1992. Nevertheless, as the legacy of Neil Kinnock's 
internal Labour reforms and modernization process continued to determine domestic 
affairs, so they remained as an influence on foreign decision and policy-making. 
699 Ibid., (June 1989: 24) 
700 Ibid., (June 1989: 24) 
pol Despite appearances, the shift in Labour's policy position resulting from left-wing 
pressure during the 1980s was not quite what is seemed: although Ross' claim that the force 
arose from the grass-roots is supported by Edmunds, the achievements are substantially 
qualified: `The movement toward a policy recognising Palestinian national rights was 
undoubtedly a bottom-up one, starting in the constituency parties and the extra-parliamentary 
left, moving up the internal decision making bodies and, eventually, capturing the 
parliamentary leadership. Even so, it is interesting to note that the campaign's success, to 
some extent, depended on those supporting a policy change taking control of the centre: the 
NEC, the International Department and the parliamentary leadership. It was only when the 
left started to dominate these bodies and a left-wing leader (Michael Foot) was in place, that 
the policy supporting the PLO was incorporated into official policy statements. Moreover, it 
should not be forgotten that in the end it was the activists who acquiesced to the leaderships 
position father than controlled it. They included clauses explicitly stating their support for 
Israel's existence in their conference motions. The leadership also overturned the 1988 and 
1989 resolutions despite the fact that they had won a two thirds majority needed to become 
policy. In the end, too, the activists were compelled to accept a policy that refused to include 
an explicit reference to Palestinian statehood, preferring to use the more neutral sounding 
concept of self-determination without specifying its content. ' Edmunds, June (May, 1998: 
117-118) 
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The pragmatic realism and abandonment of ideologically based idealism was retained 
by the new Labour Leader, John Smith, and the Acting Leader Margaret Beckett 
(May-July 1994). 702 The retention of pragmatism stemmed from the recognition 
within the mainstream of the party resulting from the changing fortunes in the election 
results that showed the party was increasingly viewed as a potential party of 
government in the minds of the electorate. These developments were to have profound 
consequences for Labour's approach to foreign affairs generally, and the situation in 
the Middle East and the Israel-Palestinian conflict in particular, as the role of ideology 
diminished further with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc in 1990- 
1991. If anything, Labour's brand of political pragmatism became a more refined and 
concentrated product as the success of Clintonism found further resonance with some 
Labour figures. As Clare Short conveys after Neil Kinnock's resignation after 
Labour's fourth successive election defeat in April 1992: 
`It was after the 1992 defeat [and Neil Kinnock's resignation] that New 
Labour was created by a very small group of people who went on to take the 
reins of power and to restrict and diminish the democracy of the Party. The 
idea of New Labour was an imitation of President Clinton's New Democrats, 
and focused completely on presidential questions. It became clear ... that 
neither Blair nor New Labour had any significant guiding principles, 
philosophy or values. The `Third Way' was an attempt to turn triangulation - 
the identification of two opposing views so the middle position can be pursued 
- into a philosophy. But triangulation was a tactic and contained no guiding 
principles. ' 703 
Despite continued disquiet, as with his predecessor Neil Kinnock, Smith did not 
shrink from continuing the internal reform and modernising programme of the Labour 
702 Margaret Beckett was Deputy Leader (1992-1994) when Smith died, therefore 
automatically becoming Acting Leader. 
703 Short, Clare (2004: 2) An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of 
Power, (London: Free Press) 
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Party. One of the key reforms John Smith introduced was `one person, one vote, '704 
effectively dissolving the union bloc-vote system. 
John Smith's reforms included Labour's approach to foreign affairs. In a key foreign 
policy speech Smith conveyed his own vision and that of the party at a time when 
foreign affairs and issues were at the forefront of British politics. The first Gulf War 
(1990-1991) and the Oslo-Washington Accords (1993) encapsulated the two central 
tenets of Smith's and Labour's approach to decision and policy-making amid the 
tumultuous external events in the post-Cold War and New World Order: the primacy 
of the United Nations; and the adoption and application of political pragmatism. 
Smith asserted his own belief in this pragmatist approach by referencing the historical 
role and support the Labour Party undertook in the development of the United Nations 
as a key non-party political organ and forum in world affairs: 
`The Labour Party has always insisted that support for the United Nations 
must be a key component of British foreign policy. The post-war Labour 
government and, in particular, its distinguished Foreign Secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, played a critical role in its foundation. In fact the Labour Party is the 
only major political Party in Britain that includes support for the United 
Nations in its constitutional objectives. '705 
Smith follows this socialist perspective and appreciation of the United Nations with 
an appraisal of the successes of political pragmatism in addressing some of the most 
intractable issues that exist in the dramatically changing international climate of the 
704 Labour's conference structure gave access via the bloc-vote to the decision and policy- 
making process of conference across a federation of affiliated organisation. These organs 
comprised the constituency branches, trades unions, the Fabians and Co-operative movement, 
and after 1920, Poale Zion. In the economic climate and logistical circumstances of 1900 
bloc-voting made practical, if dubious democratic sense; however, the rapid growth of unions, 
membership and subsequent amalgamations resulted in a disproportionate influence of the 
unions upon Labour policy. 
705 Brivati, Brian (2000: 244) Guiding Light: The Collected Speeches of John Smith, (London: 
Politico's) 
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post-Cold War era and `New World Order. ' On the Israel-Palestinian conflict 
specifically, Smith noted approvingly: 
`I believe there is much that is being done and can be done to build a better 
world. This positive agenda was reinforced for me very powerfully at a 
meeting of the Socialist International that I attended in Lisbon recently. 
Speaking at the conference were Shimon Peres, the Foreign Minister of Israel, 
Abdel Latif, the representative of the PLO, and from South Africa, Nelson 
Mandela, Leader of the ANC. The progress reports they gave us on the Middle 
East peace settlement ... were truly remarkable. They were reports of 
agreement, conciliation, and negotiation between Jew and Arab ... that would 
have seemed unimaginable just a few years ago. Of course, there is still a long 
way to go in the Middle East -a lot of fear and hatred still to be overcome. But 
the evidence of progress - real progress cannot be denied. '706 
John Smith's tenure (April 1992 - May 1994) as Leader of the Labour Party was 
tragically cut short. Nevertheless, it laid further foundations for the pragmatism of 
Tony Blair and New Labour which were to follow. It also provided the basis for the 
conclusion to the deviation process and the arrival at a neutralist consensus and policy 
trajectory for Labour. 
The Palestinian First Intffadah concluded with the signing of the Oslo Accords 
between Israel and the PLO in September 1993. Margaret Beckett - the then Deputy 
Leader - addressed the annual party conference with an assessment of British Labour- 
Israeli Labor Party relations in the wake of the historic agreement. Beckett bestowed 
Labour's congratulations upon the Israeli Labor Party and its leaders, and summarized 
the nature of the protracted and close relationship which both British and Israeli 
Labour Parties had enjoyed. In a written reply to a request for an account of the basis 
for the nature of the relationship extolled at the conference Beckett states: 
706 Ibid., (2000: 241) 
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`There is no doubt that the tentative moves towards a peace settlement in the 
Middle East would not have taken place had Likud still been the Party of 
government in Israel and they have only occurred because of the election of a 
Labor government. ' 707 
Adding: 
`That is not, of course, to say that there are not many issues on which the 
Israeli Labor Party and the British Labour Party would not see eye to eye, or 
indeed that there are not many episodes in the past history of Israel where 
there has been considerable disquiet in the British Labour Party, a disquiet 
which has invariably been communicated to our Israeli colleagues. ' 708 
Although Beckett's reference to `episodes' hints at some fluctuations in relations (a 
point made by Fatchett, who also states that `the nature and the level of the contacts 
have changed over the years'709), what Beckett's explanation underlines is not just the 
continuity in terms of the pragmatism that is now firmly enshrined in Labour's 
approach to foreign affairs, but also how this is applied to the Israel-Arab/Palestinian 
conflict, despite the seriousness of the Israeli Labor Party's role in the conflict. As 
with Kinnock, the clear emphasis on the peace process allowed at the same time 
Labour - and Labour figures in particular - to create distance from the issue, and by 
doing so, defer the worst excesses of the essential dilemma. In this example, overt 
criticism of the excesses of the Israeli Labor Party's role in violations of international 
law and civilian deaths is demurred by the emphasis upon their role in facilitating the 
peace process. 
Conclusion 
It is evident that the combined effects of a series of external determinants during the 
1980s sowed further `seeds of doubt' in the minds of even some of the most 
707 Beckett, Margaret (16.11.1993: 1) 
708 Ibid., (16.11.1993: 1) 
709 Fatchett, Derek (21.01.1997: 1) Letter: Fatchett-Nelson, House of Commons 
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committed pro-political Zionist/Israel figures of their demographic and- parliamentary 
generations. The growing influence and legacies of the left-wing (old and new) within 
the Labour Party in the period after 1967 on the Israel-Palestinian issues is also 
clearly evident, as is the equally important development of the more mainstream 
opinion and positions in Labour, represented by the broader deviation process towards 
neutralism which extended across all wings of the party. By the 1970s the left-wing 
(within which many pro-Israel Jewish Labour MPs were located) and far-left-wing 
had either remained pro-Israel (Michael Foot for example), become neutralist, or 
outright pro-Palestinian. As Kinnock says of this period when pro-Palestinianism 
came to the forefront and to briefly dominate the party's policy position: 
`It became an issue of the left-wing in the 1960s and early 1970s when 
wearing a Kafyah [Palestinian black and white head-garment] became quite 
fashionable. Up until then of course the left-wing in the Labour Party had 
contained a very significant number of Jewish people, and that is apart from 
the ones who were strongly supportive of Israel. '710 
Significant sections of the left-wing and far-left of the party were able to convert 
others within the party to at least adopt a non-partisan or neutralist position, and even 
a pro-Palestinian position (enshrined in the secular State of Palestine position, 
effectively dissolving Israel). This conversion success was undoubtedly assisted by 
some extraordinary external determinants, notably the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and 
the repression of the related Palestinian Intifadah, all of which were systematically 
and graphically conveyed by the international media. The combined effect of these 
factors was that Labour MPs and related figures became progressively more 
compromised as the essential dilemma was exacerbated by their relations with the 
Israeli Labor Party, particularly as the PLO's corresponding moves towards a 
diplomatic and political option gathered momentum and acceptance. 
The predominant internal determinant of the period is located in the general lurch to 
the left-wing, and specifically the capture of the party hierarchy and decision/policy- 
making machinery of the constituency parties, the trades unions and the NEC by both 
70 Kinnock, Neil (30.01.2004: 6) 
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grass-roots activists and far-left infiltrators in the early years of the 1980s. These 
determinants were in part the consequence of the general dissatisfaction of Labour's 
drift from socialist ideology and policies, and the- internal structural reforms that 
allowed such sections and affiliated bodies of the party to fall beyond the control of 
the leadership. All these internal and external factors assisted the deviation process 
towards a neutralist consensus within the party ranks to be briefly translated into pro- 
Palestinian policy position. In reality the pro-Palestinianism was in essence an 
anomaly resulting from a myriad of related factors, rather than a genuine Labour Party 
consensus to replace Israel with a secular State of Palestine. 
A second internal determinant was the rise to power within the party of a new 
generation of leaders. As the academic Jonathan Spyer says: 
`In the 1970s and 1980s, a generation influenced by the politics of the 1960s 
and the European New Left entered the Labour Party. Leading figures today 
such as Clare Short, Peter Hain, Jeremy Corbyn and Ken Livingstone may in 
different ways be seen as the products of this experience. For this generation, 
the cause of Palestinian nationalism was an important rallying point. '7" 
Although the immediate post-1945 `generation believed that the Jews deserved to 
have Israel'712 in response to the Holocaust and Jewish survivors, this generation 
diminished significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. The majority of new MPs were more 
likely to be motivated not just by their awareness of the Holocaust but also the 
resulting Palestinians predicament that was created as a consequence of British, 
European, American and Labour's figures responses to that abhorrence. As Kinnock 
recounts: 
`There was a generational division within the affiliations of the Labour 
movement: if you were over thirty-five or forty you were pretty likely to be 
"' Spyer, Jonathan (June 2,2004), pp. 4 
712 Kinnock, Neil (30.01.2004: 8) 
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pro-Israeli; if you were under that age you were pretty likely to be pro- 
Palestinian. '713 
Under Kinnock's leadership, and again as a result of general election defeat, the party 
moved back to a centre-left persuasion. Kinnock's internal party reforms, which were 
advanced still further by his successor, John Smith, excluded much of the left-wing, 
and the far-left-wing (the so-called `loony left') who had largely carried the policy 
agenda beyond the developing neutralist consensus into the uncharted territory of a 
pro-Palestinian position. Thus, the party consensus and policy position was brought 
back into a more rational and pragmatist neutralist line. 
The return to a more neutralist position under Neil Kinnock's direction and control - 
via this brief pro-Palestinian policy detour - sat infinitely more comfortably with the 
broader moderate section of the party. This was particularly the case since there 
continued to be a strong solidarity with Jews in terms of the Holocaust experience, an 
affiliation with Israel as a democratic state, and a desire to regain confidence in the 
Israeli Labor Party, notably, the need to be able to distinguish Labor from its Likud 
partner. This was made infinitely easier by the achievements of the Oslo peace 
process in 1993. 
We can therefore summarise that the period from 1980-1993 saw a brief period in 
which the essential dilemma was perceived as basically resolved in favour of the anti- 
colonialist and solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, at the expense of pro-political 
Zionism and the shared common origins, related religious philosophies and shared 
socialist ideologies of the British Labour Party and the Israel Labor Party. However, a 
cohort of external and internal determinants acted and combined, along with the 
influence of interested non-partisan individuals and groups, to push the party back to a 
position of neutrality. The neutrality position could accommodate a basic pro-political 
Zionism with accompanying and constructive criticism for Israeli policies, and 
effective support for Palestinian national aspirations. This position and approach was 
to be primarily facilitated through the mechanisms of political pragmatism under the 
713 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 8) 
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umbrella of the EEC, the Socialist International and the United Nations, and thereby 
attempting to alleviate the worst repercussions of the psychological, ideological and 
political components of the essential dilemma pulling against the different pro 
positions of Labour and related figures as they wrestled with their traditional 
sympathies against the evidential realities and the neutralist positions of the new 
parliamentary generations motivated by the predicament of the Palestinians and the 
wider Middle Eastern region. 
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Chapter 5 
Contemporary Era: 1994-2001 
Tony Blair and the Foreign Policy-Making 
of New Labour (1994-2001) 
Introduction 
The agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the State of 
Israel, and the accompanying mutual recognition pact known collectively as the Oslo 
Accords of 1993, initially appeared to offer the Labour Party an unprecedented 
opportunity to address the legacies and constraints imposed by the essential dilemma. 
With reconciliation between the two key protagonists (Israel and the Palestinians) the 
British Labour Party was effectively absolved on an important level from the 
influence and continuity of the essential dilemma and its component aspects: the Oslo 
signing relinquished a good deal of the contradictions posed by Labour's desire, on 
the one hand, to sustain its traditional pro-political Zionism/Israel position; and on the 
other, to fulfill the requirements of the party's socialist ideology in terms of 
supporting Palestinian resistance to Israeli colonial policies, by evoking the party's 
constitution commitment to uphold UN resolutions and international law. 
The opportunity to address the essential dilemma presented by the external 
determinant - the Oslo Accords and the subsequent Middle East Peace Process 
(MEPP) - was shaped in large part by a major Labour-derived internal determinant: 
the death of John Smith and the resulting party leadership election - via the Acting 
leadership of Margaret Beckett - led to the ascendancy of Tony Blair and the New 
Labour Party in July 1994. The reform and modernization process begun by Neil 
Kinnock and continued by John Smith was accelerated and expanded under Blair as 
the remaining `sacred cows' of old Labour were radically amended or jettisoned as a 
new Labour Party was fashioned. Blair's ultra-pragmatism and non-ideological 
philosophy - what became known as Blairism, - and an initial aversion to foreign 
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affairs, was to have profound consequences for Labour-Israel relations concerning the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict and the peace process, particularly as Labour moved from 
opposition to government 1997. 
Previous chapters have demonstrated the crucial role played by one internal 
determinant in particular with regards to shaping Labour policy towards the 
Palestinian-Zionism/Israel conflict: that of key leadership figures and their personal 
political beliefs (notably Ramsay MacDonald, Clement Attlee, Harold Wilson, 
Michael Foot etc). This chapter explicates the political philosophy of the key 
leadership individual of the period, Tony Blair himself, and demonstrates how these 
beliefs translated into a response to the foreign policy issues during New Labour's 
opposition and early government experiences. The end result was a `capturing' of 
Labour foreign policy by Blair and his closest confidants, including non-Labour 
figures and policy advisors. Traditional party and government mechanisms for 
formulating policy were mostly bypassed by a small `kitchen cabinet' style circle, 
which generally pursued policies which accorded with Blair's own personal 
philosophy. How this subsequently impacted upon New Labour relations with 
political Zionism, Israel and the Israel-Palestinian question will be addressed in 
chapter six. 
"The best prime minister we never had": John Smith 
John Smith's short (22 months) leadership saw something of a renaissance in Labour 
Party leadership interest in foreign affairs. Shortly before his death in May 1994, 
Smith gave the Tawney Lecture, 714 in which he outlined the crucial role which ethics 
played in his political outlook, a theme to be reiterated in the party in subsequent 
"' The Tawney Memorial Lectures are hosted by the Christian Socialist Movement (CSM) 
and named after the Christian socialist writer, university historian and economist, Richard 
Henry Tawney (b. 1880-d. 1962). The `CSM is a movement of Christians with a radical 
commitment to social justice ... and to 
fostering peace and reconciliation. Affiliated to the 
Labour Party and with members in the Commons, the Lords, on local councils and in trade 
unions and constituency Labour parties, CSM makes sure the Christian voice is heard in 
politics. Through lobbying, publications, public meetings, local branch activities, media work 
and other ways we are an effective voice for social justice. ' 
(http: //www. thecsm. org. uk/whoweare. html) 
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years. For Smith this was an important moment in his career: as a life-long admirer of 
his ideas and writings, R. H. Tawney was also revered as the father of Christian 
socialism, viewing British socialism as particularly `ethical ... and pragmatic. '715 
Smith's Christian socialism was inherently pragmatic. He viewed his religious faith - 
like Presbyterians generally - as a deeply private matter between the individual and 
God; a matter which shaped his own outlook, but did not have to be imposed on those 
with whom he worked and dealt. This was reflected too in how he organized his 
office. Decision and policy-making under Smith was generated, in part, from within a 
small team of internal and external advisors, employing consultants and managers 
with their own areas of expertise and experience (press and publications, domestic and 
foreign affairs, conference and speech writing). As Smith's biographer Mark Stuart 
conveys: `each person in the office had a personal line of influence to John. For 
instance ... 
Meta Ramsay and Andrew Graham supplied their own policy ideas. '716 
One of these policy ideas would take Smith on his only foreign trip as Leader of the 
Opposition. Over Christmas 1993, Smith was encouraged to undertake a visit to the 
Middle East: to Israel and the Occupied Territories. According to Mark Stuart, it had 
been the idea of Meta Ramsay, "' an assistant and advisor on foreign affairs to the 
Labour Policy Unit of John Smith's Office: 
`Over Christmas 1993, Smith went to Israel accompanied by Mike Elrick718 
and Meta Ramsay. Meta felt it was important to foster the Jewish vote and 
75 John Smith [Editor: Christopher Bryant] (1993: 127-128) Reclaiming the Ground. - 
Christianity and Socialism, Chapter 6, John Smith, Reclaiming the Ground - Freedom and the 
Value of Society, (London: Spire) 
716 Stuart, Mark (2005: 311) John Smith: A Life, Chapter 21, Just One More Heave, (2003), 
(London: Politico's) 
"' Scottish Labour Party related figure Margaret Mildred [Meta] Ramsay (b. 1936) (Baroness 
Ramsay of Cartvale, 1996). After a career in the British Diplomatic Service (1969-1991), 
Ramsay became foreign policy advisor to John Smith and Jack Cunningham (Shadow Foreign 
Affairs Spokesperson, 1992-1995), an Advisory Council Member of the Foreign Policy 
Centre - the foreign affairs Think Tank established by Tony Blair (1998) - and is the House of 
Lords chair of the Labour Friends of Israel (LFI). 
"' Mike Elrick was a member of John Smith's Press Team. 
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improve links with Labour's sister Party in Israel, including its leader and 
Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Israel was chosen in preference to India, 
where Smith would have visited the following year, had he lived. '719 
According to an interview Stuart conducted with Baroness Ramsay in 2003, Smith 
had a series of `excellent individual meetings with Prime Minister Rabin, and Shimon 
Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister, both of whom he knew from meetings of the 
Socialist International. '720 However, as Stuart continues to convey via Mike Elrick, 
Smith's tour and meetings were not all as constructive or as informative as had been 
expected: 
`The rest of the visit was not a great success in terms of generating publicity. 
Smith grew increasingly irritated with his minder, whom he considered 
patronizing. He was also unhappy with the briefing he received from a senior 
Israeli security spokesperson. 
Mike Elrick recalls: "John didn't suffer fools gladly, and he felt insulted by the 
bog standard briefing, believing that he had not been given the respect that a 
Leader of the opposition from Britain deserved. s721 
While the Labour Leader was not entirely happy with his treatment by the Israelis, 
and despite having visited the Occupied Territories (staying in Jerusalem), there is no 
record of any meetings with Palestinian representatives, aside from the Christian 
Palestinian church minister who officiated at the Christmas Eve Service at the Church 
of the Nativity in Bethlehem. His leadership would perhaps have been unlikely to 
cause any significant redirection in Labour's policy trajectory. But Smith's death left 
only room for speculation. 
New Labour in Opposition (1994 1997) 
79 Stuart, Mark (2005: 349-3 50) Chapter 23, Stresses and Strains, (2003) 
720 Ibid., (2005: 349-3 50) quoting, Interview, Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale, June 24,2003 
721 Ibid., (2005: 349-350) quoting, Interview, Mike Elrick, June 10,2003 
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The death of John Smith in May 1994 and the election of Tony Blair as Labour Party 
Leader in July precipitated a further radical reform and modernization of the Labour 
Party, crucial to which was the influence of the new, young party leader himself. 
Tony Blair's, and by extension, New Labour's political philosophy, was shaped above 
all by one defining factor: successive general electoral defeats. The general election 
defeats of 1979,1983,1987 and 1992 had scarred Blair and traumatised the entire 
party. The reform and modernization process that would eventually produce New 
Labour had begun with the 1983 election debacle. Margaret Thatcher's 1983 victory 
condemned Labour's left-wing to irreparable decline, and issued a licence to Neil 
Kinnock - and to a lesser extent John Smith - to undertake the most comprehensive 
and radical `root and branch' process of reform and modernization in Labour's 
history, with the single goal being to win a general election and form a Labour 
government. The party's move to the left-wing in the leadership, the decision and 
policy-making body (NEC), and in policies (1980-1983), had been an major electoral 
error; more than that, the party became infused with the belief that orthodox socialism 
was now increasingly incompatible with modem democratic socialist party. 
Tony Blair was the quintessential product of both the election defeat and opposition 
experience, and came to symbolize this jettisoning of the left-wing and of the 
dogmatic subscription to the socialist ideology - or indeed ideology per se. Blair had 
lost his deposit in the 1983 drubbing at the Beaconsfield by-election, and spent nearly 
a decade frustrated and agonizing over the seminal reality of British politics: that you 
can have the finest policies, but without power, they were essentially meaningless. 
Blair had come to realize that securing power was as much about image, presentation 
and perception as much as it was about the core substance of policies. Still, the 
electorate had to trust a party: Labour had - for numerous reasons related to the 1970s 
and the following left-wing surge of the early 1980s - lost that trust. Recovering it 
would require both presentation and substance. Tony Blair believed, and Labour 
reached a consensus, that he was the most likely person to present and deliver the 
policies and win the trust, and thus political power. 
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In reaching that party consensus the political intellectual heavyweight, Gordon 
Brown722 - widely considered, as a scholar and published socialist theorist, to be 
Smith's and Labour's heir apparent, - had agreed not to contest the party leadership 
election in favour of the more dynamic and photogenic married family figure of Tony 
Blair. It was generally viewed across a wide section of the party that Blair with his 
charisma and ideological vacuity would be more likely to achieve the election of a 
Labour government. In terms of electoral success Labour's decision to trust and invest 
in Blair was to prove justified. Blair - the arch pragmatist and showman - was to 
deliver three successive election victories (1997,2000 and 2005). 
The Shaping of Blair's Political Philosoph 
`No one gets anywhere alone. '723 
The 1983 general election defeat and his early negative experiences of Labour's left- 
wing may have been a defining factor in Tony Blair's political development, but there 
are also important aspects of his early life and background that have also shaped his 
political and personal philosophy. The origins of Tony Blair's philosophy are said to 
be located in his early childhood and adolescence. Blair was raised in a religious 
family centred upon self-responsibility and led by an ambitious and professionally 
successful political-academic father, Leo Blair. As Tony Blair was to say himself, 
`My father was Norman Tebbit' the working class `get on your bike Tory and 
orthodox Thatcherite. '724 
Blair's father may have become politically Conservative, but his broader background 
was in many ways traditional Labour, even brushed with Communism. The son of 
Celia Ridgway and Charles Parson (travelling music-hall actors), the greater influence 
722 Gordon Brown (b. 1951) MP: (Dunfermline East, 1983-2005), (Kirkcaldy & Cowdenbeath, 
2005-present); PM: June 2007-present; Chancellor, 1997-2007. 
723 Hammad, Suheir (1996: iv) Born Palestinian, Born Black, (New York: Writers & Readers) 
724 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Cöllins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 18) Chapter 
2, Father and Mother 
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on Leo came from his adoptive parents James and Mary Blair and their life steeped in 
the poverty-stricken mire of the industrial working-class Govan district of Glasgow. 
James Blair was a shipyard worker and Communist. Tony Blair recalls his father's 
accounts of that upbringing: 
`I remember my father telling me about being brought up in Glasgow in the 
1930s, living in a crowded tenement, five or six families sharing a toilet, foster 
mother finding it hard to make ends meet, his foster father a shipyard worker 
subject to casual labour of those times. '725 
Leo Blair's first job was in the employment of The Daily Worker (the British 
Communist Party's daily news paper), becoming Secretary of the Govan Branch of 
the Scottish Young Communist League by the age of 15 (1938). After contemplating 
a career as a Communist MP726 a period of military service (1942-1947) exposed him 
to a political metamorphosis as he rose from private to lieutenant. The military 
experience motivated Leo Blair to take a law degree, and to become a lawyer and 
lecturer in law at Durham University. As an illegitimate child raised by caring though 
materially-deprived parents, Leo had a restless desire for self-improvement and self- 
reliance; qualifications in law and a position in academia were for him double 
indemnities against life. As Seldon says: `The law meant prosperity; and academia 
status. '727 Tony Blair's mother, Hazel Corscaden (b. 1923-d. 1975), was from a 
`staunch Protestant family' 728 which had migrated to Glasgow from County Donegal 
in Ireland. After her father's death and mother's re-marriage to a butcher, she left 
school at 14 after `receiving little formal education' to become a government office 
worker; Hazel is described as `religious, though not church-going. )729 Seldon states 
725 Ibid., (2004: 18) Chapter 2 
726 Two Communists were elected to parliament in 1945: Willie Gallacher (West Fife, 1935- 
1950) and Phil Piratin (Mile End/Stepney, 1945-1950) 
727 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 4) Chapter 4, 
Father's Stroke, 1953-71 
728 Ibid., (2004: 17) 
729 Ibid., (2004: 18) 
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that despite the success of his father it was Blair's mother who was the `major 
influence on his world view and his politics: '730 
`Not only did she help imbue him with religious faith: it was her social 
conscience, commitment to others and sheer kindness that coloured his 
outlook. Hers was not an ideological nor a Party political vision ..., but she 
rooted in him a fundamental respect for others. 731 
These early roots were to provide the foundations of Blair's personal and political 
philosophy, in particular his pragmatism. While the values of Conservatism were 
admirable, they were not in themselves complete without the addition of a socialist 
welfare model. As a consequence Blair found he could not subscribe entirely to either 
political philosophy. The reality was that life required a much more complex 
arrangement comprising an overlapping and interrelating combination of self-reliance 
and state provision, family, religious faith, community and society. In short, no one 
gets anywhere alone. As a result of his father's stroke, virtually overnight the Blair 
family were exposed to the sobering reality and limitations of self-reliance, while at 
the same time they were catapulted into the realisation of the value and security of 
collective state provision of the kind located in socialist ideology. In Blair's words, 
6 on an emotional level I was suddenly made aware that nothing was permanent. 9732 
Blair was educated at one of the best and most expensive public schools in Durham, 
The Choristers School. From Choristers he proceeded to Fettes College, Edinburgh, 
one of Scotland's most prestigious private schools. While there he displayed little if 
any interest in politics, a trait that continued at University. According to Seldon there 
was `little evidence of interest in the social issues of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
despite some hints of a developing social conscience and awareness. ' Similarly: 
`Political interest seems to have remained firmly unawakened. The problems 
of the Wilson governments of 1966-70, trade union unrest, the General 
730 Ibid., (2004: 22) 
731 Ibid., (2004: 20) 
732 Ibid., (2004: 7) Chapter 1 
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Election of June 1970 and the debate on entry into the European Economic 
Community in 1972 all seemed to pass him by. '733 
Tony Blair read law at St. John's College, Oxford. Despite Oxford's tradition for 
political discourse and reputation for a providing a production-line of political greats 
and national leaders, Blair showed no interest in joining any of the many political 
societies and debating groups epitomised by the Oxford Union which had hosted a raft 
of former Labour notables like Attlee, Wilson, Crosland and Jenkins. The 
revitalisation of Blair's religious faith was more evident, though never remotely 
evangelical. While at Oxford, Blair was confirmed into the Anglican Church. The 
journalist Matthew d'Ancona claims, as a result of Blair's first interview on his 
religious faith as party leader, his religious re-awakening at Oxford was the `defining 
moment of his life. '734 
The person most attributed with attracting Blair back to religious belief was Peter 
Thomson, 735 a mature 36 year old Australian and fellow student at Oxford (1972- 
1974). Seldon claims Thomson was `more important to Tony Blair than any other 
adult he met at school or university. 036 Tony Blair describes the influence of 
Thomson upon his religious beliefs and social conscience as follows: 
`I had always believed in God but I had been slightly detached from it. I 
couldn't make sense of it. Peter [Thomson] made it relevant; practical rather 
than theological. Religion became less of a personal relationship with God. I 
began to see it in a much more social context ... What I took from Peter 
733 Ibid., (2004: 13) 
734 Ibid., (2004: 34) Chapter 3, Oxford and Loss of Mother, 1971-75, quoting, Tony Blair, 
interview with Matthew d'Ancona, Sunday Times, November 13,2003 
'3s Peter Thompson held a post as Chaplin at Geelong Grammar School Timbertop Victoria 
(satellite of the British school that educated Prince Charles), and retired as Head of St. Mark's 
Anglican College, University of Adelaide. 
736 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 39) Chapter 
4, Peter Thomson 
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Thomson is the idea that your religious beliefs aren't something that shut you 
away from the world, but something that meant you had to go out and act. '737 
Thomson stirred Blair's somewhat dormant religious faith, transforming it from a 
personal belief of the mind and individual worship, into an applied practical 
mechanism by which it was possible to influence society - for the good. It was the 
connection made by Thomson between religion and practical application that in 
essence made the tentative link for Blair between religion and politics that became the 
basis and character of his brand of Christian socialism - Blairism. In addition, it was 
Thomson's role that also influenced how Blair came to view society and its structure 
that came to contribute to Blair's somewhat unconventional socialism. Although 
British political life generally and within the Labour Party specifically was overtly 
and widely secular, Blair had been introduced to the means by which he could apply 
his religious faith in a political sphere. As Seldon says: 
`Peter helped Tony stand outside England and the English ways of thinking on 
the English class system. He has helped open Tony's eyes to fresh ways of 
looking at things which are outside the box of conventional British Party 
political thinking. 738 
An additional major contribution to the religious and political development of Tony 
Blair, was his introduction by Thomson to the Scottish Christian communitarian 
moral philosopher, John Macmurray. 739 Blair's introduction to the writing of 
Macmurray served to further crystallise the religious and political marriage process. 
The writings of Macmurray had converted Thomson to the concept of translating 
religious philosophy and faith into a political applied ideology; Macmurray's 
philosophy places the primacy of action as opposed to thought in contrast to the 
737 Ibid., (2004: 44) 
738 Ibid., (2004: 44) 
739 John Macmurray (b. 1891 -d. 1976) Jowett Lecturer (Philosophy), Balliol College, Oxford; 
Grote Professor of the Philosophy of the Mind and Logic, London; Prof. Moral Philosophy, 
Edinburgh University. 
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traditional practices of private and institutionalised worship and membership of the 
established church. Furthermore, it was Macmurray's all-abiding emphasis on the role 
of community, the importance of society, and especially the self-imposed question 
resulting from the relationship of individuals to society: `which should predominate? 
Neither alone was his answer. 9740 Seldon states: 
`All his [Macmurray's] philosophy had a practical relevance; he changed the 
reference from the ideal to the real. Macmurray provided Thomson with the 
perfect riposte to what he saw as the bloodless tradition that had dominated so 
much of twentieth-century philosophy - local positivism and the linguistics of 
Wittgenstein, which he deemed a `lost half centüry. '74' 
In particular, it was the value of community and society espoused by Thomson and 
Macmurray which combined to shape the religious-political linkage that also absorbed 
all the background and experiences into a forward-looking and directional philosophy 
for Blair. As Peter Mandelson says of Blair's adoption of Macmurrayism: 
`It was Macmurray's interpretation of the social commitment of Christianity 
through the idea of community, rather than the personal experience of extreme 
poverty and hardship, that inspired Blair's political awakening. 
To create opportunities of self-fulfillment for all, which was the mainspring of 
his Christian sense of social justice, it was necessary to change people's social 
conditions. In other words, Christianity was not enough by itself - you needed 
politics and organisation, too, to improve society. '742 
John Macmurray's most relevant publication for Blair was Religion, Art, and Science 
(1961), a treatise on the `place of religion within the unity of human experience', 
religion representing `one of three major modes of reflective activity' - Art and 
740 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 32) Chapter 3 
741 Ibid., (2004: 40) Chapter 4 
742 Mandelson, Peter (2002: 33) The Blair, Revolution Revisited, Chapter 2, Labour Leaders, 
Earliest Analysis, (London: Politico's) 
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Science being the other two. Macmurray claimed that `To talk of a `philosophy of 
religion' is strictly improper. There is simply 'philosophy. 9743 As such, it is not 
difficult to see the appeal of Macmurray to Blair in a spiritual sense: 
`And religious problems cannot be solved by political means. The reason is 
simple. Religious problems are problems of free personal relations; they are 
problems of friendship, of fellowship, of reconciliation. One can organise 
cooperation: one cannot organise love. 
In other terms, the religious problem of our times is the problem of founding a 
new and all-embracing civilisation. It is the problem of uniting, in one 
universal fellowship, all the various nationalities, races and traditions, the 
cultures and religions, of mankind. 044 
Sceptics of the contribution made to Blair's religious re-awakening and the emergence 
of his political beliefs at Oxford question that the philosophical works were 
responsible for the political aspect of Blair's development. As Labour MP - Leopold 
Abse745 _ says: 
`Macmurray's instruction brought Blair to the Lord, but not to the Labour 
Party. No one could have been more anti-political than Macmurray, and if he 
[Blair] had the stamina to hack through the thicket of Macmurray's often 
dense prose, the only serious politics he would have discovered was 
Macmurray's tirade against Marx's irreligious doctrines. '746 
... Macmurray, John (1961: 7) Religion, Art, and Science: A Study of the Reflective Activities 
in Man, Chapter 1, Science out of Bounds, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press) 
744 Ibid., (1961: 68) 
745 Leopold [Leo] Abse (b1917) MP: (Pontypool, 1958-1983), (Torfaen, 1983-1987) 
746 Abse, Leo (1996: 96) The Man Behind the Smile: Tony Blair and the Politics of 
Perversion, Chapter 4, Androgynous Politics: Tony Blair, Disavowals, (London: Robson) 
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However, the most conclusive evidence to support Seldon and Mandelson's assertions 
as to the degree of influence made by Macmurray upon Blair are perhaps located in 
Blair's own testament given on entering Downing Street in May 1997: 
`If you really want to understand what I'm all about you have to look at a guy 
called John Macmurray. It's all there. '747 
What Macmurray facilitated by identifying the social aspects of Christianity via the 
concept of community - as opposed to individual faith and practice - was the directing 
of Blair towards linking his religious faith to politics. As Blair states: 
`I am a Socialist not through reading a textbook that has caught my intellectual 
fancy, nor through unthinking tradition, but because I believe that, at its best, 
Socialism corresponds- most closely to an existence that is both rational and 
moral. It stands for co-operation, not confrontation; for fellowship, not fear. It 
stands for equality, not because it wants people to be the same but because 
only through equality in our economic circumstances can our individuality 
develop properly. '748 
Peter Mandelson says Blair's brand of socialism is classically based in the writers of 
political science, natural history and Fine Arts as much as it is in philosophy: `His 
[Blair's] is an ethical socialism which draws on the ideas of Ruskin and Tawney. '749 
The complex, disparate and protected origins and influences upon Blair in terms of his 
political introduction and development are conveyed in Mandelson's summary: 
`An interviewer once accused Blair of holding opinions rather than 
convictions. `Not true, ' said Blair: `I have core beliefs which take the form of 
strong left-of-centre values. With my class background if all I had wanted to 
147 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 32) Chapter 
3, quoting, New Statesman, July 13,1994 
748 Tony Blair (06.07.1983) Maiden Speech as MP for Sedgefield, House of Commons, 
Hansard, 6th. Series, vol. 45, col. 316 
'a9 Mandelson, Peter (2002: 32) 
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do was exercise power I could and would, let's be blunt about it, have joined 
another Party. 050 
Mandelson concludes: 
`What brought Blair into the Labour Party, unlike others who have risen to 
senior positions, was not a political family background or a conventional 
Labour apprenticeship in student activity, local government and trade unions, 
but the strength of personal convictions and his belief in what Labour stands 
for - fairness and social justice in society, partnership in managing economic 
and social problems, and greater individual opportunity for all. 051 
Anthony Seldon claims the combining of religion and politics into what became 
Blairism and essentially New Labour was in large part the result of `key people: '752 
Cherie Booth certainly falls within that category. 
Cherie Booth's deep Christian (Catholic) socialist convictions were steeped in the 
deprived working-class Catholic origins of her single-parent up-bringing and 
background. It is claimed Booth was an important influence on converting Tony 
Blair's convictions to socialism, in addition to the superior virtues of Catholicism in 
contrast to Protestantism. The origins of Booth's contribution to Blairism are argued 
to be located in the contrast between the privileged privately educated middle-class 
upbringing of Blair with that of Booth. ' As Booth's biographer - Linda McDougall - 
says: 
`She [Cherie Booth] was a deeply serious Catholic girl from Liverpool who 
had no money, had joined the Labour Party at sixteen, and knew that 
Aso Ibid., (2002: 32) 
's' Ibid., (2002: 32) 
752 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: iv) 
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everything you get in this world has to be earned through hard work. She 
wanted to become a barrister to put the world to rights.... ' 753 754 
Although the Labour Party has a lengthy Christian socialist tradition, Blair's overt 
religious convictions were not universally celebrated within Labour. However, he was 
far from isolated among his parliamentary colleagues. The Christian commonality that 
existed within Labour provided the basis for two important friendships after Blair's 
election to Parliament in 1983: in the first instance with Gordon Brown (with whom 
he shared a parliamentary office), and more importantly from 1992-1994, with the 
Labour leader John Smith. It was Smith in 1992 who had `originally invited Blair to 
join the CSM [Christian Socialist Movement]. '755 There was no doubt that Blair 
sought to promote his Christian values as a core component of modem Labour's 
socialism. While Shadow Home Secretary (1992-1994) in Smith's Shadow Cabinet, at 
the 1992 party conference he stated: 
`We [the Labour Party] are trying to establish in the public mind the 
coincidence between the values of democratic socialism and those of 
Christianity. There is a desire in the Labour Party to rediscover its ethical 
values: the ethical code that most of us really believe gave birth to the Labour 
X756 Party. 
Whatever undercurrents of disquiet there may have been from the secularists in the 
Labour Party to the religious revivalism of Smith, Brown and Blair, they were largely 
silenced, or at least in part acquiesced as the party continued to progress in the 
753 McDougall, Linda (2001: 63) Cherie: The Perfect Life of Mrs Blair, (London: Politico's) 
Asa Cherie Booth most direct reference to the Israel-Palestinian conflict occurred in June 2002 
when commenting upon the latest event in a cycle of violence and counter-violence, in this 
instance, after a Palestinian suicide attack on an Israeli bus: `As long as young people feel 
they have got no hope but to blow themselves up you are never going to make progress. ' BBC 
News, Prime Minister Wife in Suicide Bomb Row, June 18,2002, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk_. politics/2051372. stin 
iss Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 517) Chapter 
34, God 
756 Ibid., (2004: 517) quoting, Michael Prescott, Sunday Times, October 10,1992 
273 
Chapter 5 (1994-2001) 
opinion polls. Although Blair was apparently unabashed in presenting his religious 
beliefs in the context of his politics and the Labour Party at the 1992 conference, it 
was thought to be the direct intervention of Alistair Campbell - culminating in his 
2003 infamous `we don't do God'757 exclamation - that gradually eroded much of the 
references in public to God after Blair became party leader and Prime Minister. 
759 
Campbell's intervention reflected his perception of a broader electoral liability with a 
religious based campaign, and dissuaded Blair from quoting biblical references, God, 
or professions of his Christian faith. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to detect the 
religious connotations of Blair's addresses and how he relates these to his socialism, 
as this extract from a speech to the party conference in 1995 illustrates: 
`I am worth no more than anyone else. I am my brother's keeper. I will not 
walk on the other side. We [are] members of the same family, the same 
community, the same race. This is my socialism. '759 
Blair's biographer Anthony Seldon summarises Blair's religious faith and how this 
relates to his personal and political values and positions, in addition to those of other 
faiths: 
`So Blair's religious beliefs are ecumenical, multi-faith and anti- 
fundamentalist but also judgemental. Indeed, it is the very clear division 
between good and evil that he learnt from Christianity that he sees as the 
principle uniting force behind all major world faiths. His is an intensely 
practical faith, not interested in doctrinal disputes, nor in dogma, nor in a 
757 During a reply to an interview question regarding the significance of their Christian faith in 
the relationship between Tony Blair and George W. Bush to David Margolick, Vanity Fair 
Magazine, June 2003, Alistair Campbell replied `I'm sorry. We don't do God. ' 
http: //www. telegraph. co. uk/news/main jhtml? xml=/news/2003/05/04/nblairo4. xml 
758 Alistair Campbell's snuffing of Blair's Christianity, or any facet of the Labour leader's 
character which may be a potential electoral liability was the result of his experience as a 
political advisor to Neil Kinnock, and had significant influence upon the formation and 
reliance upon Blair's `settee Cabinet' style of government. 
759 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 517) quoting, 
Tony Blair, Labour Party conference, 1995 
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world to come, but in this world now. His religious beliefs are closely 
intertwined with his ethical beliefs. '760 
Adding: 
`He believes all world religions, correctly followed, lead to the same God ... 
and that `religion should remain the bedrock of civilisation. ' 761 
The implications of Blair's religious convictions were to be far-reaching, both in his 
foreign policy in general, and in his responses to what he viewed as the threat of 
political Islam. (His personal interest in Islam has a history that pre-dates 9/11 by 
many years: in an interview Blair described Islam as a `deeply reflective, peaceful and 
very beautiful religious faith and I think it would be hugely helpful if people from 
other religious faiths knew more about it. '762 
Blair's ascendancy to the office of Prime Minister in May 1997 gave him the 
opportunity to not only re-fashion Labour further, but to apply Blairism into the realm 
of international as well as domestic affairs. 
1994-1997 Foreign Affairs and Policy - Old Labour and New Labour 
Tony Blair's lack of interest in foreign affairs and the entanglements they so 
frequently pose was not a singularly New Labour phenomenon. Labour's traditional, 
almost `instinctive lack of interest in external relations, '763 continued under Blair's 
leadership and in the years leading to the 1997 election, as Kinnock explains: 
`Well the first thing is that the characteristic of the phenomenon known as 
New Labour (whatever it is), was to down-play foreign politics. So they never 
760 Ibid., (2004: 526-527) 
761 Ibid., (2004: 525) quoting, The Times, April 1,2000 
762 Ibid., (2004: 525) quoting, Muslim News, March 2000 
763 Kinnock, Neil (30.01.2004: 9) 
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took any notice of what was happening elsewhere, - even over the Channel. In 
government of course you have not got that luxury !' 7M 
As with much of Tony Blair's politics, his approach to foreign affairs was indelibly 
shaped by his negative experiences of the early 1980s. For Blair, foreign affairs in that 
period were not only stained by Labour's misjudgement of the public mood over the 
Argentine invasion of the Falkland Isles, 765 but just as importantly, remained 
synonymous with the more established but equally electorally ruinous causes of the 
left-wing: notably, anti-Americanism and unilateral nuclear disarmament, with the 
resulting and deeply damaging tag issued by the Conservatives and sections of the 
media that Labour was `soft' on defence. The combined effect left Blair suspicious 
and cautious with an instinctive sense of unease on the subject of foreign affairs and 
the contentious issues it invariably appeared to generate while in opposition. But on 
entering government his position was dramatically reversed. In many ways, the timing 
of Blair's arrival as Labour Leader in relation to international affairs could not have 
been more fortuitous. The unravelling of the Communist Bloc followed by the 
implosion of the Soviet Union irreparably altered the dynamic of world affairs to an 
unimaginable extent. As a result, Labour faced a world in which it is stated: 
`Particularly important is the ever increasing interdependence of the 
international system and the consequential blurring of boundaries between 
domestic and foreign policies. 766 
764 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 8) 
765 Morgan notes, that `British public opinion, which had known virtually nothing of the 
distant Falklands previously, except perhaps the appeal of its postage stamps to philatelists, 
was outraged, ' and in contrast to many perceptions of Labour's stance, that `Foot's speech, 
perhaps his last great parliamentary performance, galvanized the nation .... He was adamant 
the Falklanders should be defended and liberated. Patrick Cormack [Conservative] praised 
him strongly -Tor once he spoke for Britain. ' Morgan, Kenneth 0. (2007: 411-412) 
766 Smith, Martin J. & Spear, Joanna (1992: 199) Changing The Labour Party, Chapter 13, 
Joanna Spear, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy, Implementation of Labour Party 
Foreign Policy, (London: Routledge) 
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In terms of Blairism and New Labour, the increasing role of the `international system' 
- the United Nations, and to a lesser extent 
NATO and the EEC, - and the shifts in the 
dimensions and conduct of world affairs, meant that, to a greater extent than 
previously experienced, Labour's foreign policy commitments became one step 
removed from the direct responsibility. As the following quote illustrates: 
`Several of the seemingly more intractable problems in the system are 
currently under negotiation; for example, disputes in ... the Middle East ... 
and this removes several potential problems from Labour's international 
agenda. ' 767 
A greater emphasis upon the role of bodies like EEC, NATO and the UN relieved 
Labour from the thorny issues of stating detailed policy-position in the manifesto, in 
that a sentence referring to the goals of the EEC in foreign affairs would suffice, even 
if in government it became more difficult. 
Irrespective of the changes inflicted by the end of the Cold War, two frequently 
asserted claims occur in almost all the accounts of Tony Blair's position on foreign 
affairs: that in comparison to the domestic agenda foreign affairs were a low priority; 
and that Blair had little interest and was ignorant and inexperienced. As a result, the 
overriding focus and primary policy emphasis prior to the 1997 General Election was 
placed on the domestic agenda, to the almost total exclusion of foreign affairs. This 
fact is exemplified in that foreign policy was only mentioned once by Blair in the pre- 
election campaign (a campaign purposely directed at domestic issues which Labour 
perceived the electorate felt had been neglected by the Conservatives), at the 
Bridgewater Hall, Manchester, when Blair stated: 
`Over the past six years we have seen a relentless decline in our effectiveness. 
Throughout this period the country has had no real foreign policy at all. '768 
767 Ibid., (1992: 199) 
768 Wickham-Jones, Mark (2000: 8) New Labour's foreign policy. A new moral crusade? 
Chapter 1, Labour's Trajectory in foreign affairs: the moral crusade of a pivotal power?, 
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As brief as the Bridgewater speech was, it is nevertheless significant in terms of its 
content and the inferences therein; although it hardly seems the place where history 
begins. Incorporating a firm commitment to the arms industry, and giving more than a 
hint that Labour would reverse John Major's position of `presiding over the largest 
reduction in our military capacity' since 1945 (which Blair linked to `national decline' 
and Britain's `weakness' in the world), Blair also gave warning that this under 
emphasis was nonetheless likely to change under his premiership: 
`I am a British patriot and I am proud to be a British patriot. I love my country. 
I will always put the interests of my country first. The Britain in my vision is 
not Britain turning back on the world - narrow, shy, uncertain. It is a Britain 
confident of its place in the world, sure of itself, able to negotiate with the 
world and provide leadership in the world. Century upon century it has been 
the destiny of Britain to lead other nations. That should not be a destiny that is 
part of our history. It should be part of our future. We are a leader of nations or 
nothing. ' 769 
Kampfher quotes two Labour activists who attended the Manchester meeting: one of 
those attending noted `the thing that attracted me about Blair was his intelligence and 
willingness to listen. The thing that alarmed me was his almost complete lack of 
knowledge of detail. '770 A fellow attendee said, `He gave no impression of having a 
foreign policy philosophy worked out. His aim was to ensure that foreign affairs 
didn't become an election issue. '77' 772 Blair's conviction about avoiding foreign 
quoting, Tony Blair Speech: Bridgewater Hall, Manchester, April 21,1997, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press) 
769 Blair, Tony Speech, Bridgewater Hall, Manchester, April 21,1997 
70 Kampfner, John (2003: 10) Part 1, Humanitarian Warrior, Chapter 1, Travelling Light 
"' Ibid., (2003: 10) 
772 John Kampfner claims that in the weeks leading to the 1997 General Election Jonathan 
Powell (Blair's Chief-of-Staff 1997-2007 and former Foreign Office diplomat) organised a 
series of informal seminars to advance Blair's diplomatic skills and knowledge of foreign 
affairs. They included: Sir David Hannay (former Ambassador to the U. N. ); Sir Robin 
Renwick (former Ambassador to Washington); Sir Rodric Braithwaite (Moscow and Major 
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issues was absolute, and on occasion, unforgiving. 
773 But however irrational and harsh 
his approach might be viewed, it was born of his own defining experiences of the 
1980s and the influence of the left-wing and `Red Ken' Livingstone's `antics' that 
became a `by-word for extremism and gesture rainbow politics'774 and condemned 
Labour in the process to a generation in opposition. But it also stemmed from the 
realist perspective and reality of the Labour Party electorate and their constituencies. 
Blair sensed that among the `grass-roots' of the party - of which his Sedgefield, 
Durham mining constituency was representative of many - the primary issues were 
decidedly drawn from the domestic school of political thought. As Kampfher says, 
`the talk in the pubs, clubs and local party committee meetings was not of Britain's 
nuclear deterrent, the collapse of Communism, or the fate of the Middle East. '775 
Blair may have been resolutely fastidious and largely successful in steering New 
Labour away from engaging in foreign affairs in the years from July 1994, but, with 
the possibility of taking office looming, international politics became more difficult to 
avoid. However, as Kampfher says: 
`Once in Downing Street, Blair was careful to stick to prevailing orthodoxies. 
The Foreign Office had had decades of experience in moulding ministers to its 
image. But an entire generation of diplomats had never worked with a Labour 
government. ' 776 
advisor); Sir Michael Butler; Sir Nicholas Henderson; Raymond Seitz (former U. S. 
Ambassador to Britain); Timothy Garton Ash (Fellow of St. Anthony's College, Oxford); 
Lawrence Freedman (Prof. War Studies, King's College, London). 
73 Ann Clwyd (Shadow Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs, 1994-1995) was the first person to 
be dismissed from Cabinet after travelling to Kurdish northern Iraq without Tony Blair's 
permission (April 1995). Labour's Foreign Policy Commission (LFPC) Robin Cook (Shadow 
Foreign Secretary and Head of the Commission) was to formulate policy over the first term, 
but Blair's closest advisor and assistant was the former Washington diplomat" Jonathan 
Powell. 
74 Rentoul, John (2001: 92) 
775 Kampfner, John (2003: 7) 
776 Ibid., (2003: 11) 
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This would not have been difficult, given Blair's own almost complete lack of 
experience in foreign affairs. Not only had he not served on any Parliamentary 
Committee on foreign affairs, `he was taking charge of Britain's role in the world with 
less foreign policy knowledge or experience than almost any incoming Prime Minister 
since the Second World War. '777 The position and outlook for foreign affairs was not 
much brighter amid Blair's own political advisors. Two of Blair's closest and most 
trusted political advisors - Alistair Campbell (Head of Communications) and Anji 
Hunter - Blair's `Special Assistant'778 - considered their role was to keep Blair and 
New Labour focused on domestic `middle England' issues; apart from Jonathan 
Powell the only other guiding arm within the inner-circle in foreign affairs came 
generally from Peter Mandelson. 
During the 1997 general election campaign foreign affairs were allocated a lowly 
listing in the priorities. This extended to the briefest of references in the Labour Party 
manifesto, which essentially reiterating the 1992 position that Britain would strive to 
be a `force for good in the world. '779 Of a document comprising over 17,000 words, 
only 450 were devoted to what could be termed foreign affairs. New Labour's first 
published foreign affairs programme was ordered under sub-headings and couched in 
language relating as much to Britain's interests as those elsewhere. The manifesto 
included a call for the `substantial reform of the United Nations, ' and stated, `Labour 
wants Britain to be respected in the world for the integrity with which it conducts its 
foreign relations' and that `the protection and promotion of human rights a central part 
of our foreign policy. We will work for the creation of a permanent international 
criminal court to investigate genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. ' 
Concluding: 
`Labour has traditionally been the Party of internationalism. A new Labour 
government will ... restore Britain's pride and influence as a leading force for 
7" Ibid., (2003: 8) 
77 Rentoul, John (2001: 92) 
79 Labour Party Manifesto (1997) New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better (Labour 
Party) See: http: //www. bbc. co. uk/election97/background/partiestmanlab/41abmanecon. html 
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good in the world. Britain could once again be at the centre of international 
decision-making instead of at its margins. '780 
The manifesto not only reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred after the 
collapse of the Communist bloc and the Cold War, with an emphasis on the role and 
influence of international and regional organs - UN, NATO and EEU - but also 
reflecting Blair and New Labour's mission to avoid international issues, and thereby 
dilute the risk of being identified and caught in foreign entanglements. 
Foreign Policy Under New Labour in Government. 1997-2001 
`It is some feat to go to war five times in six years. No British Prime Minister 
and few world leaders come close ... . 
What is it about this deeply Christian man that has given him such a taste for 
war? '7s' 
Whatever the numerous and complex reasons for avoiding the subject and related 
issues of foreign affairs before Labour came to government in 1997, there was 
certainly little evidence of the aversion to international events throughout the first 
Labour administration (May 1997-May 2001). 
The reasons for the dramatic shift in Blair and New Labour's position were in large 
part the political realities that distinguish the role of the government in contrast to that 
of an opposition party; in opposition there is little emphasis or responsibility towards 
wider British national and strategic interests and every emphasis upon party and 
domestic issues. However, the answer to the underlying basis to Kampfner's question 
as to why a `deeply Christian man' who was so determined to avoid such foreign 
entanglements came to assert himself and New Labour so readily and frequently to the 
theatre of foreign affairs, is in part located - as already explained - in the background 
of Blair's religious and political development. A further important factor in creating 
780 Labour Party Manifesto (1997) 
78' Kampfher, John (2003: Front End, Leaf Cover) 
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this shift on attaining government was generated by another major internal 
determinant - the appointment of Robin Cook. 
782 
Blair's First Foreign Secretary: Robin Cook 
For a Labour leader who had taken `pathological care '783 to avoid controversy - and 
controversy from foreign affairs in particular - while in opposition, Blair's 
appointment of the moderate left-wing figure Robin Cook as Foreign Secretary and 
the immediate approval of the radical Mission Statement had on first impressions all 
the hallmarks of the political suicidal tendencies of the 1980s. Although the Mission 
Statement was the corporate `big idea' concept of David Matheison, 784 it was tailored 
and fashioned to address both Blair and Cook's personal approaches to politics and 
world affairs. In many ways the statement was simply an extension of the reform and 
modernisation process Blair had applied across other areas of Labour and 
government. The establishment of the Department for International Development 
(DflD) and the energetic and enthusiastic direction of Labour towards the EEC and 
NATO were all significant changes in emphasis and position for Labour and Britain; 
as was the appointment of the Labour related figure Baroness Symons785 to head a 
review of the Foreign Office. 
782 Robert "Robin" Cook (b. 1946-d. 2005) MP: (Edinburgh Central, 1974-1983), Livingston, 
1983-2005); Shadow Foreign Secretary, 1994-1997, Foreign Secretary, 1994-2001) 
783 Anthony Seldon [Editor] (2001: 331) The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997-2001, 
Chapter 16, Christopher Hill, Foreign Policy, (London: Little, Brown & Company) 
784 David Matheison first came to Robin Cook's attention in 1987 while Matheison was an 
assistant researcher to Frank Dobson. Although convention allows ministers to assign two 
advisors - David Clark (Europe) Andrew Hood (international) also accompanied Cook - 
Matheison had been persuaded to join Cook in 1995; with a law degree and a PhD in Labour 
Party history he was commissioned by Cook as a spin-doctor (opposition) and political 
advisor (government). 
785 Elizabeth Symons (b. 1951) (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, 1996) former trades 
union leader, appointed a Junior Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(1997-1999), Minister of State for Defence Procurement (1999), and Minister of State for the 
Middle East in 2003. 
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On May 12th, Robin Cook addressed an audience of `the great and the good from 
embassies and think tanks'786 and the media in the Locarno Room of the Foreign 
Office, with an introduction to New Labour's approach to foreign policy. Echoing 
Labour's 1997 General Election manifesto, - and sniping at the perception of the 
disrepute the Conservatives had bestowed on international affairs - Cook stated 
Britain would once again be a `force for good in the world. ' This was to be achieved 
via `four goals' of New Labour's foreign policy strategy, as Cook stated: `They 
provide the Labour government's contract with the British people on foreign policy': 
`The first goal of foreign policy is security for nations. Our security will 
remain based on the North Atlantic Alliance. The Labour Government will 
give a new momentum to arms control and disarmament. We have already 
made a start with our joint statement for a total ban on landmines; 2). The 
prosperity of Britain is the next goal of our foreign policy. More people than 
ever before in Britain's long history as a trading nation depend on our exports 
to other countries or on investment from them into our own country; 3). The 
quality of life in Britain must also be an objective of our foreign policy. '787 
Although most of the goals were firmly planted on the pre-election preamble on 
foreign affairs, it was the fourth goal which had never previously been muted that was 
to cause Cook, Blair and New Labour so many difficulties: 
`4). Britain also has a national interest in the promotion of our values and 
confidence in our identity. That is why the fourth goal of our foreign policy is 
to secure the respect of other nations for Britain's contribution to keeping the 
peace of the world and promoting democracy around the world. The Labour 
Government does not accept that political values can be left behind when we 
check in our passports to travel on diplomatic business. ' 788 
786 Kampfher, John (1998: 133) Robin Cook Chapter 10, Flying Start, (London: Victor 
Gollancz) 
787 The Mission Statement, 
http: //www. gaurdian. co. uk/ethical/article/0 192031,00. html#article_continue 
788 Ibid. 
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Cook continued: 
`Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the 
demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for 
ourselves. The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our 
foreign policy and will publish an annual report on our work in promoting 
human rights abroad. '789 
Although the text clearly stated an `ethical dimension', the media and opposition 
interpreted the phrase to mean that Britain and New Labour was to pursue an `ethical 
foreign policy, ' which is notably different. While Cook and Blair explained that ethics 
would only be included as a component of decision and policy-making in foreign 
affairs, and denied the statement had ever intended to suggest Labour had adopted an 
`ethical foreign policy, ' the term - particularly with the assistance of Labour's 
political opponents - quickly became common currency. 
While the Mission Statement initiative more generally possessed the potential to 
generate controversy, the reality is that a number of the key issues referenced were 
being driven by significant sections of the electorate: the subject of land-mines (raised 
in profile as a result of Cambodia, Afghanistan and the involvement of Diana, 
Princess of Wales) led the way, suggesting a public consensus that human rights, arms 
sales and international development were all subjects requiring greater government 
attention. This shift in public and therefore government emphasis had been stimulated 
by both the changes arising from the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War (1990-1991) 
and the negative perceptions of the Conservatives as a result of the `Arms for Iraq' 
affair - from which Labour had benefited so much - in addition to the legacies and 
ongoing conflicts in East Timor, Chechnya or Tiananmen Square. These factors were 
evident motivations for New Labour's statement, particularly when combined with the 
eroding of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs caused by 
developments in the global economy and international community era. 
789 Ibid. 
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It was against this international background and British public opinion that the 
Mission Statement was launched, along with the continuing conflicts in the Balkans 
and Iraq that were also influencing both government and the electorate alike. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of an ethical dimension remained an intrinsically New 
Labour approach to foreign decision and policy-making, and a major innovation. As 
the academic Christopher Hill says: 
`The attempt to base foreign policy explicitly on `ethics' is in itself something 
of a revolution. Previous governments, while always in practice having to 
balance prudential and ethical considerations, have always preferred to do so 
behind the screen of a theoretically bland pragmatism, whereby interests have 
been deemed eternal and ideas a fatal distraction. 
Robin Cook (for it is not clear how far the Prime Minister shared his wish to 
go public on this matter, and so soon) was determined that foreign policy 
should face the new `realities' of on the one hand an increasingly blurred line 
between the domestic politics of particular countries and the problems of the 
international system, and on the other the pressure from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) for Britain to take a moral stand on issues such as arms 
sales and foreign dictatorships. The Foreign Secretary also clearly believed 
personally that it was right that the balance should tilt in favour of what he 
terms `progressive' causes and away from purely inter-state considerations. 790 
One of the defining characteristics of Blair - and thus New Labour's approach to 
foreign affairs and the related business of decision and policy-making - was that 
neither ideology nor personal prejudice should be allowed to hinder initiatives and the 
mechanism for debate and negotiations. As David Mencer explains: 
`New Labour was about not being tied down by dogma; it was essentially, or 
at least as far as Blair was concerned, about dealing with the world as it is, 
rather than how you would wish it to be. -)791 
790 Anthony Seldon [Editor] (2001: 332) Chapter 16 
791 Mencer, David (03.06.2004: 2) 
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This philosophical approach was a core feature of the first foray into affairs involving 
significant foreign interests for Blair and New Labour: the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process and Good Friday Agreement. 792 It was a classic Third Way non-ideological 
initiative and ultra-pragmatic approach. Blair, Mo Mowlam (Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland), the Irish government and politicians on both sides of the sectarian 
divide in Northern Irish politics placed aside some of the most orthodox ideologies of 
Unionism and Republicanism in order to attain a negotiated settlement. 
As a test-bed for New Labour and Blairism the central tenet to the approach by Tony 
Blair lay in accepting the `existing realities as opposed to what they preferred to 
exist, ' as unpalatable as that may be. Nevertheless, there were elementary pre- 
conditions: the parties concerned - Sinn Fein and the Loyalists, - had renounced 
terrorism and a ceasefire was in place; a massive economic and financial development 
and investment package reflecting the Rita Hinden doctrine and the inclusion of 
Senator George Mitchell were all prerequisites to the talk's commencement, and 
arguably, ultimately their success. Additional contributory factors were undoubtedly 
the application of ultra-pragmatism and the Blair style of unstructured and informal 
`settee' or `kitchen' Cabinets - as they became known. Although regular formal 
Cabinet sessions took place, specific subject issues were more frequently addressed 
among a close circle of Cabinet figures, advisors and officials. While a less formal 
Cabinet decision and policy-making model relinquished many of the restraints 
imposed by the traditional `checks and balances' of a more robust - yet arguably - 
rigid full Cabinet structure, imbued with the collective responsibility ethos, the less 
formal model did hold its dangers. The academic political historian - Peter Hennessey 
'92 The Good Friday [Belfast] Agreement (April 10,1998) was signed by the British and the 
Republic of Ireland governments, and most of the political parties in Northern Ireland. The 
agreement established a framework for a democratic and peaceful power-sharing forum in 
Northern Ireland. Although the foundations of the agreement were achieved during John 
Major's Premiership, the Easter signing was viewed as a lesson in ' Third Way ultra- 
pragmatism. 
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- conveys an opinion that `command and control would be the Blair style in 
government. '793 Adding in an analysis: 
`Tony Blair and his inner group of advisors seemed determined to operate 
from within No. 10, once they got there, as they had within the Labour Party - 
driving policy and presentation from the centre around a core of delivery 
musts, and brooking no serious resistance either from minister, ministerial 
colleagues or from cumbersome, traditional government mechanics. 
The one great exception to this was the Chancellor of the Exchequer-in- 
waiting, Gordon Brown. It was plainly going to be a centre-driven 
administration with the `centre, ' as later defined publicly by Tony Blair, as 
s7 "my own office, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury. 94 
Despite the inherent risks of deviating from more traditional Cabinet practices, what 
the Belfast Agreement example emphasises in terms of Blair's personal philosophy, is 
that the `result justified the means. ' Although in its simplest analogy he was a `fresh 
face to an age-old problem' Blair displayed an inexhaustible belief in himself, his 
personable charm, as well as a belief that given the right people and conditions a 
positive result can be achieved. As Kampfher elaborates: 
`Part of it is very simple, but I don't mean that necessarily pejoratively, linear 
view about problem solving; he [Blair] took that with him to Northern Ireland; 
the Good Friday Agreement, 795 in many ways attributed to his sense of 
exaggerated powers of persuasion. From that I think he genuinely took with 
him through all areas of life, including the Middle East, this sense that 
reasonable men and women, if put in a room together, can strike deals, a very 
793 Hennessy, Peter. (2000: 477) The Prime Ministers: The Office and its Holders Since 1945, 
Chapter 18, Command and Control: Blair, 1997-, (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press) 
794 Ibid., (2000: 477) referring, House of Commons Official Report, 28 July, 1998 
795 Good Friday Agreement: See: Mowlam, Mo (2002) Momentum: The Struggle for Peace, 
Politics and the People, Chapter 6, The Hand of History, Talks Progressing, (London: Hodder 
& Stoughton) 
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simple, straight forward view, and he couldn't ever quite understand it when 
people didn't see it in those terms. It must be said that back in those days, his 
own bargaining power was so much greater, because his authority 
domestically and internationally was so much greater, the two obviously go 
hand-in-hand. ' 796 
Northern Ireland was a particular challenge for Blair: not just politically, but as a 
personal anathema. It was a quintessential example of the consequences of ideological 
dogma, sectarianism and confrontation with the disastrous social, economic and 
political repercussions. To Blair the conflict was an obscene manifestation born of 
tribalism and a blind loyalty to political and religious orthodoxy; the demonstrations 
and paraphernalia of banners depicting reverence to past conflicts bore echoes of the 
British class-war mentality and extremism of the left-wing `one-book brigades' that 
penetrated Labour and the unions, amid the open conflict of the miner's strike (1984- 
1985). As such, Good Friday was as much about Blair as it was about politics. 
Blair would attempt to approach to the Israel-Palestinian conflict using the tried and 
tested model applied in Northern Ireland: setting the conditions of an end to violence 
and terror, with a core Hindenite economic aid and investment emphasis, but 
essentially modelled on external in-formal negotiating figures like Michael Levy797 
and the notion that good people - moderate progressives - sat round a table can reach 
an agreement. Before Blair became overly engaged in the Middle East, a conflict and 
humanitarian crisis closer to home came to consume much of his interest in foreign 
affairs. 
If Northern Ireland illustrated one key plank of Blairism in affairs with significant 
foreign interests, the Yugoslavia-Serbia-Kosovo War798 exemplified the other major 
'96 Kampfner, John (05.12.2003: 1) Interview: Kampfner-Nelson, St. Pancras, London 
79' Michael Abraham Levy [Baron Levy, 1997] (b. 1944) is a Labour related figure; Levy was 
formerly chief fund-raiser for the Labour Party; Gordon Brown's appointee Michael Williams 
replaced Levy as Middle East envoy after nine years in September 2007. 
798 During the Yugoslav/Serbian-Kosovo conflict (1996-1999) Serbian forces were deemed to 
have violated human rights and humanitarian law in Kosovo. Given Kosovo was a semi- 
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tenet of Tony Blair and New Labour's approach to international decision and policy- 
making: the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention (DHI). Blair first propounded the 
DHI in April 1999.799 The doctrine was viewed in some quarters as Blair's attempt to 
recover the initiative in foreign affairs - achieved by Robin Cook's 1997 Mission 
Statement - by asserting his own identity and position. Similarities between the 
Mission Statement - with its assertion that ethics should be a consideration in foreign 
decision and policy-making - and the DHI are located in the innovative - if not unique 
- affirmation that the hitherto sacrosanct principle of the sovereignty of states 
be 
challenged and overridden in the interests of averting a humanitarian calamity. The 
additional emphasis upon the use of regional and international organs (EEC, NATO, 
and United Nations) to intervene in cases of humanitarian issues was also revelatory 
in terms of the norms and practices of post-1945 era of international relations and 
international law to protect sovereign of states to address internal affairs without 
interference from external powers. 
Blair's doctrine reflected his personal attitude to international affairs: his belief in the 
pillars of natural justice and liberal and humanitarian interventionalism which are not 
necessarily based on the protection or related to British national interests. Although as 
Kampfher somewhat wryly notes: `national interests were never harmed by a more 
stable and `better world. '800 The use of intervention in the pursuit of justice - beyond 
autonomous area of Serbia, within the context of international law it was viewed by the UN 
an internal affair; as such, NATO's intervention - although supported by the United States - 
was viewed as external interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation State. Tony 
Blair, Bill Clinton and NATO justified the intervention on the grounds of stemming a 
humanitarian emergency and potential catastrophe. 
799 Tony Blair unveiled the Doctrine of the International Community before the Chicago 
Economic Club, USA (April 22,1999) at which he detailed the concept that on humanitarian 
ground the international community, in contrast to orthodox doctrine of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of a sovereign state - advocated it was right and a collective duty to 
intervene. It was based on the post-Cold War realities of a global economy and inter- 
dependency in which issues and conflict cannot be viewed or acted upon in isolation, as a 
bloc or ideological interest, but as a concern of all governments and states. Blair cited the 
enduring conflict and `ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo as a prime example. 
800 Kampfner, John (05.12.2003: 2) 
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national interests - is an example of an `over-lap' between Blair's more realists 
position regarding an `ethical dimension' to foreign policy, and that of the more 
idealist position held by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook. As Kampfher underlines: 
`It was the willingness to use force and to threaten the use of force with a view 
to that threat being carried out, for what were believed to be altruistic ends, ... 
part of that was just a reworking of global politics after the cold war, but part 
of it was derived from a biblical view of - not might being right, but when you 
were right being able to use your might, and that was really what Tony Blair 
took with him as his template in looking at everything, and it applied across 
the board. ' 801 
In terms of an analysis of what the Kosovo example says about Blair and New 
Labour's concept of foreign policy approaches in the context of humanitarian 
interventionism, Peter Hennessy suggests: 
"It underlined the blend of custom and practice and the desire for smaller, 
leaner decision-taking patterns. As one careful observer expressed it: 
Although the operation showed the PM's preference for operating on a daily 
basis in small groups, it also showed the endurance of the entrenched 
constitutional system whereby the "inner war cabinet" was linked 
continuously by less frequent meetings of DOP [Defence and Overseas Policy] 
and the Cabinet itself overseeing a variety of subjects-specific official 
groups. ' 802 
Hennessy concludes: 
801 Ibid., (05.12.2003: 2) 
802 Hennessy, Peter (2000: 506) quoting, Hennessy, Peter (1999), The Importance of Being 
Tony: Two Years of the Blair Style, the Lord Mayor's Lecture, July 12,1999, (London: Guy's 
& St. Thomas Hospital Trust), p. 15 
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`In terms of the wider picture of the Blair style, the Balkans War had another 
impact which cut against the norms of the `entrenched constitutional system' 
based on collective government. ' 803 
It would be as easy as it is tempting given Blair's overt Christian faith and his proven 
willingness to translate this into an applied politics to attribute much of the content of 
the DHI to his religious zeal. Firstly that would be too simplistic and largely 
unwarranted, and secondly politically irresponsible in the context of the glaring 
scrutiny such a policy would attract on an international stage. As Christopher Hill 
says, `although its centrepiece is an attempt to rewrite the `Just War'804 doctrine for 
the new millennium, '805 the substance of the doctrine was clearly an attempt to 
address certain post-Cold War realities - the mutual dependency of states and their 
national interests in a global economy, which could only realistically be addressed via 
international diplomatic and practical co-operation. 
Conclusion 
803 Ibid., (2000: 506) 
804 The conceptual origins of a `Just War' theory lie as much in ancient Greek and Mediaeval 
political and theological philosophy as it does in the more modem notions of natural justice 
and ethics argued to underpin political and international politics. The earliest recorded 
exponent of the `Just War' theory comes from Saint Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus, 
Augustin of Hippo [Algeria] b. 354-d. 430) whose fourth century writing establishes a centre- 
ground between absolute pacifism - enshrined in the Christian tradition - with the overt 
conquestial imperialism represented by ancient Rome. Augustine's theory has been 
interpreted to provide various and variable justifications for the use of war including Pope 
Urban II medieval crusade against the Muslims in Jerusalem (1095-1099) and the war against 
Nazi Germany by the Christian and secular pacifist movement. Blair's motivation for 
intervention in Kosovo are argued to contain a religious crusading context: `We are 
succeeding in Kosovo because this was a moral cause ... We can then embark on a new 
moral crusade to rebuild the Balkans.... Crusade. He was entirely at ease with the word. ' 
Kampfher, John (2003: 60) Chapter 3, Most Moral of Wars?, quoting, Tony Blair [source not 
cited], (London: Free Press) 
805 Anthony Seldon [Editor] (2001: 340) Chapter 16 
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Tony Blair's more determined, almost driven approach towards the reform and 
modernisation of the Labour Party - exceeding that of Neil Kinnock or John Smith - 
resulted largely from his experience of old Labour at the hands of the left-wing of the 
party in the early 1980s, and a series of four general election defeats that occurred as a 
consequence. The need to eradicate these catastrophic events from Blair's own 
conscience, as well as that of the party, also extended to addressing the collective 
memory of the electorate as a vital prerequisite to Labour regaining political power in 
order to effect change on British society. The efforts to exorcise these early political 
experiences also shaped Blair's personal philosophy and New Labour's political 
agenda throughout his term as leader of the opposition, and then his first term as 
Prime Minister. 
Blair's socialism, as with his political philosophy generally, Blairism, is a curious and 
arguably unique blend of personal background and early life-experience imbued with 
the values and benefits of the welfare state, combined with his deep Christian faith. In 
that sense it is certainly a form of Christian socialism. But for Blair, his Christian 
socialist beliefs did not translate into the traditional rigid application of socialism into 
the decision and policy-making mechanisms as enshrined in the historical 
constitutional orthodoxy of the party's socialist constitution, or the dogmatic 
adherence to established methodologies that, in his view, should be diverse and 
negotiable. The core of Blair's Christian socialism lies in the meticulous identification 
and vehement commitment to a core set of socialist values and principles - as with his 
religious faith - that remain as permanent as they are universal. But the crucial 
difference in Tony Blair's philosophical brand of Christian socialism - Blairism - lies 
in the belief that the mechanism for achieving socialist aims is largely immaterial - as 
located in the origins, basis and application of his ultra-pragmatism; what is really at 
issues is the set of values upon which that mechanism is based, not how it is achieved; 
within Blairism those values are as Christian as they are socialist. 
Tony Blair's personal blend of Christian socialist encapsulated in his core values and 
multi-dimensional approach identified in his ultra-pragmatism was as notable in both 
the inclusion of an `ethical dimension' to foreign affairs as it was in the `Just War' 
basis of the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention. The mechanism for pursuing the 
application of these values in the international environment lay for Blair in the 
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employment of special advisors and reforms directed at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the EEC, and ultimately, NATO and the UN; reforms which 
would facilitate breaking the moulds and established taboos that emulated from 
concepts like the primacy of national interests and the inviolability of sovereign states. 
Dealing with the world as it is, rather than as one might wish it to be and progressing 
a value-laden agenda through pragmatic and where necessary, ultra-pragmatic means, 
was the piston-engine at the centre of Blair's approach to foreign affairs and policy- 
making. His personal authority within the party (which stemmed principally from his 
ability to win elections) combined with his `command-and-control' and `kitchen- 
cabinet' style of policy decision-making, meant that his vision increasingly dominated 
New Labour policy-making, particularly once government had been attained, 
decisions and policy determined. 
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Chapter 6 
The New Labour Party's First Government and the Essential 
Dilemma (1997-2001) 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the policies of New Labour's first government, under Tony 
Blair, towards political Zionism and the Israel-Palestinian question. It will explore the 
internal and external determinants which shaped policies and helped determined a 
subtle shift in the policy trajectory, while remaining aware of the seminal evidence 
derived from the previous chapter: that the one overarching determinant was Tony 
Blair himself, his political philosophy, Blairism, and its implications for international 
affairs, foreign decision and policy-making in general. 
One key internal determinant, and one which had impacted upon Labour policy 
responses to the core components of the essential dilemma in previous eras, was the 
requirement to formulate policy as a party of government. The personal, ideological 
and political intricacies embedded within the internal Labour divisions among key 
leading Labour figures, including Blair, his Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, and his 
Chancellor, Gordon Brown are important factors in this equation as Labour was again 
required to balance national and strategic interests with ideologically based policy 
commitments, and personal positions. So too was the role and influence of key Labour 
MPs such as Peter Mandelson and Labour-related figures like Alistair Campbell and 
Michel Levy on whom Blair depended, and who enabled him to frequently bypass 
conventional cabinet and FCO structures. Additionally, the necessities of recapturing 
and retaining the votes of key minority communities such as the Jewish community 
after decades of mistrust of Labour left-wing extremism were also a factor. The 
application of Tony Blair's pragmatism arrived simultaneously with the more general 
discrediting of socialism in favour of social democracy within the party, and a 
corresponding transformation of Labour's status from a party in the `pockets of the 
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trades unions' to the `party of big business. ' 906 Within this contextual climate 
ideological dogma was all but abandoned in favour of a `sit down and talk it out' 
approach to foreign policy. The reform and modernisation process of the party that 
continued unabated throughout was thus an internal determinant of on-going 
significance. 
Among the numerous external determinates, the most important was clearly the 
Middle East peace process which resulted from the 1993 Oslo Accords. 807 The 
subsequent peace process presented Labour with an opportunity to move to a more 
balanced policy position, and in doing so, abandon its traditional general pro-political 
Zionist/Israel policy trajectory. This shift to an overtly neutralist position was made 
possible by the partial reconciliation of the main protagonists (Israel and the 
Palestinians) that provided Labour with the opportunity to largely detach itself from 
the constraints and contradictions generated by Labour's historic relationship with, 
political Zionism - founded on common origins - and which had found expression in 
the essential dilemma. Given that both Israel and the PLO had established a detailed 
agreement and plan, Oslo also allowed Labour to avoid awkward detailed policy 
commitments emanating from the historical contradicting perspectives which often 
offended the Palestinians and/or Israel, and sections of the party itself, by basing its 
policies on those formulated by the peace process. Furthermore, in the wake of the 
global decline of Eastern European and Russian `socialism' - as previously noted, 
`socialism' is hardly universally agreed to be a given ideology or phenomenon, - Oslo 
as an example of post-Cold War pragmatism of the international system further 
provided the foundations for the application of Tony Blair's personal philosophy - 
Blairism. 
806 See: Osler, David (2002) Labour Party PLC: New Labour as a Party of Business, Chapter 
3, Entrepreneurs' Champion: The Birth of Blairism, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing) 
807 The Oslo Accords (Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements) was a negotiated agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO). Though drafted in Oslo, Norway (August 1993) the agreement was 
signed in Washington (September 13,1993) by Mahmoud Abbas (PLO Official) and Shimon 
Peres (Israel Foreign Minister); Warren Christopher (U. S. Secretary of State) and Andrei 
Kozyrev (Russian Foreign Minister 1990-1996) were witnesses. President Bill Clinton, 
Yasser Arafat (PLO Chairman) and Yitzhak Rabin (Israel Prime Minister) were in attendance. 
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Tony Blair's position towards Israel and the Palestinians 
The previous chapter conveyed the assertion that prior to and upon becoming Prime 
Minister Tony Blair had little or no interest in foreign affairs. As David Mepham, 
Labour's Foreign Policy Advisor (1994-1997) conveys: 
`The curious thing about Blair is that he had no foreign policy pre-1997. He 
had no interest in foreign policy. He gave one speech on foreign policy during 
the Labour Party election campaign in 1997 in Manchester, which was a 
dreadful speech. It was written for him by a chap called Jonathan Powell808 
who is his Chief-of-Staff at number 10, formerly from the Foreign Office. I do 
not think it said anything about Israel-Palestine; I am sure it did not. It was a 
general statement about how he was patriotic, and Britain would be a great 
nation again; how we must have strong armed forces and never be weak on 
defence, and all that rubbish that they needed to say to get elected. And that 
was the only statement he made on foreign policy in pre-1997. '809 
It is argued that one of the primary reasons for Blair's limited interest was his 
confidence in his choice of Robin Cook as Foreign Secretary. As Mandelson and 
Liddle state: 
`Blair is very interested in foreign affairs, but he will not want these to crowd 
out his domestic agenda - especially when, in Robin Cook, he has a 
prospective foreign secretary in whom he has complete confidence. 1810 
808 Seldon says of Jonathan Powell: `His value to Blair stemmed from his lack of any personal 
or political agenda.... Powell's ability to merge himself into Blair's persona is indeed 
striking. `You know when you are dealing with him that he's inside the mind of Blair, ' said 
one Whitehall insider. `When he speaks, it is Blair's voice you are hearing. ' Seldon, Anthony. 
Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 345) Chapter 24, Jonathan Powell, 
The Impact of Jonathan Powell 
I Mepham, David (14.12.2005: 4) Interview: Mepham-Nelson, Covent Garden, London 
810 Liddle, Roger & Mandelson, Peter (1996: 245) The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour 
Deliver? (London: Faber & Faber) 
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However, the key to understanding that appointment lay in Blair's relationship with 
his Chancellor, Gordon Brown. It had been the objections from Brown to the 
appointment of Robin Cook - `Brown's great rival in Cabinet'81' - to any key 
domestic post that effectively consigned Cook to the post of Foreign Secretary, 812 in 
part, an effort to protect the Chancellor's prudent domestic economic plans from a 
known left-wing figure. Similarly it was Brown who came to increasingly squeeze 
Blair's more radical and financially costly domestic agenda, gradually directing him 
into the international arena as Brown pushed to control spending and taxation - the 
perennial concern of a Labour Party and Chancellor scarred from the 1980s `tax and 
spend' label applied by the Conservatives and right-wing press to Labour's left-wing 
public spending policies. 
Differences between Blair and Brown emerged almost immediately after the election. 
Seldon claims that `tensions quickly arose between Number 10 over the conduct of 
business. Very soon after the election, key figures in Number 10 were complaining 
they were being frozen out. '813 Although Blair and Brown had agreed to a two year 
spending freeze in 1997-1999, it was over Brown's extension of this control into a 
`new three year planning cycle' in preparation for the General Election that serious 
81 Routledge, Paul (1998: 296) Gordon Brown: The Biography, (London: Simon & Schuster) 
8)2 While the post of Foreign Secretary remains one of the three great offices of state (along 
with Chancellor and Home Secretary) the excessive travel and distinctive non-domestic 
aspect has a tendency to distance a minister from colleagues, the workings of Cabinet and 
government. As such, the post of Foreign Secretary is far from universally welcomed. As 
Susan Crosland says of Anthony Crosland, `as far as he was concerned, he didn't know 
anything about foreign affairs; ' and quoting a Labour MP, that `He was dropped from the 
skies into the FO. ' Crosland, Susan (1982: 324) Tony Crosland, Chapter 38, Learning To Live 
with One Another, quoting, Bill McCarthy, (London: Jonathan Cape). On being invited by 
Prime Minister James Callaghan to report on events in foreign affairs, Crosland 
unapologetically replied "Nil! " Jefferys, Kevin (2000: 200) Anthony Crosland, quoting, Tony 
Benn's Diaries, April 13,1976, p. 557-558 
813 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 668) Chapter 
40, Gordon Brown, Cold War, 1997-2001, Interview, Gavyn Davis, December 1,2003 
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`Differences emerged' and although `Blair managed to win some arguments.... On 
most of the significant differences in the first term Brown carried the day. '814 
815 
Gordon Brown's approach to foreign affairs was almost entirely driven by the 
domestic agenda; when and where foreign affairs touched him at all, it was usually in 
terms of their economic influence and his more Christian-based concerns for Third 
World debt. Thus, despite the fact that Brown was widely known to be `more 
Atlanticist than Blair and a declared friend of Israel, '816 it was Blair and Cook who 
drove Labour's foreign policy. Blair's delegation of foreign policy was gradually 
reversed as Brown progressively curtailed his domestic plans on the grounds of cost, 
and as the first years passed, increasingly on the basis of Brown's resentment at being 
passed-over as party leader. As a consequence, Blair sought to carve an independent 
niche for himself from the financial restraints of the Chancellor in the sphere of 
international events and issues. Brown's remoteness from the foreign-policy arena 
meant that Blair could out-maneuver Brown's financial restraints often by presenting 
a situation as a fait accompli. As Anthony Seldon says, for example: 
`On Kosovo [1999], Brown was not persuaded of the case for involvement, 
and was then `deeply shocked' when he learned that Blair had proposed to 
Clinton that the British pay one-third of the cost of the operation. '817 
On the subject of Israel and the Palestinians, Blair's personal approach was 
determined by a number of key factors (A-E). 
A. Rejection of Left-Wing radicalisation of the Party in the 1980s 
Tony Blair's biographer, John Kampfner, claims that for Blair the Palestinian issue 
was inextricably associated with the causes of the left-wing and far-left of the party in 
814 Ibid., (2004: 674-675) Interview, Charlie Whelan, November 10,2003 
815 The Blair-Brown deal was not restricted to financial aspects: Blair also gave Brown 
substantial control over economic matters and through that influence over domestic affairs. 
816 Bower, Tom (2004: 450) Gordon Brown, (London: Harper Collins) 
817 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 675-676) 
Interview, Charlie Whelan, November 10,2003 
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the 1980s, and as such, was to be avoided as being radical and thus potentially 
alienating to the British electorate. Kampfher describes the basis of Blair's approach 
and thinking towards support for the Palestinian national movement among New 
Labour figures thus: 
`Anyone going round with a Palestinian Kafyah scarf, all that kind of thing. 
It's this idea, this word that he bandies around, `modern' and `modernization', 
if only the Palestinians could, quote, "modernize, " unquote, "then they would 
become less extreme, " unquote, the Israelis would become less extreme and 
less defensive. ' 818 
Kampfher continues: 
`Blair almost sees a westernized ultra-modernity as a route to cutting through a 
lot of problems. For example, one of the reasons he finds Northern Ireland so 
intractable is because of the old-fashioned feel of Unionism; a lot of Unionist 
communities in Northern Ireland feel like England in the 1950's, and Blair 
cannot handle things that do not feel modern. '819 
Kampfher says Blair also had a Hindenite notion that what essentially lay behind 
Palestinian disquiet was a lack of educational and economic opportunity. Blair had 
witnessed the deep, and at times, violent despair of the 1980s in Britain emulating 
from the industrial wastelands and inner-city slums, and therefore if training and 
investment were forthcoming - if Palestinians `could go round with a `lap-top'820 - the 
situation would be resolved. 
The net result for Blair of these associations and perceptions was not so much the case 
that he was anti-Palestinian, just that he was anti-left-wing, and anti-anything that 
threatened New Labour's electoral credibility. Moreover, and again in reference to 
Northern Ireland, Blair found the subject generally, and many of the associated issues, 
818 Kampfher, John (05.12.2003: 5) 
819 Ibid., (05.12.2003: 5) 
820 Ibid., (05.12.2003: 5) 
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an anathema. Aspects of the Israel-Palestinian conflict represented for Blair a non- 
progressive tribalism - `stuck in the past' scenario. In essence, the conflict, as with the 
background to the Northern Ireland situation and the class-warfare mindset of old 
Labour in perpetual conflict between governments, business and the unions also 
revolted him. It was in many ways the very antithesis of `the modem' and everything 
his philosophy stood for and sought to achieve. But what is clear also from these 
sources of influence, is that Blair evidently sees Israel as the democratic modem 
exemplar, and the Palestinians as the more reactionary, authoritarian and guilty 
partner in the predicament even within the frame of what became the `both sides' 
analogy. 
B: Blair's Personal Advisor, Peter Mandelson 
Within the limited context of Blair's inner-Cabinet circle of political advisors, one of 
the relatively more informed Labour figures on foreign affairs and the Middle East - 
particularly among the junior generation - was Peter Benjamin Mandelson. 
82 1 As a 
Minister without portfolio (1997-1998) with a long-standing position based on an 
even-handed approach, Mandelson was at the heart of the New Labour administration 
and its policy-making towards the Middle East. 
It is said that if `Tony Blair chose the Labour Party; Peter Mandelson was born into it 
... ordained 
by both birth and environment to be Labour. ' 922 Possessing a first-rate 
Labour pedigree and invaluable experience of the television media, Mandelson had 
been Neil Kinnock's Director of Communications (1985) and had guided Labour 
through the reform and modernisation process under Kinnock, John Smith and Tony 
Blair. Labelled as the first `Spin Doctor' and the `Prince of Darkness' (a reference to 
his hovering in the shadows as opposed to the glaring spotlight of the press or 
conference rostrums), Mandelson is nevertheless viewed as one of the primary 
architects of New Labour, and to an extent in the casting of Blairism. 
11 Peter Benjamin Mandelson (b. 1953) MP: (Hartlepool, 1992-2004), European 
Commissioner 2004-present; Communist Party member (1971). Born in London, Mandelson 
is Herbert Morrison's maternal grandson. 
822 Macintyre, Donald (2000: 1) Mandelson and the Making of New Labour, Chapter 3, A 
Bourgeois at Heart, Tanzania, Oxford, 1972-1976, (London: Harper/Collins Publishers) 
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Although an Oxford contemporary says Mandelson was `pretty Zionist, 823 when he 
arrived at Oxford university, the people he was to meet in a very short period 
confirmed him as a resolute neutralist figure. He first travelled to the Middle East as a 
result of a chance meeting with Lord Caradon [Hugh Foot] via the Oxford United 
Nations Students' Association. Caradon, through a contact in the Arab League, 
managed to organise a tour for Mandelson to the region in 1974. It was the experience 
of Lebanon and the predicament of the Palestinian refugees that solidified 
Mandelson's neutralist position. As he says: 
`It is very strange to think that Israel does not accept the entity of the 
Palestinians and recognise the PLO. They are so obviously an entity and 
"national personality" and the PLO acts in such a responsible and authoritative 
manner here. ' 824 
In Beirut, which Mandelson described sardonically as `this outpost of American 
imperialism, '825 he met David Gilmour (son of Sir Ian Gilmour826) and David Hirst827 
before moving on to visit a Palestinian refugee camp. The experience evidently made 
an impression on the young Mandelson: 
`The conditions in these camps (and I went to a good one) are as gruesome as 
reported. Thousands of people living in unbearably cramped conditions, 
although things have improved in the last five years. 
Of course they will not leave the camps until they are given the opportunity to 
return to Palestine. It is the middle-aged and younger ones who seem most 
823 Ibid., (2000: 43) quoting, Dick Newby 
824 Ibid., (2000: 44) quoting, Peter Mandelson 
821 Ibid., (2000: 44) 
826 Sir Ian Gilmour (b. 1926-d. 2007) Conservative MP: (1977-1992), House of Commons 
Spokesperson on Foreign Affairs, and understudy to Lord Carrington (Foreign Secretary 
1979-1982), and President of Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) 1993-1996. 
82' David Hirst was The Guardian Middle Eastern journalist, author The Gun and the Olive 
Branch; The Roots of Violence in the Middle East, (1977) (London: Faber & Faber) 
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committed to return to Palestine. They are good humoured, patient and with a 
will of steel. It is a desperate situation. '828 
After completing his tour with visits to Jordan, Syria and Israel, and on returning to 
Oxford, Mandelson wrote an article in the `Viewpoint' section of the Jewish 
Chronicle advocating an independent State of Palestine in the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank. As Mandelson's biographer Macintyre concludes: `The journey dissipated what 
was left of the youthful Zionism identified by Nick Newby. '829 
C: Labour Friends of Israel (LFI) and the Israeli Ambassador 
As with many demographic and parliamentary generations of historic and 
contemporary Labour figures, Tony Blair had been identified and courted by British 
pro-Israel, Jewish figures and Israeli politicians from as early as 1987. Viewed as a 
potential leading figure within Labour, he was approached and introduced to the 
British Jewish community, the Labor Party of Israel, and Israel itself. These early 
associations had a profound affect - as they were intended to do - upon Blair's 
personal perspective on the subject and issues of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. As 
foreign policy advisor to New Labour - David Mepham - says: 
`I think even before he became leader, Blair, from a couple of trips he had 
made to Israel (as many Labour MPs do, as guests of the Labour Friends of 
Israel [LFI]), they send these upwardly mobile young Labour MPs to Israel, 
take them around Israel and they all come back very pro-Israeli, and he was in 
that mould. Even though he did not know a lot of the detail, from the moment 
he became Labour leader he did not say much about it, he did not do much 
about it, he did not make any policy statements, but his instincts were 
obviously much more on the side of the Israelis than the Palestinians. ' 830 
Although the main purpose of LFI, since its founding in 1957, was the introduction of 
Labour figures to Israel from a Labor Party of Israel perspective, its other main 
"Z8 Macintyre, Donald (2000: 45) 
829 Ibid., (2000: 43-44) 
$30 Mepham, David (14.12.2005: 4) 
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function was to maintain, develop and secure additional links between the British 
Jewish communities, the Labor political establishment in Israel, and the British 
Labour Party. This was to be facilitated by key linking figures that included Moshe 
Raviv (Israeli Ambassador to Britain 1993-1998). Moshe Raviv claims that both Blair 
and Brown had been identified as potential Labour Leaders and advised that they be 
invited to Israel at the earliest opportunity: 
`When I left London as Minister Plenipotentiary in 1988,1 recommended to 
my successor that two young Labour Members of Parliament, Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown, be invited to visit Israel at an early date. ' 831 
Raviv states that as a consequence of establishing early contacts and organizing visits 
to Israel, he developed a `good rapport with the Labour leaders, - John Smith and his 
successor Tony Blair, '832 (although an account of Smith's experience on a visit to 
Israel does not necessarily substantiate Raviv's claim. )833 Raviv also states when and 
how the three key Labour figures (Blair, Brown and Cook) were directly introduced to 
the Israeli perspective with the Middle East Peace Process, which had begun with 
Oslo: 
`In the three years prior to the British elections in May 1997, the Labour 
leaders visited Israel and got acquainted at first hand with our leaders and with 
the problems of the peace process. These visits included Tony Blair, Lord 
Irvine of Lairg, Gordon Brown and Robin Cook. '834 
The initial relationship with Moshe Raviv generated a general interest in Israel and the 
Middle East in Blair. With the increasing number and regularity of contacts as Blair 
advanced through the Labour Party ranks his introduction and interest led to a 
profound commitment to Israel, which was to be frequently expressed by Blair at the 
831 Raviv, Moshe (1998: 270) Israel at Fifty: Five Decades of Struggle for Peace, (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson) 
832 Ibid., (1998: 270) 
833 See: Stuart, Mark (2005: 349-350) Chapter 23, Stresses and Strains 
131 Raviv, Moshe (1998: 270) 
303 
Chapter 6 (1997-2001) 
annual party conferences. After Raviv's return to Israel in 1998 the role as main 
unofficial link between Blair, the British Jewish Community and the Labor Party in 
Israel passed to Michael Levy. 835 
The Labour related figure Michael Levy was appointed as Tony Blair's special 
advisor and envoy to the Middle East in 2002.836 As Blair's special advisor, Levy's 
primary expertise lay in the specific area of the British Jewish Communities and the 
Labor Party of Israel, and their perspective on the conflict with the Palestinians. 
Although Levy had known Blair since 1994, and had long-standing personal and 
professional connections with the British Jewish communities and organisational 
bodies (notably the Board of Deputies of British Jews and Labour Friends of Israel), 
and the Israeli Labor political figures, 837 he had few if any additional areas of 
expertise relating to the Palestinians or the Middle East generally. Prior to his 
appointment as Envoy his main activity had been as a fund-raiser among the Jewish 
communities for Labour's election campaign. Whatever the origins, the significance 
and influence on Blair was varied and noted, as Kampfher states: 
`Levy had two functions: one was fund raising, and the other was to school 
Blair in the intricacies of Middle Eastern politics. '838 
And as David Mepham affirms, the primary functions of Levy to Blair and New 
Labour: 
835 It is claimed Tony Blair first met Michael Levy at a London social event hosted by Gideon 
Meir (Deputy Director-General for Media and Public Affairs) and (Minister Plenipotentiary at 
the Israeli Embassy, London); Levy and Blair had a mutual acquaintance in Eldred Tabachnik 
QC (former President, Board of Deputies of British Jews) both of whom qualified at Derry 
[Lord] Irvine's Law Chambers. Irvine had provided legal advice to Labour regarding 
expelling Militant (1980s). 
836 Michael Levy resigned his position as Special Advisor and Envoy to the Middle East on 
the June 27,2007, the date Tony Blair relinquished his Premiership and passed the Labour 
Party leadership to Gordon Brown. 
837 Daniel Levy (Michael Levy's son) has served as an advisor to Ehud Barak (Israeli Labor 
Prime Minister 1999-2001) and Yossi Beilin (Labor Deputy Foreign Minister 1999-2001). 
838 Kampfher, John (05.12.2003: 3) 
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`I do not know at what point Michael Levy - an interesting and important 
figure on this issue - came into the picture. He was basically just a friend of 
Blair who talked to him a lot about the Israeli-Palestinian question, and 
presumably influenced him a lot in terms of his thinking. ' 839 
The appointment of Michael Levy was an unusual appointment in the sense that Levy 
had specific expertise in terms of Israel, but little wider expertise in the Middle 
Eastern region and foreign affairs generally; this key factor created a good deal of 
criticism. Watkins' says of Levy and his appointment that his `sympathies are 
demonstrably pro-Israeli' and that `his knowledge of the Middle East seems to be 
confined to association with a long list of Zionist and Israeli causes. '840 A second 
criticism was that Levy's appointment further confirmed the suspicion that Blair was 
circumventing the conventional Cabinet and FCO roles in New Labour's decision and 
foreign policy-making by utilizing a `settee cabinet' to advance his own ultra- 
pragmatic approach. Watkins' claims Levy was dispatched on `a series of visits to 
Arab heads of State, with instructions to report back directly to the Prime Minister - 
not the Foreign Secretary. '841 Questions as to whom or what Levy represented and 
was ultimately responsible for, were an ongoing concern, combined with the fact that 
his qualifications and experience were entirely embedded in the Jewish and Israeli 
Labor Party, the fact that Levy was advising the British Prime Minister on one, if not 
the most sensitive and volatile issues in international affairs, and largely acting 
beyond the usual Cabinet structure, diplomatic channels and support networks located 
in the Foreign Secretary and his Office is also commented upon by the academic, 
Stuart Wavell: 
`Another paradox. Levy is a pillar of British Judaism and a leading 
international Zionist who has served as Blair's special envoy to the Middle 
East, where he is credited with brokering talks between Palestinian and Israeli 
leaders - much to the irritation of British Foreign Secretaries such as Robin 
839 Mepham, David (14.12.2005: 4) 
840 Watkins, David (06.07.2003: 1) 
$4' Ibid., (06.07.2003: 1) 
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Cook, who would not speak to him, and Jack Straw, who keeps his 
distance. ' 842 
It may have been the combination of the lack of experience on Blair's behalf in 
conjunction with the informal style in negotiating and policy-making formulating 
favoured by Blair that merged into the realm of `special advisors' and Michael Levy 
in particular. As Kampfher states: 
`Blair has always operated through informal channels, in whatever form of 
policy, whether it was domestic or whatever, he doesn't particularly like 
formal Cabinet Committee meetings, he likes dealing with `kitchen Cabinets' 
and individual people doing "jobs" unquote for him, so Michael Levy worked 
rather like the role of Alistair Campbell, Peter Mandelson and Jonathan 
Powell, these people, that is the way he likes to deal with people; Michael 
Levy was of that category. 843 
This approach may have worked for Blair in remoulding the Labour Party and 
concluding an agreement in Northern Ireland, and it had the enormous benefit of 
bypassing official channels with all the related `checks and balances' of Permanent 
Secretaries and career diplomats in the field, but it also held dangers that became all 
too prevalent on Blair's post-9/11 2001 trip to Syria while rallying global support 
for the forthcoming `War on Terror. ' Alternatively, the use of envoys and advisors 
like Levy could be used to avoid awkward discussions with Robin Cook, particularly 
842 Stuart Wavell Lord Cashpoint's Touch of Money Magic, Sunday Times, March 6, 
2006, http: //www. timesonline. co. uk/tol/news/uk/article742819. ece 
843 Kampfner, John (05.12.2003: 3) 
844 Some of the potential short-falls of relying on a small group of advisors with relatively 
narrow field of expertise occurred in October 2001 when Tony Blair came up against some 
sobering realities and perspectives on the ills of the Middle East on his visit to President 
Bashar Al-Assad of Syria. With Blair at his side, Assad deviated from a privately agreed 
statement before the assembled press and humiliated Blair to state that the primary concern 
for the peoples of the Middle East was not Afghanistan and Iraq, but Israeli terrorism against 
the Palestinians and Arab states. The ground-work for the trip had been prepared by Michael 
Levy and Jonathan Powell, but without foreign office advice. 
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on issues relation to an `ethical dimension to foreign policy' which Cook - as a less 
pragmatic figure - saw generally as a higher policy priority than Blair; as Kampfher 
says, in these situations and contexts `if other people could do jobs for Blair, 
circumventing Cook, he was happy to do that. '845 Although for Blair - and particularly 
after Cook's controversial trip to the Occupied Territories and Israel - it was `quite 
often seeing Cook's manner as being more harmful than the actual substance of the 
policy. ' 846 (See: Chapter 5, Tony Blair and the Foreign Policy-Making of New Labour 
1994-2001) 
It might also be easy to imagine that a Foreign Secretary as able as Cook may find the 
imposition of a `special advisor and envoy' transplanted into the Foreign Office with 
his own desk and direct channels of communication to the Prime Minister, 
unacceptable. And particularly when this resulted in policies which completely 
bypassed the formal Foreign Office procedures, practices and expertise, in addition to 
the debating and scrutinizing format of a Cabinet government. However, as Kampfher 
says: 
`The irony of all of that is that Cook and Levy became good friends; ' 
[although] `... Cook was originally very suspicious' of Levy `... Cook and 
Levy pretty soon realized they just about saw eye-to-eye on the Middle East. 
And Cook became quite happy to leave Levy to do quite a lot of his work, 
when Levy was seen to be successful. 9847 
D: New Labour and the Jewish Vote 
Ever since the Labour Party and the political Zionist movement were established, the 
Labour Party had been the `party of choice' for the British Jewish communities. Apart 
from some brief divergences in the 1930s and early 1940s, Jewish voting instincts had 
remained with Labour through the 1950s and 1960s; to a degree, this was reflected in 
the number of Jewish MPs. As Rubinstein notes: 
" Kampfher, John (05.12.2003: 5) 
846 Ibid., (05.12.2003: 5) 
847 Ibid., (05.12.2003: 5) 
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`It was ... 
largely within the British Labour Party that Jewish political activity 
took place and Jewish politicians rose to positions of influence. 848 849 
However, as Rubinstein claims, `during the past ten years [c. 1972-1982] most of the 
pro-Arab and anti-Israeli feeling in Britain ... emanates 
from the Labour Party, 
especially (though not entirely) from its socialist left-wing. '850 As a consequence of 
these changes within Labour many Jewish voters became alienated. As Mencer states: 
`When the Labour Party was in the wilderness years in the 1980s, the Party 
made a sharp move to the left-wing, and this meant that a lot of the Jewish 
community in Britain left its ranks and moved, closer towards the 
Conservatives. Margaret Thatcher's constituency was Finchley and Golders 
Green was a constituency with a large Jewish community in it. So obviously 
she made a large play for that particular vote and that support. ' 851 
But as Labour MP Paul Rose852 notes, aside the decline in Jewish MPs, there were 
other reasons behind the decision by the left-wing to become critical of Israel in that 
, the longer Israel is regarded as an occupying power, and the fu ther we get from the 
memories of 1948 and the preceding horrors, the more tenuous are those ties likely to 
848 Rubinstein, W. D. (1982: 17) Chapter 1, quoting, Geoffrey Alderman (1975: 195) Not 
Quite British: The Political Attitudes of Anglo-Jewry, British Sociology Year Boole Volume 
2 
849 Central to Rubinstein's hypothesis in accounting for the shift in the hitherto generally close 
relations between the Labour Party and British Jews occurred in part as a result of the `most 
important single feature of modern Jewish history' - the `changing nature and size of the 
Jewish elite. ' It is argued in the post-1945 period (particularly the 1960s) a Jewish majority of 
`upper-middle classes' reflected a sea-change in Jewish political allegiances, and a 
`realignment of the allies and enemies of the Jews, with the traditional `right' and `left' 
changing places in their regard for Jews and their interests. '849 Rubinstein, W. D. (1982: 11) 
850 Rubinstein, W. D. (1982: 152-153) Chapter 5, The Western Democracies: The United 
States, Britain and Australia 
85' Mencer, David (03.06.2004: 2) 
852 Paul Rose (b. 1935) MP: (Manchester Blackley, 1964-1979). A barrister and leading left- 
wing activist in Manchester, Rose was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Barbara Castle. 
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become. '853 It was against this background that the reforms of the Labour Party under 
Neil Kinnock with the decline and exit of the left-wing and far-left had begun to 
redress the balance; as the reform and modernisation process continued under John 
Smith and Tony Blair the party came gradually to be seen as distancing itself from 
anti-Israel policies. 
In the period leading up to New Labour's 1997 election success, and following on the 
work of Moshe Raviv, Michael Levy had been instrumental in orchestrating the 
perception of Blair and New Labour as a party that the British Jewish communities 
could once more trust, not only with British Jewish interests, but with those of 
Zionism and Israel in particular. New Labour's need to secure Jewish votes was 
clarified by Raviv's observation that `an important component of Blair's `New 
Labour' policy' was to `win the support of the Jewish community in Britain. '854 The 
capture of this small but important electorate, often located in some key marginal 
seats, was considered crucial for the election and re-election of New Labour, as well 
as the progress of the Oslo Peace Process, which the majority of Jews in Britain 
supported, became the opportunity and the vehicle for Labour to achieve this 
objective. As Kampfher says, a key component and mechanism for securing a section 
of the Jewish vote for Labour was undertaken via the LFI at the Labour Party 
conference: 
`... when Blair took over, people at party 'conference would gauge Blair's 
priorities by the amount of time he spent at the Labour Friends of Israel and 
the LMEC after dinner speeches; Blair would, did, and does spend more time 
at the LFI party, and always gives a speech as the Guest of Honour, than at 
any other party. That was the kind of thing that Michael Levy said "you do 
that and be seen, you don't just do it quietly, you be seen to be doing it as a 
statement of your priorities, " and he did that from 1994. '855 
953 Rubinstein, W. D. (1982: 156-157) Chapter 5, quoting, Paul Rose, Jewish Chronicle, June 
29,1979 
854 Raviv, Moshe. (1998: 270) 
855 Kampfer, John (05.12.2003: 8) 
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Blair's approach to attracting the Jewish vote in order to assist in securing a Labour 
government brought some criticism within the party. His pro-Israel stance was made 
at the expense of the wider neutralist policy position (based on the Oslo Accords) and 
was often seen more as a pro-Israel bias than an attempt to get Labour elected, 
particularly as David Mepham says, when he addressed the party conference: 
`In so far as Blair had a kind of instinct on the question he was always very 
pro-Israeli. And I noted that from working for the party from 1994 to 1997 that 
the only indication that I saw of it, was that every year at the party conference 
there was a Labour Friends of Israel reception which was always extremely 
well attended, and Blair always went to and made a very nice speech; and then 
there was the Arab League Ambassadors reception that Blair would turn up to 
for about a minute - and leave. It was very clear even then that he was very 
pro-Israeli. '856 
E: Best Practice States 
Tony Blair's style of approach to domestic politics is also identifiable in his 
inclinations towards foreign affairs and the Israel-Palestinian conflict. As John 
Kampfher says, Blair's approach reflected the influence of the 1980s in terms of 
applying `what he regarded as idealism and ideology over what was workable, and 
what is practicable, so it was partly pragmatism, about trying to get the Labour Party 
back to what he considered were first principles, and Israel's right to exist being the 
bottom line, and from there, everything else stems. '857 Kampfher continues: 
`There is a convergence within that sense of promoting "beacon countries. " 
Blair would use it in a domestic context in a very Blairite phrase "best 
practice" or "good practice" just as it is - identify good schools, help them 
spread good practice across the city; the same thing is to identify a country in a 
region, and help it to develop best practice within that region. '858 
856 Mepham, David (14.12.2005: 4) 
857 Kampfner, John (05.12.2003: 8) 
858 Ibid., (05.12.2003: 7) 
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The interest and promotion of `best practice' and `beacon states' within liberal 
interventionalist thinking is thought to be a key factor in Blair's long-standing support 
for the state of Israel. As Kampfner further elaborates: 
`Blair makes much shore of the fact that Israel within its own state is a 
functioning democracy, operating through the ballot box, while imperfect, it 
is, within those terms, an example to other countries in the region and beyond, 
how even in a fragile region you can operate within those rules. So it is partly, 
not quite Israel as a beacon, even he would see that as loaded, but Israel as an 
example of how it can work. ' 859 
For Blair, while he acknowledges Israel's imperfections, as a democracy it remains, 
particularly in the context of the rest of the Middle Eastern region, a paragon of 
western values. Despite his forthright view of Israel, Blair was able to distinguish 
between the authoritarianism of some Arab states and the democratic credentials of 
others. For example, `while he would be defensive on Israel's behalf in terms of states 
like Syria, he would have a different approach to Jordan and Egypt because they were 
seen as being more westernized in terms of their adherence to western norms. 860 
The New Labour Government and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict 1997-2001 
By the time that Tony Blair's New Labour took over the reins of government, the 
peace process which had been built upon the Oslo Accords of 1993 was already in 
serious trouble. In 1996, following the 1995 assassination of Yitzak Rabin, the right- 
wing Likud leader, Benyamin Netanyahu, 861 had been elected Prime Minister of 
Israel. Netanyahu was intent on stalling, and even reversing the supposed concessions 
to the Palestinians. For Blair and large numbers of British Jews, the commitment to an 
`Oslo-plus' position found Britain increasingly isolated from the possibility of 
influencing either Netanyahu, or Israel. Particularly as both Israel and Arafat's 
859 Ibid., (05.12.2003: 5) 
"0 Ibid., (05.12.2003: 6) 
" Benyamin Netanyahu (b. 1949) Israeli PM [Likud]: 1996-1999; Foreign Minister, 2002- 
2005; Ambassador UN, 1984-1988. 
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Palestinian Authority were proving unable or unwilling to implement those stages of 
Oslo already agreed, with a resulting spiralling into violence on both sides. 
This was the serious background situation which confronted Blair's new Foreign 
Secretary, Robin Cook on Labour's election to government in May 1997. Unlike 
many of his predecessors at the Head of the Foreign Office, Robin Cook came to the 
post of Foreign Secretary with significant experience of foreign affairs. Having 
already served as Shadow Foreign Affairs Spokesperson (July 1994 - May 1997) he 
considered his duty - in what was still seen in some quarters to be a ministerial 
backwater - to have been duly served. Denied what he considered his rightful and 
natural key domestic mantle, Cook came to the Foreign Office cloisters determined to 
stake out a piece of political territory of his own. More specifically, Cook already had 
a well developed sense of the subject and issues emanating from, and surrounding 
Israel and the Palestinians. In an interview with the author, Cook stated that the 
origins of his interest lie in the influence resulting from the activities of the Labour 
related figure of Yousef Allen in Scotland: 
`Well I was always deeply aware of it [Israel-Palestinian subject], and indeed 
in Scottish circles there had been a long link with the PLO and the Palestinian 
struggle. 
There was quite a lot of Palestinian contact with the Scottish Labour Party, 
particularly organised actually and in many ways originating with Ernest Ross 
and George Galloway - who are both from Dundee - George Galloway did not 
become an MP there like Ernest but he originated from there and became a 
key organiser. Ernest Ross who is a good friend and has very strong links with 
the Palestinian people (and probably still does); he was very active in the 
House on the issue when I became an MP [1974]. '862 
This early introduction led to an interest which continued to develop as his career 
progressed with his appointments to more senior shadow and government ministerial 
posts. Once on the opposition front benches, he was appointed by Blair as 
862 Cook, Robin (02.11.2004: 1) Interview: Cook-Nelson, Portcullis House, London 
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Spokesperson on Foreign Affairs in 1994 after John Smith's death. Cook states his 
view on the Israel-Palestinian subject in 1994 and its influence upon New Labour: 
`Without doubt the Middle East situation was one of the high priorities of 
foreign policy at that time. I first went to the Middle East while I was still in 
opposition [1974-1997] and I spent a night with our Ambassador in Tel-Aviv 
and a couple of nights with our Consular-General who was in East Jerusalem 
(because we have a separate diplomatic representation to the Palestinians). 863 
And I travelled then quite extensively through the West Bank and Gaza. One 
of the advantages of being in opposition is that you do actually and frankly get 
more time than when you are Foreign Secretary. '8M 
On December 9th, 1997, sixth months after becoming Prime Minister, and with Tony 
Blair, New Labour, Robin Cook and the special advisor and kitchen cabinet style 
installed at Number 10, the Labour government made what was widely interpreted as 
the first foreign policy statement on the subject of the Middle East peace process and 
the Israel-Palestinian conflict. In addition to stating the government's policy position 
on one of the most important regions and subjects in foreign affairs, the speech was 
also considered to be a presentation of Blair's personal views and position amid a 
rapidly faltering Oslo Peace Process. 
The address was made within the complex and emotive context of a party already 
embroiled in issues arising from New Labour's `ethical dimension' to foreign policy 
(already bruised by the sale of Hawk Trainer aircraft to Indonesia) and a Prime 
Minister and a Foreign Office consequently already attempting to distance themselves 
from the intense media scrutiny surrounding the declaration that New Labour's 
foreign policy was to have an `ethical dimension. ' Notably, the speech was made to a 
meeting of Labour Friends of Israel (LFI) as Blair stated: 
863 The other reason for the separate diplomatic residencies is that in accordance with UN 
resolutions and international law, Britain does not recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, 
as such the official residence of the Ambassador remains in Tel-Aviv, as does all other 
Embassies. 
864 Cook, Robin (02.11.2004: 1) 
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`How wonderful it is to be among friends. Not just friends of Labour but 
friends of Israel too. I am proud to say -I have counted myself as a friend of 
Israel all my adult life. As a young man, Israel presented a social democratic 
ideal - even before I knew what the words social democracy properly meant. 
Here was a triumph of a new country transformed from a homeland to 
statehood in the aftermath of the greatest crime against humanity known to 
history - the Holocaust. '865 
Blair continues to state the basis and nature of relations (past and present) between 
the British Labour Party, the Jewish community in Britain, the Labor Party in Israel, 
and in light of Likud's election to government, Israel itself. In addition to identifying 
the central basis of the relationships, which are primarily viewed as being founded on 
the `shared' and `traditional values', Blair also refers too to the previous difficulties of 
the 1980s - `now resolved' under New Labour: 
`There was a time when some in the Labour Party worried that to confess to 
being a Friend of Israel counted you against the politically correct. One 
measure of how far New Labour has come is that this is now long behind us. 
Alongside Labour's reassertion of traditional values, there has been a 
remarkable renewal and strengthening of the deep roots between the Jewish 
community and the Labour Party. It is one of Labour's proudest 
achievements. ' 866 
Despite Blair's very obvious -identification with Israel, and especially with the British 
Jewish communities, there was clear evidence that Blair did not hold the Palestinians 
and PLO entirely responsible for the precarious position of the Peace Process. There 
were a number of critical notes - which Blair did not flinch from stating - regarding 
Israel's need to stick to agreements reached thus far and respect requests by the United 
States for a `freeze on settlement activity', and `substantial further redeployments' of 
the Israeli military in order to maintain momentum in the peace process. 
865 Blair, Tony (09.12.1997: 1-2) Speech: Blair-Labour Friends of Israel (LFI), London 
866 Ibid., (09.12.1997: 3) 
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Although Blair is careful in the best traditions of a pragmatist to convey to the 
representatives of Netanyahu's Likud government - metaphorically present in the 
galleries - the failures and the requirements of the Oslo Accords - all be it from the 
relative safety of the `both sides' analogy: 
`I saw Prime Minister Netanyahu in London recently. I said two things to him: 
That the security of Israel must be protected; and that it is crucial to regain the 
trust and the momentum that has been lost. The Interim Agreement and the 
Hebron Agreement have to be implemented. The promises both sides have 
made have to be fulfilled as the very minimum of good faith. ' 867 
Blair continues: 
`From Israel, that means responding to the American calls for a freeze on 
settlement activity and substantial further redeployments of Israeli forces from 
the West Bank. The exchange of land for peace is at the heart of the Oslo 
Accords. I therefore welcome the Israeli Government's acceptance of the need 
to move forward on its commitment to transfer more of the West Bank to 
Palestinian control. 468 
Reactions to the policy statement were mixed: Moshe Raviv (former Israeli 
Ambassador to Britain) described it as `the most authoritative policy statement of his 
government on the peace process to date. '869 Conversely, it was viewed by the retired 
Labour MP, David Watkins, as a dubious speech derived from `misconceptions based 
in disinformation. '870 Although Robin Cook states he was `rather taken back by the 
extent to which he was giving a very emotional personal endorsement of Israel,, 871 he 
is rather more inclined to categorise it in the broader context of Blair challenging 
867 Ibid., (09.12.1997: 6-7) 
868 Ibid., (09.12.1997: 6-8) 
869 Raviv, Moshe (1998: 270) 
870 Watkins, David (15.12.1997: 1) Letter: Watkins-Blair, CAABU, London 
871 Cook, Robin (02.11.2004: 4) 
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traditional positions, - his ultra-pragmatism - as much as anything of substance. As 
Cook remarks retrospectively in 2004: 
`I think Tony was obviously stating a position, and of course Tony has positioned 
himself throughout his career as being somebody who was courageous in 
disagreeing with the Labour Party. I do not think anyone would suggest that it was 
politically incorrect to be supporting Israel. Labour Friends of Israel has always 
been strong-willed and has even to this day a very large number of Labour MPs 
who are attached to it. ' 872 
As another example of the lurking dangers that arise from reliance upon small group 
of advisors, according to David Watkins, the `original draft' of Blair's statement of 
Labour's policy position on the Israel-Palestinian issue caused `consternation in the 
FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]. '873 Although Watkins' says he never 
actually saw the original draft, the Foreign Office had apparently been sufficiently 
alarmed by the overt pro-Israeli bias of the speech that they had `insisted on getting a 
few balancing paragraphs inserted. Even so, the speech was seriously unbalanced. '874 
Furthermore Watkins' makes a point of emphasis that it is also, `Interesting to recall 
that this was when Robin Cook was Secretary of State [for Foreign Affairs]! '875 The 
reference by Watkins' to Cook's perhaps further evidence - also reflecting the 
assessments by Kampfher, Mepham and Mencer - that Blair and Cook - and despite 
their quite different introductions and perspectives on the subject - operated on a 
`duel' or `parallel' track approach to Foreign Policy. Watkins made a direct response 
to the LFI speech via a letter to Blair in which he unequivocally identified the speech 
as fundamentally flawed and biased in its assessment of the conflict thus far, and most 
particularly, where responsibility for the continuity of the conflict should lie. In an 
interview Watkins reiterated in more detail the assertion that the source of the 
`misinformation' afflicting Blair's interpretation of the issues and situation resulted 
from the fact that the speech had actually been written by Labour Friends of Israel 
872 Ibid., (02.11.2004: 4) 
873 Watkins, David (06.07.2003: 2) 
874 Ibid., (06.07.2003: 2) 
875 Ibid., (06.07.2003: 2) 
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(LFI), something that in David Watkins' opinion and substantial parliamentary 
experience was `unique, and certainly unprecedented. '876 
In contrast to the criticisms directed at Blair from the Foreign Office and Watkins, 
Moshe Raviv argued that Blair's LFI speech only reiterated the British view that 
peace could only be achieved on the basis `of a just exchange of land for peace', and 
as such, the `Blair statement did not represent a change of British policy since the Six 
Day War, but it reflected friendship for Israel and understanding of its 
vulnerability. '877 For others, Blair's speech was a clear reflection of the applied 
pragmatism which New Labour had adopted and directed towards foreign affairs from 
the moment they assumed office, and exemplified by the Northern Ireland peace 
process in terms of `dealing with the world as it is, rather than how you would wish it 
to be. ' 878 
For Blair, in addition to his belief that progress in the Peace Process could be made 
via training and education, the Rita Hinden school of thought which had also been 
applied in Northern Ireland as part of the Mitchell Plan was also a key factor in 
creating the correct conditions in the Israel Palestinian issue: 
`I want to see the Palestinians free to trade with the EU' [and] `I want to see 
the EU and Israel working together to remove obstacles to the development of 
the Palestinian economy. 979 
Blair's pragmatic approach was reflected later in a debate the following year in the 
House of Commons, during which the Labour MP, George Galloway, demanded that 
Israel - `as a violator of UN resolutions, should be subject to a similar sanctions 
regime as Iraq. '880 Britain's position at the time, seeking progress in the peace process 
in collaboration with the EEC, was - Galloway deemed - entirely inadequate. Robin 
876 Ibid., (06.07.2003: 9) 
877 Raviv, Moshe (1998: 271) 
878 Mencer, David (03.06.2004: 2) 
879 Blair, Tony (09.12.1997: 11) 
880 Galloway, George (02.02.1998) Iraq, Hansard, col. 728 
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Cook rejected Galloway's assertion that `Britain had turned its back on the Palestinian 
people, '881 arguing that the Palestinians had never sought such sanctions themselves. 
Cook argued further, and remaining in line with Blair's own support for like-minded 
`best-practice' states, the difference between states for who sanctions policies might 
be appropriate, and those like Israel where it was not: 
`I have many criticisms of the Israeli Government, but we should remember 
that they were elected with the support of half the population of Israel. It 
would be extremely helpful if Saddam Hussein were even to contemplate 
allowing his people the same expression of their democratic will. Until he does 
so, he is in a very different category from Israel. '882 
For Cook and the government, supporting the Palestinian economy was a far more 
useful and constructive approach, offering as it did a degree of prosperity, a practical 
route forwards. 
For Labour critics of Israel, the leadership's refusal to apply sanctions against Israel, 
despite its abysmal treatment of the Palestinians, its reneging of important elements of 
the Oslo peace process and, indeed, its possession of nuclear weapons in 
contravention of treaty obligations, was evidence of double standards, which flew in 
the face of both the notion of an ethical dimension to foreign policy and a 
commitment to liberal humanitarian interventionism. Ernest Ross summarised the 
resulting frustration: 
`People ask me why so many Palestinians seem to support the Iraqi regime in 
times of crisis. The answer is that rallies in support of Iraq are an expression of 
the extreme frustration at policies backed by the United States and designed to 
protect Israel from the exacting standards of international law - laws that we 
are demanding Saddam Hussein should abide by - and therefore to frustrate 
the legitimate goals of Palestinian self-determination and the return of 
occupied Arab lands. '883 
8g' Cook, Robin (02.02.1998) Iraq, Hansard, col. 728 
882 Ibid., (02.02.1998) Iraq, Hansard, col. 728 
883 Ross, Ernest (17.02.1998) Iraq, Hansard, col. 967-968 
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The Strategic Defence Review and Report (July 1998) 
Six months after the LFI speech and nearly a year into the first New Labour 
government, Tony Blair made his second major foray into the realm of international 
affairs. The fact that Blair was prepared to make a sweeping commitment to foreign 
affairs at this time reflected both his increasing isolation from domestic affairs as 
Gordon Brown asserted his fiscal prudential influence upon taxation and spending, 
and the fact that he had recognised that world affairs were increasingly impinging on 
the domestic arena. 
During the 1994-1997 period in opposition, Tony Blair, Robin Cook and New Labour 
had gained a great deal of political credibility and electoral capital from comparison 
with the ultra-realism of the Conservative's foreign policy, in what was called - the 
`doctrine of benign inactivity. ' 884 It was also while in opposition that New Labour 
recognized the shifting dynamics of international affairs in the post-Cold War and 
Gulf War eras. As a consequence, almost immediately upon taking office, Blair 
commissioned the Strategic Defence Review (May 1997) (published as a policy 
document in July 1998), which not only reflected the comprehensive reforms and 
modernisation of the Labour Party and proposals for the EEC and UN, but also clearly 
identified and proposed ideas to address the shifting dynamics in international affairs. 
As George Robertson (Defence Minister) stated: 
`The Review is radical, reflecting a changing world, in which the 
confrontation of the Cold War has been replaced by a complex mixture of 
uncertainty and instability. These problems pose a real threat to our security, 
whether in the Balkans, the Middle East or in some troublespot yet to 
g84 Seldon, Anthony [Editor] (2007: 597) Blair's Britain 1997-2007, Chapter 27, Michael 
Clarke, (2006: 10) Foreign Policy, A decade of Labour's foreign policy, quoting, Tony Blair, 
A Global Alliance for Global Values, Foreign Policy Centre, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 
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ignite........ In the post-Cold War world, we must be prepared to go to the 
crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us. '885 
The Middle East figured highly on the agenda of the review: 
`Outside Europe our interests are most likely to be affected by events in the 
Gulf and the Mediterranean. Instability in those areas also carries wider risks. 
We have particularly important national interests and close friendships in the 
Gulf. Oil supplies from the Gulf are crucial to the world economy. 
Confrontation in the Middle East carries the risk of escalation and since the 
region borders NATO [Turkey - NATO member (1952) and a 
European/Middle Eastern State] gives us a continuing stake in its stability. '886 
In conclusion, Robertson stated: 
`We do not want to stand idly by and watch humanitarian disasters of the 
aggression of dictators go unchecked. We want to give a lead, we want to be a 
force for good.... a sound defence is a sound foreign policy. '887 
The Strategic Defence Review Report (July 1998) became the foundation text and 
evidence - in conjunction with external events - that provided a key theoretical basis 
for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention. This was made explicitly nine-months 
after the Strategic Defence Review and Report, when Tony Blair made another major 
foreign policy speech to the Economic Club of Chicago on April 22,1999. While it 
had been the continuation of the Balkans conflicts that specifically generated the 
initiative and provided the backdrop to the Chicago address, the interventionalist basis 
of the doctrine clearly had the potential for global relevance. 
885 George Robertson The Strategic Defence Review, Introduction, Section (6), Command 
Paper 3999, July 1998, (Stationery Office), p. 2 
Ibid., July 1998, Introduction, Section (6), p. 40 
887 Ibid., July 1998, Introduction, Section (6), p. 19-20 
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The doctrine of the international community and the intervention into what are 
traditionally argued to be the internal affairs of sovereign nation states was neither 
new nor universally accepted. As academics Driver and Martell convey: 
`There was nothing new in the argument itself - just war and the grounds for 
intervening in others' affairs is an age-old problem that has been much picked 
over. But it was applied to a context of allegedly greater globalization than 
before, and it did mark some differences from previous Labour ... 
approaches. 
Blair advocated reforms to international financial institutions, the UN Security 
Council, Third-World debt and environmental agreements and argued for a 
shift away from a bias towards non-interference. International interventions 
beyond a state's own borders is justified, argued Blair, in cases of genocide, 
refugee crises and regimes based on minority rule. In practice genocide and 
refugee crises have come to be the key justifications for intervention. (To have 
taken on minority rule as a basis for international intervention may have led to 
Britain's later having to invade even some of its closest and most powerful 
allies, or even itself! ) The international `community', for Bair, should act 
when there is a humanitarian catastrophe that the government concerned will 
not or cannot address. ' 888 
This might have seemed to bode well for Labour supporters of the Palestinians. The 
situation involving Israel and the Palestinians contained many of these referenced 
criteria for intervention: the Palestinian refugee crises extended back to 1948; the 
Israeli occupation forces were a minority over a majority; the conditions - particularly 
in Gaza - were a humanitarian crises in themselves; and successive Israeli 
governments (particularly those of Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon) did not seem able or 
willing to address the situation; and many Israeli activities were long-standing and in 
violation of UN resolutions and international law. But while Blair appeared 
888 Driver, Stephen & Martell, Luke (2002: 37) Blair's Britain, Chapter 5, New Labour, Third 
Ways and Globalization, Ethics and Internationalism: A New Approach to Foreign Policy, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press) - 
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determined to follow through on the theory with its practical application to issues and 
regimes in some parts of the world, he was clearly less inclined to do so when it came 
to Israel. As Driver and Martell again state: 
`Blair became increasingly involved in foreign policy as time progressed, for 
instance on Iraq and Serbia. He was seen as more hawkish than Cook or even 
Bill Clinton. His approach showed more certitude, stressing leadership and 
bilateral relations with the USA. '889 
Blair's apparent reluctance to concede to some Labour arguments did not necessarily 
indicate that Blair had no interest in pursuing resolution of the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict. From an ultra-pragmatist's perspective, he was acutely aware that he was 
able to wield greater influence over Israeli policy towards the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict when the Labor Party of Israel was in government as opposed to Likud. For 
example, when Ehud Barak890 was elected the nature of the relationship was 
illustrated in that Britain was the first country Barak visited, after the United States in 
July 1999. Blair quickly repaid the compliment with an almost immediate return visit. 
However, Blair's approach to foreign affairs in dealing with whoever was in power 
was tested when Barak subsequently lost the election to Ariel Sharon, who formed a 
Likud bloc government in February 2001. Although Blair did not achieve much 
success with Sharon, the policy position remained the same: to accept what existed 
and not be distracted by wishing the circumstances and individuals were different. 
This approach was applied equally to the Palestinian leadership, in particular Yasser 
Arafat, who was politically ignored and at times castigated by both Sharon and U. S. 
President Bush junior. 
Blair's relations with President's Clinton and Bush: A key external determinant 
The British relationship with the United States, and more specifically Blair's own 
relationship with U. S. President Bill Clinton, was to play a crucial role in defining the 
limits of Blair's ability to influence Israel and its conflict with the Palestinians. Blair's 
relations with Bill Clinton were close, but not without occasional disagreements and 
889 Ibid., (2002: 37) 
890 Ehud Barak (b. 1942) Labor PM: 1999-2001; Labor leader, 1996-2001. 
322 
Chapter 6 (1997-2001) 
spats on key areas of policy in major theatres of international affairs. Kampfher says 
of Blair's relations with Clinton on foreign issues generally, and the subject of the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict in particular: 
`It was predominantly a very good relationship but they had big rows over 
Kosovo, quite serious ones, and I document ['Blair's Wars' 2003] how 
Clinton got increasingly exasperated with Blair's posturing, and Blair's 
moralizing, and there are a lot of Clinton people quotes in there about that. 
But that having been said, [the Middle East generally, and the Israel- 
Palestinian peace process in particular] ... this was Clinton's baby, this was 
Clinton's thing, he needed something to show for himself, and he was 
convinced that he could deliver, and he jealously guarded that ability and 
wouldn't let anybody else getting near the plaudits or getting involved. He 
made it clear to Blair in no uncertain terms; he couldn't see what Blair could 
deliver to the equation, which he couldn't do himself, - and he was probably 
right. ' 891 
Despite the continuation of the `special relationship' Bill Clinton ensured that during 
his term in office Blair had little or no influence on the issue of the Middle East, and 
Israel-Palestine in particular. 
Up until Clinton's departure in January 2001, Blair became increasingly frustrated at 
being effectively excluded from the Middle East Peace Process, particularly after the 
departure of Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) and the arrival of Ehud Barak (Labor) in 
July 1999. With the election of a Labor Prime Minister in Israel, Blair felt able to take 
a more influential role. There were a number of reasons for Clinton's exclusion of 
Blair: Clinton - as with Likud and to a lesser extent, Labor in Israel - viewed the 
European position on the Israel-Palestinian issue as too pro-Palestinian/Arab. He, with 
a debt of gratitude to the pro-Israel Jewish lobby for supporting the Democrats in the 
election against George Bush senior, did not want to risk offending pro-Israel Jewish 
sensitivities; additionally, sensing the approach of the end to his period in office, he 
891 Kampfher, John (05.12.2003: 7) 
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sought to capture an opportunity to secure another major coup in international affairs 
by cementing a Final Status agreement between Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak; as 
such, as Kampfher says: `Clinton ensured Blair was consulted, but nothing more. '892 
The Chicago speech and the resulting doctrine can thus be understood as a barely 
veiled attempt by the British Prime Minister to persuade a reluctant President Clinton 
to support a collective participatory approach to foreign policy issues. At the time, 
directed at securing U. S. participation or at least support for military intervention in 
Kosovo via NATO to prevent the Serbian forces of Slobodan Milosevic from 
conducting his military campaign in the semi-autonomous province. However, by 
asserting the linkages between the Kosovo situation and the broader processes of 
globalization, and by claiming the collective responsibility of the international 
community to intervene through collaborative efforts was a factor arising from 
globalisation, Blair was both demanding that Britain and other nations be included in 
the processes of international decision-making, and justifying a British pro-active 
interventionist policy. 
The common perception is that Blair was disadvantaged by Clinton and the 
Democrats' departure from office and by the arrival of the hard-line Republican 
George W. Bush, in that Blair had lost a partner prepared to engage in the Israel- 
Palestinian issue. However, in terms of the Israel-Palestinian issue this was not 
necessarily the reality. While disagreements over the Israel-Palestinian issue were not 
sufficient to alienate Blair and Clinton, Clinton's decision to monopolise efforts to 
resolve the conflict to gain domestic and international prestige, at the exclusion of 
Blair, meant the departure of Clinton and the election of George Bush in November 
2000 appeared to present an opportunity for an arch pragmatist like Blair to influence 
the American perspective on affairs in the Middle East. 
The early signs for Blair were positive: although Bush owed a debt to the Christian 
right-wing `bible belt' of the Conservative heartlands of America, he was not - as 
Clinton had been - quite as beholden to the pro-Israel American Jewish vote. And 
although the Bush administration came to be increasingly influenced by the Christian 
892 Ibid., (2003: 178-9) 
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fundamentalists and their alliance with the extreme Likud Jewish lobby (a union 
provided by Benjamin Netanyahu via `impeccable links to the American right'893 and 
cemented as Israeli Prime Minister 1996-1999), Bush appeared, initially at least, more 
willing to give Blair a more active role. 
However, Blair was to remain thwarted: two months after Bush took the inaugural 
oath (Jan 20`h 2001), Ariel Sharon, the far-right revisionist Zionist, defeated Labor's 
Ehud Barak in the Israeli general elections of March 2001. The election of the hard- 
liner Sharon may have dramatically reduced the possibility of Blair's influence, but 
for Blair, it simply meant delving deeper into the philosophy which had sustained him 
through his political career: `you work with what exists, rather than what you prefer to 
exist! ' Likud and Sharon were the new realities and Blair intended to work with those 
new realities. Even though politically as a Republican Bush and Blair were 
theoretically polarised, Blair's ultra-pragmatism ensured he saw the change in the 
White House as an opportunity for Britain, Labour and himself. Whatever Blair's 
philosophical approach, the reality proved increasingly difficult. As Kinnock notes: 
`There is a deep frustration on all sides of the arguments, with the- failure to 
stimulate a meaningful Peace Process. So far, tragically, it has proved to be the 
case because you will never get George Bush, - in or out of an election year, - 
to be really audacious about inducing the Israeli government to move in the 
right direction, you will see no equivalent of `Nixon in China. '894 
Kinnock concludes: 
`What people cannot see is any imaginative initiative coming from the United 
Kingdom government to by and make its subscription to the Peace Process. 
Everybody knows that if an opportunity arises that the British/Labour 
government is not going to turn its back on the opportunity, but of course a 
country of our size and power can only fight or work on so many fronts, so 
"3 Ibid., (2003: 76) 
' Kinnock, Neil (30.01.2004: 5) 
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maybe it is fairly natural that it is not among the priorities, but that to is a 
sense of frustration. ' 895 
Bush junior was clearly not inclined to make the same mistakes as Clinton, or his 
father - George Bush senior - in becoming unnecessarily embroiled in the affairs of 
the Israel-Palestinian conflict. He had seen Clinton grow increasingly desperate to 
salvage something from the huge investment made in the Israelis and Palestinians to 
define his presidency, only to ultimately fail to secure an agreement between Ehud 
Barak and Yasser Arafat. Bush made it clear from the beginning that he had no 
intention of becoming similarly involved. Blair had hoped that in the vacuum caused 
by America's withdrawal from active engagement in negotiations, he - with his 
personal international stature then at a highpoint - might be able to step in to fill the 
diplomatic vacuum. But as Kampfher points out, he soon realized the impossibility of 
this scenario: 
`It was never going to happen, because the Israelis were never going to let it 
happen. And Blair pretty soon realized that he would have to return to a very 
traditional British approach to the Middle East of prompting and prodding the 
'896 Americans. 
Blair was not entirely impotent in exerting influence on the American presidency. 
What are seen as generally positive and substantive achievements by Blair upon the 
American President included the prevention of Israel assassinating President Yasser 
Arafat, the publication of the Road Map, and George Bush (junior) being the first U. S. 
President to acknowledge and support the concept of establishing a Palestinian state 
as a matter of U. S. foreign policy. 
A defining feature of the differences in the approach of Blair in contrast to Bush was 
that despite some deep seated misgivings about the role of Yasser Arafat in the 
conflict, especially the issue of suicide bombers, Blair's position remained fairly 
statically set on recognition of Arafat as the democratically elected leader of the 
895 Ibid., (30.01.2004: 6) 
896 Kampfner, John (05.12.2003: 7) 
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Palestinians, and he continued to negotiate with him; Bush, from a very early stage, 
and assisted by the Israeli Likud government, publicly rejected Arafat on both counts, 
directly calling for his replacement as a pre-condition for renewed negotiations. 
Nonetheless, criticisms that Blair was too subservient to the American position on the 
Middle East and generally failed to assert any effective influence upon US policy are 
also disputed. As Baroness Symons argues: 
`But I think it is very obvious and widely acknowledged that the Prime 
Minister had a great deal of influence in getting George Bush signed up for the 
Road Map, and that he does have a recurring theme in his discussions with the 
President of the United States about the Israel-Palestine issue. 
It isn't the only issue in Middle East politics, but it is the long-running real 
sore and bone of contention, and source of unrest - as we all know, and has 
been for a very, very long time. So I think we have all contributed to trying to 
keep this problem constantly on the front burner and not the back burner. '897 
As David Mepham pointed out, Blair's apparent proximity to America was not a 
reason for replicating American policies, but rather the means by which he sought to 
advance his own: 
`Blair sees Middle East policy as being a policy that is pursued by gaining 
influence upon the United States rather than something that is pursued directly 
to the region. That is also how he views international policy more generally. 
That America is the dominant power, whether it is Clinton or Bush, the way to 
get things done is to stick very, very close to them. '"' 
Or as Blair's political advisor - Jonathan Powell - more succinctly stated in terms of 
tactical advice when attempting to influence American policy on the Middle East and 
89' Symons, Baroness (19.01.2004: 7-8) Interview: Symons-Nelson, House of Lords, London 
898 Mepham, David (14.12.2005: 6) 
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the Israel-Palestinian conflict: `you get up the arse of the American's - and you stay 
there. ' 899 
The Return of a Labor Government in Israel: Ehud Barak 1999-2001 
Tony Blair and New Labour welcomed the return of the Israeli Labor Party to 
government and the departure of Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu in May 1999. Not only 
was it generally agreed that Netanyahu had assisted the unravelling process of the 
Oslo Accords, but that he had little if any intention of ever concluding a peace 
agreement with the Palestinians. Robin Cook describes how, in the years preceding 
Labour's election victory in May 1997, the peace process had still been underway, 
and despite obvious difficulties, seemed to have a good chance of success. 
Netanyahu's election to power had seriously hindered the progress. However, as Cook 
says: 
`Then, when I became Foreign Secretary, which coincided with a period when 
Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister of Israel, which was a very 
serious difficulty because not only was he himself resolute in not wanting to 
make any concessions to the Palestinians, but he also lost the trust of all Arab 
leaders of the region who all felt that at various times or other he had made 
them promises which he had not kept. And to some extent actually the Arab 
leaders found themselves more disposed to the era of Sharon [March 2001- 
April 2006] not to Ariel Sharon himself - but in terms that they were more able 
to understand where they were with Sharon because at least he was already a 
blunt Israeli sort who would never be any different, whereas they thought 
Netanyahu was. For instance, when Netanyahu went to the Wye Plantation 
meeting he made an agreement but never implemented it. '900 
The contrast between Cook's narrative in conveying the period during Netanyahu's 
reign, and that after the arrival of Ehud Barak two years later (May 1999) is all to 
evident: 
89' Ibid., (14.12.2005: 6) 
900 Cook, Robin (02.11.2004: 2) 
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`I was with Tony Blair when he first met Barak in London on his way to the 
United States. I found Barak an enormous breath of fresh air actually. I 
remember a quote in the press at the time saying meeting him was like 
walking out into the night air or into an early dawn. He wanted to get a 
settlement; he wanted to get an agreement. I found that brief period of the 
Barak Government really quite exciting in that there were options and 
possibilities. '90' 
In a last-ditch attempt to assure himself of a legacy built on peace in the Middle East, 
Clinton used the opportunity of Barak's election and clear enthusiasm to reach a peace 
settlement, to call the Israeli and Palestinian leaders to the negotiating table once 
more. It is notable that Robin Cook viewed the `failure' at Camp David (July 2000)902 
to achieve an agreement between Israel and the PLO as being attributable to Arafat, - 
and Arafat alone: `Arafat didn't exactly reject it, but he failed to grab it. '903 While 
Arafat was lacking in `people skills' and intent above all on maintaining an Arab 
consensus for his position, it is Barak that Cook sees as `bold' and `visionary; ' 
similarly, Cook says that what Barak offered the Palestinians was `the best' deal they 
have ever been presented by Israel. Regardless of the merits or otherwise of the `deal 
on offer, ' no progress was made and the talks limped on into 2001. In reality neither 
Barak nor Arafat were able or prepared to reach an agreement. With the Clinton 
administration dominating the peace process negotiations, Cook - as with Blair - 
sought alternative means for asserting British influence and interests in the Middle 
East. 
90' Ibid., (02.11.2004: 2) 
902 The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David (July 11-25,2000) between U. S. President 
Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat (Palestinian Authority) and Ehud Barak (Prime Minister of Israel) 
was modelled on the 1978 meeting between Anwar Sadat (President of Egypt) and Menachem 
Begin (Prime Minister of Israel) which concluded with the first Israel-Arab peace treaty 
(1979). The 2000 summit was a Final Status Settlement of the most contentious issues 
(Jerusalem, borders, refugees and settlements) were deferred as a mechanism to secure the 
1993 Oslo-Washington Accords agreement, but talks concluded without agreement. 
903 Cook, Robin (02.11.2004: 3) 
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As a concession to Cook being appointed away from key domestic areas, and Cook's 
favoured non-domestic post of minister for Europe, Blair had allowed Cook to retain 
the services of Derek Fatchett, 904 905 a long-term left-wing colleague; the other key 
appointment which gave a greater pragmatism to New Labour's foreign affairs came 
with the appointment of Baroness Symons906 as Minister of State in the Foreign 
Office (1997-1999). Although Symons was appointed by Blair as a tried and tested 
moderniser, it was also regarded as a clear signal that New Labour's reform 
programme would extend to one of the most traditional bastions of British 
government - the Foreign Office. What Fatchett and Symons shared was a common 
904 Kampfher says: Cook was allowed to retain the services of Fatchett as `compensation for 
loosing out on his choice for the European ministry. ' Kampfher, John (1998: 129) 
905 Derek Fatchett (b. 1945-d. 1999) MP: (Leeds Central, 1983-1999); Junior Minister, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 1997. 
906 In a 2004 interview Baroness Symons recounted the origins and basis of her interest in the 
Middle East and the Israel-Palestinian issue: `Israel-Palestine has been an issue for all of my 
adult life. Has it been the most important issue? No, I guess East-West politics was one of the 
huge things - obviously for the generation I grew up in, - and although it was a domestic issue 
the situation in Northern Ireland in relation to terrorism of course that was the big focus, - on 
terrorism. When I was the General Secretary of the FTA [Association of First Division Civil 
Servants, 1989-1996] I did go to Israel with a number of trade union colleagues via the 
Histradut which was quite interesting because obviously within the Histradut there was quite 
a lot of left-wing people many of whom had a great deal of sympathy with the Palestinian 
cause. That was very good experience because one wasn't just going down the line of a right- 
wing Israeli view of life, one was going and did indeed meet and spend time with quite a few 
Palestinians as well. So that brought a lot back into my sort of consciousness and focus of 
what was happening in the sense that like a lot of people interested in politics - although not a 
politician at the time, - one reads news papers and current affairs programmes and you do 
form a view. 
Israel is a tiny country. One has to keep reminding ourselves of that. Israel features so much 
in this huge international issue. This tiny country with a small population: it has got military 
might out of all proportion to itself; and it's a democracy. And it is an extraordinary 
phenomenon that is surrounded by a whole range of Arab countries that don't want it, but 
who are bit by bit gradually coming to terms with the fact that it is probably going to stay 
there; and no one wanting to be the first to say so, - except that now they have. And I do think 
it took some guts for Arab states to say that. ' Symons, Baroness (19.01.2004: 5-6) 
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interest in the subject of the Middle Eastern affairs. Cook's choice as his third special 
advisor - David Matheison - was also highly significant when it became apparent that 
he had been working on Cook's great initiative for New Labour's approach to foreign 
affairs, - the Mission Statement. All these factors would be utilized and combined to 
assert Cook's own identity upon a department after being side-lined from much of the 
domestic agenda. 
A central part of Cook's Middle Eastern strategy was to improve British and Labour- 
Arab relations - which he considered had faltered under the Conservatives and during 
Labour's years in opposition - along with a more proactive role for the EEC (which 
historically had been reluctant to be involved as a result of West German reluctance to 
offend Israel), which would be enhanced by Britain's Presidency of the EEC (1998- 
1999). Robin Cook had announced the new approach and his intentions to visit the 
Middle East on a three-day tour to those assembled at the 50th Anniversary of the 
Anglo-Arab Association (05.03.1 998). 907 
Given the rapidly deteriorating situation between Israel and the PLO it was arguably 
perhaps always going to be something of a difficult and risky venture. Although 
approved by Blair and in possession of a new injection of economic aid to the 
Palestinian Authority struggling to come to terms with their own decline and the 
growing influence of the political and religious extremists, it would be Cook's first 
visit to the region as Foreign Secretary (Cook had previously visited the region as 
Shadow Spokesperson in September 1996). The tour included a visit to Faisal 
Husseini (PLO representative in East Jerusalem), a meeting with PLO official Salah 
Ta'amri, and a visit to one of the newest Israeli settlements in the Occupied 
907 Kampfher claims, as Foreign Secretary Cook had delayed visiting the Middle East on 
several occasions - for various reasons - generating concerns: `He [Cook] had toyed with the 
idea of using the three days to travel to the Middle East, but saw little merit in considering a 
visit to the region into such a short space of time. He considered going again on 4 November, 
to take in Israel, Gaza, Egypt, and possibly Syria and Saudi Arabia; `Scheduling difficulties' 
were cited. Indeed, his reluctance to visit the region in 1997 had caused some consternation in 
the Foreign Office. `It took us a long time to engage Robin in the [Middle East] region', said 
one [un-referenced] official. ' Kampfner, John (1998: 204) Chapter 14, Retribution Time 
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Territories in the East Jerusalem district - Jebel Abu Ghneim (re-named Har Homa by 
Israel). 
Even under what passes for normal circumstances in the Middle East such a visit 
would have raised concerns, but with British, European, American and international 
frustration at Netanyahu's failure to implement key aspects of the Oslo agreements 
(Israeli troop re-deployments, a settlement freeze and movement restrictions on Gaza 
airport and borders), and the failure of Arafat to rein in the extremists, along with the 
increasing spiral of violence and counter-violence on both sides, it was bound to be 
more difficult than usual. 
The visit to East Jerusalem was in many ways symbolic of New Labour's ethical 
dimension to foreign affairs as well as its commitment to a new multi-lateralist world: 
Cook was attempting to reinvigorate the Peace Process by reaffirming the view of the 
EEC that the settlement building was not only a violation of international law but an 
obstacle to peace. It was also a statement of intent that Cook meant to use Britain's 
Presidency to assert a more active role for the EEC. 
In the event, Cook was ambushed and compromised by both sides: Israel decried the 
visit to Jebel as `provocative' even before Cook left London; an agitated, placard- 
waving mob of Israeli settlers protesting at Cook's visit to the Occupied Territories 
were allowed to jostle and verbally abuse the British Foreign Secretary by Israeli 
security. Cook was further criticised by Israel for not including a visit to Yad Vashem 
(the Holocaust Memorial) even though with prior agreement of the Israeli government 
Yad Vashem had not been included because Cook had visited the site for three hours 
on his last visit. Then, after complaints from Netanyahu, a dinner - at which Cook had 
planned to meet the Labor Leader Ehud Barak - was cancelled and a planned meeting 
cut short. The walls of the British Consulate in Jerusalem were daubed with graffiti 
claiming Cook was anti-Semitic. 
On the Palestinian side (although the official meeting with Husseini had been 
abandoned in an effort to appease Netanyahu) Faisal Husseini - with no prior 
knowledge or permission of British officials - had accosted Cook with a request that 
he lay a wreath at the village of Deir Yassin (the site of a massacre of Palestinians in 
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April 1948 by political Zionist pars-militaries), and expressed profound offence that 
Cook had reneged on the arrangements to meet Husseini as a capitulation to Israel. 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of Cook's visit, as Kampfher says in summary: 
`Whatever the rights and wrongs of the episode, it looked bad. Comparisons 
were made with David Mellor who, as a visiting junior Foreign Office 
minister, had berated an Israeli colonel in the Gaza Strip in 1988. The analogy 
was drawn of an American going to Belfast and seemingly siding with 
nationalists against unionists. Initial press coverage back home was disastrous. 
Cook was portrayed as gaffe-prone and insensitive, his blunt talking 
counterproductive among a political elite that makes a habit of taking offence. 
A leader in The Times was particularly damaging to Cook. At the top was 
written: `The artful radical. ' Below it was the headline: `Diplomatic Disaster. 
Cook has not helped British foreign policy or the peace process. '` 08 
Although some parliamentary colleagues, EEC Foreign Ministers, and sections of the 
broad-sheet news papers supported Cook's stance, these views were generally lost 
amid the images of a British Foreign Secretary being buffeted in the mud and rain by 
protesters and the extensive diplomatic spat that followed. Cook's effort to move the 
agenda forward in the face of a deteriorating peace process was diverted by offended 
Israeli political elite and sympathetic allies at home. A month later, Blair made his 
own trip to the region, a trip which was portrayed as being `designed to repair 
relations between the UK and Israel. 
' Cook's position as Foreign Minister was now 
in jeopardy. Kampfher claims it was not just the visit to the Middle East and 
difficulties on other foreign tours which ultimately undermined Cook, but a series and 
eventual culmination of related issues, one of the most serious being `revelations 
about an extra-marital affair. '910 
908 Kampfher, John (1998: 222) Chapter 15, The Relaunch, quoting, The Times, March 18, 
1998 
90" Ibid., (1998: 222) 
910 Ibid., (1998: 223) 
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The limitations of New Labour in Government 
For all the desires of Tony Blair and Robin Cook to make their mark on the 
international theatre, when it came to Israel and the Palestinians, they were actually 
able to achieve very little. This was not for want of trying, or as a result of the 
essentially pro-Israel inclinations of the Prime Minister. But as Cook stated: 
`We were always conscious at the Foreign Office that Downing St. was very 
sympathetic to the Israeli perspective. But that is not to deny that Tony himself 
really has a genuine interest in trying to get some kind of settlement. And he 
has put more work into Northern Ireland than any British Prime Minister, and 
I am quite sure that he believes that if he could get an entry he would bring 
some of that experience and those skills to the Middle East. '91 
Indeed, it has been argued that Blair's own position (as well as that of Michael Levy), 
and consequently the policy pursued by New Labour under his premiership, evolved 
over the early years of government into a more informed and even-handed 
positioning. As retired Labour MP David Watkins commented: 
`I haven't got the access today [2003] that I had in 1997 but I think Blair has 
become much more middle-of-the-road on this whole issue, and I think he 
does recognise - and he has said this publicly - that the Palestinians have 
suffered a grave injustice, and until that is put right there will not be peace 
with justice and honour - I'm paraphrasing what he said - and that is what 
Blair has said on many occasions. '912 
The claims that there had been a shift in Blair's position also occurred among some of 
his contemporaries on the backbenchers. Speaking retrospectively in 2006, some of 
the reasons behind Blair and New Labour's shift towards a more balanced approach 
9.. Cook, Robin (02.11.2004: 5) 
912 Watkins, David (06.07.2003: 2) 
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are captured by one of the new MPs that followed Blair into government in 1997, as 
Brian Iddon913 states: 
`I have admired the Israelis in the past - their ability to `green' the deserts, the 
socialist concept of the Kibbutz, and their ability to defend themselves against 
Arab attack in 1967. However, I now see what the Israelis are doing to their 
neighbours as something akin to what has happened to themselves over many 
centuries. I believe that the creation of the State of Israel, mainly for the Jews, 
with Palestinians on their own land as second-class citizens, was wrong - 
promoted by the Zionists, of course. However, having made that mistake, I 
will defend the right now for Israel to exist as a State, and I am therefore in 
favour of a two-State settlement in that region. '914 
Re-iterating Watkins' `same coin' analogy, Iddon also notes the role of the Israeli 
Labor Party in converting his own position to that of neutrality: 
`As I see it, it is obvious that the aim of successive Israeli Governments (Labor 
or Likud, even coalitions) is to create an expanded Israeli State, with 
Jerusalem as their capital. Ethnic cleansing has been going on in the region for 
decades; now it is accelerating. I cannot understand our Government's stance 
on this issue unless it is not to offend the Americans. '915 
Above all, and with a sea-change in sections of the party clearly underway, Blair's 
policy position towards the peace process was driven above all by his pragmatic 
approach to international relations, not by his pro-Israel sympathies, and his 
determination to achieve a role for Britain meant that the peace process achieved a 
high priority for his foreign policy team. As Cook again says: 
913 Dr Brian Iddon (b. 1940) MP: (Bolton South East, 1997-present); Secretary to the All-Party 
Parliamentary Britain-Palestine Group. 
914 Iddon, Dr Brian (09.02.2006: 1) Letter: Iddon-Nelson, House of Commons 
915 Ibid., (09.02.2006: 2) 
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`I do not think honestly that there is anything in the four years that I was there 
[ 1997-2000] that we could have done more on the peace process to change the 
outcome. It was a very high priority for us, not just for me, but also for 
Michael Levy who put in an immense amount of effort in going back and 
forward, became well known and trusted by all the major players, contrary to 
what appeared in the press at the time he had a lot of respect from our 
Ambassadors because what our Ambassadors want wherever they are is 
access, and Michael actually got them access, and they relished that. And we 
came very close. '916 
Critics of Cook assert that despite the declared honourable intension that emulated 
from the Mission Statement and the appointment of key reformers, change and 
success under his Foreign Affairs leadership was ultimately curtailed by the `special 
relationship' with the United States. As Driver and Martell point out, `Cook had 
represented Labour's ethical mission and its desire to challenge the traditional model 
of state sovereignty. ' 917 Despite his efforts, and those of Blair himself `The new 
Labour government continued to fulfil the traditional British foreign policy role as the 
most loyal ally of the United States, especially in the Middle East. '918 
Robin Cook recognized the limitations of the Anglo-U. S. alliance. When asked about 
the role of Lord Levy as Blair's special envoy, he suggested that - whatever the 
criticisms levelled at Blair for the appointment - Lord Levy might in fact have been 
able to prevent some of the errors made in the Geneva 2000 negotiations had Britain 
been able to maintain a more independent role. As Cook conveys: 
`To be frank, Michael Levy was criticised by the press who said Tony Blair 
should not be using him to do this sort of thing, but in the culture of the Arab 
world it is the most natural thing in the world that a close friend of the Prime 
916 Cook, Robin (02.11.2004: 5) 
91 Driver, Stephen & Martell, Luke (2006: 184) 
918 Ibid., (1998: 146) 
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Minister be sent on his behalf; it comes more naturally to them than any 
democratic role of politicians and Prime Ministers. '919 
Cook continues: 
`Unfortunately when Clinton organised the Geneva [March 2000] meeting 
they thought at that point that they were on the verge of an agreement, and he 
cut Britain out because they were approaching the Presidential elections and 
they wanted all the credit to go to America.... I think that it was just possible 
that they might have made more progress if they had kept Michel Levy 
involved. '920 
Conclusion 
The evidence in this chapter suggests that Blair's and Cook's neutralist policies made 
little progress as a consequence of the inconsistencies in the approaches of successive 
Israeli Labor and Likud governments towards the peace process. In the early years of 
the New Labour government, the honourable intentions initially based on Cook's 
determination to apply an ethical dimension to foreign policy dramatically foundered 
on Netanyahu's unravelling of much of the progress made through the Oslo peace 
process, to which New Labour was entirely committed. By the time Ehud Barak's 
Israeli Labor Party had come to power in 1999 British influence was being even more 
firmly excluded from the process by their own American allies as Clinton sought, 
unsuccessfully, to secure an agreement before leaving office. 
In terms of the trajectory of New Labour policy towards political Zionism, Israel and 
the Palestinians, there can be little doubt that Blair's government, despite, and within 
the context of his own pro-Israel inclinations, was fully committed to even- 
handedness in approach, and neutrality in terms of policy. The exclusion of the left- 
wing and far-left of the party via the modernisation and reform processes initiated by 
Kinnock, continued by Smith, and expanded and accelerated under Blair, ensured that 
919 Cook, Robin (02.11.2004: 2) 
920 Ibid., (02.11.2004: 2) 
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the policy trajectory did not swing further towards the Palestinians, despite the Israeli 
and Labor Party of Israel's role in the failure to progress the Oslo peace process. As 
the peace process disintegrated into the Second Intifadah, Blair's government 
substituted political support for the Palestinians with economic support, partly 
because in Blair's mind this was the most pragmatic response, and partly because it 
was in line with the pro-economic development Hindenite school agenda which had 
been inherited from old Labour, and partly because the leadership remained 
sympathetic to Israel, instinctively so in the case of Blair, in line with the historic 
common origins and related philosophies which they still considered to be based on 
relatively firm foundations. 
The internal determinants of this progression towards a firmly neutralist policy 
position can therefore be understood as follows. Firstly, the pro-political Zionism of 
New Labour's key leadership figure, Tony Blair, was mitigated by way in which he 
had internalised the new international order, globalisation and his own personal 
religious beliefs. Liberal interventionism and the requirements of an ethical dimension 
to foreign policy required that he seek a means to alleviate Palestinian suffering, 
whilst pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy strategy. Secondly, the continued 
modernisation and reform of the party itself had removed the left-wing and far-left 
from positions of influence over foreign policy. Blair was surrounded by a Foreign 
policy team of his own making, including appointees and special envoys, and 
operating through a settee-style of decision and policy-making which circumvented 
both broader party based mechanisms and to some extent the contribution and 
scrutiny of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
The external determinants that influenced the shift in New Labour's policy trajectory 
included the altered international environment (which necessitated - in Blair's view - 
the liberal humanitarian interventionist approach); the Oslo peace process itself 
(which enabled New Labour to focus on the apparent reconciliation of the two parties 
to the Israel-Palestinian conflict and thereby evade its own essential dilemma); the 
exclusionary policies of the United States (which restricted the British role to a 
supportive, economic development-based contribution, which could be located within 
the pragmatism and pro-development agenda of New Labour more generally); and 
the election in 1996 of Netanyahu's Likud government in, Israel (which New Labour's 
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early initiatives to explore a window of opportunity when the American presidency 
was still remotely open to a role for Britain) but came to falter as Netanyahu drove to 
reverse aspects of Oslo which he viewed were disadvantageous to Israel. And in a 
strongly related sense, what this chapter further conveys is that regardless of New 
Labour's ethical dimension to foreign policy and the doctrine of international 
intervention, and its constitutional commitment to socialism, UN resolutions and 
international law, the party was not prepared to apply these policies and principles 
universally. Despite the fact that all the prerequisite criteria guiding the decision to 
approve and implement sanctions and facilitate military intervention in the Balkans 
and Iraq, for example, was evident, it is clear that this criteria and approach would not 
be applied to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, irrespective of whether Likud or Labor 
were in power. 
It was perhaps a matter of supreme irony that the internal and external determinants 
conspired to create a willingness and ability within New Labour to pursue an Israel- 
Palestinian peace process - without abandoning either the historic connections with 
Israel, or the desire of significant sections of the party for a just settlement for the 
Palestinians, - at the moment when the Oslo peace process was at its lowest ebb, and 
from which it declined further. It had been the Oslo process that essentially facilitated 
this New Labour policy, which was now being equally scuttled by American 
presidential aspirations, Israeli intransigence and a politically compromised Yasser 
Arafat. These combined factors excluded the New Labour government from the 
international role to which its leaders aspired, and from which the psychological, 
ideological and political components of the essential dilemma had hitherto conspired 
to prevent. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has provided an historical survey of the relationship between the Labour 
Party in Britain with political Zionism, and more specifically the way in which that 
relationship has impacted upon Labour Party policy towards political Zionism, Israel 
and the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The thesis sought to identify the root source of 
Labour's historically pro-political Zionist position, and to examine its evolution 
through successive decades in response to both the internal dynamics of the party 
itself, and the external environment within which it was operating. Specifically, 
individual chapters demonstrated the following: 
Chapter 1 located the initial pro-political Zionism of the early Labour Party in the 
perceived common origins, related religious philosophies (collectively referred to in 
this thesis as the psychological aspect and component of the essential dilemma) and 
the perceived shared socialist ideology of the Labour Party and political Zionist 
movement. It was determined that the influence of these factors upon leading Labour 
figures created a pro-political Zionist party consensus and the foundations upon which 
a near century of relations were to be based. This period also facilitated a profound 
and unique bond between Labour and political Zionism that was more akin to a family 
blood tie than what might normally be associated with alliances of political and 
religious parties possessing commonalities; this special tie was a major component of 
the essential dilemma condition that became of increasing importance as the inherent 
ideological contradictions located in the relationship arose and increased as both the 
realities of political Zionism and Palestine became more widely known and 
understood. Labour found temporary sanctuary from the excesses of the essential 
dilemma in the periods it was not in government office, and more particularly, amid 
the emergent and overwhelming realities of the Nazi genocide, - the Holocaust, 
responding with the adoption of the most pro-political Zionist policy position in the 
party's history in 1944. 
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Chapter 2 addressed the period from 1945 to 1962, showing how, in the aftermath of 
the Holocaust, the influence of the essential dilemma resurfaced. On forming a 
government, the contradiction between Labour's traditional pro-political Zionist 
sympathies and 1944 policy conflicted with the overriding obligation to prioritise 
British national interests in the face of the greatest moral impediment created by the 
predicament of Jewish refugees and the all too prevalent realities of political Zionism 
and Palestine. 
Chapter 3 covering the period from 1963 to 1979 showed how, despite the leadership 
of Harold Wilson, (who represented the embodiment of Labour's pro-political Zionist 
traditions) key external determinant, such as the 1967 and 1973 wars and the re- 
emergence of a distinct Palestinian dimension to the conflict, combined to further 
raise the spectre of the essential dilemma substantially deferred by the moral post- 
Holocaust impediment and creation of the State of Israel. The net effect of these 
factors was a further sequence of internal division embodied in the development of 
the deviation process towards a neutralist position, culminating in the open rebellion 
by some Labour figures against the pro-Israel directorship of the leadership. 
Chapter 4 addressed the 1980s, a period characterised by Labour's shift to the left- 
wing in the leadership, the decision-making body of the NEC, and the TUC. This, in 
conjunction with some seminal external determinants in the shape of Israel's invasion 
of Lebanon and the related Intifadah, generated an anomaly in the form of the 
adoption of an overtly pro-Palestinian policy by Labour in 1982. Subsequent internal 
Labour reforms under the pragmatist - Neil Kinnock - placed the party on a clearly 
neutralist trajectory that prospered in the post-Oslo period, increasingly ensuring that 
Labour did not return to its traditional pro-Zionist/Israel policy position. 
Chapter 5 builds upon the evidence produced in preceding chapters that, in the 
absence of a clear and consistent ideological position within Labour towards political 
Zionism and the Israel/Palestinian question, key individuals within the leadership 
(including both front and backbenches) have been able to shape policy by ardent 
advocacy of their own positions and prejudices. The thesis is brought into the 
contemporary era by specifically addressing the years from 1994 to 1997. In this 
period Tony Blair became party leader, reforming and reformulating the Labour Party 
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as New Labour and imposing his own vision of foreign policy and foreign policy- 
making upon the party, and latterly, the Labour government. The chapter suggests that 
his personal influence has been seminal in determining Labour Party foreign policy 
both in, and out of government, and therefore examines the origins and philosophical 
basis of his own approach to foreign policy-making. 
Chapter 6 addresses the period from 1997 to 2001, and specifically the formulation of 
New Labour policy towards political Zionism and the Israel-Palestinian question 
under a Tony Blair-led government. It shows how New Labour's election to 
government ushered in a select cabinet style of special advisors in decision-making, 
within the context of an ethical dimension to foreign affairs and the introduction and 
selective application of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Whilst initially 
apparently released from the more problematic constraints created by the essential 
dilemma with the advent of the Oslo Accords in 1993 (which had seen the two parties 
to the conflict reaching an apparent agreement), the subsequent unravelling of the 
Oslo process forced Tony Blair and his foreign minister, Robin Cook, to once more 
engage with the psychological, ideological and political contradictions epitomized 
within the components of the essential dilemma. 
Throughout the entire period (1900-2001), Labour's policy trajectory has altered from 
being fundamentally pro-political Zionist to being essentially neutralist (after a brief 
flirtation with pro-Palestinianism during the 1980s). The neutralist position has 
emerged as the closest thing to a consensus, which can include both pro-political 
Zionists and those members for whom socialist commitments make support for a 
colonialist Israel impossible. At the same time, neutralism has been a means to evade 
substantively addressing the origins, source and continuity of the essential dilemma. 
In making this trajectory deviation towards neutralism, the influence of key 
individuals has been to some extent diluted, although the issue itself has remained the 
domain of highly-motivated individuals on both sides of the dilemma. 
How then might we evaluate the entirity of this relationship during the three eras: 
historical, modern and contemporary? The overall argument in this thesis is that the 
British Labour Party and the political Zionist movement formed and possessed a 
unique relationship, based on several key factors. In its earliest and crucial period the 
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basis of relations was undoubtedly built upon the perceived common origins derived 
from the related religious philosophies, and the shared socialist ideology which 
bound to create a unique idealist political identity and affiliated alliance. But equally, 
if not perhaps more importantly, these common origins in conjunction with the shared 
social, political and economic circumstances and experience of poverty, injustice and 
struggle, combined to forge and cement not just a deep-seated and fierce socialist 
affinity between Labour and related figures and political Zionists, but an equally 
profound emotional bond, a crie de coeur, and something more aligned to a family 
kinship with all associated ties, loyalties and prejudices; epitomised in the way 
Labour figures referred to the political Zionists as our `sisters' and the Labor Party of 
Israel that `bears the same name' as the British Labour Party. 
There is also little doubt and much evidence to support the claim that, particularly 
among Labour MPs and related figures with no or little knowledge of political 
Zionism and/or the realities of Palestine, that relations began and were continued in 
good faith and socialist sincerity; amid the slums and ghettos in which the vast 
majority of Labour and political Zionist figures were born and raised, and from which 
the Labour Party and the Zionist movement was founded and emerged, relations were 
initially and largely innocently located in the common struggle of purpose and for the 
most part, genuinely located in a socialist identity, aspirations, and methodology. 
The Historical Era: 1900-1944 
The fact that the political Zionist movement achieved such a degree of sustained 
support from Britain was a remarkable achievement in itself; the fact that it received - 
and has continued to receive - the support of the British socialist Labour Party is in 
many ways, even more remarkable. There is evidence to support the claim that some 
of this support was undoubtedly based on understandable ignorance, and less 
understandable expediency, as well as cultural prejudice. One of the reasons the 
political Zionists were so successful in developing relations with Labour stems from 
the fact that political Zionism was presented to Labour figures as being a socialist 
mass-Jewish movement that sought to liberate Jews from endemic persecution by 
facilitating mass immigration to Palestine, where a socialist utopia could be 
established to the advancement, inclusion and gratitude of the indigenous peoples, the 
Palestinians (references to native peoples began to occurred as it became evident that 
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Palestine was not in fact `empty' as at first claimed by some individuals and sections 
of the Zionist movement). 
It is clear that the political Zionist leaders and activists were not entirely, or always 
directly to blame for this misperception among Labour MPs and related figures as to 
the realities of Zionism and Palestine; whether by design or circumstance, ignorance 
and/or expediency, from the earliest periods any number of key Labour figures from 
the highest echelons of the party hierarchy can be found actively propagating the 
Zionist philosophy and agenda for world Jewry and Palestine. During the first 
parliamentary debate on Palestine to involve a Labour MP, Josiah Wedgwood claimed 
in 1922 that `Zionism was creating a new society, based on democracy and progress, 
that it was welcomed by the Arab [Palestinian] common people and opposed only by 
feudal landlords. The common people ... stood to benefit enormously from the 
developments that the Jewish people would bring. v921 Wedgewood's assertions came 
to epitomise the perceptions, views and positions of a generation of Labour MPs and 
related figure. 
The realities, however, of both political Zionism and Palestine, were all too frequently 
at variance with these claims, and as a consequence so were the subsequent 
perceptions and policy positions of Labour figures and the party. As the academic 
Michael Shalev says, socialist Zionism was a `particular branch of European Zionist 
thought and activity' that actually `arose out of the polarization of Jewish 
socialists, ' 922 and that polarization was the result of the majority more nationalistic 
revisionist sections of the Zionist movement, which was anything but socialist. 
Similarly, the argument that the mass of persecuted Jewry sought to go to Palestine 
was also at best exaggerated, and at worst, the subject of misinformation and 
propaganda designed to direct the huge Jewish exodus from Russia and Eastern 
Europe from reaching the Americas, thereby compelling them to enter Palestine, to 
921 Watkins, David (1996: 112) quoting, Josiah Wedgwood, March 9,1922, Hansard, col. 
1575-1584 
922 Shalev, Michael. (1992: 35) Labour and the Political Economy in Israel, Chapter 2, 
Accounting for the Exclusivism. The Histadrut and the Palestinians, (New York: Oxford 
University Press) 
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adopt and facilitate the political Zionist philosophy by converting Palestine into the 
modern state of Israel. 
Nevertheless, the implication that `Zionism equalled Socialism'923 and visa versa, in 
the context of the almost overwhelming ignorance of the realities of political Zionism 
and Palestine at that time, interspersed with Zionist propaganda - which had a 
`dubious reputation as far as the truth was concerned'924 - was an alluring and potent 
force. And particularly so, when combined with varying degrees of expediency and 
more than a smidgen of cultural prejudice centred on the notion that as a 
quintessentially European, occidentally derived ideology, political Zionism offered 
salvation to Jews from persecution, all of which came to understandably provide a 
`powerful and attractive argument for British Socialists. ' 925 As a consequence, it was 
this perceived socialist linkage that as Watkins' says, came to be `unassailably planted 
in the minds of two generations of Labour activities' to provide what many Labour 
figures considered to be a `definitive basis'926 for Labour's close, supportive and 
sympathetic relationship with political Zionist figures and the philosophy of political 
Zionism. As Morrison's 1948 reminiscence poignantly underlines, in a 1936 Palestine 
- ironically on the eve of the Palestinian revolt - he had witnessed `Socialism on the 
highest level. M7 
Furthermore, the gradually emerging realities of Palestine among Labour figures - not 
least the actual existence of the indigenous Palestinians - were also heavily at a 
variance with established perceptions among Labour figures (in its most extreme 
form, the belief that Palestine was empty). In terms of the Palestinians, for the most 
part, the political Zionist enterprise in Palestine had been exclusive and detrimental, 
913 Watkins, David (1996: 112) 
924 Shapira, Anita. (1992: 42) quoting, Theodor Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor 
Hera!, Patai, R. [Editor] (1960) (New York: Herzt Press & Thomas Yoseloff), June 7,1895, 
1: 40 
925 Watkins, David (1996: 112) 
926 Ibid., (1996: 112) 
927 Donoughue, Bernard & Jones, George W. (2001: 256), quoting, Herbert Morrison, Speech 
to Labour conference, quoted in Jewish Chronicle, May 21,1948 
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generating intense Palestinian resentment as they were gradually dispossessed of land 
by successive influxes of Jewish immigrants. The realisation of Palestinian existence 
and the gradual awareness that they were also resident, distinctive as Arabs and 
possessed a deep affinity and attachment to a land they had inhabited continuously for 
some seven centuries came to form a key part of the essential dilemma, particularly as 
this situation escalated into frequent bouts of open disorder and violence. 
Although it remained a firm and relatively successful policy of the political Zionists 
to emphasise the generic Arab identity of the Palestinians, with all the associated geo- 
demographic implications and connotations that brought about in the context of the 
Palestinian-Zionist issue (notably the concept of transfer of the Palestinians to `Arab' 
territories elsewhere, and the Zionist argument that Palestine represented a fraction of 
the wider `Arab' territories), the existence and determination of the Palestinians to 
assert their identity and their claim to Palestine also remained a major source of 
Labour-political Zionism tensions, as well as forming a core component of the 
essential dilemma. Had Palestine been empty, or the Palestinians been entirely 
nomadic Bedouins, then the emerging realities of political Zionism as a nationalist, 
colonial and para-military ideology and movement might not have had the same 
degree or number of negative implications for Labour and its relations with political 
Zionism. But the emergent realities of the Palestinians, which grew more effective 
and pronounced as Palestinian nationalism gained currency, in conjunction with the 
related, if belated acknowledgement of the likely consequences of the political Zionist 
agenda for Palestine of creating a Jewish/political Zionist state, elevated the 
ideological contradictions for Labour, that to a lesser extent were already evident and 
problematic, to a new and increasing height. 
Similarly and relatedly, had Labour remained a party of opposition many of these 
issues arising from the disclosure of realities in Palestine and of political Zionism 
might have been of significantly less importance. However, Labour's meteoric rise to 
government barely twenty-four years after it was founded, and a second government 
term (1929-1931), which unfortuitously coincided with some of the most eventful 
developments in Palestine and within political Zionism, ensured the common origins 
and essential dilemma would become an increasingly problematic contradiction for 
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Labour individuals as well as for the party, particularly in terms of its decision and 
policy-making. 
The significance of the shared socialist ideology to the basis and nature of Labour- 
political Zionist relations is further complicated by the additional component within 
the common origins, - the related religious philosophies dimension. The significance 
of Christian religion in the founding motivations and principles of the Labour Party 
are epitomised by the popular maxim - attributed to Morgan Phillips (Labour Party 
General Secretary, 1944-1961) - that `socialism in Britain owed far more to 
Methodism than to Marx. '928 The fact that the Labour Party and political Zionism 
were founded upon religious foundations provided an important and readily available 
basis for the establishment and maintenance of Labour-political Zionist relations, as 
such, much of its nature emulated from their related religious philosophies. As with 
the common origins and perceived shared socialist ideology the mutual familiarity 
and over-lapping beliefs between Christian and Judaic faiths among Labour and 
related figures ensured that the relationship was, in some instances, bound together as 
surely as the Old Testaments and the New Testaments. 
It is perfectly evident that the religious backgrounds, education and belief of Labour 
and related figures were a key aspect in determining and sustaining the basis and the 
nature of relations between Labour and political Zionism. The biblical romanticised 
perceptions of Palestine generally acquired within an occidental culture steeped in the 
Christian faith, its traditions and values, often instilled from birth, and furthered by 
primary, secondary and higher education curricula, meant Labour figures were 
invariably more versed in the history of the ancient Hebrews than the history of their 
own parliamentary origins located in the seventeenth century mire of the English civil 
war. This provided generations of fertile minds, and crucially receptive hearts, for 
concepts like the Jewish `return, ' and convenient slogans like `an empty land, for a 
people without land' upon which the political Zionist philosophy was essentially 
premised. 
928 Wilson, Harold (1964 [c]: 1) The Relevance of British Socialism, Chapter 1, What is 
British Socialism? (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson) 
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From Keir Hardie to Tony Blair, committed Christian and Jewish Labour and related 
figures played key roles in aligning the socialist Labour Party to Christianity and 
Judaism, and by extension, to political Zionism; this aligning occurred to the extent 
that it gradually became difficult for some Labour figures to discern the possible 
difference between terms like `Jew' and `Jewish' and `Zionist' and `Zionism, ' when 
in reality being Jewish does not necessarily equate to being a Zionist, and visa versa 
(the practice of interchanging, replacing and categorising terms of reference is also 
located in the attempt to replace the term `Palestinian/s' with `Arab/s' in what this 
thesis calls the currency of language). 
What is clear in a summary of the historical era is that with the sobering predicament 
of the Jews in Europe becoming progressively more desperate, to eventually 
culminate in the Nazi genocide, Labour figures and the party generally found a 
mechanism amid the unprecedented gravitas of this Jewish calamity, to suppress the 
ideological contradictions and the worst influence of the essential dilemma; by 
adopting a policy-position in 1944 which advocated creating a Jewish state from all of 
mandate Palestine with the encouraged transfer of the Palestinians, Labour figures 
arrived at a consensus, which assumed the moral impediment of the Jewish case in 
Europe overrode the Palestinian case in Palestine. While this policy undoubted 
resulted from the influence of the Holocaust, it was also based on the factors 
generated by the common origins, ignorance, and expediency, and to an extent, 
cultural prejudice. Above all else perhaps, the 1944 policy position at the close of the 
historic era was also the result of the psychological aspect of relations, and crucially, 
the ability of the political Zionists to secure their adoption by Labour. For by the time 
the full realisation of the realities of political Zionism and Palestine had been 
established in the minds of Labour and related figures, many were already too 
psychologically involved to respond fully to the ideological and political 
contradictions presented by the relationship; a situation akin to what has been 
described as `This Cuckoo in the nest. '929 Amid the contradiction the ornithological 
metaphor used to describe the location of the political Zionist Movement at the heart 
of the British Labour Party and political system has other appropriations: for the 
929 Adams, Michael & Mayhew, Christopher (2006: ix) Introduction, quoting, Tim Llewellyn 
[former BBC Middle Eastern correspondent, 1974-1984] 
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Cuckoo, as with the political Zionists, has an astonishing ability to replicate the 
markings of the hosts parent's eggs to ensure its adoption and nourishment, despite 
the growing contradictions posed by the emerging and expanding evidence of another 
species' hatchling. For the most part, by the time Labour came to realise what 
political Zionism really comprised, it was too late: to all intents and purposes the 
commitments and promises had already largely been made. 
The Modem Era: 1945-1993 
If the more excessive prevarications of the political Zionists - that reached a peak in 
1930-1931 - were largely avoidable during the inter-war period by a Labour 
leadership and party increasingly perplexed by the ideological contradictions 
exacerbated by the disturbances that pitted the years from 1920 to 1939 in Palestine, 
the moral imperative created by the Holocaust and the Jewish survivors effectively 
dissolved any remaining significant resistance within mainstream Labour to political 
Zionist aspirations towards Palestine. 
While Labour felt the decision in 1944 to offer Palestine as a resolution to centuries of 
endemic Jewish persecution in Europe and Russia was now morally irrefutable in the 
wake of the Holocaust and its survivors, the Palestinians understandably saw no such 
justification. The fate and plight of Jews at the hands of the Fascist and Nazi regimes 
had been an entirely European affair. As such, the offer of Palestine by an imperial 
power did not equate with either the moral justification, or Palestinian aspirations for 
self-determination, or indeed the realities of Palestine; this was the case before the 
Holocaust, and from a Palestinian perspective in particular, the case had not changed 
in its aftermath. If anything, the situation was more intractable than ever in terms of 
equating the problems of Europe with those of Palestine: the insatiable quest for 
Palestinian self-determination and independence, along with the resurgence of Arab 
nationalism set in the more assertive anti-colonial atmosphere of the post- 1945 world, 
were powerful and still growing forces of resistance, to which Britain, with strategic 
national interests in the Middle East, the Indian Sub-Continent and Muslim south-east 
Asia, certainly had to take into consideration, and sometimes heed. 
In a remarkably short space of time Labour's predicament had also changed. The 
policy commitments of December 1944, made while Labour was a war-time coalition 
349 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 
member, were quite suddenly and rudimentally transformed with Labour's somewhat 
surprise election to government in July 1945. The duty of the Labour government was 
to protect British interests, which were inextricably bound to the wider Middle 
Eastern region, its leaders and peoples, and most notably with the emergent Arab 
states for strategic reasons, and increasingly, those of oil. In the context of a coalition, 
Palestinian existence or objections were of little or no impediment, but as a 
government, and in the context of a wider duty to British national interests, Palestine 
and the Palestinian position had important and far-reaching implications. In short, 
Labour's idealist ultra pro-political Zionist policy position of 1944 was made 
redundant by the demands of national political realism after the party's election to 
government. 
These phenomenal circumstances and the enormous questions they raised for Labour 
figures and party policy eventually established two fairly defined positions within 
Labour: those who advocated something akin to the ultra-pro-political Zionist 1944 
position, and those who advocated the pro-British national and strategic interest's 
position. The years 1945 to 1949 were essentially characterised by the internal tussles 
between these two positions. At the same time, events and issues derived from 
external determinants in Europe, Palestine, the wider Middle East and the United 
States, conspired to pressure Labour into first abandoning the mandate and Palestine, 
then recognizing the State of Israel. This precipitated an unceasing dichotomy for 
Labour as it attempted a precarious balancing act between the traditional ideological 
tendencies towards sympathy and support for political Zionism and then the Jewish 
state, against the more practical realist alliances with the Arab states required to 
ensure the post-war recovery was sustained via oil and trade, and the additional 
requirement to contain Soviet expansionism. 
With the state of Israel now in existence and the Palestinians at the conclusion of the 
1947-1949 Arab/Palestinian-political Zionist/Israel war either absorbed within the 
boundaries of the State of Israel, or floundering in refugee camps under the auspices 
of Jordan (West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip), Labour felt the consequences of the 
essential dilemma - derived in part from the predicament of the Palestinians - would 
be submerged and alleviated by what amounted to a fait accompli - in the shape of 
Israel. And that, with the simple passage of time, and the distractions of subsequent 
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events like the onset of the Cold War, the Palestinians would - as `Arabs' - be 
absorbed by their host states. However, the rise of the post-colonial struggles and the 
assurgency of Arab nationalism in the formidable frame of Colonel Abdel Nasser, 
served to resurrect the core aspect of the essential dilemma as the existence of the 
Palestinians, their distinct identity, attachment and belief in the right of their claim to 
Palestine aligned itself with the greater Arab nationalist movement. Despite the 
simmering injustices felt by the Palestinians resulting from the impingement of a 
European crime - the Holocaust - and resulting guilt upon their national existence, 
they not only refused to be silenced, obscured and absorbed, but re-surfaced to 
become, once again, a core factor belying the ideological contradiction in the basis 
and nature of Labour's relations with political Zionism. 
Not only did Palestinians resolutely refuse to be absorbed by neighbouring Arab 
states, but the emergence of the Palestine National Council (PNC) and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) provided the political means to direct a national 
collective consciousness into a decision and policy-making process. By opting to 
reject offers to become Jordanian nationals and aligning themselves with the policies 
of Arab states that refused to permanently absorb Palestinian refugees into their 
populations as a resolution to the anti-Semitism and guilt of Europe, the substance and 
foundations of a national Palestinian political entity were created. Furthermore, in the 
nullifying epitaph of the Arab defeats by Israel in the 1967 and 1973 wars, the 
Palestinians re-directed their nationalist struggle from an over-reliance on their host 
states towards greater self-reliance; this gave a resurgence to their own distinct 
Palestinian identity, and thus, a reaffirmed their claim to Palestine. These 
developments initially took the form of a guerrilla campaign against Israel, and a 
disastrous employment of international terrorism (epitomised by assassinations, the 
hi-jacking of civil aircraft and the 1972 Munich Olympics attack); this tactic 
eventually evolved into a reform and modernisation programme, which placed a 
greater emphasis on political and diplomatic initiatives as much as it did the armed 
resistance. This reform process culminated in Yasser Arafat's United Nations General 
Assembly address (1974) and the 1988 Algiers declaration. As these dramatic 
political and diplomatic Palestinian initiatives occurred and developed so a core 
aspect of the essential dilemma resurfaced as a re-energised issue for Labour, 
. primarily, because while the 
Palestinian national movement remained engaged in 
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armed resistance and terrorism the influence of the essential dilemma could be 
suppressed to a greater degree by the expressed abhorrence of Labour figures to the 
terrorist tactics employed by the PLO and affiliated groups. 
As these Palestinian factors extended into the realm of Labour as a party of 
government (1964-1970 and 1974-1979), the Palestinian dimension of the broader 
Arab-Israel conflict came to represent an increasingly unavoidable component of the 
essential dilemma, especially as Labour attempted to reconcile its traditional and 
instinctive support for Israel, with the constitutional duty to secure British interests 
(Arab oil and trade) which again came under acute focus during the Arab-Israel 
conflicts of 1967 and 1973. The efforts to ignore the Palestinian dimension became 
even more problematic as sections of the party deviated away from the pro-Israel 
position of the leadership as they became ever more aware of the Palestinians as a 
central part of the Arab-Israel problem, and actively and vocally committed to the 
search for a resolution. 
As the memories and influence of the Holocaust declined as those with direct or 
indirect experience of its consequences diminished and new parliamentary 
generations entered the fray, so the loyalties to Labour's traditional pro-political 
Zionist position became increasingly challenged by what became the deviation 
process. The deviation process of disaffected Labour figures has its beginnings in the 
1956 Suez affair, which accelerated after 1967, and erupted into open parliamentary 
rebellion in 1973 as sections of the party stood against the pro-Israel leadership of 
Harold Wilson. The deviation of Labour figures found its greatest expression in the 
establishment of two parliamentary related groups - CAABU (1967) and the LMEC 
(1969) - as the need to understand and resolve the contradiction the Israel-Palestinian 
situation presented for Labour gained momentum and support. This deviation process 
made tentative progress within the leadership as the pro-Israel grip wielded by Wilson 
was gradually prised towards a more moderate fair-minded and pragmatic neutralism 
advocated and applied by Labour leader James Callaghan after Wilson's retirement in 
1976. 
The more even-handed approach of Callaghan coincided with the electoral decline of 
the Labor Party of Israel and the ascendancy of Menachem Begin's right-wing Likud 
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bloc to government from 1977 to 1984. The more extreme policies of the Likud - 
notably the rapid acceleration and expansion of settlement building - gave further 
credence and impetus to the deviation process, particularly as Labour figures lost an 
additional sense of distinction as Israeli Labor Party figures accepted key ministerial 
posts in a series of Likud led coalition governments from 1984 - notably Yitzhak 
Rabin (Defence Minister) and Shimon Peres (Foreign Minister) - that only served to 
further smudge the ideological boundaries and apportioning of responsibility for what 
are illegal acts in international law. The Labor Party of Israel's participation in Likud 
coalition governments after 1984 raised more consternation as the settlement 
programme expanded and accelerated after the conclusion of the Camp David peace 
treaty with Egypt in 1978. The treaty effectively neutralised the largest Arab army to 
directly border Israel, allowing Israel to invade Lebanon in 1979 and 1982, and to 
suppress the civil population of the West Bank (1987-1993) during the first 1ntifadah 
in order to facilitate the next phase of Israeli settlement and associated land 
confiscations in the quest for an Eretz (greater) Israel. The Israeli Labor Party's role 
in this sequence of events resulted in a growing disaffection of an increasing number 
of British Labour figures, as they began to questioning whether Labor in Israel was 
simply a `different side to the same coin? ' As a result, the deviation process continued 
to progress and expand towards a non-partisan consensus and neutralist policy 
position in light of these events in Israel, the Occupied Territories and the Middle 
East. 
One of the consequences of the radicalisation of the Palestinian national movement in 
the late 1960s and 1970s was that it caught the attention and support from individuals 
and sections on the left-wing and far-left of the Labour Party. The socialist secular 
politics of Yasser Arafat's Al-Fatah, the largest political party within the umbrella of 
the Palestine National Council and PLO, and the advent of a plethora of Palestinian 
socialist, Marxist-Leninist and communist parties - notably the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(DFLP) and the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) - all found a degree of resonances 
with the leftist radicalism of the period. This radicalism afforded a level of influence 
upon the more mainstream and traditional left-wing of the Labour Party culminating, 
after the capturing by the left-wing of the party leadership (1980) and the decision and 
policy-making mechanism of the NEC, some local parties and sections of the trades 
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union movement, with the adoption of an overtly pro-Palestinian policy in 1981. At 
the same time, the more moderate party consensus continued with the deviation 
process towards a neutralist conclusion, the policy position based on even-handedness 
being affirmed after the decline and fall of the left-wing after the 1983 general 
election defeat and the arrival of the pragmatist moderate left-wing figure of Neil 
Kinnock as party leader. 
As a representative of a relatively new demographic and parliamentary generation, 
Neil Kinnock possessed arguably fewer pro-political Zionist/pro-Israel instincts than 
any other preceding Labour Leader of the modern era. While he clearly illustrated his 
awareness and allegiances to political Zionism and the resulting State of Israel in the 
context of his knowledge and sympathies resulting from the Holocaust, because of his 
age he is also, if not equally aware of Palestinian history and their current 
predicament in relation to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Additionally, as a pragmatist, 
Kinnock was prepared - particularly as an opposition leader - to overtly challenge the 
extremes of Israel in pretty much equal quantity and quality as he was that of the 
Palestinians. 
Kinnock was fortuitous in the sense that he inherited a Labour Party recovering from 
the shock of the surge to the left-wing, with the resulting anomaly of the party's pro- 
Palestinian policy position - bucking a pro-political Zionist consensus tradition 
extending to 1917 - and its calamitous 1983 electoral defeat. These factors combined 
to enable Kinnock to appear like a moderate to the pro-Israel encampment, simply by 
advocating equitability in approach and a position of neutralism. Kinnock's 
neutralism was derived as much from his ultra-pragmatism born of a desire to return 
Labour to government as it was determined by his concern for the predicament of the 
Palestinians, which he never really viewed as a case based on national self- 
determination, preferring an Hindenite school of approach centred upon economic 
development and financial investment. However, with the advent of the wholesale 
reform and modernisation programme of the Labour Party and the protracted 
disturbing struggle in the Occupied Territories between 1987 and 1992, Kinnock was 
able to not only forge ahead with his own reform programme, but carried the Labour 
Party resolutely towards a consensus and policy position founded on neutralism. In 
doing so, Kinnock avoided the more troubling aspects of the essential dilemma by 
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addressing what he viewed as the concerns of `both sides' as he sought to steer 
Labour towards a return to government. 
Neil Kinnock's pragmatism and neutralism extended to his successors - John Smith 
and Margaret Beckett (Acting Leader) - who were fortunate to benefit from the 
inclusion of a rare external determinant that positively assisted Labour's tentative 
efforts to address the essential dilemma: the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords. The 
agreement by the PLO and Israel to recognise each other almost, at the stroke of a 
pen, released Labour from a number of the restraints imposed by the essential 
dilemma, notably, the increasing discomfort and difficulties imposed by the deviation 
process and the mounting evidence - particularly from the 1980s - emphasizing not 
just the fundamental ideological contradiction in Labour's pro-Israel traditions and 
instincts, but the inherent problems this generated as Labour became increasingly 
pressured to address the essential dilemma by addressing Israel's conduct against the 
Palestinians in a more even-handed manner. 
The Contemporary Era - New Labour: 1994-2001 
With the election of Tony Blair as party leader and the fashioning of a New Labour 
Party from the philosophy of Blairism, the general pragmatic neutralist trend, with a 
pro-Israel undercurrent continued. As an arch ultra-pragmatist Blair sought a solution 
to the conflict on the rapidly crumbling foundations of the Oslo Peace Process. 
Although for a range of internal reasons stemming mostly from Blair's early 
experiences of Labour's left-wing surge of the 1980s, foreign affairs were largely 
avoided in opposition (1994-1997); after assuming government in 1997 that 
avoidance of international politics became much less of an option. And in a bizarre 
twist of internal party dynamics, a frustrated Blair, increasingly excluded from 
domestic arena by a prudent chancellor, turned to the international arena he had so 
fervently tried to avoid as he strove to assert his own identity beyond the controls of 
an ever more resentful Gordon Brown. As Seldon says of Blair on domestic affairs, 
`When at last he [Blair] did find his own agenda, early in the second term [2001], it 
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ran slap up against the Labour Party - and Gordon Brown. 930 As a consequence it was 
as if the far-flung corners of a foreign field became forever England as Blair 
addressed international affairs with a degree of messianic passion that took Britain to 
war on five occasions in the space of five years. 
For Blair, the experience of the early 1980s during Labour's left-wing lurch and 
subsequent mauling in the 1983 general election irreparably shaped his own political 
philosophy. Further successive election defeats in 1987 and 1992 only served to 
temper Blair's resolve to abandon socialism as an orthodox ideology, and to radically 
accelerate and extend the modernisation and reform of Labour with the central aim of 
attaining the party's election to government with the primary purpose of effecting real 
change in Britain. Blair's politics were also deeply influence by his background and 
the experience of his family. From his mother he acquired abundant self-belief and 
confidence, and inherited the foundations of what became a profoundly deep Christian 
faith (reinforced at university); from his father he learnt the values of self-reliance, 
progressive upward social and economic mobility. But from both parents he came to 
understand the limitations of family, religion and individualism as the intervention of 
ill-health imposed a radical re-evaluation, and a deep appreciation for the values of 
the socialist Welfare State, and later, the Labour Party from which it was founded. 
It was the powerful combination of domestic and political experiences that moulded 
and directed Blair into the formulation of his own unique Third Way political 
philosophy, - Blairism. With his ascendancy to the party leadership in 1994, Blairism 
- the curious blend of Christian socialist values and social democratic pragmatism - 
was administered with missionary zeal across the breadth and width of the party and 
the issues of the day. Ultimately he completed the transformation process begun by 
Neil Kinnock and John Smith to convert the old Labour from an opposition party into 
New Labour as a party of government. However, Blair's 1980s experiences and the 
reform and modernisation drive were to have important implications for the Israel- 
Palestinian question. 
930 Seldon, Anthony. Ballinger, Chris. Collins, Daniel & Snowdon, Peter (2004: 691) 
Conclusion 
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Blair was not anti-Palestinian. In the first instance - as it was the case with foreign 
affairs generally - if he gave the Palestinians any thought at all it was invariably set in 
the context of his early political experiences: as one of a plethora of questionable 
causes adopted largely by the party's left-wing, Blair viewed the Palestinian issue 
through anti-left-wing and anti-idealist spectacles with lenses further distorted by 
ignorance, - and to an increasing extent, political expediency. The expediency factor 
became increasingly influential as the realities of the Palestinian predicament under 
occupation and settlement emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s to become a 
growing concern of the party's moderate centre ground. And while the gradual 
political and religious radicalisation of the Palestinian national movement further 
alienated Blair, as it only served to re-enforce his prejudices inherited from the 1980s, 
his general myopic condition exacerbated by his relative ignorance of the subject and 
early associations with pro-Israel influences as his political career blossomed, could 
not avoid entirely the neutralist deviation process, which refused to be acquiesced 
within his limited parameters to create a wider consensus. 
Blair was, however, a pro-Israel figure. Not in the sense that he was an unquestioning 
convert to the philosophy of Zionism, in either its socialist, religious and Messianic 
manifestations, but because first and foremost, he was pro-Jewish. As an anti- 
ideologist Blair was as troubled by the rigid ideologically-based positions of the 
Labor Party of Israel and its commitment to state ownership, associated links with 
Israeli trade unions and the institutional dinosaur of the Histadrut, as he was of the 
left-wing idealism of the Kibbutz movement, which had lured so many Labour figures 
to political Zionism. 
What made Blair pro-Israel. was derived and largely determined from a number of 
important though equally complex and influential sources. A key source was his 
introduction to British Jewish communities - of which he had little prior experience - 
and their associations with related British political organs like Poale Zion, Labour 
Friends of Israel (LFI), the Labor Party in Israel, and thus many aspects of the State of 
Israel itself, and to a lesser extent, the links between the British trades union 
movement and those of Israel. As a long recognised source of political influence 
within the Labour Party, Blair was quickly made aware of the potential influence 
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these pro-Israel groups wielded upon the Jewish communities in terms of securing 
Jewish votes for Labour. Similarly, as with numerous other Labour figures, Blair was 
identified and groomed as a potential political asset to Israel from the earliest period 
of his career by Moshe Raviv and Michael Levy into developing relationships with an 
array of pro-Israel personalities and groups. 
Aside the purely political aspects, Blair developed a deep admiration for the social 
and cultural structure of British Jewish communities. This was not just based upon 
related religion philosophies, but the links between the Judaic faith emulating from 
the synagogue, with the broader cultural and social basis of the Jewish communities, 
particularly the myriad of welfare and support groups, societies and charities that are 
an intrical part of a thriving and functional society. While invariably bound to a 
common Jewish religious identity and culture, of which a deep sense of community 
duty was an active reality, it was these aspects of Judaism and the British Jewish 
communities - also identified by Labour MPs Ian Mikardo and Greville Janner as 
being a sources of political support - that made a tremendous impact upon Blair; the 
Jewish faith and community model represented an embodiment of the brand of 
Christian socialism that he had acquired at Oxford, linking religious faith, community 
and society, socialist collective provision with the responsibility of the individual, all 
of which were in large part the products of his background, parents and early political 
life. It also provided a social and political template to key aspect of Blair's Third Way 
pragmatism. 
However attracted Blair was to the Jewish communities, he still generally applied the 
principles of rejecting religious orthodoxy and political radicalism. As such, he did 
not readily engage with Jewish and Israel representatives unless they reflected the 
progressive and reformist approach to religious and political affairs, that were viewed 
to comprised the majority of Jewish New Labour supporters and the Israeli Labor 
Party during the Oslo peace process era. 
Blair, like many generations of Labour figures before him, did not usually 
differentiate between Jews and Israelis, or Jews and political Zionists for that matter. 
His written and oral references flow from Jewish to Israeli, and back again, with a 
repeated interchangeable fluency as if there 'are no discernible differences. 
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Conversely, there is little room for doubt that Tony Blair viewed the Palestinians as a 
secondary partner in the Oslo peace process. It is clear that he has still retained a 
negative sense of his early experiences and perceptions of the Palestinians, and in 
some cases, what they still represent as an essentially reactionary, undeveloped and 
undemocratic people that possess a tendency towards political and religious 
fundamentalism. However, in the context of the Israel-Palestinian conflict Blair 
viewed this issue almost exactly as he had approached Northern Ireland: as a 
pragmatist, Blair held no truck with Israeli or Palestinian figures who were either or 
idealists or fundamentalist; the figures Blair was interested in were the realists, 
moderniser and reformist, the pragmatists such as Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak and 
Mahmoud Abbas, 93 1 and to a lesser extent, Yasser Arafat. As with the Good Friday 
negotiations, Blair was interested in the figures that were prepared to come to the 
centre-ground and make an agreement based on compromise. 
In terms of Tony Blair's approach to the Israel-Palestinian conflict he was almost the 
complete pragmatist, `working with what exists as opposed to what one would prefer 
to exist. ' He approached Israel and the Palestinians as he did China, Iran, Syria or any 
number of countries and related issues: as long as they fulfilled certain conditions in 
that they were seen to be trying to reform and modernise, to democratise, moderate 
and amend the injustices for which they were criticised, he was prepared to negotiate. 
Blair's raison d'etre was to secure a settlement; in order to achieve that his priorities 
were located in finding the right political figures and circumstances to bring that 
about. While he freely acknowledged the historical grievances and injustices 
perpetrated against the Palestinians and in particular the Jews during the Holocaust, 
he did not extend that understanding and recognition as far as making it acceptable or 
a justification for pursuing confrontation and violence, or allowing past events to 
prevent reaching a comprised agreement. In that respect, and in conjunction with his 
pragmatism Blair's approach often bordered on indifference towards individuals like 
Benjamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon and concepts like Eretz Israel as he was about 
Gerry Adams' `united Ireland' or Ian Paisley's `no surrender' mentality. This 
93' Mahmoud Abbas [Abu Mazen] (b. 1935) was born in Safed, Palestine (now northern 
Israel). PNA President, 2005-present; PM: PNA, March-October, 2003. 
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indifference simply reflected Blair's approach to the tribalism and senseless class-war 
confrontation of old Labour and the trades union movement: it was not personal, for 
Blair, it was the business of good individual responsibility and integrity in leadership 
and the progressive collective contribution and consensus of government towards 
decision and policy-making in foreign affairs. 
In terms of the origins and source of the essential dilemma and its influence, Tony 
Blair was the first Labour leader and Prime Minister in eighty years (1917-1997) to be 
released from many of the restraints imposed by the contradictions arising from 
Labour's socialist principles and the party's traditional support for political Zionism. 
With the mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO produced via Oslo many of the 
sources and origins of the essential dilemma were vastly reduced, as Labour could 
place itself in the slip-stream of the pro-Oslo position without offending Israel, or the 
Palestinians. Furthermore, with Labour's virtual abandonment of socialism, and the 
adoption of a more flexible and vague social democratic identity the degree of the 
ideological contradiction also diminished. 
Robin Cook differed from Blair on a number of crucial points which were to have 
profound consequences for Blair-Cook relations and New Labour's foreign policy 
towards the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Whereas Blair was schooled and gradually 
indoctrinated into acquiring an instinctively pro-Israel bias within the context of his 
dominating pragmatism, Cook had been introduced to the Palestinian perspective in 
terms of an education and experience from an early period in his political career. 
Again, in contrast to Blair, although Cook had by 1994 accepted the inevitability of 
Labour's reform meaning the jettisoning of socialist idealism, he had retained far 
more of his socialistic approach to the Israel-Palestinian issues, and foreign affairs 
generally: nowhere did this difference exclaim itself more profoundly and 
consequentially than in the declaration by Cook that New Labour's foreign policy 
would contain an `ethical dimension. ' As a result, Cook's less pragmatic and more 
rigidly principled approach to issues inevitably generated resistance, with the result 
that he was to become repetitively and disparagingly labelled as `controversial' when, 
as in the case of Israel, all Cook was attempting was to apply were Labour policies 
and principles in an even-handed approach. As Blair came to realise the error in his 
choice of appointment and the ineffectiveness of his own special advisor - Michael 
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Levy - on the most contentious of contentious issues, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, 
and amid the early repercussions of Cook's troubled visit to the Occupied Territories 
and Israel in 1998, Blair and Cook consciously proceeded to developed a `dual track' 
or `duel policy' approach to foreign affairs. 
Tony Blair's track was essentially based on the usual structure of informal non- 
traditional routes and practices, settee Cabinets, small groups of advisors and 
interested parties; Cook proceeded on the more traditional basis of UN resolutions 
(international law), Human Rights, moral and ethical principles. For Blair the primary 
consideration was one of economic development and financial investment, security 
and an end to terrorism (which invariably meant securing Israeli security and 
stemming Palestinian terrorism, not Israeli) with the avoidance of reference and 
inclusion of the United Nations or international law. Cook by comparison arguably 
had fewer such historical considerations: for him the inclusion and application of 
ethical principles and international law in Labour policy was far more inflexible and 
applicable. Cook was not entirely averse to interpretation and deviation from the 
`letter of the Law', but he was far more orthodox than Blair. For Cook international 
law is international law, and a UN resolution is a UN resolution, whether it is violated 
by Saddam Hussein's regime occupying Kuwait, or Israeli settlement building in the 
Occupied Territories; a war crime is still a war crime, whether it is Saddam gassing 
Kurds in Halabjah, or the Israelis facilitating a massacre at Sabra and Chatila or 
Qana; ethnic cleansing is ethnic cleansing whether it be in Bosnia, Rwanda, East 
Timor or East Jerusalem. While for Blair, Palestinian suicide bombings and the failure 
or reluctance of Arafat to curtail these acts are an intolerable, motiveless and 
inexcusable abhorrence, similar acts of violence, Israel's firing of rockets from 
helicopter gunships into civilian apartment blocks in the Gaza Strip for example, 
while not condoned, is not unequivocally condemned by Blair using the same 
language. Arbitrary acts of Israeli violence invariably being acknowledged, if at all, 
with vague references that Israel as a sovereign democratic state has the right to 
defend itself and her people, accompanied by an obligatory appeal for Israeli restraint 
(often in the wake of civilian Palestinian casualties). 
Generally speaking, for Cook there were few if any differences in the aforementioned 
examples: they are all equally unacceptable, and this equally unacceptable aspect is 
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most obviously and adequately illustrated in his `both sides' analogy and approach; 
these examples are what divided the two Labour colleagues, and what led to the 
creation of the `dual tract' approach. It was not the case that Blair and Cook were 
diametrically opposed in terms of the basis and nature of relations, or the content and 
principles of policy, but more a case of level and degrees. Nevertheless, if there was 
one figure who may have breached the beach-head to address the essential dilemma it 
was Robin Cook, but his replacement at the first respectable opportunity - and to 
Cook's evident displeasure932 - in May 2001, was also perhaps a reflection of Blair's 
recognition of this possibility for the loss of consensus and the potential for trouble 
within the party this difference in style and emphasis of approach might instigate. 
Common Origins and the Essential Dilemma: The Human Factor and the Language of 
Family 
While there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the primary basis for Labour's 
relations with political Zionism is derived from the perceived common origins, related 
religious philosophies and shared socialist ideology, there is evidently something 
further that is not entirely attributable to any of these factors. The research findings 
suggest that additional factor is something more akin to a crie de coeur, a `human 
factor, ' which engages the heartfelt commitment of individuals and motivates them to 
pursue relations even in the face of glaring ideological and political contradictions. 
This human, personal, or what this thesis terms the psychological aspect of the 
essential dilemma, is arguably the most difficult to define, and yet it is perhaps the 
most important aspect; not least because the psychological aspect has not only 
survived the decline of socialist ideology and the secularization of British politics and 
society, but also because it remains the most irrational and illogical factor in many 
respects. It is identified in a rudimentary manner using the nearest possible analogy: 
that of a `family member' reflecting the kind of instinctive, if not innate loyalty and 
affection often born of common parents and background, a degree of sympathy, 
support and loyalty usually derived from family bond, identity and kinship. What 
932 Claire Short says the replacement of Robin Cook caused `considerable tension and there 
was a delay before Robin accepted his new post' and speculates the `real reason for removing 
Robin' was that Blair already knew the `views of the incoming US administration on Iraq. ' 
Short, Claire (2004: 107-108) 
362 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 
makes it so important within the essential dilemma, is that it appears to be more able 
to circumvent the many contradictions posed by Labour's relationship with political 
Zionism that result from socialist ideology and principles, politics generally, and 
religious philosophy and faith. 
One of the most important examples of this `human factor' is often located in the use 
of language by Labour and related figures when referring to political Zionism, or later 
Israel, which often seems closer to terms of endearment relating as much to family 
blood-ties and kinship as much as they do political, or even religious identities and 
allegiances. This occurred not just in the heady days of the early 1920 with Ramsay 
MacDonald, Josiah Wedgwood and alike, but continued with sufficient emotional 
energy to reduce `tough and matter-of-fact' personalities like Herbert Morrison into a 
waxing `sentimental' 
933 figure blurting to the House of Commons that political 
Zionism in Palestine was `one of the most wonderful manifestations in the world, '934 
and that the political Zionists were `surely among the most splendid human types to 
be found anywhere in the world. '935 For many Labour MPs across the parliamentary 
generations, there was, and remained, a deep personal attachment and ideological 
affiliation, a `unique '936 and `special bond, '937 a `special relationship' 938 between 
Labour and the political Zionist movement. 
This psychological attachment was far more understandable in an era when the 
Labour Party was heavily comprised of some of the most disadvantaged, ignorant 
figures desperately pre-occupied with local and national domestic affairs, and 
933 Donoughue, Bernard & Jones, George W. (2001: 256) quoting, Susan Lawrence, 
Interview, Dr S. Levenberg. 
934 Ibid., (2001: 256) quoting, Herbert Morrison, June 19,1936, Hansard, vol. 313, col. 1387 
935 Ibid., (2001: 256) quoting, Herbert Morrison, Daily Herald, August 22,1935 
936 Gorny, Joseph (1983: xii) Preface 
937 Harris, Kenneth (1987: 158-159) 
938 Musallam, Ramzi. (June 1989: 24) quoting, Labour Party Policy Review Document, 
(1989) The Middle East 
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`surrounded by propagandizing'939 from colleagues and affiliated bodies like Poale 
Zion. In the period from 1900 to circa 1939 the ideological contradictions and the 
emerging essential dilemma posed by Labour's socialism and political Zionism's 
colonialist nationalism were largely by-passed by depicting political Zionism's 
agenda for Palestine as a `socialist experiment, which by Labor Zionist definitions, 
would be non-imperialist; ' Zionist figures like, Dov Hoz helped obscure the 
contradictions, securing Labour's sympathy and support with a socialist emphasis - 
the shared socialist ideology - and by linking Labour's `humanitarian impulses' - the 
`psychological aspects' - and affinity with the Holy Land - shared religious 
philosophies - to the `political aspects' by asking the British Labour Party via 
statements and policies `to help Labor Zionism build its new Jerusalem in advance of 
the one it aspired to build itself. '94° However, it is clear that the perceptions and 
positions stemming from the psychological aspects, the deeply human factors, have, 
to a significant extent, remained imbued within the Labour Party and related figures 
with continuing consequences. 
Despite the dramatic changes in terms of the education and knowledge among Labour 
and related figures, this profound sense of common identity manages to transcend the 
decades, events and changes in leadership, to be carried into the era of New Labour in 
opposition. As backbencher James "Jim" Cousins941 said in 1995 of the Labor Party in 
Israel, `it bears the name of my own party and shares many of our hopes and 
traditions ... they are our 
brothers and sisters. 942 These sentiments were epitomised 
by the party leader and Prime Minister Tony Blair when he stated that, as a result of 
New Labour, and the decline of the left-wing, there had been a `remarkable renewal 
and strengthening of the deep roots between the Jewish community and the Labour 
939 Lepskin, Fred Lennis (July 1986: 13) Chapter 1, quoting, Tom Clarke, (1950: 155) 
Northcliffe in History: An Intimate Study of Press Power, (London: Hutchinson) (Simon 
Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada) 
940 Ibid., (July 1986: 12) 
'l James "Jim" Cousins (b. 1944) MP: (Newcastle upon Tyne, Central, 1987-present) 
942 Cousins, Jim (Newcastle upon Tyne, Central) (01.03.1995), Middle East Peace Process, 
Hansard, col. 998 
942 Blair, Tony (09.12.1997: 3) 
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Party. It is one of Labour's proudest achievements. ' 943 Additionally, the links 
identified by Blair also extended to links with Israel, as Louise Ellman944 recounts as 
a new generation backbench MP the origins and influences of her pro-Israel instincts 
(amid her pro-Oslo position) which are quite literally based on family: `In my youth I 
was a member of Habonim Dror, the socialist Zionist youth movement. I spent a year 
living in Israel on a Kibbutz from 1967-68. As a socialist I supported a collective 
lifestyle. I also have family and friends living in Israel. '945 
Testimony to the durability of this `special bond' is located in the fact that despite 
some sobering evidence as to the factual realities of both Palestine and Zionism, and 
later Israel and the Israeli Labor Party, Labour figures have remained fairly 
consistently resolute in the pro-Israel approach. This has been in particular contrast to 
Labour's approach to similar circumstances in Kosovo and Iraq, for example; in 
relation to Israel the application of sanctions or military intervention has remained 
muted and passive despite Israel's breaches of international law and UN resolutions 
extending over many decades. 
Even in the wake of the 1967 war when Israel was still being generally depicted in the 
currency of language as a `David vanquishing a hulking Goliath, '9" despite the fact 
that the very comprehensiveness of the victory had partly exposed the myth that Israel 
was the weaker party, the evidence was insufficient to move key Labour figures 
towards greater neutrality; and later, among the war crimes committed by Israel in 
Lebanon and the brutality towards the Palestinians some Labour figures remained 
anxious to somehow rationalize what Israel was now doing as an occupying power 
abusing its victims right under the glare of the television camera. '947 Nevertheless, an 
9a3 Ibid., (09.12.1997: 3) 
« Louise Ellman (b. 1945) MP: (Liverpool Riverside, 1997-present); Chair of the Jewish 
Labour Movement and Vice Chair Labour Friend's of Israel. 
gas Erman, Louise (28.03.2006: 1) Email: Ellman-Nelson, House of Commons 
946 Hussein, Abdirahman A. (2002: 289) Edward Said., Criticism and Society, Chapter 5, 
Culture and Barbarism: Eurocentric Thought and Imperialism; Zionism, Orientalism, and 
Euro-American Imperialism, (London: Verso) 
947 Ibid., (2002: 289) 
365 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 
increasing numbers of Labour figures found the evidence irrefutable that Israel - and 
the philosophy of political Zionism upon which it was founded and sustained, - 
presented an undeniable ideological contradiction in terms of Labour's socialist 
principles. And while the media captions and images of Palestinians wielding sling- 
shots epitomised - with some irony - the exchange of the analogy of `David' from 
Israel to the occupied, dispossessed and suppressed Palestinians of the Occupied 
Territories, Labour leaders and key figures retained the position that what Labour was 
essentially attempting to address was a situation generated by economic inequalities, 
not the political and legal injustices preventing Palestinian self-determination and 
perhaps statehood. 
This position of denial based on the psychological aspects extended to the era of Tony 
Blair and New Labour. As an innate pragmatist in both internal and external affairs 
Blair was somewhat immune from the full influence of the essential dilemma. 
However, with the decline of Oslo and the Labor Party of Israel, and the political 
resurgence of the Palestinians after 1967 and even more so in the post-1973 period, 
the influence of the essential dilemma re-emerged to become an increasing influence 
upon individuals, groups and ultimately the party as a whole and its decision and 
policy-making mechanisms. 
In the final analysis, and despite all the dissenting voices within the Parliamentary 
Labour Party, the constituencies, and even on the streets, the evidence remains that 
beneath the persona of an even-handedness captured in the language and the 
theoretical approach of the `both sides' policy, under the influence of the 
psychological aspects of the essential dilemma Tony Blair's position remained largely 
unchanged, in that it is intuitively, - pro-Israel. Nowhere is this general underlying 
condition more adequately illustrated than in a speech he gave at the 2002 annual 
party conference. 
Following the first anniversary of the 9/I1 attack and the largest political 
demonstration in British history (motivated principally by a proposal to apply `regime 
change' in Iraq), the growing unease among Labour figures at Blair's apparent 
reluctance to acknowledge a link between Middle Eastern and Islamic resentment 
towards the west arising from the double-standards, typified by the application of 
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sanctions upon Iraq but not Israel, were conveyed to the Labour leader in the `Green 
Room' as he prepared to address the conference 94g In response Tony Blair 
incorporated the following sentence in an effort to allay the concerns and secure the 
support of conferences for Britain's role in the forthcoming `War on Terror: ' 
`Some say the issue is Iraq. Some say it is the Middle East peace process. It's 
both. Some say it's poverty. Some say it's terrorism. It's both. And yes, what 
is happening in the Middle East now is ugly and wrong. The Palestinians 
living in increasingly abject conditions, humiliated and hopeless; Israeli 
civilians brutally murdered. '949 
Blair continued as he develops where he sees a resolution to the conflict lies: 
`I agree UN resolutions should apply here as much as to Iraq. But they don't 
just apply to Israel. They apply to all parties. And there is only one answer. By 
this year's end, we must have revived final-status negotiations and they must 
have explicitly as their aims: an Israeli state free from terror, recognised by the 
Arab world, and a viable Palestinian state based on the boundaries of 1967. '95° 
If nothing else it was another example of how the Palestinian aspect of the essential 
dilemma, which had plagued the Labour Party and its leaders since circa 1917, 
emerged yet again to generate internal concern and dissent at the highest levels of the 
leadership and the decision and policy-making forums. Coming nearly five years after 
948 Apart from Iraq, the Labour delegates restlessness at the 2002 conference was further 
heightened by the ongoing destruction of Palestinian towns by Ariel Sharon (including the 
controversial April assault on the Jenin, West Bank refugee camp); John Kampfher says Blair 
was informed that if he wanted to secure support for the `War on Terror' (an invasion of Iraq) 
he would need to acknowledge the perception of double-standards in the government's 
dealing with Israel in contrast to Iraq; in what Kampfher says was another `sign of Blair's 
informal approach [to foreign affairs] which sent the Foreign Office into paroxysms of 
despair ... a 
last minute paragraph was inserted in the Green Room by Jonathan Powell 
[Chief Political Aid], which wasn't even on the autocue. ' Kampfher, John (05.12.2003: 8) 
919 Blair, Tony (01.10.2002) Speech: Labour Party Conference, (Blackpool) 
950 Ibid., (01.10.2002) 
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his inaugural speech as prime minister on the Israel-Palestinian conflict (December 
1997), while Blair's public policy position remained as pragmatic as ever - enshrined 
in his `both sides' analogy, - his inherent pro-Israel tendencies were just as prevalent, 
as David Mepham's assessment underlines: `I do not think his basic instincts have 
changed very much. '951 The conference address contained all the cliches and 
anomalies present in the 1997 statement: the `both sides' analogy was now reflected 
in the `all parties' terminology; the cause of the Palestinian resistance and 
predicament remains primarily one of economics, `poverty; ' and Israel remains the 
sole victim of terror, even though during the Second Intifadah (September 2000 - 
January 2005) some 950 Israelis were killed by Palestinians, and 3,223 Palestinians 
were killed by Israelis, 952 for Blair, it is only Israelis who are `brutally murdered. ' 
Although Blair says he agrees UN resolutions should apply `here' [to Israel], the 
failure to use the explicit reference to Israel renders the reference evasively 
ambiguous. Furthermore, there is no firm commitment to ensure Israel's compliance 
with UN resolutions or international law via sanctions, or indeed, military 
intervention, as was being sought against Iraq at the time of the speech. Again, unlike 
Kosovo and Iraq, there is no clear statement of what the Labour government will 
undertake to implement the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and an ethical 
foreign policy in the Israel-Palestinian case. (Almost inevitably, there was no revival 
of the final-status negotiations, but Blair took Britain to war in Iraq. ) That is the 
crucial difference: Tony Blair and New Labour, as a result of the common origins and 
the resulting essential dilemma, are inherently unable to apply the same principles to 
Israel as they have on numerous occasions elsewhere. 
While it may be accepted in some quarters as a case of Tony Blair's `informal 
approach' to foreign affairs, or as a further example of the ultra-pragmatist scripting 
the play to the bay of a disgruntled audience, the example can also be used as 
concluding evidence that in terms of his own and New Labour's relations with Israel, 
Blair still operated largely beyond the central premise that significant section of the 
95' Mepham, David (14.12.2005: 5) 
952 See: BBC News (Tuesday February 8,2005) Intifada Toll 2000-2005, (c. September 29, 
2000 - January 15,2005). See: B'Tselem, Israel Human Rights Group, 
(http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/3694350. stm) 
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Labour Party had now clearly adopted as a consensus: that as a prerequisite to 
addressing a core aspect of the essential dilemma, Labour must apply the same 
principles and actions to Israel as it does elsewhere; whether those principles be 
socialist, based on equality, or as an ethical dimension to foreign policy, and/or the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, or via the United Nations and international law. 
The `last-minute' inclusion suggests that far from the paragraph being the result of a 
considered even-handed awareness based on the socialist ethical and humanitarian 
principles of the New Labour Party, it was in fact the result of last-minute addition, a 
hurried adjustments born of a pragmatist trying to reconcile the contradictions 
imposed by the consequence of the common origins and the essential dilemma in 
response to a neutralist consensus conveyed to the leadership from the floor of the 
conference. Once again however, the crucial psychological, ideological and political 
quandary for Blair stemming from both the conference floor and the essential 
dilemma, is, as the veteran left-wing figure Tony Benn reflects, that a specific rebuke 
of Israel is just too uncomfortable given the historical, modern and contemporary 
sympathies and affiliations in that `It will be an admission of a mistake, ' but, as Benn 
also says, and as this thesis asserts, `that isn't so important as getting it right. '953 
What Blair's speech and his position ultimately illustrates, is that some Labour MPs 
and related figures cannot operate beyond the parameters of the United Nations and 
international law because a succession of Labour leaders have shown that when it 
come to political Zionism and later the State of Israel, a great many of them are 
unable to completely resist the influence of the common origins and the essential 
dilemma. The evidence remains predominantly supportive of the primary assertion in 
this thesis, that, despite the decades of evidence to illustrate the inherent ideological 
contradiction posed by a socialist Labour Party's relations with political Zionism in 
the wake of the realities of both political Zionism and Palestine, relations have been 
maintained. They have not only been maintained, but are still prevalent and perfectly 
able to influence positions and policy even though such positions are contrary to 
almost every principle of New Labour. And regardless of New Labour's pledge to 
953 Benn, Tony [Editor, Ruth Winston] (2007: 277) More Time for Politics: Diaries, 2001- 
2007, Chapter 5, More Time for Politics, Wednesday November 5,2005, (London: 
Hutchinson) 
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introduce an ethical dimension to foreign affairs and to apply the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, and despite the devastating consequences of Israel's 
occupation policies for the Palestinians, and the role of the Israeli Labor Party in 
formulating and applying those policies in violations of international law and UN 
resolutions, many Labour figures remain - as a result of the common origins and the 
psychological aspects - instinctively sympathetic and supportive of Israel, despite the 
ideological contradictions and the resulting essential dilemma. As a consequence the 
continuity of the essential dilemma was secured, as the basis and nature of the 
relationship between Labour and political Zionism remains principally the 
consequence of what the poet Rupert Brooke once termed, `a richer dust 
concealed. '954 
914 Brooke, Rupert (1936: 148) [January, Eighth Impression) The Complete Poems of Rupert 
Brooke, 1914, V, The Soldier, (London: Sidgwich & Jackson) 
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